Dara Sariaslani et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 31, 2020

13362639 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jan. 31, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/362,639 01/31/2012 Dara Sariaslani 20110351-01 3802
126149 7590 01/31/2020
Keysight Technologies, Inc.
C/O CPA Global
900 Second Avenue South
Suite 600
Minneapolis, MN 55402
EXAMINER
BLOSS, STEPHANIE E
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2864
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/31/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
keysightdocketing@cpaglobal.com
notice.legal@keysight.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte DARA SARIASLANI and JOEL P. DUNSMORE
____________

Appeal 2019-000220
Application 13/362,639
Technology Center 2800
____________
Before DONNA M. PRAISS, DEBRA L. DENNETT, and LILAN REN,
Administrative Patent Judges.
DENNETT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL1
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant2 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–14 of Application 13/362,639. We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM IN PART.

1 In our Decision, we refer to the Specification (“Spec.”) of Application
13/362,639 (“the ’639 App.”) filed Jan. 31, 2012; the Final Office Action
dated Dec. 8, 2017 (“Final Act.”); the Advisory Action dated Feb. 23, 2018
(“Adv. Act.”); the Appeal Brief filed June 4, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”); the
Examiner’s Answer dated Aug. 9, 2018 (“Ans.”); and the Reply Brief filed
Oct. 4, 2018 (“Reply Br.”).
2 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “Applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies Keysight Technologies, Inc. as the
real party in interest. Appeal Br. 2.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The ’639 Application relates to residual phase noise of a device under
test (DUT). Spec. ¶ 1. The Specification describes, inter alia, a system for
measuring residual phase noise of a DUT including at least one signal source
configured to generate a stimulus signal to be input to the DUT and to
generate a reference signal is phase coherent with the stimulus signal. Id.
¶¶ 24–28, 31–34, and 37–49. A first receiver is configured to receive and
measure an output signal from the DUT responsive to the stimulus signal.
Id. A second receiver is configured to receive and measure the reference
signal and to output a measurement of the reference signal. Id. A computer
processor is configured to receive the measurement of the output signal from
the first receiver and the measurement of the reference signal, and
computationally suppresses a carrier of the output signal based on the
computed difference, thereby providing the residual phase noise of the DUT.
Id.
Claim 1 is representative of the ’639 Application’s claims and is
reproduced below from the Claims Appendix of the Appeal Brief.
1. A system for measuring residual phase noise of a device
under test (DUT), the system comprising:
at least one signal source configured to generate a stimulus
signal to be input to the DUT and to generate a reference signal
that is phase coherent with the stimulus signal;
a first receiver configured to receive and measure an
output signal from the DUT that is responsive to the stimulus
signal and to output a measurement of the output signal;
a second receiver configured to receive and measure the
reference signal from a signal source of the at least one signal
source and to output a measurement of the reference signal; and
a computer processor configured to receive the
measurement of the output signal from the first receiver and the
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measurement of the reference signal from the second receiver, to
compute a difference between the measurement of the output
signal and the measurement of the reference signal so as to
computationally suppress a carrier of the output signal based on
the computed difference, thereby providing the residual phase
noise of the DUT.
Appeal Br. 25 (Claims App.).
Independent claim 8 recites a method for measuring residual phase
noise of a DUT. Id. at 26–27.
REFERENCES
The Examiner relies on the following prior art in rejecting the claims
on appeal:
Meyers US 5,412,325 May 2, 1995
Buckley US 6,480,006 B1 Nov. 12, 2002
Yamaguchi et al.
(“Yamaguchi”)
US 2005/0031029 A1 Feb. 10, 2005
REJECTIONS
On appeal, the Examiner maintains the following rejections of the
claims3:
1. Claims 8–14 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101 due to
being directed to a judicial exception. Final Act. 2–3.
2. Claims 8–14 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over
Buckley in view of Meyers. Final Act. 3–7.

3 Because this application was filed before the March 16, 2013, effective
date of the America Invents Act, we refer to the pre-AIA version of the
statute.
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3. Claims 1–7 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over
Buckley in view of Meyers, and further in view of Yamaguchi.
Final Act. 7–10.
DISCUSSION
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
Appellant identifies, and in light of the arguments and evidence produced
thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential)
cited with approval in In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(“[I]t has long been the Board’s practice to require an applicant to identify
the alleged error in the examiner's rejections.”)). After considering the
argued claims in light of the case law presented in this Appeal and each of
Appellant’s arguments, we are not persuaded of reversible error in the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 8–14 as being directed to unpatentable
subject matter, however, we are persuaded that the Examiner reversibly
erred in rejecting claims 1–14 over the cited prior art references.
Rejection 1 of Claims 8–14 under § 101
The Examiner rejects claims 8–14 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed
to patent ineligible subject matter. See Final Act. 2–3; Ans. 2–4. An
invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme
Court, however, has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit
exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not
patentable. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). In
determining whether a claim falls within an excepted category, we are
guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Alice (see
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id. at 217–18), and Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012). In accordance with that
framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See
Alice, 573 U.S. at 219.
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (id. at 219–20; Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611
(2010)); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95
(1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69
(1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and
chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr,
450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth,
vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v.
Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson,
409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
If a claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step
of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of
the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient
to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 221. “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include
‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort
designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at
77).
In January 2019, the PTO published revised guidance on the
application of Section 101. USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter
Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). Under
the Guidance, we first look to whether a claim recites (1) any judicial
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exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical
concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a
fundamental economic practice, or mental processes) (“Guidance Step 2A,
Prong One”), and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception
into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)) (“Guidance
Step 2A, Prong Two”). Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and
(2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then
look to whether the claim (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial
exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field
(see MPEP § 2106.05(d)), or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception (“Guidance Step 2B”).
Judicial Exception — Guidance Step 2A, Prong One
The Appellant argues the claims under this rejection as a group. See
generally Appeal Br. 4–13. Accordingly, we focus our discussion on
independent claim 8, which we select as representative of the group.
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
As indicated above, under Guidance Step 2A, Prong One, we consider
whether claim 8 recites a judicial exception to the statutory categories of
patent-eligible subject matter, including one of the following groupings of
abstract ideas: (1) mathematical concepts, e.g., mathematical relationships,
mathematical formulas or equations, and mathematical calculations; (2)
mental processes, e.g., concepts performed in the human mind, including
observations, evaluations, judgments, and opinions; and (3) certain methods
of organizing human activity. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
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The Examiner finds claim 8 to be directed to measuring residual phase
noise of a device under test (DUT), the DUT providing an output signal
responsive to a stimulus signal, comprising: receiving measurements of the
output signal from a first receiver and measurements of a reference signal
from a second receiver; mathematically determining a difference between
the output signal and the reference signal based on the received
measurements of the output signal and the reference signal; and determining
the residual phase noise of the DUT based on the difference between the
output signal and the reference signal. Ans. 2. The Examiner thus finds
claim 8 to be directed to the abstract idea of mathematical relationships.
Ans. 2–4.
Claim 8 recites the following limitations: (1) “receiving and
measuring at a first receiver;” (2) receiving and measuring at a second
receiver;” (3) “receiving measurements . . . from the first receiver and . . .
from the second receiver at a processor;” (4) “computing at the processor a
difference between the received measurements;” and (5) “determining the
residual phase noise of the DUT based on the computed difference.” Appeal
Br. 26–27 (Claims App.). The limitations that recite “receiving” also recite
“measuring.” Id. Differences between received measurements are
computed (calculated) by a processor, and the difference is determined to be
the residual phase noise of a DUT. See id.
“Information as such is an intangible.” Electric Power Group, LLC v.
Alstom, S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Our reviewing court
treats collecting information, including when limited to a particular content,
as within the realm of abstract ideas. See id. (citing Internet Patents Corp. v.
Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015); OIP Techs., Inc.
v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015);
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Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d
1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for
Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014); CyberSource Corp. v.
Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). Merely
presenting the results of abstract processes of collecting and analyzing
information, without more (such as identifying a particular tool for
presentation), is abstract as an ancillary part of such collection and analysis.
See, e.g., Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1347; Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu,
LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
The Supreme Court has established that a mathematical concept
without more does not constitute patent-eligible subject matter. See Parker
v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 587–96 (1978) (“Here it is absolutely clear that
respondent’s application contains no claim of patentable invention.
. . . Respondent’s application simply provides a new and presumably better
method for calculating alarm limit values.”); Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v.
Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939) (“[A] scientific truth, or the
mathematical expression of it, is not patentable invention . . .”).
Claim 8 recites the mathematical concept of determining a difference
by mathematical calculations. Accordingly, we conclude that claim 8 recites
a mathematical concept, which is an abstract idea. See Digitech, 758 F.3d at
1350 (method claims an abstract idea where it describes a process of
organizing information through mathematical correlations not tied to a
specific structure or machine).
Integration into a Practical Application — Guidance Step 2A, Prong
Two
Having determined that claim 8 recites the abstract idea of a
mathematical relationship, we next look to determine whether the claim
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recites “additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53–54. According to the
Guidance, even if a claim recites any one of three groupings of abstract
ideas, the claim is still not “directed to” a judicial exception (abstract idea),
and thus is patent eligible, if “the claim as a whole integrates the recited
judicial exception into a practical application of that exception.” Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 53. Limitations that are indicative of “integration into a
practical application” include: (1) improvements to the functioning of a
computer, or to any other technology or technical field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(a)); (2) applying the judicial exception with, or by use of, a
particular machine (see id. § 2106.05(b)); (3) effecting a transformation or
reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing (see id.
§ 2106.05(c)); and (4) applying or using the judicial exception in some other
meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to
a particular technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception (see id.
§ 2106.05(e)). See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55 (“Prong Two”). In
contrast, limitations that are not indicative of “integration into a practical
application” include: (1) adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with
the judicial exception, merely including instructions to implement an
abstract idea on a computer, or merely using a computer as a tool to perform
an abstract idea (see MPEP § 2106.05(f)); (2) adding insignificant extra-
solution activity to the judicial exception (see id. § 2106.05(g)); and
(3) generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular
technological environment or field of use (see id. § 2106.05(h)).
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55 (“Prong Two”).
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Appellant argues that claim 8 recites “actual signal measurements are
performed, and an actual trait of the DUT—residual phase noise—is
determined,” making the process not merely an abstract idea, “but rather a
practical way of determining a physical trait of the DUT.” Appeal Br. 7.
This argument is not persuasive because claim 8 merely uses a processor to
perform the abstract idea of calculating differences between measurements,
thus the abstract idea is not integrated into a practical application. See
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53.
Appellant contends that claim 8 does not merely automate a process
that can otherwise be done by hand and does not simply implement an
abstract idea using a computer. Id. at 7–8. Appellant argues that claim 8
actually improves a test system’s methodology, and does not merely collect,
analyze, and display electronic information. Id. at 8. However, Appellant
proffers no evidence, points to nothing in the claim or Specification, to
support these arguments. And we find nothing to support Appellant’s
contentions.
To the contrary, claim 8 recites receiving and measuring signals and
calculating a difference between them. Appeal Br. 26–27 (Claims App.).
No improvement is recited, explained, or supported. Data is collected,
analyzed, and displayed—without more—despite Appellant’s assertion
otherwise. Appellant’s argument that “actual signal measurements are
performed” (Appeal Br. 7) is insufficient to indicate an integration of the
abstract idea into a practical application. Appellant offers no explanation of
how or why electronic signal measurements improve functioning of
anything, apply to a particular machine (other than a generic “processor”),
change an article to a different state or thing, or link an abstract idea to a
particular technological environment. See id. at 7–8.
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We determine that claim 8 as a whole does not integrate the judicial
exception—a mathematical concept—into a practical application of that
exception. Merely linking the use of the abstract idea to a particular field of
use—calculating residual phase noise in this case—does not indicate
integration of the abstract idea into a practical application.
Inventive Concept — Guidance Step 2B
Under Guidance Step 2B, we determine whether the claim provides an
“inventive concept,” i.e., whether the additional elements beyond the judicial
exception, individually and in combination, amount to “significantly more”
than the judicial exception itself. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. “[S]imply
append[ing] well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously
known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality,” indicates
absence of an inventive concept. Id.
Appellant argues that “various elements in the claims are sufficient to
ensure that the claims amount to significantly more than the abstract idea
itself, particularly in that the claim as a whole is for a particular application
of an asserted abstract idea, and involves a novel ordered process.” Appeal
Br. 9. Appellant contends that the claims do not involve mere data
gathering, and do not simply equate to mathematical relationships such as an
algorithm, or simply reduce the amount of calculations in known and
established computations. Id.
Appellant argues that even if some or all of the steps/elements of
claim 8 are well-known components, “the ordered combination of applying
these steps and/or using these components is not.” Id. at 11.
Appellant contends, “[t]he claims . . . improve an existing
technological process, i.e., improvements to electronic circuitry testing, and
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more particularly improvements in efficiency with regard to testing devices
under test (DUTs), and identifying and/or accounting for residual phase
noise added to an input stimulus signal by the DUTs.” Id. Appellant argues
that such improvements to another technology field transform an abstract
idea into a patent-eligible application. Id. (citing Alice generally).
Appellant argues that the combination of steps recited in claim 8 applies the
computed difference of two measurements to improve the technological
process of “measuring residual phase noise of a device under test (DUT)”
using a dedicated processor. Id. at 12. Appellant contends that the
improvements recited in claim 8 quantify the residual phase noise of a DUT
by calculating the difference between the output signal of the DUT and a
reference signal phase coherent with the output signal of the DUT, such that
there is no need for physically mixing the output signal of the DUT with
another signal, thereby eliminating the need for various signal processing
components. Id. Such improvements, Appellant argues, amount to
“significantly more” than the assertedly abstract idea itself. Id.
We agree with the Examiner that claim 8 simply recites a receiving of
data and a determination, which is no more than an algorithm. See Ans. 5.
As such, the claims do not improve a technological process, and simply
improve a calculation or determination, which is still abstract. See id. The
Examiner notes that, unlike the case in Diehr, claim 8 only recites
“determining the residual phase noise,” but recites no step utilizing this
determination. Id.
In response, Appellant argues that it is the Examiner’s burden to show
that the claim element or combination of elements of the claims are well-
understood, routine and conventional to a skilled artisan in the relevant field.
Reply Br. 5.
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Appellant’s argument is not persuasive. In addressing step 2B, we
consider only the elements additional to the abstract idea. BSG Tech LLC v.
BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“It has been clear
since Alice that a claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which
it is directed cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the invention
‘significantly more’ than that ineligible concept.”). We need not account for
any claim limitation for the purposes of determining whether it is “well-
understood, routine, conventional,” as all limitations in claim 8 are
swallowed by the abstract idea; an inventive concept does not arise in the
claim limitations taken individually, as they recite use of generic, well-
known components performing well-known, routine, and conventional
activities of data collection and manipulation.
An inventive concept “cannot simply be an instruction to implement
or apply the abstract idea on a computer.” Bascom Global Internet Svcs.,
Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355). Unlike Bascom, the ordered combination of claim
elements fails to show an inventive concept because claim 8 is not limited to
a specific technical solution of the abstract idea of collecting and
manipulating data. Without explanation, Appellant contends that the claims
“improve methodology of a test system.” Appeal Br. 8. However, to the
extent that the applicant identifies “drawbacks” in “conventional” residual
phase noise measurement techniques (see Spec. ¶¶ 5–7), the ordered
combination in claim 8 does not address overcoming such drawbacks.
Accordingly, we determine that an inventive concept does not arise from
claim 8’s ordered combination of elements.
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In conclusion, for the reasons stated above and in the Final Office
Action and Answer, we sustain the rejection of claims 8–14 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101.
Rejection 2 of Claims 8–14 under § 103 over Buckley in view of Meyers
Appellant argues the prior art rejection of claims 8–14 as a group.
See Appeal Br. 13–21. We select independent claim 8 as representative of
the group. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
The Examiner finds that Buckley teaches the limitations of claim 8,
except that Buckley does not explicitly carry out the method of determining
residual phase noise using computer code at a processor. Final Act. 4. The
Examiner finds that Meyers teaches a method of mathematically determining
phase noise using computer code. Id. at 5. The Examiner concludes that it
would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the
invention to have modified Buckley to include the processor and processing
capabilities of Meyers in order to lower the cost of the measurement system
and reduce hardware to result in a lighter, smaller, and more reliable system.
Id. (citing Meyers 2:57–68; 3:54–68).
Figure 1 of Buckley is reproduced below:
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Figure 1 shows a preferred embodiment of a phase noise measurement
system in accordance with Buckley’s invention. Buckley, 7:7–8. A Unit
Under Test (UUT) (1000) is coupled to a phase noise measurement system
(2000) which includes a stable local oscillator synthesizer (STALO) (1), a
receiver/downconverter (2), a digitizer (3), a spectrum analyzer (4), and a
computer (5) including a display screen (6), keyboard (7), and mouse (8).
Id. at 7:24–29.
Appellant argues that Buckley discloses only a single receiver having
two inputs, input 9 for inputting the output from the UUT 1000, and input 12
for inputting the output of the STALO 1. Appeal Br. 16; Reply Br. 8.
In response to Appellant’s argument that Buckley discloses a single
receiver, but not a first and a second receiver, the Examiner finds that a
“receiver” is defined as “a device for converting signals (such as
electromagnetic waves) into audio or visual form.” Ans. 6. The Examiner
finds that the two inputs in Buckley (9 and 12) fit this definition of receiver.
Id. In addition, the Examiner finds that Meyers teaches the use of multiple
waveform recorders to convert signals into visual form and, therefore, are
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receivers as claimed. Id. The Examiner finds that “a waveform recorder is a
form of spectrum analysis,” thus the waveform recorders read on the
claimed receivers. Id. at 7.
Appellant argues that the inputs of Buckley do not “convert” a signal
to audio or visual form or convert a signal from a modulated wave. Reply
Br. 9. Appellant argues also that Buckley’s inputs do not receive and
measure the output signal or reference signal. Appeal Br. 18 (citing Spec. ¶¶
25, 32). Therefore, Appellant contends, Buckley’s two inputs do not read on
the claimed two receivers. Id. at 18–19.
With regard to Meyers, Appellant argues that waveform recorders do
not receive and measure an output signal from a DUT or a reference signal
generated by a signal source. Reply Br. 19. Appellant contends that
waveform recorders do not convert signals to visual form and are not
spectrum analyzers. Id. (citing Meyers, 3:58–62).
Appellant’s argument is persuasive that the Examiner reversibly errs
in finding that either Buckley or Meyers teaches the receivers as claimed.
Therefore, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 8 as obvious over
Buckley in view of Meyers. Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection of
claims 9–14, which depend from claim 8, as obvious over the combined
references for the same reasons as for claim 8.
Rejection 3 of Claims 1–7 under § 103 over Buckley in view of Meyers and
further in view of Yamaguchi
Appellant argues that claims 1–7 are patentable over Buckley in view
of Meyers and further in view of Yamaguchi for the reasons articulated with
respect to claim 8. Appeal Br. 21. Appellant does not argue the claims
separately. Id. We select claim 1 as representative of the group of claims.
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
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Claim 1 recites a system for measuring residual phase noise of a DUT
comprising, inter alia, a first and second receiver. Appeal Br. 25 (Claims
App.).
As in the rejection of claim 8, the Examiner finds that Buckley
teaches a first and second receiver. Final Act. 7. In the Answer, the
Examiner refers the reader to the discussion of the rejection of claim 8. Ans.
7–8.
Because we determine supra that the Examiner reversibly errs in
finding that Buckley (or Meyers) teaches a first and second receiver, we do
not sustain the rejection of claim 1—or its dependent claims 2–7) over
Buckley in view of Meyers, and further in view of Yamaguchi.

CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
8-14 101 Eligibility 8–14
8–14 103(a) Buckley, Meyers 8–14
1–7 103(a) Buckley, Meyers, Yamaguchi 1–7
Overall
Outcome 8–14 1–7
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED IN PART