Danny R. Jinks, Complainant,v.R. James Nicholson, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMay 15, 2008
0120065119 (E.E.O.C. May. 15, 2008)

0120065119

05-15-2008

Danny R. Jinks, Complainant, v. R. James Nicholson, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.


Danny R. Jinks,

Complainant,

v.

R. James Nicholson,

Secretary,

Department of Veterans Affairs,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01200651191

Hearing No. 250-2005-00123X

Agency No. 200L-0621-2004-102619

DECISION

On September 6, 2006, complainant filed an appeal from the agency's August

9, 2006, final order concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO)

complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. �

2000e et seq. The appeal is deemed timely and is accepted pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the Commission

affirms the agency's final order.

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, complainant worked

as Food Service Supervisor at the agency's Nutrition and Food Service

(NFS) at the James H. Quillen VA Medical Center in Mt. Home, Tennessee.

On June 22, 2004, complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that he was

discriminated against on the bases of race (Caucasian) and in reprisal

for prior protected EEO activity when:

1. on or about May 5, 2004, he was issued a letter of reprimand for

failing to follow instructions; and

2. he was suspended from June 30, 2004 through July 2, 2004, for failing

to follow instructions.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a

copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request

a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely

requested a hearing and the AJ held a hearing on November 1, 2005,

November 18, 2005, December 2, 2005, and January 17, 2006.

The AJ issued a decision on July 27, 2006, finding that complainant

failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he was

discriminated or retaliated against as he alleged. Specifically, the AJ

determined that, assuming complainant established a prima facie case of

race discrimination or retaliation, the agency articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions.

The AJ found that, with regard to claim (1), complainant's supervisor,

the Food Production Manager (FPM), provided the following reasons in her

proposal to reprimand complainant for failure to follow instructions:

Complainant was instructed to post a vacancy for a WG-3 food service

worker assignment for the cold food relief position. Three employees

expressed interest in the assignment. One employee asked complainant if

the assignment would affect the days she had off and that employee stated

that complainant told her that it would. However, the first employee

stated that when another employee asked complainant about whether the

new assignment would affect his days off, complainant stated his days

off would not change. Eventually, the position was given to the third

interested employee. However, when the schedules were posted, selectee

was not put into the position but assigned to another position to which

another employee had already been assigned as a result of complainant's

instructions. The FPM testified at the hearing that employees were

upset about the manner in which the position was handled because the

position was supposed to be posted; complainant should not have asked

employees if they were interested in the position; and when the schedule

was posted, complainant informed another employee that his days off

would not change with the new position. The FPM testified that these

actions caused conflicts because some employees believed that they had

been given incorrect information regarding the position.

On January 23, 2004, complainant called from the domiciliary (dom)

kitchen to report that the chipped gravy was too thin. The FPM instructed

complainant to use cornstarch to thicken the gravy and complainant stated

he knew the procedure to thicken the gravy. The FPM later came to the

area, and the cook and a student were attempting to thicken the gravy.

Rather than following her instructions, complainant had instead procured

bacon and eggs to use on the serving line without permission.

On January 28, 2004, complainant approached a cook in the dom and asked

if she had heard the latest rumor about someone else coming to cook in the

dom. The employee became upset and confronted the cook foreman because she

felt it was a reflection on her performance. The cook foreman confirmed

that she and another employee were changing work locations but that

the change was not made due to any negative aspect of her performance.

In multiple discussions both in person and via email, the service chief

had instructed all supervisors to refrain from spreading gossip and

spreading rumors. Rather than asking his supervisor or the executive

chef regarding the change, complainant spoke to the cook and caused her

to be upset.

With regard to claim (2), the AJ found that on Sunday, April 11, 2004,

complainant was the supervisor on duty and he granted annual leave to four

out of seven of the dom to go home early. Complainant had also granted

annual leave to five out of twenty of the hospital NFS staff for that

same date. On Friday, April 9, 2004, the dom supervisor requested that

the floors be scrubbed that weekend; however, a review of the cleaning

schedules showed that the assigned cleaning tasks in the dom were not

completed. When asked why the cleaning tasks were not complete, the

employees stated that they did not have the time to complete the tasks.

On April 11, 2004, contrary to the practice of the NFS, the schedule

did not include three relief workers to cover for those employees using

leave and two employees had been scheduled as working "extra hours" to

cover vacancies on the evening shift. As such, complainant would have

been precluded from granting of unscheduled annual leave as he did.

The Chief of the Nutrition and Food Service (CNFS) testified at the

hearing that she issued the notice of proposed suspension to complainant

because he failed to follow instructions when he granted the leave

especially after there had been a group meeting with the supervisors

discussing when leave could be approved by a supervisor. Complainant was

told in that meeting that during the weekend in question the floor should

be cleaned with the scrubber; however, complainant allowed employees to

leave early and the floor was not cleaned with the scrubber.

The AJ further found that complainant failed to proffer sufficient

evidence to show that the agency's reasons were a pretext for race

discrimination or retaliation. The AJ found that the fact that the

discipline was issued without good cause did not establish that the agency

acted with discriminatory or retaliatory intent. The agency subsequently

issued a final order adopting the AJ's finding that complainant failed

to prove that he was subjected to discrimination as alleged.

On appeal, complainant makes numerous arguments regarding how the

agency's discipline was in violation of the agency's handbook. Further,

complainant argues that he was discriminated and retaliated against.

The agency requests that we affirm its final order.

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by

an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Universal

Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)

(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory

intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,

456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a

de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held.

An AJ's credibility determination based on the demeanor of a witness or

on the tone of voice of a witness will be accepted unless documents or

other objective evidence so contradicts the testimony or the testimony so

lacks in credibility that a reasonable fact finder would not credit it.

See EEOC Management Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.B. (November 9, 1999).

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, complainant

must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the

Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

He must generally establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that

he was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances

that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction

Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). The prima facie inquiry may be

dispensed with in this case, however, since the agency has articulated

legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct. See United

States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,

713-17 (1983); Holley v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request

No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997). To ultimately prevail, complainant must

prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency's explanation

is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,

Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Center

v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Texas Department of Community

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); Holley v. Department

of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997);

Pavelka v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05950351 (December

14, 1995).

We find that the AJ's finding that the agency articulated legitimate

reasons for issuing complainant the letter of reprimand and the

subsequent suspension is supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Specifically, the agency provided that it disciplined complainant in

claims (1) and (2) for failure to follow instructions on a number of

occasions.

The burden now shifts to complainant to prove that the agency's

proffered reasons were a pretext for discrimination or retaliation.

We find that the AJ's finding that complainant failed to show pretext

by a preponderance of the evidence is supported by substantial evidence

in the record. On appeal complainant makes numerous arguments that the

agency denied him his due process as outlined in the agency's handbook

regarding how he was disciplined; however, we find these arguments

unpersuasive to show that the agency's proffered reasons for disciplining

complainant were a pretext for discrimination or retaliation. Further,

complainant has proffered no evidence to support his contention that

the agency was motivated by retaliatory or discriminatory animus.

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal,

including those not specifically addressed herein, we affirm the agency's

final order adopting the AJ's decision finding that complainant failed

to establish that he was discriminated or retaliated against as he

alleged.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

_____5-15-08____

Date

1 Due to a new data system, this case has been redesignated with the

above referenced appeal number.

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0120065119

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P. O. Box 19848

Washington, D.C. 20036

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0120065119