Darlene F.,1 Complainant,v.Megan J. Brennan, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Headquarters), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Dec 11, 2018

0120171578 (E.E.O.C. Dec. 11, 2018)

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013

Darlene F.,1
Complainant,

v.

Megan J. Brennan,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service
(Headquarters),
Agency.

Appeal No. 0120171578

Hearing No. 430-2016-00327X

Agency No. 66-000-0003-14

DECISION

On March 24, 2017, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s
February 24, 2017, final decision concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint
alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title
VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS
the Agency’s final decision.

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue presented is whether the Agency properly found that Complainant did not show that she
was subjected to unlawful discrimination or harassment.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Postal Inspector Team
Leader at the Agency’s Charlotte Inspection Service Division in Charlotte, North Carolina.

1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name
when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website.
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On February 28, 2014, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency subjected
her to unlawful discrimination and harassment on the bases of race (Black), sex (female), and in
retaliation for protected EEO related activity arising under Title VII when:

1. On December 17, 2013, Complainant left the office at 3:00 p.m. with the intent to return
or work from home; however, the Assistant Inspector in Charge (AIC) called and
informed Complainant that her workday ended when she left the office;

2. On December 20, 2013, and other dates, the Inspector in Charge (IC) and AIC subjected
her to higher scrutiny regarding her whereabouts, including calling Complainant or her
staff members to check on her;

3. On or around January 14, 2014, AIC instructed Complainant to discontinue using sticky
notes indicating her work duty availability, and AIC threatened to issue a Letter of
Warning for insubordination if she continued; and

4. On or around January 14, 2014, AIC instructed Complainant to remove the time
Complainant had worked on her informal EEO complaint from her work log.

The Agency initially dismissed Complainant’s complaint for failure to state a claim, citing 29
C.F.R. § 1614.107(a)(1). Complainant appealed to the Commission and in EEOC Appeal No.
0120141894 (Oct. 21, 2015), the Commission reversed the Agency’s dismissal and remanded for
an investigation into Complainant’s claim of harassment.

Regarding claim 1, Complainant stated she left her office at about 3:00 p.m. to conduct personal
business and left a sticky note notifying, “on cell, will return shortly” on her office door because
AIC previously instructed her to do so whenever she was away. Complainant stated that when AIC
called to ask about Complainant’s whereabouts, she informed AIC that she planned to finish her
work from home, but AIC asserted Complainant’s workday ended when she left the office.
Complainant contended that she worked 24 hours per day due to the nature of the inspection
service.

Regarding claim 2, Complainant stated that on December 20, 2013, and other dates specified
below, she was subjected to higher scrutiny regarding her whereabouts and work hours.
Complainant stated that on December 20, 2013, AIC called an inspector (I-1) from Complainant’s
team to check on Complainant’s whereabouts during a holiday team lunch that Complainant had
informed AIC about previously. Complainant stated that AIC addressed Complainant upon her
return to the office regarding work hour issues and the “on cell” sticky note that was placed on her
door during the lunch. Complainant contended other Team Leaders were not subjected to the same
scrutiny, including a Team Leader (TL1) whose whereabouts AIC did not know on several
occasions. Complainant also stated the following:

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• On April 12, 2010, Complainant received a call from AIC, who noted that
Complainant’s IC wanted to know Complainant’s whereabouts while she was at a
gynecologist appointment;
• On January 20, 2012, Complainant received an email from IC, who inquired, “How
do you know you are working until 6:30 tonight, but you have nothing for January
3, 4, 5, 6, 9 or 11?” Complainant stated that based on her schedule that day, she
knew how long she would be in the office. She also stated she tracked her hours
using her calendar, and that if she did not have an entry in the e-diary work log, it
was because she had not input them yet;
• On February 16, 2012, IC emailed Complainant inquiring whether she was at work
until 10:30 p.m. Complainant replied she reviewed Vulnerability Risk Assessment
Tool (VRAT) letters from 9:00 p.m. to 10:30 p.m. from home;
• On February 24, 2012, at about 8:50 a.m., IC emailed Complainant inquiring about
her whereabouts and whether she was working that day. Complainant stated she
went to the District office directly from home for an 8:00 a.m. meeting;
• On March 1, 2012, at approximately 8:50 a.m., Complainant missed a call from IC
and responded to IC via email, noting she was at the Vehicle Maintenance Facility
car garage getting inspection stickers for several Law Enforcement Vehicles (LEV)
assigned to her team and AIC;
• On February 28, 2013, Complainant left her office at about 2:50 p.m. for a dentist
appointment and received calls from her team member (I-2) regarding an emergent
situation and received intermittent calls from I-2 and AIC throughout her
appointment;
• On January 31, 2014, AIC asserted that she would only allow Complainant to claim
two out of the eight work hours Complainant claimed for January 29, 2014.
Complainant was on annual leave that day, but she stated that she still worked eight
hours from home because she received and responded to 40 emails;
• On March 28, 2014, AIC asserted she would not approve Complainant’s e-diary
work logs regarding March 4, 5, 6, 14, and 15, 2014, unless Complainant amended
them as directed; and
• On May 30, 2014, IC emailed Complainant inquiring about her whereabouts, and
Complainant responded that she took their intern to the hospital for a drug
screening, as was suggested by the Agency’s headquarters. Complainant stated she
had informed her team members prior to leaving the office.

Regarding claim 3, Complainant stated AIC instructed her to no longer use sticky notes on her
door indicating she was available via cell phone while away from her office, contrary to a prior
instruction AIC had given her. Complainant stated she asked AIC to put her instructions in writing,
but AIC declined. Complainant stated she then informed AIC that she would continue to use the
notes until she received advice from her lawyer, and AIC threatened to issue her a Letter of
Warning for insubordination. Complainant contended that no other Team Leaders were required
to use sticky notes regarding their whereabouts.

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Regarding claim 4, Complainant stated AIC instructed her to remove the time she worked on her
informal EEO complaint from her e-diary work log because she had not obtained prior approval
from AIC. Complainant contended that prior approval was not required because she worked on
her informal EEO complaint from home, and that another inspector (I-3), a white male, was
permitted to claim official time for his EEO complaint without prior approval under AIC.

Final Agency Decision

After the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of
investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge
(AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing but subsequently withdrew her request.
Consequently, the Agency issued a final decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b). The
Agency found that Complainant failed to show a prima facie case of discriminatory harassment
because she did not establish that: (1) she was subjected to unwelcome conduct in all but her fourth
claim; (2) the Agency’s conduct was because of her protected class or activity; and (3) the
Agency’s conduct in her claims was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work
environment. Additionally, the Agency found Complainant failed to show that: (1) she was
subjected to retaliatory adverse treatment in all but her fourth claim; and (2) management’s
nondiscriminatory explanations for the fourth claim were pretextual. The decision concluded that
Complainant failed to prove retaliation or discriminatory harassment as alleged.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal, Complainant reiterates the allegations she raised in her complaint and further contends
she has established a prima facie case of discriminatory harassment for all her claims and a prima
facie case of retaliation for claims 2, 3, and 4. Complainant further maintains that the Agency
failed to give a nondiscriminatory explanation for any of her claims, except for claim 4.
Complainant also argues the Agency’s explanations regarding claim 4 are pretextual. Complainant
contends she was subjected to a higher level of scrutiny compared to her co-workers when: AIC
required her to place sticky notes on her door to indicate where Complainant was at all times while
out of her office, but other Team Leaders were not required to do so; other co-workers were given
leeway to perform personal business by AIC, but Complainant was not; and AIC checked on
Complainant’s whereabouts but not the whereabouts of other inspectors from her team who were
also at the team lunch but did not return to the office with Complainant.

The Agency does not present any arguments on appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b),
the Agency’s decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a).

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See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614, at Chapter 9,
§ VI.A. (Aug. 5, 2015) (explaining that the de novo standard of review “requires that the
Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the
previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents, statements, and testimony of
record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision
based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law”).

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Disparate Treatment and Harassment

Generally, claims of disparate treatment based on race, sex, and retaliation for protected EEO
related activity are examined under the three-step analysis articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). First, Complainant must establish a prima facie case of
discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of
discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). Next,
the Agency must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Dep’t of
Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). If the Agency is successful, the burden reverts
to Complainant to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the Agency’s reason(s) for
its action was a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., 530 U.S. 133,
143 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993); U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of
Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715-716 (1983).

In order to establish a claim of hostile-environment harassment, Complainant must show that: (1)
she belongs to a statutorily protected class; (2) she was subjected to harassment in the form of
unwelcome verbal or physical conduct involving the protected class; (3) the harassment
complained of was based on her statutorily protected class; (4) the harassment affected a term or
condition of employment and/or had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the
work environment and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5)
there is a basis for imputing liability to the employer. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d
897 (11th Cir. 1982).

Race and Sex

As an initial matter, we determine that the incidents contained in Complainant’s complaint are
essentially a single, interrelated claim that she was subjected to disparate treatment and harassment
when the Agency scrutinized her work hours and whereabouts more than her peers from April
2010 through May 2014. See Complainant v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 0120122428
(Sept. 18, 2012) (finding incidents such as complainant being subjected to observation by manager,
being called at home, denial of extended lunch, and being issued Letter of Warning subsequent to
conflicting instructions to be sufficiently related incidents).

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Regarding claims 1 – 3, to show the Agency’s conduct was because Complainant is a black female,
Complainant stated that other Team Leaders -- who were white males and also supervised by AIC
and IC -- were not required to use sticky notes to keep management informed of their whereabouts
nor frequently questioned about their whereabouts and work hours. Comparative evidence relating
to other employees is relevant if the employees are similarly situated such that they have the same
supervisor, job function, and engaged in similar conduct. See O’Neal v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC
Request No. 05910490 (July 23, 1991). However, considering the issue here is regarding disparate
levels of scrutiny concerning whereabouts, engagement in similar conduct cannot be factually
established without first determining whether the management used similar level of scrutiny
necessary to become aware of whether other Team Leaders engaged in such conduct.

Whereas IC acknowledged that he was unaware of any incidents where other Team Leaders left
the office without a known business-related reason and without informing AIC like Complainant,
Complainant has stated there were several occasions where AIC did not know the whereabouts of
TL1, who is a white male. IC also conceded that the Agency did not require other Team Leaders
to use sticky notes regarding their whereabouts. Thus, we find Complainant has provided
comparative evidence of similarly situated co-workers outside of Complainant’s protected classes
who were not subjected to the same scrutiny as Complainant. Therefore, we find this creates an
inference that the Agency subjected Complainant to disparate treatment based on race and sex
regarding claims 1, 2, and 3. See Scheels v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 07A50005 (July
28, 2005) (finding inference of disparate treatment where complainant received greater scrutiny
and was required to do things differently while getting less leniency than similarly situated
employees outside of complainant’s protected class).

Regarding claim 4, Complainant stated that an inspector (I-3), a white male, was permitted to use
official time on his EEO complaint without prior approval from AIC. However, this is not
comparable to Complainant’s situation because AIC was not I-3’s direct supervisor; I-3 had a
Team Leader as his direct report. See O'Neal, supra, EEOC Request No. 05910490 (noting to be
considered similarly situated, employees must have the same supervisor). Complainant has not
presented any other evidence regarding claim 4 that would establish an inference of race or sex
discrimination. Thus, we find that Complainant failed to establish a prima facie case of race or sex
discrimination for claim 4.

Retaliation

To establish a prima facie case based on retaliation, Complainant must present evidence which, if
unexplained, would reasonably give rise to an inference of retaliation. Shapiro v. Soc. Sec. Admin.,
EEOC Request No. 05960403 (Dec. 6, 1996). Complainant may establish such an inference of
reprisal by showing: 1) she engaged in protected activity; 2) the Agency official involved was
aware of her protected activity; 3) she was subsequently disadvantaged by materially adverse
treatment; and 4) a nexus exists between the protected activity and the adverse treatment. Whitmire
v. Dep't of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal No. 01A00340 (Sept. 25, 2000).

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Even if the Agency’s conduct does not involve a tangible employment action such as a disciplinary
action or a termination, Complainant may prove discriminatory harassment by showing the
Agency’s conduct was based on retaliatory animus, and it was severe or pervasive enough to create
a hostile work environment for Complainant. See Rideout v. Dep’t of the Army, EEOC Appeal
No. 01933866 (November 27, 1995).

Here, Complainant engaged in EEO activity, when on December 18, 2013, she informed IC that
she would pursue a hostile work environment and discrimination claim. It is uncontested that AIC
was aware of Complainant’s EEO activity after December 18, 2013, but there is no evidence that
Complainant had engaged in EEO activity at the time of the events contained in claim 1.
Therefore, only the incidents that occurred after December 18, 2013, are relevant for
Complainant’s reprisal claim.

Complainant stated that due to the continuous scrutiny, her work was interrupted, her leadership
was subverted, and she was unable to concentrate and felt intolerable emotional distress at work.
An employee is subjected to materially adverse treatment if the Agency’s conduct is reasonably
likely to deter her from engaging in protected EEO activity. Complainant v. Int'l Boundary &
Water Agency, EEOC Appeal No. 0520130669 (Feb. 11, 2014). We find that the alleged actions
are reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in EEO activity. Therefore, we find
Complainant was subjected to materially adverse treatment. See Complainant v. Dep’t of the Air
Force, EEOC Appeal No. 0120122196 (Oct. 24, 2012) (finding materially adverse treatment where
complainant is regularly checked on and subjected to higher scrutiny). The alleged events occurred
shortly after Complainant’s EEO activity, which establishes a nexus between her EEO activity and
the alleged actions. See Clark County School District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 286 (2001) (noting
causal connection may be inferred by evidence that shows temporal proximity was very close
between complainant’s protected activity and the agency’s conduct). Therefore, we find that
Complainant established a prima facie case of reprisal regarding claims 2, 3, and 4.

Agency’s Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Reasons

Nonetheless, we find the Agency had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions.
Specifically regarding claims 1 – 4, IC stated that from his personal observation and AIC’s reports
to him, Complainant was absent from her work location on many occasions without a known work-
related reason and AIC would not be able to reach her. IC explained that asking Complainant about
her work hours and whereabouts was about accountability because she was absent without
informing her supervisors. IC further stated that AIC advised him that Complainant claimed work
hours late in the evening on numerous occasions for work that is typically performed at the office.
IC stated that working remotely required prior approval from the supervisor and was not the norm
within the division. IC also explained that there must be a specific need to do the work remotely.

Pretext Not Shown

To show the Agency’s reasons are pretextual, Complainant cites U.S. Postal Inspection Service
Manual (ISM) 1-3.3.4.5, which states inspectors will receive credit for unscheduled hours actually
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worked. Complainant argues that because another black female inspector (I-4) allegedly falsified
her e-diary, Complainant was also scrutinized more than white male inspectors, including an
inspector (I-5) who was known to also have falsified his e-diary. Complainant contends other white
male Team Leaders were given the benefit of the doubt and not required to use sticky notes
indicating their whereabouts, even though AIC did not know the whereabouts of TL1 on several
occasions. Complainant contends that other inspectors were given leeway to perform personal
business, citing that after the December 20, 2013 team lunch AIC did not inquire about the
whereabouts of other inspectors who were out conducting personal errands. Complainant argues
that prior approval for official time to work on her informal EEO complainant was not required
because she worked on her informal EEO complaint from home.

Upon review, regarding claims 1 – 3, email records from as early as February 27, 2013, reveal that
AIC explained to Complainant that AIC did not want Complainant claiming work hours when she
was at home after doctor’s appointments and directed her to either return to work or use sick leave
to cover the time, and that otherwise her official workday would end when she left the office. AIC
also explained to Complainant that while all inspectors are responsible for answering phone calls
24 hours a day, seven days per week, it does not entitle inspectors to claim compensation time
(comp time). Email records reflect AIC repeatedly explained to Complainant that working from
home required prior approval from the supervisor and that AIC would have been more lenient if it
was once every couple of months and not a routine occurrence for Complainant. According to the
Agency ISM 1-3.2.1 and 1-3.2.2, inspectors do not receive comp time, and regular work hours
“are determined by the postal inspector’s individual assignment and as approved by management”
(emphasis added).

Regarding the January 29, 2014, incident where Complainant claimed eight work hours for
answering 40 emails while on annual leave, email records show AIC explained to Complainant
that AIC did not consider a “string of little emails” to be working. Email records from December
18, 2013, also reflect that IC did not consider being available and in contact with team members
and management via cell phone and email to equal work hours but rather part of the responsibility
for all Team Leaders. Regarding March 4 – 6, 2014, when Complainant attended trainings, email
records reflect AIC explained to Complainant that her workday began when the class began and
that travel time from the hotel to the office was not claimable. The email reflects that Complainant
had claimed 13 hours compared to about eight hours claimed by another inspector who also
attended the same training. According to ISM 1-3.2, work hours do not include time spent
commuting to and from inspector’s residence, even if driving or riding in an LEV except for
responding to an emergency. Regarding March 14 – 15, 2014, where Complainant claimed 23 and
23.5 hours of official time while on official travel for a training, email records show that AIC
instructed that Complainant claim eight hours of sick leave, explaining that Complainant cannot
claim the time she was in the hospital for food poisoning during the workday as work hours, but
that Complainant could claim per diem for entire time she was in travel status.

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The record indicates that Complainant regularly claimed work hours in a manner that was not the
norm for inspectors within Complainant’s division. According to Complainant’s own statement, it
was the norm for Team Leaders within the division to answer calls and address situations presented
without claiming work hours. Email records further reflect Complainant acknowledging that
inspectors from the division never claimed official time for hours worked on annual leave, as
Complainant attempted to do. Moreover, Complainant acknowledged in her affidavit that AIC
explained to her that whereas both I-4 and I-5 had falsified their e-diaries, I-5 went back and
amended his e-diary because he was warned about it. Thus, the record reflects that I-5, a white
male, also received scrutiny regarding his e-diary like Complainant.

Furthermore, Complainant stated AIC asked her to use sticky notes keep management informed of
her whereabouts. However, Complainant’s affidavit regarding December 17, 2013, and subsequent
email records, reflect that AIC explained to Complainant her sticky notes did not inform the office
of her whereabouts and that she is required to work from the office, not from her cell phone. We
determine that a sticky note that said “On cell, will return shortly” was inconsistent with the reason
of AIC’s original request.

Per Complainant’s own affidavit, other Team Leaders who worked in remote locations regularly
checked in with management. By Complainant’s own admission, she left the office while on work
duty status to run a personal errand on December 17, 2013, without informing or obtaining AIC’s
approval. The record does not show that Complainant obtained prior approval to work from home
for that day as required by the ISM and as enforced by AIC. On the other hand, regarding the team
lunch, after which AIC did not inquire about the whereabouts of the other inspectors, Complainant
is their direct supervisor, not AIC.

Regarding claim 3, we find it reasonable for the Agency to require Complainant to obey the
instruction about sticky notes, even if Complainant disagreed with the supervisor’s order.
Regarding claim 4, when AIC instructed Complainant to remove hours she worked on her informal
EEO complaint from her e-diary, Complainant stated that AIC explained to her that official time
to work on her EEO complainant required prior approval. According to the Management
Instruction EL-110-2013-4 (“EEO Instruction”), requests for official time for Complainant must
be made in advance, and it is not unreasonable for supervisors to require prior notice so as not to
unduly disrupt operations. Thus, both work schedules and official time for EEO activity required
prior approval from the supervisor. Email records also show Complainant acknowledged that there
was no teleworking policy within her division that would have enabled her to claim official time
while away from the office without prior approval from her supervisor.

Complainant has not provided any specific evidence to show that other Team Leaders under AIC
and IC were permitted to claim work hours for answering calls and emails while off duty, to
regularly leave the office for personal business while on work duty status without informing AIC,
or to work remotely without prior approval and that they still received less scrutiny than
Complainant. While Complainant believed AIC and IC’s interpretation of ISM 1-3.3.4.5 regarding
unscheduled hours actually worked were mistaken, without proof of a demonstrably
discriminatory motive, the wisdom of the Agency’s business decisions may not be second-guessed.
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Mendez v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 0120090593 (May 20, 2010); see also Bryant v.
Dep’t of Agric., EEOC Appeal No. 0120110021 (June 9, 2011) (holding misapplication of rules
alone is not sufficient to show discriminatory animus).

As such, we determine Complainant has not shown that the reasons offered by management are
factually baseless, not the actual motivation for their conduct, or are insufficient to motivate their
conduct. See Hana D. v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 0120141019 (July 28, 2016)
(noting mistake by management does not establish pretext). Thus, we find that Complainant has
not shown that the Agency’s nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct were pretext for unlawful
discrimination. Likewise, we conclude Complainant did not prove she was subjected to unlawful
discrimination or harassment. See Oakley v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01982923 (Sept.
21, 2000); Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., EEOC Notice No. 915.002
(Mar. 8, 1994).

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including
those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the Agency’s final decision for the reasons
set forth in this decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0617)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or
the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish
that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or
law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or
operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal
Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party shall have
twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration in
which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment
Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B
(Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Complainant’s request may be
submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131
M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to
reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration
of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604.
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The agency’s request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO
Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof
of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as
untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any
supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The
Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited
circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety
(90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must
name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department
head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result
in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider
and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of
your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)
If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request
permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs.
Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the
court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or
appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole
discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for
filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for
the specific time limits).
FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations

December 11, 2018
Date