Danny's Foods, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 31, 1982

260 N.L.R.B. 1445 (N.L.R.B. 1982)

DANNY'S FOODS. INC.
Danny's Foods, Inc. and Lynn Gruska and Local
339, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America. Cases 7-CA-17417, 7-CA- 18462, and
7-CA- 17836
March 31, 1982
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN VAN DE WATER AND
MEMBERS FANNING AND HUNTER
On September 30, 1981, Administrative Law
Judge Robert T. Wallace issued the attached Deci-
sion in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the
General Counsel filed cross-exceptions and a sup-
porting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find-
ings,I and conclusions2 of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt his recommended Order, as
modified herein.3
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
'Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge It is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credi-
bility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence con-
vinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products,
Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951) We have
carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
I No exceptions have been filed to the Administrative Law Judge's dis-
missal of the alleged 8(aXS) violation based on Respondent's failure to
comply fully with the arbitration award or to his determination with re-
spect to the alleged 8(a)(1) and (3) violation that post-arbitral deferral
under Spielberg Manufacturing Company. 112 NLRB 1080 (1955), is inap-
propriate.
Chairman Van de Water and Member Hunter agree with the Adminis-
trative Law Judge's conclusion that Respondent violated Sec 8(a(I) and
(3) of the Act by removing employee Gruska from her position as alter-
nate receiver. In so doing, they note that Respondent's conduct was in
retaliation for Gruska's having filed a grievance under the parties' collec-
tive-bargaining agreement. See Walker Electric Co.. Inc., 219 NLRB 481,
486 (1975), and Mushroom Transportation Co.. Inc., 142 NLRB 1150, 1156
(1963).
The Administrative Law Judge found implicit in Respondent's argu-
ments the contention that employee Gruska, as an alternate receiver, was
a managerial employee. He rejected such "contention" on the basis that
Respondent previously had agreed to include the position in the bargain-
ing unit. We find it unnecessary to pass on the Administrative Law
Judge's comments since Respondent in its exceptions has raised no issue
of Gruska's employee status and the record contains no evidence that em-
ployee Gruska was a managerial employee.
' We shall modify the recommended Order to include provisions
which more specifically remedy the violations found and a general cease-
and-desist provision.
260 NLRB No. 197
Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modi-
fied and set out in full below, and hereby orders
that the Respondent, Danny's Foods, Inc., South-
field, Michigan, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Relieving employees of work assignments or
otherwise discriminating against them in regard to
their hire, tenure of employment, or any other term
or condition of employment because they filed
grievances under the collective-bargaining agree-
ment.
(b) Attempting to induce employees to file com-
plaints against an employee who has filed a griev-
ance in order to generate a basis for taking adverse
action against that employee.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering
with, restraining, or coercing employees in the ex-
ercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action neces-
sary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Restore Lynn Gruska to her former assign-
ment as alternate receiver or, if that position no
longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position,
without prejudice to her seniority or other rights
previously enjoyed and make her whole for any
loss suffered by reason of the discrimination against
her, with interest, to be computed in the manner
prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB
289 (1950), and Florida Steel Corporation, 231
NLRB 651 (1977). (See Isis Plumbing & Heating
Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962).)
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to
the Board or its agents, for examination and copy-
ing, all payroll records and reports, social security
payment records, timecards, personnel records and
reports, and all other records necessary to analyze
the amount of backpay due under the terms of this
Order.
(c) Post at its place of business on 8 Mile Road
in Southfield, Michigan, copies of the attached
notice marked "Appendix."4 Copies of said notice,
on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 7, after being duly signed by its representa-
tives, shall be posted by Respondent immediately
upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by it to insure that said notices are not altered, de-
faced, or covered by any other material.
' In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu-
ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
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I)6ECISIONS O()F NATIONAL LABIOR RELATIONS BO()ARD
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 7, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order,
what steps Respondent has taken to comply here-
with.
APPENDIX
NOTICi To EMPI OYEES
POSTED BY ORI)tR 01 THE
NATIONAL LABOR REI.ATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT relieve employees of work as-
signments, or otherwise discriminate against
them in regard to their hire, tenure of employ-
ment, or any term or condition or employment
because they file grievances under the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement.
WE WILL NOT attempt to induce employees
to file complaints against an employee who has
filed a grievance in order to generate a basis
for taking adverse actions against that employ-
ee.
WE WILL NOI in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by
Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL restore Lynn Gruska to her
former assignment as alternate receiver or, if
that position no longer exists, to a substantially
equivalent position, without prejudice to her
seniority or other rights previously enjoyed
and WE Wlt.L. make her whole for any loss suf-
fered by reason of the discrimination against
her, with interest.
DANNY'S FOODS, INC.
DECISION
STATEMENIT OF THE CASE
ROBERT T. WAtI. ACt, Administrative Law Judge:
Upon charges filed by the Union (Local 339, Internation-
al Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers of America) and Lynn Gruska, an individu-
al, against Respondent (Danny's Foods, Inc.), a consoli-
dated complaint was issued on November 21, 1980, in
which it is alleged that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act
by, among other things, denying Lynn Gruska an oppor-
tunity to work as a substitute receiver. The case was
heard before me at Detroit, Michigan, on February 23
and 25, 1981.
Upon the entire record, and after due consideration of
the oral argument of the General Counsel and the brief
filed by Respondent, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent is a retail grocer with stores at several lo-
cations (including one in Southfield, Michigan) in or near
Detroit, Michigan. Its principal office is in Inkster,
Michigan. During the year ending December 31, 1979,
which period is representative of its operations during all
times material hereto, it had gross revenues in excess of
$500,000 and it purchased and caused to be transported
and delivered to its stores in Michigan food products and
other goods and materials in excess of $50,000, which
goods and materials moved directly from points located
outside in the State of Michigan. It admits, and I find,
that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act, and that
the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALI (EG ) UNI:AIR LABOR PRACTICES
Lynn Gruska has been in Respondent's employ as a
full-time cashier for about 6 years. In July 1979, she was
transferred to Respondent's newly opened grocery store
in Southfield and given an additional responsibility as al-
ternate or substitute receiver at that store. In the latter
capacity she was to fill in as receiver whenever the regu-
lar receiver was on leave or otherwise unavailable.
Under the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement be-
tween Respondent and the Union, which was in effect at
all times pertinent herein, the position of receiver is in-
cluded in the same classification as cashier but is rated at
20 cents per hour over the hourly rate for cashier. Re-
sponsibilities of the receiver include verifying that quan-
tities of goods delivered are the same as those invoiced,
signing checks (subject to countersigning by a company
official) for all C.O.D. orders, and authorizing payment
for all other deliveries. The position is particularly sensi-
tive because the goods usually move directly to shelves
for sale without recheck by management as to the quan-
tities delivered. Seniority or other union considerations
play no part in the selection of the receiver. Rather, a
person is placed in that job solely at the discretion of
management.
Employees at the Southfield store were given the
option of choosing either a 5- or 6-day workweek, with
the proviso that the option selected would be binding on
all employees at the location; and by majority vote they
chose a 5-day week. Subject to the 5-day policy, cashiers
were entitled to work every other Sunday at time-and-
one-half their regular rate of pay. By custom, however,
the receiver did not participate, and instead worked reg-
ularly Monday through Friday.
On Friday, January 4, 1980, a work schedule was
posted for the following week on which Lynn Gruska
was assigned to work Monday through Friday as substi-
tute receiver. But January 6 was her alternate Sunday to
work as cashier, and, upon protest through the union ste-
ward, she was allowed to work that day. However,
Wednesday was deleted from her schedule in accordance
with the 5-day workweek policy. On the following Sat-
urday (January 12), she made an oral grievance through
1446
DANNY'S FOODS, INC
the union steward for a day's pay for Wednesday at re-
ceiver's wages. Not receiving satisfaction, she filed a
written grievance on January 14 (the "Wednesday griev-
ance") citing as a basis for her claim a provision in
schedule A, article I, section 3(f) of the collective-bar-
gaining agreement which reads as follows:
The Employer shall each week in each store post a
work schedule for such store for the following
week. Full time employees shall be guaranteed
work or pay for the number of hours so posted
Among other things, her written grievance stated: "On
Friday, the following week's schedule was posted. My
schedule read MON. thru Friday as receiver . . . plus
Sunday."
On or about January 29, a local level hearing under
the grievance procedure provided for in the collective-
bargaining agreement was held at which Lynn Gruska
was represented by the union business agent. According
to the latter, the meeting ended with the store manager
agreeing to satisfy the grievance upon proof (an "affida-
vit,") that the union steward who had informed Lynn
Gruska on Saturday (January 4) that Sunday had been
added to her work schedule for the following week, had
not at the same time advised her that Wednesday had
been deleted from the schedule. On February 5 the busi-
ness agent provided a note to that effect from the ste-
ward, but the grievance was not remedied. The store
manager denies that any settlement agreement was
reached.'
On Saturday, February 2, Lynn Gruska noted that the
regular receiver would again be absent during the fol-
lowing week, whereupon she asked the owner of the
store (Dan Knopper) why she was not scheduled as sub-
stitute receiver. In reply, he stated that he had relieved
her of that assignment because she had filed a grievance
for an unearned day's pay, that by asserting the griev-
ance she had shown that she was not 100 percent for the
Company, and that he could no longer trust her in the
sensitive job of receiving. With one "exception," 2 Knop-
per admits that statement.3 Her removal was made the
subject of written grievance on February 54 and of
formal charge (Case 7-CA-17417) on February 15.
t In the absence of impartial corroboration of the business agent's ver-
sion, I find it impossible to resolve the conflict of testimony as to the ex-
istence of an agreement. Accordingly, the General Counsel has failed to
meet his burden of proof on an element essential to establishing that Re-
spondent's failure to settle the grievance gave rise to a breach of duty to
bargain collectively under Sec 8(a)(5) of the Act, as alleged in the com-
plaint. That allegation will be dismissed.
I Knopper claims he did not say he relieved Gruska "because she filed
a grievance." However, in an affidavit dated June 25, 1980, he admits
that he did so at least in part because of the attitude which prompted her
to file such a patently unwarranted grievance. Apart from any merit that
distinction may have (and I find none) I credit Gruska's version of his
reply.
I Knopper's reply is alleged in the complaint also to involve a threat in
violation of Sec. 8(aXI) of the Act. In addition, the same violation is al-
leged to have occurred in mid-May when two supervisors told Gruska
that she was not being assigned as substitute receiver because she filed
the "Wednesday grievance." I find no threats
4 Also on February 5, six cashiers signed and sent a letter to Knopper
complaining of Gruska for being rude to other employees in front of cus-
tomers, increasing the workload of other cashiers by taking excessively
The "Wednesday grievance" and the "removal griev-
ance" were heard together by an arbitration board pro-
vided for in the collective-bargaining agreement and
composed of employer and union representatives. Both
Respondent and Lynn Gruska appeared and argued their
respective positions before the panel. On April 21, the
board resolved the grievances in her favor and found
that she was entitled to the relief requested; i.e., a day's
pay for Wednesday and reinstatement as alternate receiv-
er. In connection with the removal grievance the board
concluded "that the Company retaliated against the
grievant for filing a grievance that the Company did not
consider proper . . . as a tactic to punish the grievant
for exercising her legal and contractual rights to file a
grievance."
Respondent has complied with the decision of the arbi-
tration board to the extent that it has paid Lynn Gruska
all backpay to which she was entitled thereby, and it
continues to pay her the 20-cent-per-hour premium for
all hours in which a person other than the regular re-
ceiver fills in as receiver. However, it refuses to reinstate
her as alternate receiver; and that refusal is the basis of a
formal charge by the Union (Case 7-CA-17836) and an
allegation in the complaint that Respondent thereby vio-
lated its duty under Section 8(a)(5) of the Act to bargain
collectively with the representative of its employees.
Nancy Smith is a cashier at the Southfield store. Testi-
fying under subpena, she states that one day in July 1980,
Store Manager Teeple told her to shut down her register
and follow him into the backroom. She did so fully ex-
pecting to be reprimanded for an earlier on-duty argu-
ment she had with another cashier (not Lynn Gruska).
Instead he told her that "we have a problem in our store
and the problem was Lynn"; that she was a "bad seed"
who is ruining things for other cashiers; and that if the
other cashiers felt she was a problem and wanted to "get
rid of' her, his hands were tied unless they acted with
"100 percent cooperation" in signing another written
complaint. He then asked Smith to write up a complaint
and have all the other employees sign it; and he said that
the complaint should mention certain things like rudeness
to customers; not carrying her workload, and not staying
by the register. He also told her that if she did as re-
quested things would work out fine but, if not, things
"would get sticky in the store." Smith had not signed the
earlier complaint (see fn. 4) since she did not agree with
it; and made no attempt to comply with Teeple's asserted
request that she initiate a new complaint and solicit sig-
natures from other cashiers. During the next several
months she feels she was treated very badly. Among
other things, she claims she was not spoken to by man-
agement and she found it hard to function as a cashier in
that environment.5 Teeple does not recall details of the
conversation, but he is sure that he never said that Smith
should write up a complaint against Gruska. On other
long breaks, and trying to change company rules to her own advantage
regardless of how other employees would be affected.
5 In addition, Smith indicates that she received a warning concerning
absences and that another cashier told her that Teeple said he was going
to "get rid of' Gruska I find the former insufficient to warrant an infer-
ence that the warning was retaliatory and I decline to credit the latter
absent direct testimony from the other cashier
1447
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
occasions, he told employees that they should put any
complaints they have in writing, but he states that he has
never directed an employee to file a complaint against
another. He considers his post-conversation treatment of
Smith to have been of the "highest quality," adding that
"anything she asked of me I definitely gave her." 6 I
credit Smith. Albeit given reluctantly under subpena, her
testimony was candid and consistent; and she had noth-
ing to gain by testifying adversely to the Company be-
cause she was still employed there. On the other hand,
Teeple's testimony appeared to be studiously vague. He
did not deny initiating the conversation, and his com-
ments concerning his later conduct fall short of a dis-
avowal of retaliatory employment of the "silent treat-
ment."
Knopper states that Gruska had a history of causing
dissention among cashiers; that he transferred her to the
Southfield store and named her as alternate receiver
there to give her a fresh start and as a token of his confi-
dence in her potential; that he lost that confidence be-
cause of her "Wednesday grievance" and prior history;
that his decision to remove her from that position was
made on January 12, 2 days prior to the filing of her
written grievance on January 14,7 and that two subse-
quent events confirmed to him the correctness of his de-
cision, to wit: the complaint by six of her fellow workers
on February 5, and an incident on March 23, 1980, when
she sold at 49 cents each two 10-pound boxes of deter-
gent on sale for $4.49 per box. In connection with the
latter incident, he expects that even if the price tags on
the boxes were incorrect or the dollar digit key on the
register had stuck (as sometimes happened), an experi-
enced cashier should have caught the error.
Analysis and Conclusions
Initially, it must be decided whether Respondent's ad-
mitted failure to fully comply with the arbitration award
by not reinstating Lynn Gruska abide by the collective-
bargaining contract s in effect with the Charging Union,
in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, as alleged in
the complaint. In my opinion, that single instance of non-
compliance with grievance procedures in the contract is
insufficient to support a finding that Respondent has
thereby repudiated its statutory duty to bargain collec-
tively with the representative of its employees. In this re-
spect the Board has long recognized that a breach of
contract is not ipso facto an unfair labor practice. Paper-
craft Corporation, 212 NLRB 240, 241, fn. 3 (1974); and
I The conversation in question is alleged in a formal charge by Gruska
(Case 7-CA-17836), and in the complaint, to involve independent viola-
tions of Sec. 8(a)(1).
' The implication here, later drawn in Respondent's brief, is that Knop-
per's removal action could not have been in retaliation for "the filing of"
the grievance, as alleged in the complaint But Knopper admittedly acted
after learning of the oral grievance. The latter was lodged under the
grievance procedure set forth in the collective-bargaining agreement and,
accordingly, was a protected activity. Under those circumstances, the
voicing of the grievance constituted its "filing"; and I so find.
I As pertinent, art. VII, sec. 2(b) of the collective-bargaining contract
provides that "... all settlement made in the grievance procedure, in-
cluding the decision of the Industrial [Arbitration] Board, shall be final
and binding on all parties ... "
any event, the Board in a similar situations has declined
to make its processes available for enforcement of arbi-
tral awards, finding that:
. . the desirable objective of encouraging the vol-
untary settlement of labor disputes through the arbi-
tration process will best be served by requiring that
parties to a dispute, after electing to resort to arbi-
tration, proceed to the usual conclusion of the pro-
cess-judicial enforcement ....
Accordingly, the allegation of violation of Section
8(a)(5) will be dismissed. '
Next, a decision must be made as to whether the
award of the arbitration panel should be regarded as dis-
positive of the separate allegation in the complaint that
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(l) and (3) of the Act
by discriminatorily relieving Lynn Gruska of her assign-
ment as alternate receiver because she filed the "Wednes-
day grievance" protesting Respondent's scheduling of
work. I see no reason for not determining the issue here.
Although the panel concluded that her removal was in
retaliation for filing the grievance, I find the post-arbitral
deferral doctrine in Spielberg Manufacturing Company,
112 NLRB 1080 (1955), inapplicable because there is
lacking on this record sufficient information upon which
to base a finding that the award meets the criteria set
forth in that case."
Turning to consider the substance of the discrimination
issue, I am persuaded that the evidence establishes a
prima facie violation of Section 8(a)(l) and (3). As noted
above, I have credited the testimony of Gruska to the
effect that Respondent's owner (Knopper) stated that he
removed her because she filed the grievance; and it is
well established that the filing of a grievance alleging a
violation of a collective-bargaining agreement is a pro-
tected concerted activity regardless of whether the
grievance relates solely to one employee's personal claim
and regardless of the merits of the grievance. Interboro
Contractors, Inc., 157 NLRB 1295, 1298 (1966), enfd. 388
F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967); ARO, Inc., 227 NLRB 243
(1976). Respondent accepts that statement of the law but
points to the decision in the Interboro case as recognizing
an exception in the case of a fabricated grievance. It
argues that such is the case here because in her written
grievance Gruska falsely stated that the schelule for the
week involved called for her to work Monday through
Friday, plus Sunday, when in fact that schedule as origi-
nally posted did not give her an assignment on Sunday.
9 Malrite of Wisconsin, Inc., 198 NLRB 241 (1972), affTd in pertinent
part 494 F.2d 1136 (D.C Cir. 1974). See also Advice Memoranda of
NLRB General Counsel, 101 LRRM 1168 (1979).
'0 In his oral argument, counsel for the General Counsel cites B. N.
Beard Company, 231 NLRB 191 (1977), for the proposition that an em-
ployer may not reject a collective-bargaining agreement without violat-
ing Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. In that case the Board, in effect, denied a
motion for summary judgment on the ground that a failure to honor an
agreement to settle a grievance "might be viewed" as a failure to bargain
under the Act, and it ordered that the complaint be assigned for hearing
so that the issues raised could be considered on a complete record. I find
that decision too tentative to have precedent value herein.
" For example, the representative of the grievant was a regular
member of the arbitration panel and, absent affirmative evidence that he
recused himself, the panel's award is not shown to be "fair and regular."
1448
DANNY'S FOODS, INC.
While the phraseology of the grievance lacks precision, I
do not read the language used as necessarily stating that
a Sunday assignment as cashier was listed on the sched-
ule as originally posted. In any event, Knopper does not
claim to have been deceived. Rather, as stated in his affi-
davit of June 25, 1980, he understood and strongly disa-
greed with "the substance" of the grievance. I find that
Gruska was engaged in a protected concerted activity
and that her removal as alternate receiver was in retali-
ation therefor.
In addition, based on testimony heretofore credited, I
find that Respondent's store manager (Teeple) later at-
tempted coercively to induce other employees (through
Nancy Smith) to complain about Gruska, thereby to gen-
erate a basis for further adverse action against her be-
cause she filed the grievance. In so acting, Respondent
further violated Section 8(a)(1) not only by infringing
again upon Gruska's protected right to file the grievance
but also, through its chilling effect, by interfering with,
restraining, and coercing those other employees in the
future exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the
Act.
In light of the above, I am not persuaded by Respond-
ent's defense on brief, based on Wright Line, a Division of
Wright Line, Inc., 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), that it would
have relieved Gruska as alternate receiver in the absence
of the protected activity. In that respect it argues that
under the collective-bargaining contract, management
had absolute discretion in selecting or removing its re-
ceiver and alternate receiver, and that it would have
used that discretion to relieve Gruska for complaining
about the work schedule even if she had not invoked the
grievance procedure. This is a variation of the argument
considered and rejected in footnote 2, above. The basic
error lies in the false assumption that Respondent's dis-
cretion is absolute when in fact such discretion, albeit
broad, cannot be used, as here, to discipline an employee
for exercising a protected right to file a grievance.
One final comment is appropriate. There appears to be
implicit in Respondent's perspective throughout this pro-
ceeding a conviction that the position of receiver, be-
cause of its special responsibilities, is inherently manage-
rial. That may be true. But Respondent is reminded that
it agreed to inclusion of that position in the bargaining
unit.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By relieving Lynn Gruska of her assignment as al-
ternate receiver because she filed a grievance, Respond-
ent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
2. By attempting to induce other employees, through
Nancy Smith, to complain about Lynn Gruska, thereby
to provide a basis upon which Respondent could take
adverse action against her because she filed the griev-
ance, Respondent interfered with protected rights both
of Lynn Gruska and those other employees, in violation
of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
3. The aforesaid practices tend to lead to labor dis-
putes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free
flow of commerce and constitute unfair labor practices
affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
4. The evidence fails to establish any other unfair labor
practices.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices, I find it necessary to order it to cease
and desist from engaging in those practices and to take
certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the poli-
cies of the Act. Such affirmative action will include an
offer to reinstate Lynn Gruska in the position of alter-
nate receiver (or to a substantially equivalent position if
that job is no longer extant) and making her whole for
lost earnings and other benefits. Any backpay is to be
computed on a quarterly basis from the date of removal
to the date of proper offer of reinstatement, in accord-
ance with F. W Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289
(1950), with interest thereon as established in Florida
Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977); see, generally,
Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962).
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]
1449