Dallas Airmotive, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Jan 25, 2019

16-CA-192780 (N.L.R.B. Jan. 25, 2019)

JD-10-19
Dallas, Texas
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
Dallas Airmotive, Inc.,
Respondent
Case 16-CA-192780
and
International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO,
Aeronautical Industrial District Lodge 7761
Charging Party
Linda Reeder and Maxie Gallardo, Esqs.
for General Counsel
Rod Tanner, Esq.
for Charging Party
Bill Finegan, Esq.
for Respondent
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Sharon Levinson Steckler, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in Fort
Worth, Texas on June 11-13, 2018. Charging Party International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, Aeronautical Industrial District Lodge 776 (Lodge 776) filed a
charge against Dallas Airmotive, Inc., a subsidiary of BBA Aviation Company, (Respondent) on
February 8, 2017. Counsel for the General Counsel (General Counsel) issued a Complaint and
Notice of Hearing on December 29, 2017. On January 11, 2018, Respondent filed its Answer
in which it denies any violations of the Act.
In late 2016, Respondent relocated bargaining unit employees to a site less than 10
miles away as part of its plan to close a facility. The complaint alleges that the bargaining unit
employees make up a majority of the employees at the new facility, but Respondent refused to
recognize Lodge 776 as the exclusive bargaining representative. In addition, the complaint
alleges a number of unilateral changes after the bargaining unit employees transferred to the
new facility. At hearing I granted General Counsel’s motion to amend the complaint that
Respondent allegedly violated Section 8(a)(2) by establishing a committee of employees that
dealt with Respondent.
On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and
after carefully considering the briefs filed by the parties, I make the following

1 Charging Party corrected the Union name at hearing without objection.
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2
FINDINGS OF FACT2
I. JURISDICTION
5
Respondent Dallas Airmotive, Inc., a Texas corporation and a subsidiary of BBA
Aviation Company,3 a Delaware corporation, with offices and locations in the Dallas-Fort Worth,
Texas metropolitan area (DFW Metroplex), has been engaged in repair and maintenance of
aircraft engines. During the 12-month period ending November 28, 2017, Respondent
purchased and received at these facilities goods, materials and services valued in excess of 10
$50,000 from points located outside the State of Texas. Respondent admits, and I find, that it
has been an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6) and (7) of
the Act.
II. RESPONDENT’S FACILITIES AND UNION REPRESENTATION15
As of the beginning of 2014, Respondent had several facilities, including one located at
Forest Park in Dallas, Texas (Forest Park facility). Two other facilities were located within the
DFW Metroplex: Dallas Love Field airport (Love Field, also called Hangar C); and, Heritage
Park, in Grapevine. Texas (Heritage Park). Respondent also had a facility in Neosho, 20
Missouri.4
Respondent’s facilities repair and refurbish aircraft engines. The facilities worked on
different brands of engines. Some facilities also perform the testing in the test cell area. The
airplane and helicopter engines arrive on Respondent’s docks and are then scheduled for 25
disassembly. Once disassembled, the employees clean the motor parts of the engine. The
parts are inspected. Based upon inspection, Respondent gives a cost estimate of repairs to the
customer. Once the customer approves the repairs, Respondent orders any needed parts or
proceeds with repairing parts. Part of the component repair process may include plasma

2 Although I have included citations to the record to highlight particular testimony or exhibits, my
findings and conclusions are not based solely on those specific record citations, but rather upon my
review and consideration of the entire record for this case. My findings of fact encompass the credible
testimony, evidence presented, and logical inferences. The credibility analysis may rely upon a variety of
factors, including, but not limited to, the context of the witness testimony, the weight of the respective
evidence, established or admitted facts, inherent probabilities, and reasonable inferences that may be
drawn from the record as a whole. Double D Construction Group, 339 NLRB 303, 303–305 (2003);
Daikichi Sushi, 335 NLRB 622, 623 (2001) (citing Shen Automotive Dealership Group, 321 NLRB 586,
589 (1996)), enfd. 56 Fed.Appx. 516 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Credibility findings regarding any witness are not
likely to be an all-or-nothing determination and I may believe that a witness testified credibly regarding
one fact but not on another. Daikichi Sushi, 335 NLRB at 622.
When a witness may reasonably be assumed to be favorably disposed to the party, an adverse
inference may be drawn regarding any factual question on which the witness is likely to have knowledge.
International Automated Machines, 285 NLRB 1122, 1123 (1987), enfd. 861 F.2d (6th Cir. 1988). This is
particularly true where the witness is the Respondent’s agent. Roosevelt Memorial Medical Center, 348
NLRB 1016, 1022 (2006). Testimony from current employees tend to be particularly reliable because it
goes against their pecuniary interests when testifying against their employer. Gold Standard Enterprises,
234 NLRB 618, 619 (1978); Georgia Rug Mill, 131 NLRB 1304 fn. 2 (1961); Gateway Transportation Co.,
193 NLRB 47, 48 (1971); Federal Stainless Sink Division, 197 NLRB 489, 491 (1972).
3 General Counsel amended the parent name at hearing without objection.
4 Respondent has more facilities worldwide, but those are not relevant to these proceedings.
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3
treatment to worn metal parts. Parts are sprayed with metal and re-machined for
refurbishment. Once all the parts are available in the facility, the reassembly is scheduled and
proceeds. When the motor is reassembled, it is tested in the test cell and then shipped back to
the customer.
5
Of the facilities involved here, only Forest Park employees were unionized. The
Machinists have represented the Forest Park bargaining unit since 1966. Since that time, the
parties have entered into successive collective bargaining agreements, including one in
effective from March 23, 2015 through March 23, 2018. The bargaining unit consisted of “all
production and maintenance employees employed by [Respondent] at its facilities located at 10
6114 Forest Park Road, Dallas Texas.” (Jt. Exh. 28, Art. I.)5 Respondent admits, and I find,
that the Machinists and Lodge 776 are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
The Forest Park facility was located near a large medical center that included Parkland 15
Hospital and University of Texas-Southwestern Hospital. The Forest Park facility contained
several product lines that refurbished, repaired and/or overhauled aircraft engines. The Forest
Park employees also tested the engines after the overhauls and/or repair. The process of
testing creates much noise and vibration, which was considered inappropriate for its
neighborhood. The Forest Park facility transferred its work to different facilities. In 2014 and 20
2015, some of the Forest Park employees transferred to Love Field and Heritage Park; others
were laid off in 2014. However, in 2016 and 2017, Respondent eventually transferred the
remaining Forest Park bargaining unit employees to Respondent’s new facility located at DFW
Airport (DFW Center). Almost all of the relocated Forest Park employees retained the same job
duties as before and with the same supervision. Respondent continued to recognize Lodge 25
776 for whatever employees remained at the Forest Park facility, but refused to recognize
Lodge 776 for the employees at DFW Center.
Doug Meador served as Respondent’s president until about 2016. (Tr. 512.) Max Allen
served as general manager of the Forest Park facility from October 2014 until March 2015. 30
From March 2015 until his termination on August 2, 2017, Allen served as Vice President of
Operations over all the facilities in the United States for repair, overhaul and all operational
duties, including safety, quality and training. While Allen was general manager, Nandu
Madireddi was chief of operations (COO). Allen last reported to Mark Johnstone, CEO and
President of BBA Aviation. 35
David Daniel is currently Vice President, Human Resources for American, Singapore
and Brazilian operations, a position he has held since October 2016. Before that time, he was
Human Resources Director for the same facilities.
40
Paul Black, Jr., president and directing business representative of Lodge 776,
supervises 18 staff members, including Doyle Huddleston, a business representative in charge
of Respondent’s Forest Park bargaining unit. Throughout the events described here,
Respondent was aware that only Huddleston, and not employee members of the bargaining
committee, had the authority to enter into agreements on behalf of the International Union and 45
Lodge 776 for the Forest Park bargaining unit. (See, e.g., Tr. 509-510.)

5 Abbreviations in this decision are: “Tr.” for transcript; “GC Exh.” for General Counsel exhibit; R.
Exh.” for Respondent exhibit; “CP Exh.” for Lodge 776 exhibit; “Jt. Exh.” for joint exhibit; “GC Br.” for
General Counsel brief; “R. Br.” for Respondent brief; and, “CP Br.” for Lodge 776 brief.
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III. 2014: RESPONDENT ANNOUNCES LAYOFFS AND
NEED TO MOVE SOME WORK FROM FOREST PARK
In 2014, Respondent expected to close the Forest Park facility within 2 years. (Tr. 516,
519) At the time, Respondent was committed to transferring work from Forest Park to Heritage 5
Park and Love Field, with plans to improve those facilities to accommodate its production
needs. (Tr. 520.)
On January 10, 2014, Respondent and Lodge 776 representative met about rumors
regarding the Forest Park facility’s future. Respondent was represented by COO Madireddi, 10
General Manager Allen, HR Director Daniel and counsel. Lodge 776 was represented by
Business Representative Huddleston, and negotiating committeemen and employees Jimmie
LeFlore and Wesley Blaine. Huddleston also was aware that business at the Forest Park
facility was slow. COO Madireddi advised the Lodge 776 bargaining team that growth around
Forest Park was an issue because of the noise created by the facility and that Respondent was 15
looking for a site for relocation, particularly for the test cell work. Madireddi also stated
concerns about a possible injunction because of noise and other environmental issues.
Additionally, the property value of the Forest Park facility improved and Respondent had too
much “foot print” in the Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex. (R. Exh. 8.) Huddleston asked for
recognition for the bargaining unit at other locations. Madireddi said Respondent was looking 20
at other phases and other lines --- the unionized employees might have a job there and might
not, and those with job would be dispersed to sites currently available. At that time, the
available sites were Heritage Park and Love Field. (Tr. 156-157.) Respondent presented a
slide show discussing a phased approach, but focused on Phase I, which Respondent also
called “Sea Change.” 25
Madireddi talked about different times for moving work from Forest Park, but only Phase
I was definite. Also indefinite were the number of employees moving from Forest Park to
different facilities. Madereddi emphasized that Forest Park employees would be required to
apply for jobs and perhaps be hired. When asked for recognition for the test cell unit, 30
Respondent could not say where the test cell work was moving and emphasized that the Forest
Park employees might not move to a different location.
HR Director Daniel sent to Huddleston and others an email, dated January 15, 2014,
regarding the Phase I transition of Forest Park. With an attached memorandum from COO 35
Madireddi intended for Forest Park employees, the Phase I plan was to move “excess capacity”
from Forest Park to other facilities around Dallas-Fort Worth. Phase I’s expected completion
was June 2014, leaving a work force of 150 bargaining unit employees at the Forest Park
facility. At the end of that time, the work left at Forest Park would be the Rolls-Royce Spey/Tay
lines, Rolls Royce accessories, much of the component repair work, and all current engine 40
testing. A number of engines and component repair, particularly for the Pratt6 line, were
expected to move to Heritage Park. The PT6 line,7 except for repair and testing, was expected
to transition to Love Field. (GC Exh. 5(a).) The result would be that, after work on the engines
was complete at Heritage Park and Love Field, testing would still take place at Forest Park.
(Tr. 381-382.) 45
Lodge 776 and Respondent continued to meet about the planned closure of the Forest
Park facility. The parties met on February 11, 2014. Lodge 776’s goal was to engage in effects

6 The Pratt line referred to a turbine-powered engine.
7 The PT6 is a turboprop Pratt & Whitney engine.
JD-10-19
5
bargaining and ensure as many of its represented employees remained employed. (Tr. 166.)
Respondent provided tentative Phase I discussion estimates for layoffs of which job
descriptions would suffer losses. (R. Exh. 11.) Although Huddleston maintained he and Lodge
776 had little input into the discussions and none about compensation or benefits,
Respondent’s summary of notes, dated February 17, 2014 and shared with Huddleston, 5
reflects Lodge 776’s discussions. These notes also reflect that Respondent advised that the
Forest Park employees transferred would be considered “at will” employees. (R. Exh. 10.)8
However, during the 2014 negotiations, Respondent’s representatives neither told the Lodge
776 representatives that all of the operations at the 3 Dallas-Fort Worth facilities would move to
a single facility nor said it would go to a new facility. (Tr. 107, Blaine.) 10
By February 18, 2014, the parties signed an agreement entitled “Forest Park Closure
Agreement” for the Phase I transition. (GC Exh .13.) The Agreement on Phase I gave priority
to Forest Park employees applying for jobs elsewhere, but the employees had to meet certain
requirements for hiring. The Agreement stated the selection process would be complete by the 15
end of June 2014, unless shifted due to “unforeseen changes and circumstances.” If
employees transferred to like jobs, with Power Plant licenses and longevity premiums, the base
pay would be unchanged. Otherwise, compensation would follow the policies of the receiving
facility. Health and welfare benefits, 401(k) and holidays would not change for transferred
bargaining unit employees. Sick pay would follow the practice of the receiving facility, but the 20
transferred employees would continue to receive 48 hours of sick time per year. Lodge 776
agreed that: “All other policies, practices, and procedures at the location where the work will
move will apply.” (GC Exh. 13.) For further development, Respondent expected to announce
the county for development by March 7. (GC. Exh. 13, p. 4.) The Phase I agreement also
offered a voluntary separation plan and estimated 130 employees could be eligible to apply, 25
which would be awarded in seniority order. Id.
By letter dated February 28, 2014, Respondent, by letter, advised Lodge 776 that
approximately 90 Forest Park bargaining unit employees would be permanently laid off.
Respondent also offered voluntary separations or transfers to another Respondent facility. 30
Attached to the letter was a list of those employees Respondent expected to lay off. (GC Exh.
2.) On March 7, 2014, Respondent sent Lodge 776 a letter with notification that 3 more
employees subject to permanent lay off. (GC Exh. 3.)
During Phase I, not all listed employees were laid off: Approximately 10 to 15 Forest 35
Park employees applied for and obtained positions at Heritage Park. (Tr. 162.) Huddleston
stated the Forest Park employees who transferred to Heritage Park or Love Field were no
longer union members. (Tr. 210.) With the layoffs and transfers, the number of Forest Park
bargaining unit employees dropped from 280 to approximately 190. (Tr. 163.)
40
On March 7, 2014, Respondent sent to employees an internal memo about finding a
new test facility. Respondent narrowed down the possible locations to two, one of which was
located at DFW Airport, and anticipated updating information by the end of the month. (GC
Exh. 17.)

8 Lodge 776 contends that the letter, written by counsel from Daniel’s notes, constitutes double-
hearsay and was also an ex parte communication with the union. Respondent’s counsel also sent a
letter summarizing the February 14 negotiations, which drew the same objections from General Counsel
and Lodge 776. (R. Exh. 12.) I asked the parties to brief what weight, if any, these documents should
receive. Respondent, without any case law, addresses only the ex parte portion and not the hearsay
objections. (R. Br. 12)
JD-10-19
6
IV. 2015: RESPONDENT AND LODGE 776 BARGAIN FOR A NEW CBA AND ANOTHER TRANSITION
AGREEMENT
By January 2015, Respondent began construction on a new facility located at DFW 5
Airport, called DFW Center. DFW Center construction was delayed due to weather and
inability to obtain and/or retain construction workers.
In March 2015, the parties entered into negotiations for a new collective-bargaining
agreement and a subsequent agreement regarding the upcoming closures in the Forest Park 10
facility. (R. Exh. 2.) Respondent’s negotiating team consisted of HR Director Daniel, General
Manager Allen, HR Manager Stephanie Hanes and COO Madireddi. Huddleston and two
Forest Park employees, Wesley Blaine and Jimmie LeFlore, represented Lodge 776. During
the negotiations in March 2015, Respondent told Lodge 776 representatives that a new facility
on 20 acres at DFW Airport would be built: the DFW Center. As for the work performed at 15
DFW Center at the time, none could be performed as Respondent broke ground within the
previous few months. (Tr. 79.) At the time of the negotiations, Madireddi did not discuss when
the Forest Park facility might close. As became apparent in negotiations, Respondent was not
clear on what might happen to the Forest Park employees.
20
Although Huddleston normally keeps bargaining notes, he testified that he did not keep
any regarding this set of negotiations. (Tr. 198-200.) HR Manager Hanes, however, took notes
of each meeting, which were finalized after the meeting and distributed to the parties at the
subsequent meeting in finalized form without input from Lodge 776. At hearing Respondent
did not present all bargaining notes for these sessions. (Tr. 436-438.) 25
At the first negotiation session on March 2, Madireddi again explained that Forest Park
must close because of the neighborhood: Located in the middle of the hospital district with
residential and retail development in the area, the Forest Park facility created noise and air
pollution that was a problem for surrounding facilities and housing. Huddleston demanded to 30
bargain over the closure as part of the collective bargaining negotiations. (Tr. 177.)
Huddleston asked Madireddi whether Respondent broke ground on the new DFW
Center and asked for recognition of the unit and work at that location. During the negotiations,
Huddleston would ask for recognition a few times and Respondent would reject the proposal.35
Madireddi stated the work was not necessarily going to DFW Center, but to other areas; he
further stated that Lodge 776 would not be recognized because the work would go to non-union
facilities.
Huddleston recalled that Madireddi stated that Heritage Park would not have 50 percent 40
unionized employees. (Tr. 177-178.) Huddleston asked whether the bargaining unit
employees would keep their jobs. Madireddi responded that no one would be guaranteed a job
and employees would be required to apply and interview, as employees were required to do in
2014 when the previous two product lines left the Forest Park facility. (Tr. 79.)
45
In the second negotiation session, held on March 3, 2015, Lodge 776 proposed a
change to the preamble of the collective-bargaining agreement that would work at DFW Center
and any future facilities within a 100-mile radius of DFW Center, but not including Heritage Park
or Love Field. Respondent stated it was building a Rotorcraft facility, and “Premier testing” was
moving to the facility. Madireddi promised to keep Lodge 776 apprised as events unfolded. 50
Daniel stated that because Respondent was uncomfortable and did not know what would
JD-10-19
7
happen, Respondent was still “trying to figure things out. This language could then be illegal.”
(R. Exh. 2.)
During negotiations, Respondent represented that the Rotorcraft9 product lines and all
testing work would be the only work moved to DFW Center. (Tr. 78, 288.) Respondent also 5
represented that it did not know what it intended to do with the Rolls Royce lines because
Respondent made no decisions yet. (Tr. 288.) Although Huddleston asked if all work would be
consolidated at DFW Center, Respondent said it did not know what would happen. As far as
Lodge 776 knew, it expected much of the work would move to Love Field and Heritage Park
would stay in those locations because Respondent spent millions renovating these locations. 10
(Tr. 108, Blaine.) Indeed, Respondent built a mezzanine at Heritage Park for additional work
space.
Regarding the upcoming closure of Forest Park, Lodge 776 determined that it needed to
bargain with Respondent about the effects of possible layoffs and maintained a goal of 15
ensuring employment for as many Forest Park employees as possible. Daniel testified that the
parties spent approximately a day plus another portion of day discussing closure. During these
negotiations, HR Manager Hanes presented two lists to Lodge 776 representatives: One
contained the 17 job classifications listed in the collective-bargaining agreement for the Forest
Park facility; the second list of 8 job classifications, which Hanes said were necessary to match 20
the non-bargaining unit job titles at the other facilities. (Tr. 85; GC Exh. 10; Jt. Exh. 21.) Blaine
testified without contradiction that the duties between the bargaining and non-bargaining job
titles were not different.
During bargaining Respondent advised Lodge 776 that the test cell work would move 25
from Forest Park, but Respondent did not know where it would move. (Tr. 395.) Respondent
also was uncertain what would happen with the Rolls Royce line and had no plans to
consolidate operations at DFW Center from the three Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex facilities.
(Tr. 245-246.) At the time, Respondent in fact did not know where the product lines would be
located in the future. (Tr. 395.) 30
On March 9, 2015, Lodge 776 left the preamble language proposal on the table. (R.
Exh. 3.) The minutes reflect no discussion about Respondent’s plans for the Forest Park
closure on March 10 either. (R. Exh. 4.)
35
At the March 17, 2015 session, Madireddi informed the union representatives that “if not
all the jobs move, mostly likely the most senior would move.” The parties then had further
discussions about severance pay and COBRA provisions for closure of Forest Park. (R. Exh.
6.) This discussions shifted to the collective bargaining agreement, including economic and
non-economic proposals. Huddleston withdrew Lodge 776’s proposal for changes in the 40
preamble language of the collective bargaining agreement. Regarding collapsing the job titles,
Madireddi told Lodge 776 that everyone would be grandfathered in and the changes would
apply only to new employees. Madireddi also stated that Respondent would offer its last, best
and final offer for the collective bargaining agreement the following day. (R. Exh. 6.)
45
As promised, on March 18, Respondent presented Lodge 776 representatives with an
agreement about closure and placement of employees with its “final and best” offer. (Tr. 178,

9 Rotorcrafts are turbine engines used in helicopters. Rotorcraft work was performed in the Neosho,
Missouri facility, landed at Heritage Park and did not move to DFW Center. The Rotorcraft work was
never performed at the Forest Park facility.
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8
195; GC Exh. 18.) The minutes reflect little discussion of the Forest Park closure agreement.
(R. Exh. 7.) Huddleston testified Respondent never provided a date for closing Forest Park.
(Tr. 178-179.) The parties did not discuss a number of issues regarding movement to DFW
Center, including rules of conduct, discipline, seniority, hours and shifts, reporting, temporary
assignments, or health and safety for the closure agreement. (Tr. 179-180.) Dues checkoff, 5
appointment of union officials and access of union representatives were not discussed.
In March 2015, while the parties were negotiating a new agreement, the parties took a
break. The Lodge 776 bargaining committee visited the DFW Center site, approximately 10 to
11 miles away from the Forest Park facility. Blaine observed that the site had some raised 10
support beams, a hole in the ground and a small parking lot. (Tr. 107-108.) After the parties
completed discussions of the closure agreement, they returned to bargaining for a successor
collective-bargaining agreement.
About spring 2015,10 Allen held employee meetings at the Forest Park facility in which 15
he announced Respondent found a new site at DFW Airport. He told the employees that this
location would house the test cell work and Rotorcraft Center of Excellence.11 Allen could not
recall whether he told Forest Park employees when the test cell line would move to DFW
Center. He also told employees that the PT6 line would go to Love Field and other lines would
go to Heritage Park. He said the Rolls Royce line would stay at Forest Park. (Tr. 360.) Allen 20
advised that the employees would have to apply for their jobs within the product lines that were
moving. (Tr. 359.)12
Lodge 776 held a ratification meeting for the collective bargaining agreement.
Respondent and possibly one of the employees on the Lodge 776 bargaining team prepared a 25
written summary for Lodge 776 to distribute to the employees. The last page of the summary
discussed the “Forest Park Facility Closure Agreement”:
During the course of these negotiations the parties took a break from contract
renewal bargaining to discuss a Facility Closure Agreement. It has been the 30
Company’s position through negotiations and that position has been repeatedly
shared with the union that the facility closing subjects would best be addressed
at a later time because of a number of unknown factors including the timing and
location of the movement of work out of the Forest Park facility. At the union
urging, however, the parties have since discussed the issues surrounding a 35
closing and reached tentative agreement on the terms of a new Facility Closure
agreement. In line with the parties’ bargaining ground rules discussed at the
opening of these collective bargaining sessions, the tentative agreement on the
facility closure is subject to and contingent upon the parties reaching agreement
on the terms of a renewal collective bargaining agreement. 40
(Tr. 182, 201-202; GC Exh. 18.) Although Huddleston believed this paragraph contained
certain inaccuracies, he did not attempt to contact Respondent to make changes; he testified
that he instead explained the contents to Lodge 776 membership at the ratification meeting.
45

10 Testimony reflects the date may have been March, April or May, 2015.
11 Respondent never established the Rotorcraft Center of Excellence.
12 Andrews testified that Allen said if employees wanted the union, “you could take it with you.” (Tr.
362.)
JD-10-19
9
On August 3, 2015,13 Respondent and Lodge 776 representatives signed the “Forest
Park Facility Closure Agreement.” (Jt. Exh. 25.) The delay in signing the Facility Closure
Agreement was due to the parties proofing and clarifying the language in the collective
bargaining agreement. Daniel, General Manager Allen and HR Manager Stephanie Hanes
signed the agreement on behalf of Respondent. The agreement provided that Forest Park 5
employees would have to bid on their positions. The stated purpose of the agreement was
transitioning the bargaining unit work from the Forest Park facility until it completely closed. (Jt.
Exh. 25.) In the agreement, Respondent made representations about the closure, including:
Based on present forecasts and business models, [Respondent] commits 10
that currently active Forest Park bargaining unit employees impacted by the
shutdown of the Forest Park facility shall be given priority consideration for
positions associated with work transferred out of the facility to other facilities in
the [Dallas-Fort Worth] Metroplex.
15
(Jt. Exh. 25.)
The parties agreed wages and compensation would “follow the practice at the location
where the work will move . . . .” For a number of benefits, such as sick pay, holidays and
vacation, the parties agreed that they would remain the same but subject to the practices at the 20
location of the moved work. The agreement also stated, “All other policies, practices and
procedures at the location where the work will move will apply.” (Jt. Exh. 25.)
Respondent’s witnesses testified that the 2015 Closure Agreement would be in effect
until the Forest Park facility closed. Respondent’s intent with the 2015 was not to discuss with 25
Lodge 776 every determination it made regarding moving employees. (Tr. 397.) Daniel
testified that this closure agreement provided the guidelines for moving bargaining unit
employees from the Forest Park facility and required no further notice to Lodge 776; it also did
not contain dates for the transfers. (Tr. 445-446.) Respondent admittedly did not know what
facility or facilities would be the future site(s) for Forest Park work and product lines when it 30
negotiated the 2015 Closure Agreement. (Tr. 464.) Despite this representation, Allen
specifically denied that the final shutdown for Forest Park was negotiated with the Union during
contract renewal negotiations. (Tr. 302.)
The negotiated collective bargaining agreement was effective March 23, 2015 for the 35
following 3 years, until March 23, 2018.
V. 2016: RESPONDENT STARTS MOVING EMPLOYEES INTO DFW CENTER
Respondent did not know where the Forest Park work would move until the earlier 40
portion of 2016. Respondent then decided to move all Forest Park work to DFW Center. (Tr.
302, 464.) Because of more rain delays, DFW Center was not ready for occupancy until that
summer. Allen testified that the movement of work to DFW Center also was managed through
moving product lines; when each product line could move was determined by the workload at
each location and the vendors’ supply. (Tr. 304.)45
About mid-2016, Respondent also determined that it would no longer need to recognize
Lodge 776 at DFW Center. (Tr. 521-522.) Daniel denied that, in 2014 and 2015 negotiations,

13 The parties agree that the six-month delay in signing the final agreements was due to reviewing of
language before the agreements could be printed.
JD-10-19
10
Respondent told Lodge 776 that it would not recognize the bargaining representative when the
work moved. He instead recalled telling Huddleston in the 2014 and 2015 discussions that
Respondent would not know where the work was moving, “what the number would be, and that
we wanted to be compliant with the law.”
5
Vice President Allen held all-hands meetings, to communicate its decision to the
employees. (Tr. 304, 328.) Allen advised all facilities (Forest Park, Love Field and Heritage
Park) would move into DFW Center. (Tr. 327-328.) Employee and local president Jackson
notified Huddleston about the meeting. (Tr. 326-327.) Huddleston responded that Respondent
kept changing things and apparently said the union was not apprised. (Tr. 330.) 10
Daniel directed HR Manager Hanes to meet with the Forest Park shop bargaining
committee about the transfers instead of making the bargaining unit employees go through an
application process. (Tr. 464-465.) At no time Respondent did not notify Lodge 776 officials
Huddleston or Black about the change in plans; Respondent assumed the parties’ 2015 Forest 15
Park Closure Agreement applied, despite the incomplete information on which the 2015
agreement was based. (Tr. 398-399, 401, 413.)
The first employees to move into DFW Center were a test cell employee from Neosho
and five test cell employees from Heritage Park to work on Rotorcraft test cells. (Tr. 248-249.)14 20
About July or August 2016, Respondent moved 30 component repair employees from Heritage
Park into DFW Center. (Tr. 253.)15 Also in July or August, Respondent moved 35 Honeywell
TFE employees from Heritage Park to DFW Center.
In the meantime, in June 2016, Respondent opened jobs and then offered transfers to 25
DFW Center to 175 Forest Park bargaining unit employees. On June 6, Respondent had a job
posting that instructed employees of its application process for component repair technicians at
DFW Center, which were known at Forest Park in different job categories. Aviation
maintenance technician was similarly posted. This process involved Human Resources
personnel meeting with each team between June 6 and 10, 2016 and at the meeting the 30
bargaining unit employees would have to accept or decline the job at DFW Center. (Jt. Exh. 6.)
Respondent required employees to place their names on a sheet for an intent to
transfer. HR Manager Hanes sent to Forest Park employees letters, dated June 20, 2016,
regarding the terms of the transfer and required employees to sign and date the letter. 35
Respondent’s transfer letter to Forest Park employees included the following language:
Once you officially transfer to the DFW Center, your hourly base rate will
be $_____. Please note that this rate may be adjusted at a later date to properly
reflect any applicable automatic step increases, longevity differential increases or 40
for obtaining a power plant differential, all in accordance with the collective
bargaining agreement.
This letter is not a contract of employment, expressed or implied, or a
promise of employment for any specific term, and does not alter the “at will” 45
nature of your employment with Dallas Airmotive.

14 Allen’s testimony on these points were answers of “sounds correct” and “approximately correct.”
(Tr. 248.)
15 Allen could not recall how many of the Heritage Park component repair employees formerly
worked at Forest Park. (Tr. 254.)
JD-10-19
11
(Jt. Exh. 29, emphasis in the original.) The letters also included anticipated dates of transfer,
which were subject to change,16 and that the employee would continue to report to the same
supervisor. The job offers reflected the titles in use at the non-unionized facilities.
5
Between June 1 and July 1, 2016, 187 Forest Park bargaining unit employees signed
letters agreeing to transfer to DFW Center. (Jt. Exh. 29.) HR Vice President Daniel stated it
did not follow the 2015 closure agreement because Lodge 776 expressed concerns about
employees applying for jobs and “we made the decision to not have them go through that
application process.” (Tr. 390-391.) 10
On July 8, 2016, Respondent met with the shop committee, but Huddleston was not
among the attendees. Respondent presented no evidence that Huddleston was notified about
the meeting or its content. Respondent listed five items for discussion. Regarding the transfer
letters, Respondent’s notes reflected, in relevant part:15
. . . .
2. Transfer letters distributed to all bargaining unit employees.
Copies of letters with final transfer dates will be provided to the committee.20
3. DFW Center tour and mixers scheduled to begin next week,
ending in August. . . .
(R Exh. 1.)17 Based upon these notes and the listed participants, I infer that Respondent still 25
had not notified Huddleston about the transfers and the committee was merely informed of
what Respondent had already done, which was to issue and collect transfer letters to the
bargaining unit employees.
During the week of July 11, 2016, Vice President Allen conducted an all-hands meeting30
at the Forest Park facility in which he announced that all Forest Park product lines, e.g., Rolls
Royce and component repair, plus the lines at Heritage and Love Field, would be consolidated
at the new DFW Center. When an employee asked whether the Forest Park employees would
continue to be represented by the union, Allen stated DFW Center would be an “at will” shop.
Jackson stated this was the first time anyone was notified that Respondent intended to 35
consolidate all facilities at the DFW Center. (Tr. 348.) In the same month, Jackson, who
attended the meeting, notified Business Representative Huddleston about Respondent’s plan
to transfer all employees to DFW Center. Huddleston responded that Respondent was
changing things again, without keeping anyone, including the union, informed. (Tr. 330.)
40
After the Forest Park all hands meeting, Respondent sent Forest Park employees to
tour the DFW Center construction site, which was in process of completion. Employees were
provided directions and a DFW Center site map. (Tr. 472-473; GC Exh. 24.) The map

16 Respondent initially anticipated dates of transfer from August through December 2016. (Jt. Exh.
29.)
17 According to Respondent’s notes, the meeting lasted 2 hours. However, these sentences
contained the only information about these topics. Daniel maintained that the parties reached an
agreement not to proceed through the application process. The bargaining notes were extremely brief
for a 2-hour meeting and do not support his testimony as the minutes occur after the offers were made to
employees.
JD-10-19
12
reflected specific areas for the Rolls Royce line (marked Spey/Tay) and different areas for the
Pratt Whitney jets, the Honeywell TFE731, Rotorcraft and component repair. The map marked
locations for the warehouse, PW 100 and APU as “to be determined.” (GC Exh. 24.)
When Forest Park employees toured DFW Center, employees from other facilities also 5
attended. Respondent’s employee “ambassadors” hosted the tours of the new facility, which
was delineated with tape to show the different areas in the plant where each line would be
placed. Employee and bargaining committee member Jimmie LeFleur noted that most of lines
showed departments from Forest Park; however, an area was marked for the 15D line. LeFleur
thought it was strange because the 15D line previously moved from Forest Park to Heritage 10
Park, but asked no questions. At the end of the tour, Respondent hosted pizza luncheons, at
which HR Manager Daniel introduced employees by facility and asked the Heritage Park and
Love Field employees to talk about the working environment and conditions at their respective
facilities. Daniel then left the luncheons. (Tr. 351, 474.)
15
Daniel testified undisputedly that he and Huddleston discussed the closure of Forest
Park after a grievance meeting on August 9, 2016 and followed up with an email to Huddleston.
The email confirms that Lodge 776’s officers and committeemen remain Forest Park
employees until the Forest Park facility closed. However, if transferred “to another facility” the
union official would still be permitted to conduct union business. Additionally, the email 20
reflected discussions of moving some backlogged work at “another DFW based facility” but
returning to Forest Park for completion of work. Daniel did not testify that he discussed with
Huddleston the Forest Park transfers to DFW Center specifically, nor does the email reflect
Respondent’s decisions regarding moving all Forest Park employees to DFW Center. (R. Exh.
14.)25
Respondent communicated plans for the plans and subsequent delays to employees
through all-hands meetings and its internal electronic communication system, Yammer. (Tr.
305.) Non-employees had no access to Yammer.
30
In October 2016, the Lodge 776 bargaining committee, consisting of employees Blaine,
Kenny Jackson, J.D. Gonzalez and Darren Johnson, met with HR Manager Hanes at the Forest
Park facility. Hanes discussed Respondent’s planned transfers from the Forest Park facility to
DFW Center and engaged in further discussions.
35
Respondent still had not notified Huddleston about the Forest Park transfers to DFW
Center. Allen testified HR Director Daniel or the stewards should have notified Huddleston.
(Tr. 247.) Allen and Daniel were aware that the employee union representatives did not have
final say on decision making for the union. Huddleston testified that he would have not agreed
to the Forest Park closure agreements had he known Respondent intended to move 40
approximately 90 percent of the Forest Park bargaining unit to another location that was only a
few miles away. (Tr. 188.)
At some point in 2016, Respondent moved some of its test cell operations, other than
those at Forest Park, to DFW Center. (Tr. 244.) The test cell testing for Rotorcraft was moved 45
to DFW Center, but the remainder of the line was sent to Heritage Park. (Tr. 245.)
About December 12, 2016, approximately 55 Forest Park employees who worked on
the Rolls Royce engines transferred to DFW Center. Their work and supervisor did not change
when they went to DFW Center. (Tr. 97.) After transfer, Frederick Andrews, a Rolls Royce 50
quality control inspector, continued to work on the Rolls Royce line, performing the same
JD-10-19
13
functions, and regularly interacted with the Rolls Royce line employees. Other than
pleasantries, he did not interact with the transferees from Heritage Park. Andrews observed
that 2 or 3 Heritage Park mechanics cross-trained with the Rolls Royce line, and 2 of the 3 left
after about 3 weeks; 1 mechanic stayed with the Rolls Royce line. The employees on the Rolls
Royce line at DFW Center remained as constituted at Forest Park with the exception of that 5
one additional mechanic. (Tr. 366-367.)
Andrews received an employee handbook from Respondent at the DFW Center.18
Kenny Jackson, a 20-year employee working in quality control, moved from Forest Park to
DFW Center in October 2016, then worked a 6-month stint in Heritage Park before moving 10
back to DFW Center. While at Forest Park, he held positions of stewards and immediately
before he left, local lodge president. He received no cross-training for his position and
performed the same duties.
After about a week and a half in DFW Center, Respondent’s HR Generalist Zara Baker 15
provided orientation for Jackson and 12 other employees. Baker discussed a number of
policies that differed from those in place at Forest Park. Differences were in attendance, sick
time, vacation time, overtime, breaks and pay. Times for beginning and ending shifts also
changed. Although Respondent had provided handbooks to some employees, Respondent no
longer had any available by the time Jackson was in orientation and by the hearing, still had not 20
provided him with a handbook. Seniority no longer existed, so employees had no layoff or
callback rights or seniority for changing shifts. When he ultimately was sent to a permanent
assignment to DFW Center, Jackson had the same job in quality control that he had at Forest
Park. He operated the same equipment but worked with employees from all three facilities.
25
In October 2016, employee Wesley Blaine, who worked in the Forest Park facility as a
material specialist team leader in the warehouse, accepted a transfer to DFW Center. He
worked between the two facilities for a number of months, spending approximately 4 to 5 hours
per week in the Forest Park facility. He continued to earn the same hourly base rate of $23.86.
Everyone from his department, shipping and receiving, moved to DFW Center. Per Blaine, until 30
September 3, 2017, he worked under the collective bargaining agreement because Huddleston
requested that the shop committee members to remain bargaining unit employees until the
agreement expired. During that period approximately those employees plus 8 maintenance
employees worked at Forest Park pursuant to the collective-bargaining agreement. (Tr. 92-93.)
35
VI. LODGE 776’S PETITIONS AND RESPONDENT’S ACTIONS
Blaine noticed that almost all the Forest Park employees now worked at DFW Center
and notified Huddleston. (Tr. 98.) On December 29, 2016, Lodge 776 filed a representation
petition with the Board for a bargaining unit of all production and maintenance employees, 40
including lead persons, but excluding supervisors. The address for the facility was the same as
the DFW Center but still included Forest Park. (R. Exh. 15.) However, because it discovered
the DFW facility employed a majority of its bargaining unit employees, Lodge 776 withdrew the
representation petition as it believed it already had a collective-bargaining agreement in place
and a contract bar. (Tr. 52.) Lodge 776 then filed a unit clarification petition, which also was 45
withdrawn.
After Lodge 776 withdrew its representation petition, Allen held an all-hands meeting at
Heritage Park, which Jackson attended. During the meeting, Allen said Lodge 776 had

18 The handbook also included “at will” language.
JD-10-19
14
withdrawn its petition and “he was going to fight to do everything that he could to still get
everybody to vote.” (Tr. 346.) He said he had taken the Forest Park facility out of the “Stone
Age” and removed the chains off the doors. Allen said he gave the employees a better work
opportunity and took away the break buffer. Jackson asked if the union came in, whether Allen
would put the chains back on the doors. Allen denied that he would do so, then introduced 5
Jackson as the local lodge president. At some point Allen called Lodge 776 “immoral, unethical
and un-American.”
In January 2017, Blaine attended a different all-hands meeting that Allen conducted.
Blaine testified that Allen read a statement in which he stated Lodge 776 withdrew its 10
representation petition and filed Board charges. Allen further stated he did not understand
where the Union got the number for recognition from; he then said the Union’s actions were
immoral, unethical and un-American. He also stated, “[T]he company would do anything in [its]
power to stop it from happening.” (Tr. 99.)
15
By certified letter dated January 9, 2017, Lodge 776 President Black sent Daniel notice
that it believed Respondent repudiated its bargaining relationship by moving most of the Forest
Park facility’s operations to the DFW Center, which continued the same operations. The Union
demanded to meet and bargain about the transfer of operation and alleged unilateral changes.
(GC Exh. 4.)20
On January 13, 2017, Daniel sent Black a letter stating that the parties already
negotiated over the Forest Park facility’s closure in 2015 and had further discussions in 2016
about Forest Park. Daniel stated Respondent received Lodge 776’s unit clarification petition on
January 10 and would use the Board processes to address Lodge 776’s issues. (GC Exh. 5.) 25
Contrary to Respondent’s reasons during negotiations that it could not recognize the union
because of possible legalities and numbers, Daniel now claimed the 2016 “local union
leadership at Forest Park” was told it would have no representational rights at DFW Center with
Forest Park employees transferring to that location. (GC Exh. 5.)
30
VII. 2017: AFTER DELAYS, RESPONDENT COMPLETES RELOCATING EMPLOYEES FROM FOREST
PARK TO DFW CENTER
Respondent encountered delays in transferring employees from Forest Park to DFW. It
moved by product lines. (Tr. 304.) Respondent’s January 4, 2017 seniority list reflected that 35
approximately 53 bargaining unit employees remained at Forest Park. (GC Exh. 23.) By late
March 2017, 30 bargaining unit employees, who primarily worked in test cell, remained at
Forest Park. (Tr. 466.)
Employees from Heritage Park and Forest Park were assigned to 13 departments. 40
Some of the departments reflected the product line and engine: Pratt Whitney and Honeywell
TFE from Heritage Park; and Rolls Royce Spey/Tay from Forest Park. The other areas
remaining are: accessory; cleaning; component repair; maintenance; NDI; preservation;
production; quality control; scheduling; test cell; and the warehouse.
45
When Blaine moved to DFW Center in 2017, he noted that much of the old equipment
from the Forest Park facility moved but some new equipment was present too. The shipping
and receiving department in DFW Center had newer workstations, shelving and electric power
jacks. Around January 2017, Blaine’s Forest Park supervisor, Ed Muccioli, moved into the
facilities maintenance and support role and Shannon Kancir became manager over the 50
shipping and receiving department. (Tr. 87-88.) Blaine stated the component repair and
JD-10-19
15
engine employees were a combination of employees from the Forest Park and Heritage Park
facilities. Blaine also noted that the plasma spray area had a new boost, which was an updated
version of the machines found in the Forest Park facility. Also updated were machine shop
equipment such as lathes and mills.
5
Respondent’s list, dated January 27, 2017, shows that 204 employees were working at
DFW Center. Of those on the list, none were listed as transferrees from Neosho or Love Field.
The split between Forest Park and Heritage Park transferees was approximately 147 to 47
employees respectively, or 72 percent of the total DFW Center employees relocated to from
Forest Park. (Jt. Exh. 23.) The shift in timing and movement of employees may be viewed in 10
a table, with the number of employees listed for each facility on specific dates:
September 2016 December 2016 January 2017
Forest Park 223 87 (-136) 78 (-9)
Love Field 34 38 38
Heritage Park 334 302 (-32) 287 (-15)
DFW Center 34 190 (+156) 198 (+8)
(Jt. Exh. 24.)19 In February 2017, Respondent relocated approximately 40 more Forest Park
employees to DFW Center, with the relocation completed in fall 2017. 15
By January 2017, in addition to the Rolls Royce Spey/Tay production line, the
employees relocated from Forest Park included accessory, cleaning, component repair,
maintenance, NDI, quality control, scheduling, test cell, warehouse, preservation and
production control. Respondent further listed what position each employee held by his new title, 20
not reflecting the variety of titles held at Forest Park. Excluding the component repair tech II
and inspector quality control positions in January 2017, Forest Park bargaining unit employees
held well over 50% of each of the positions. Heritage Park employees occupied the only 3
component tech II positions at DFW Center. Forest Park transferees held a significant number
of the approximately 60 component repair tech III, component repair tech, and component 25
repair lead positions. (Jt. Exh. 2.)20 Respondent’s witnesses and documents admitted that
these employees worked the same job functions in DFW Center as their previous locations.
(Tr. 291-292; Jt. Exh. 2.) In quality control, the supervisor was from Forest Park.
In January 2017, the maintenance department at DFW Center was comprised of 30
approximately 10 employees for Forest Park, 1 from Heritage Park and one without a listed pre-
existing location. (Jt. Exh. 2.) Some maintenance employees worked between the Forest
Park facility and DFW Center until at least March 2017. The Forest Park maintenance
employees now work at DFW Center. Of approximately 14 employees in DFW Center’s
accessory department, 11 came from Forest Park. Of approximately 8 employees in DFW 35
Center’s cleaning department, 6 came from Forest Park. Component Repair had 48
employees from Forest Park and approximately 18 from Heritage Park. Of the approximately 6
employees in DFW Center’s NDI, 5 were from Forest Park. By January 2017, Forest Park had
moved approximately 17 test cell employees into DFW Center and Heritage Park had not sent
any more, leaving it at approximately 3. Overall, in the departments other than the actual 40

19 Respondent generated both Jt. Exhs. 23 and 24. Respondent did not explain discrepancies.
20 Jt. Exh. 2 was prepared by Respondent; however, some of its entries are incorrect. For example,
Jackson is listed as a Heritage Park employee from, but continued to serve as Lodge 776 president and
apparently continued to have dues removed while he temporarily assisted there.
JD-10-19
16
production lines, Forest Park employees greatly outnumbered the relocated Heritage Park
employees in DFW Center.
When employee Jackson, the lodge president, returned to DFW Center, he worked in
the same job in quality control. Since working at DFW Center, he worked with quality control 5
employees from the other facilities. Frederick Andrews,21 a quality control inspector, transferred
on December 12, 2016 from Forest Park to DFW Center. He reviews logbooks and inspects
the Rolls Royce line, which he previously performed at Forest Park. He kept the same
supervisor after transfer. (Tr. 357.)
10
Jimmie LeFleur, a test cell technician, moved from Forest Park to DFW Center in
September 2017. (Tr. 128-129.) His supervisor first notified him about the transfer to DFW
Center about June 22, 2016. Although LeFleur’s transfer letter indicated he would move in
September 2016, LeFleur, a shop steward, did not move from Forest Park to DFW Center until
a year later. In about July or August 2017, before the transfer, LeFleur also was advised he 15
might be required to make other changes upon transfer.
When LeFleur transferred to DFW Center in December 2017, Respondent reassigned
him to a different shift. He continued to hold his lead position for two months at DFW Center,
then was advised that he would no longer be working as the lead. He continued to work in the 20
test cell department and worked with the same people on his shift. Heritage Park transferees
also worked in the test cell department. Blaine never received a handbook for policies at DFW
and asked how an employee could be disciplined for attendance if the employees had no
knowledge of what the policies were.
25
By the time of the hearing in June 2018, the Pratt lines, inventory support, K2 support
and some component repair moved into DFW Center from Heritage Park. (Tr. 105.)
Respondent advised that it intended to move the remaining Heritage Park work to DFW Center,
but still had not done so. The mezzanine, previously built at Heritage Center, was supposed to
be moved to DFW Center. 30
On November 20, 2017, Huddleston filed a grievance regarding an alleged unjust
termination with Respondent. (GC Exh. 20.) A week later, Daniel sent to Huddleston an email
stating that it would not process the grievance until the issues with the Board were resolved.
(GC Exh. 21.) 35
Respondent’s plans for transferring from different facilities to DFW Center changed so
many times that Allen could not recall how many versions Respondent had. One of
Respondent’s plans was to move all remaining Love Field and Heritage Park employees to
DFW Center by the end of 2017. Allen, who was no longer employed by Respondent but 40
allowed access approximately 2 months before the hearing (April 2018), testified that these
plans had not come to fruition. (Tr. 258.) The Rotorcraft, APU and PW100 lines remained at
Heritage Park.
At the time of hearing, in June 2018, Respondent intended to move employees from 45
Heritage Park to DFW Center. In reviewing CP Exh. 1, a biweekly time record beginning May
28, 2018 and ending June 10, 2018, a document that Respondent provided, Blaine noted that a
number of the employees listed on his group leader report included Rotorcraft employees who
still worked at Heritage Park, not DFW Center. No Respondent witness contradicted Blaine’s

21 Andrews also served as recording secretary for Lodge 776.
JD-10-19
17
review. Thus, Daniel’s claim that in early June 2018, the percentage of employees at DFW
Center from Forest Park was between 50 to 51 percent was not correct. The Heritage Park
product lines Respondent planned to be move were the PW100 engines, Rotorcraft, and
auxiliary power units, which would decrease the percentage of Forest Park employees at DFW
Center. (Tr. 478.) Daniel also testified that the product lines operate independently. 5
VIII. ALLEGED UNILATERAL CHANGES FOR THE FOREST PARK EMPLOYEES
In the process of moving Forest Park employees to DFW Center, Respondent changed
a number of the terms and conditions. Some, but not all, employees were provided with an 10
employee handbook with an effective date of 2011-2012. (Jt. Exh. 8.) These changes included
differences in discipline and discharge procedures, rules of conduct, job security, hours of work,
shift schedules, reporting and call-back pay, temporary assignment, job selection and posting
of positions, transfers and promotions, health and safety, and union dues check off.
15
Lodge 776 discovered the change in check off when it no longer received dues
payments. Blaine found that his dues stopped upon transfer, on September 4, 2017. The dues
reports confirm Respondent stopped dues deductions for all employees, except the employees
continuing to work at least some time at Forest Park.
20
Lodge 776, previously permitted access at the Forest Park facility, was deprived of
access to DFW Center. The collective-bargaining agreement provided overtime for any time
exceeding 8 hours per day, double-time for Sunday or any hours worked exceeding 12 hours,
time and a half for Saturdays. The DFW Center rules paid overtime for over 40 hours per week
and double time for over 60 hours per week, and sick leave and jury duty will not count towards 25
the amount needed to incur overtime. (Tr. 93-94, 271.) Vacation pay changed, as well as how
employees were awarded their raises. (Tr. 279.) Seniority no longer applied.22 DFW Center
has a health safety committee that differs from the contractual provisions, which required an
equal number of management and union representatives on the committee. (Tr. 345.)
Employees no longer had access to the contractual grievance procedure at DFW Center and 30
Respondent instead instituted an open door policy. Respondent did not notify or bargain with
Lodge 776 about these changes.
IX. RESPONDENT ESTABLISHES THE “AMBASSADORS”
35
In spring 2016, Allen and HR Manager Hanes created positions called “ambassadors.”
Ambassadors were located at all Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex locations, including Forest Park.
Starting in September 2016, the ambassadors for the facilities held telephone conferences to
discuss issues. Respondent also allowed employees to select among employee volunteers for
positions called “ambassadors.” The ambassador committees were never presented to Lodge 40
776.
Allen later testified that employees were asked to volunteer based upon whether they
demonstrated leadership abilities and had shown a desire to participate, and both managers
and other employees identified potential ambassadors. 45
Jackson, who served as an ambassador while continuing to work at Forest Park in
2016, testified that the duties of the ambassadors were to “be leader leaders for the people, to

22 Respondent regularly provided seniority lists to Lodge 776 representatives, in accordance with the
provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement. See, e.g., GC Exh. 23 and Tr. 378.
JD-10-19
18
get information back to them, let them be aware of what’s going on every step of the way
through the process.” (Tr. 339.) If the team had questions about an area, the ambassadors
obtained answers and advised the employees in the shop. Jackson understood that his role
as ambassador was not one as a “union.” (Tr. 341.)
5
Respondent conducted ambassador meetings once or twice per month per
teleconference with the various locations. The ambassadors sat on committees with
managers. Meeting topics included safety issues and break times. Allen sat in for
approximately 75 percent of the meetings to delegate work to the ambassadors. (Tr. 273-274.)
Allen maintained the meetings were for communication, corporate and social responsibility and 10
provided some leadership training “to partner with the workforce.”
During one conference call in 2016, a Heritage Park employee said no one wanted a
union at that location and he was speaking for everyone. Jackson was on that call. After some
further heated exchanges with the Heritage Park employee, Jackson answered that every 15
person was able to make up his or her own mind. HR Manager Hanes, who was sitting with
Jackson, eventually was able to redirect the conversation back to other topics. Later, Allen
told the ambassadors, including Jackson, that the union would not be discussed in the
ambassador meetings. (Tr. 342.)
20
By the time of the hearing, Respondent no longer held ambassador meetings.
However, it was soliciting employees by email to become new ambassadors. (Tr. 352.)
CREDIBILITY
25
Of the Respondent witnesses who testified, only Daniel remained currently employed.
Daniel’s testimony as an adverse witness was vague. However, Respondent recalled him for
its case in chief. Much of this testimony was driven by contemporaneous communications and
bargaining notes, which were usually more credible than the other testimony provided. I find
that he is partially credited, particularly where contemporaneous documents supported his 30
testimony.
Allen’s recall regarding the all-hands meetings was vague and he frequently could not
recall when certain statements were made or when product lines were moved from one location
to another. He also testified contradictorily about how busy the Rolls Royce line was: He first 35
testified that the business waxed and waned and was likely to decrease because of the age of
the engines, yet his affidavit contradicted him. (Tr. 263.) Regarding the percentage of former
Forest Park employees who were supervised by the same supervisor, he tried to generalize to
the manager, then was impeached with his affidavit that over 60 percent had the same
supervisor. 40
Nandu Madireddi was called twice in General Counsel’s case in chief, and returned for
Respondent’s case in chief. During Respondent’s case, he engaged in several lengthy
narratives alternately with leading questions. He frequently couched testimony about the 2014
negotiations with warnings of how long ago it was and that he did not have access to any 45
documents before testifying. He was not sure of when he left Respondent’s employ, but most
of the testimony supports that he left in 2015, after the Closure Agreement was negotiated. He
remains disturbed about leaving Respondent’s employ and alluded to the time after his
dismissal as a dark period, which seemed to affect his memory. I find that information he
provided about movements in the product lines after he left Respondent’s employ relied upon 50
JD-10-19
19
others Respondent employees who shared information with him is hearsay; I therefore do not
credit that testimony.
Regarding Black, Lodge 776 used a number of leading questions on direct examination,
which limits the credibility of those answers. I credit that Respondent failed to notify him about 5
the en masse relocation of the bargaining unit. Huddleston had first-hand knowledge of the
negotiations, but did not have available any bargaining notes. He admitted he may not have
participated in all of the discussions and that the discussions were “foggy.” Some of
Huddleston’s discussions of negotiations were fleshed out with the bargaining team and
Respondent’s bargaining notes.10
Jackson, despite some leading questions and some possible discrepancies on when all
hands meetings were held in 2016, demonstrated his knowledge of the events and is generally
credited. However, I do not rely upon Jackson’s testimony that Respondent notified “union
officials” of the upcoming Forest Park transfers in the summer of 2016; he did not identify who 15
the union officials were, and the overwhelming evidence shows that Respondent did not notify
Huddleston or Black.
ANALYSIS
20
I. SECTION 8(A)(5) ALLEGED WITHDRAWAL OF RECOGNITION OF THE FOREST PARK
BARGAINING UNIT
In examining whether Respondent unlawfully withdrew recognition and the alleged
unilateral changes, I first deal with the Forest Park bargaining unit. Because I find that 25
Respondent was required to recognize and bargain with Lodge 776 for the Forest Park
bargaining unit and Lodge 776 did not waive its rights for representation, the following section
will deal with accretion of the other employees who transferred from the other locations.
A. Applicable Law30
The question is whether Respondent must recognize and bargain with Lodge 776 when
it relocated the majority of the Forest Park bargaining unit and product lines to DFW Center. A
long-held two-prong test determines whether the employer must recognize and apply the
collective bargaining agreement at the site where the represented employees were transferred:35
1. The operations at the new facility are substantially the same as those at the old
facility; and,
2. The transferres from the old plant constitute a substantial percentage, usually 40 40
percent or greater, of the new plant employees.
Harte & Co., 278 NLRB 947, 948-949 (1986), citing: Westwood Import Co., 251 NLRB 1213,
1214 (1980), enfd. 681 F.2d 664 (9th Cir. 1982); General Extrusion Co., 121 NLRB 1165, 1167-
1168 (1958); Marine Optical, 255 NLRB 1241, 1245 (1981), enfd. 671 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1982). 45
The test is applied on the date when the transfer process is “substantially completed.” Harte,
278 at 949.
B. The Parties’ Positions
50
1. General Counsel and Lodge 776
JD-10-19
20
Neither party contests Respondent’s need to relocate employees from Forest Park.
General Counsel contends that Lodge 776 retained its right to represent the employees at DFW
Center.
5
Lodge 776 suggests that, despite having a legitimate reason for the transfers,
Respondent seized upon it to withdraw recognition. Lodge 776 contends that it would have
never agreed to the 2014 or 2015 Forest Park Agreements if it knew Respondent intended to
transfer all Forest Park employees to one location. It further notes Respondent never notified
Black or Huddleston about the transfers to Forest Park. It claims that Respondent officially 10
withdrew recognition through Daniel’s January 13, 2017 letter in response to the demand for
recognition. As of January 13, 2017, the former Forest Park employees constituted a majority of
the employees at DFW Center and their work was unchanged. Accordingly, Respondent had
an obligation to recognize the union and apply the collective bargaining agreement, which was
still in effect. Further, the existence of a valid collective bargaining agreement created a 15
contract bar at that time, meaning that Lodge 776 presumptively was the majority
representative of the bargaining unit employees. (CP Br. at 35-36.)
2. Respondent
20
Respondent contends that the 2016 and 2017 Forest Park bargaining unit employee
transfers to DFW Center are controlled by the 2015 Closure Agreement, which was in effect
until the Forest Park facility closed completely. It relies upon the language that employees
would be relocated to “a facility in the DFW Metroplex.” Although Respondent was not sure of
the future location of the Forest Park product lines during 2015 negotiations, DFW Center was 25
within the DFW Metroplex; Respondent was within its rights to move employees to that site
without further negotiation. Respondent did not make unilateral changes to wages, hours and
terms and conditions of employment because Respondent followed the conditions set forth in
the 2015 Closure Agreement. This Closure Agreement did not require any further notice to
Lodge 776 to consolidate at DFW Center, and Lodge 776 officers had notice. Respondent 30
stated, “That the Union was not given formal notice is not relevant to the issues in this matter.”
(R. Br. at 16.) The length of the closure process also is not controlling because of the
complexity and safety issues to overhaul the engines.
Respondent distinguished the matter at hand with other cases that also sought Section 35
8(a)(3) violations. However, Respondent notes it met with Lodge 776 regarding the closure of
Forest Park and transfer and/or layoff of the bargaining unit employees. Respondent suggests
that Lodge 776’s demand for recognition, taking place in mid-January 2017, was premature; if
anything, the complement of employees now at DFW Center is the correct measure of the
number of employees in the facility, and now the Forest Park employees are not the majority. 40
The Forest Park bargaining unit was relocated 10 miles away to DFW Center and Respondent
does not contend that the distance is an issue.
C. Application of Harte and Central Soya
45
At this point, I examine whether the moves into DFW Center were relocation only, or
relocation and consolidation. See Central Soya Co., 281 NLRB 1308, 1309-1309 (1986), affd.
867 F.2d 1245 (10th Cir. 1988) (Board finds relocation and consolidation). Although Central
Soya, supra, differentiates Harte as only a relocation, Harte’s basic test is important to
determine whether the Forest Park employees directly transferred to DFW remain a valid unit. 50
JD-10-19
21
1. Using Harte, the Forest Park bargaining unit remains intact and must be recognized
a. The operations at the new facility are substantially the same as those at the
old facility
5
The first issue, continuity, focuses on whether the retained employees understand that
their job situations are essentially unaltered. Leach Corp. v. NLRB, 54 F.3d 802 809 (D.C. Cir.
1995), enfg. 312 NLRB 990 (1993). The analysis examines whether Respondent kept same
operational methods, managers, customers and services or products. It also examines
“changes in size, makeup or the identity of the employees complement.” King Soopers, Inc. v. 10
NLRB, 254 F.3d 738, 743 (8th Cir. 2001), enfg. 332 NLRB 32 (2000). Also see NLRB v.
Gaylord Chemical Co, LLC, 824 F.3d 1318, 1325 (11th Cir. 2016), enfg. 361 NLRB 771 (2014),
adopting as modified 358 NLRB 525 (2012).23
Allen admitted that the jobs functions were primarily the same as Forest Park. The15
functions performed by the Forest Park employees at DFW Center were identical in every way,
including the type of aircraft engines on which they worked and the customers they served.
Despite some updates of the equipment, most of the equipment was the same and the tasks
did not change. NLRB v. Gaylord Chemical Co., LLC, 824 F.3d 1318, 1326 (11th Cir. 2016),
enfg. 361 NLRB 771 fn. 1 (2014), incorp. by reference 358 NLRB 771 (2014). Other than 20
orientation to the facility, employees apparently had no new instruction on their tasks and no
change in processes of refurbishment of the engines. The Forest Park employees were
advised on their transfer letters that their managers would remain the same. Respondent
further admitted that at least 60 percent of the transferred Forest Park employees retained the
same manager.24 Because the functions are the same and operations essentially had no 25
changes, the Forest Park jobs were relocated to DFW Center. Central Soya, 281 NLRB at
1309. Thus, the first prong of Harte is proven.
b. The transferees from the old plant constitute a substantial percentage,
usually 40 percent or greater, of the new plant employees 30
Regarding the second prong of Harte, the Forest Park employees represented a
substantial percentage of the employees working at DFW by January 2017. Although the
standard only requires 40 percent or greater, here the number was 72 percent, significantly
more than the requirement. This high percentage further demonstrates continuity in the 35
workforce. NLRB v. Gaylord Chemical, 824 F.3d at 1316. The date of substantial completion
determines when Respondent should have recognized and bargained with Lodge 776.25 That
time is January 13, 2017 and no later.26

23 Gaylord, 361 NLRB 771 adopted the ALJ’s findings from 358 NLRB 525 and issued a new Order.
24 Respondent contends that the record shows no proof of consistent management after Forest Park
relocation. However, testimony and documents show otherwise.
25 Although Respondent does not contend that Lodge 776 lost majority support, the record also
reflects that well over a majority of the Forest Park employees were union members before transfer.
26 For the numerous reasons stated, I find it unnecessary to rely upon the contract bar argument.
However, should I be found incorrect about Lodge 776 waiving its rights to set terms and conditions of
employment upon moving, the contract bar would apply as stated in NLRB v. Rock Bottom Stores, Inc.,
51 F.3d at 370:
. . . Under the Board's long-standing contract bar rule, “if an employer and a union
have entered into a collective bargaining agreement, the agreement constitutes a bar to
the holding of a representation election for the life of the agreement, up to a maximum of
JD-10-19
22
Respondent incorrectly contends that Lodge 776’s mid-January 2017 demand for
recognition was premature as Respondent had more employees from all facilities to move to
DFW Center. Respondent contends that Harte and other cases emphasize the “existence and
ongoing applicability of a collective bargaining agreement related to the represented facility 5
whose workforce has been relocated.” (R. Br. at 19.) Relying on Gitano Distribution Center,
308 NLRB 1172 (1992), Respondent contends that these employees had no collective
bargaining agreement and therefore this matter is distinguished from Harte, supra, Westwood,
supra, and Rock Bottom Stores, 312 NLRB 400 (1993), enfd. 51 F.3d 366 (2nd Cir. 1995). and
Rock Bottom Stores, supra. However, the Board found Gitano, in which only a partial transfer 10
of the bargaining unit occurred, did not apply when an employer relocates an entire bargaining
unit to a new facility. Rock Bottom Stores, 312 NLRB at 402. In 2016, Respondent moved
almost the entire Forest Park workforce in stages to DFW Center. By early January 2017, the
relocated Forest Park bargaining unit became the majority of the employees at DFW Center
and has remained that way. Indeed, Respondent moved the entire Forest Park workforce to 15
DFW Center. As discussed in Rock Bottom, Respondent’s reliance upon Gitano for this portion
of the analysis is not applicable.
D. The Bargaining Unit Consisting of Forest Park Employees Remained an Appropriate
Unit 20
I find that the entire Forest Park bargaining unit, whether located at DFW Center or
Forest Park, remains appropriate. The relocated bargaining unit remains an appropriate
bargaining unit and the union, here Lodge 776, retains its representative status. United
Steelworkers of America AFL-CIO-CLC, Local #7912, 338 NLRB 29 (2002) (respondent union 25
violated §8(b)(3) when it refused to bargain with employer about transferred unit), citing Gitano,
308 NLRB at 1175. An employer cannot duck its obligations on effects bargaining, like the
transfer of employees, “by waiting until after the change has taken place and then claiming that
the bargaining unit is no longer viable.” Dodge of Naperville, Inc. v. NLRB, 796 F.3d 31, 37,
reh’g en banc denied (D.C. Cir. 2015), enfg. 357 NLRB 2252 (2012). Respondent has the 30
burden of proof to show this unit is no longer appropriate by showing compelling circumstances
overriding a lengthy bargaining history. ADT Security Service Inc., 355 NLRB 1388, 1396
(2010), enfd. 689 F.3d 628 (6th Cir. 2012).

three years.” NLRB v. Arthur Sarnow Candy Co., 40 F.3d 552, 557 (2d Cir.1994); see
also Westwood, 681 F.2d at 666; NLRB v. Marine Optical, Inc., 671 F.2d 11, 16 (1st
Cir.1982). The rule applies in the absence of unusual circumstances, Westwood, 681
F.2d at 666, and is intended to promote industrial peace by stabilizing, for a reasonable
term, a contractual relationship between employer and union. Arthur Sarnow Candy, 40
F.3d at 557; Corallo v. Merrick Cent. Carburetor, Inc., 733 F.2d 248, 252 (2d Cir. 1984).
Thus, the rule applies even when a union has lost majority support. See Harbor Carriers
v. NLRB, 306 F.2d 89, 92 (2d Cir.1962), cert. denied sub nom. Deck Scow Captains
Local 335 v. Harbor Carriers, 372 U.S. 917 (1963); NLRB v. Marcus Trucking Co., 286
F.2d 583, 593 (2d Cir.1961). The rule prohibits employers from petitioning the Board for
decertification of a union and from repudiating the contract or withdrawing recognition
from and refusing to bargain with a union during the term of the collective bargaining
agreement. Marine Optical, 671 F.2d at 16.
A workplace relocation is not the kind of “unusual circumstance” that prevents
application of the contract bar rule. . . .
For the bargaining unit transferring from Forest Park, the collective bargaining agreement did not
expire until March 2018, well over a year after a majority of the transfers occurred.
JD-10-19
23
Beyond the relocation of the unit Respondent does not prove circumstances that
demonstrate a significant change for the Forest Park employees. Respondent admits the
production workers, who are the majority of the transferees, remained segregated from other
production areas. The parties also had bargaining history of about 50 years. 5
The closure of one facility does not make the unit repugnant under Board policy. ADT
Security Service, 355 NLRB at 1388. Nor does Respondent state any circumstances that
overcome the significant length of bargaining history. The integrity of the Forest Park
bargaining unit remained intact. In re Comar, 339 NLRB at 903 fn. 2.10
Because the unit remained intact, Respondent had an obligation to recognize and
bargain with Lodge 776. Instead, Respondent refused to recognize the transferred unit and
unlawfully withdrew recognition from an established bargaining unit at the relocation site. The
date on which Respondent officially withdrew recognition is the date on which it ultimately 15
stated such to Lodge 776 --- Daniel’s letter of January 13, 2017. I therefore find that
Respondent relocated the Forest Park bargaining unit as a whole with the same duties and at
the same time found an opportunity to “rid itself of the Union” and its obligations under the
collective bargaining agreement with an unlawful withdrawal of recognition. In re Comar, 339
NLRB at 911. Also see Central Soya, 281 NLRB at 1310 (“In these circumstances, the 20
Respondent should not be allowed to capitalize on the relocation . . . to justify terminating its
long-term bargaining relationship with the majority representative.”)27
E. Lodge 776 Did Not Waive Its Right to Represent the Bargaining Unit
25
Transferred employees’ rights to continued representation by their bargaining agent is a
statutory right and any waiver of such right must be clear and unmistakable. King Soopers, Inc.
v. NLRB, 254 F.3d at 743. Nothing in the bargaining records or testimony reflects that the 2015
Closure Agreement, which superceded the 2014 agreement, included an agreement by Lodge
776 to waive its rights to recognition at a single facility. When the parties entered the 30
agreement, Respondent had no knowledge of where most Forest Park employees would be
moved, much less to a single facility. Huddleston did not pursue Lodge 776’s demand for
recognition for movement of employees does not constitute a waiver, particularly in light of
Respondent’s contention that it did not know whether the bargaining unit would exist at any
given facility. See generally Randolph Children’s Home, 309 NLRB 341, 343 (1992). 35
Where an employer either misleads a union or purposefully keeps it uninformed about
relocation, it cannot conclude that the union waived its rights to represent the bargaining unit.
Waymouth Farms, Inc., 324 NLRB 960, 963 (1997), enf. in rel. part 172 F.3d 598, 600 (8th Cir.
2001). To make transfer bargaining meaningful, the employer should notify the union of the 40
“when and where.” Waymouth Farms, 324 NLRB at 963. Respondent did not do so.
Respondent failed to notify Huddleston when it made its decision in 2016 to move
Forest Park employees to a single facility. A change in location of work, particularly one of this
magnitude, is material and significant. Respondent contends it had no reason to notify 45
Huddleston about consolidating all facilities at DFW Center because the 2015 Closure
Agreement said the Forest Park employees would be moved to a facility within the DFW
Metroplex. However, Respondent did not actually follow the 2015 Closure Agreement, which
required posting of positions, and instead determined to transfer the entire Forest Park

27 Respondent’s refusal to meet regarding grievances is a refusal to bargain.
JD-10-19
24
employees to DFW Center. Respondent’s change in the terms of the 2015 Closure Agreement
constitutes a unilateral change as Respondent did not contact Huddleston. McGraw-Hill
Broadcasting Co., Inc., 355 NLRB 1283, 1285-1286 (2010).
At the time of negotiations in 2015, Respondent admittedly did not know where the 5
Forest Park employees were going. Respondent’s witnesses admitted they did not know how
many different plans were put forth for transfers; Respondent admits and I find that the plans
were fluid and changed frequently. In the 2015 negotiations, Huddleston did not push his
demands for recognition at the new facility to impasse; Respondent stated its reasons for not
agreeing to recognition at the time were its uncertainty in where Forest Park employees would 10
be moved in the future and did not want to risk an unlawful agreement. This does not a waiver
make as it is not clear or unmistakable and Respondent’s position about transfers changed so
frequently.
In mid-2016, when Respondent made its decision to move the entire Forest Park 15
functions to DFW Center, the situation constituted changed circumstances and required
Respondent to notify and, upon request, bargain. See generally Redway Carriers, 301 NLRB
1113, 1121 (1991). Notification to employees in the bargaining unit, such as Jackson, does not
constitute sufficient notice, particularly when Respondent knew that the employees on the
bargaining team could not bind the union. See, e.g., Palm Beach Metro Transportation, LLC, 20
357 NLRB 180, 183 (2011), enfd. 459 Fed. Appx. 874 (11th Cir. 2012) (respondent employer
notified employees of layoff but not certified bargaining representative insufficient).
Instead, by mid-2016, Respondent had meaningful information about the relocation.
Respondent admittedly did not notify Huddleston because it did not want to be bothered after 25
2015 and additionally determined in mid-2016 it would not recognize Lodge 776 upon transfer
to DFW Center. It did not inform Huddleston, the Local 776 official with binding authority, and
the evidence points to Respondent purposefully avoiding any obligation to advise Huddleston of
the transfer’s “when and where.” Even Respondent’s 2016 email communication to Huddleston
was couched in terms of Forest Park closure only and said nothing of the relocation. In doing 30
so, Respondent precluded meaningful bargaining about the effects of transferring all bargaining
unit employees to a single location, DFW Center, instead of dispersing employees between
Heritage Park and Love Field. Waymouth, supra.
Lodge 776 also did not waive recognition due to the collective bargaining agreement 35
unit description, which contains the specific location of the Forest Park facility. This situation is
analogous to Comar, Inc., 339 NLRB 903, 912 (2003), enfd. 111 Fed.Appx. 1 (D.C. Cir. 2004):
The unit was described by jobs in a specific company division and no other employees without
geographic limitation. The administrative law judge determined that the unit was intact and the
division only relocated, so the recognition clause was not a valid defense to the alleged 40
violations. As Lodge 776 did not include specific language to limit the Forest Park bargaining
unit to only that location, it is not a waiver of its representational rights for the Forest Park unit
at DFW Center. Id.
Lastly, Lodge 776 did not waive its rights through Respondent’s transfer letters, which 45
Respondent required Forest Park employees to sign to be able to move to DFW Center.
Respondent did not discuss the terms in these letters with Huddleston. Respondent’s
agreement to effectuate the transfer for the individual Forest Park employees included “at will”
language. The official bargaining representative, Huddleston and Lodge 776, had no say in
agreeing to “at will” language and Respondent admittedly did not notify Huddleston. 50
Respondent’s 2016 transfer letters, which were not negotiated with Huddleston, conditions
JD-10-19
25
employee acceptance of transfer to DFW Center upon an “at will” employment relationship----in
other words, the represented transferee from Forest Park must decline union representation for
acceptance at DFW Center. This language creates a “yellow dog” contract. The “yellow dog”
contract is “a private agreement between an employee and employer, where the employee
promises not to join, become or remain a member of any labor organization.” M&M Affordable 5
Plumbing, Inc., 362 NLRB No. 159, slip op. at 6 fn. 10 (2015), citing First Legal Support
Services, 342 NLRB 350, 362 (2004). Also see Carlisle Lumber Co., 2 NLRB 248, 263-268
(1937), enfd. as modified, 94 F.2d 138 (9th Cir. 1937), cert. denied 304 U.S. 575 (1938). Such
terminology reinforces Respondent’s admission that it did not want to deal with Lodge 776 after
the 2015 Closure Agreement and does not prove Lodge 776 unmistakably waived its rights to 10
represent the Forest Park bargaining unit when it transferred to DFW Center.
II. ARE EMPLOYEES FROM OTHER FACILITIES ACCRETED INTO THE BARGAINING UNIT AT
DFW CENTER?
15
As I have determined that the Forest Park bargaining unit continues to exist at DFW
Center, I must address whether the other employees at DFW Center belong in that unit as well
as a consolidation, stated in Central Soya, supra.
A. Applicable Law for Accretion20
Accretion is defined as “the addition of a relatively small group of employees to an
existing unit where these additional employees share a community of interest with the unit and
employees and have no separate identity.” Safety Carrier, Inc., 306 NLRB 960, 969 (1992).
Accretion may be examined when facing a “merged workforce” and a possible community of 25
interest. International Longshore & Warehouse Union v. NLRB, 890 F.3d 1100, 1111 (D.C. Cir.
2018). New employees who enter employment within the bargaining unit are presumptively
within the bargaining unit because they have little or no separate group identify and would not
be an appropriate unit. Sara Lee Bakery Group, Inc. v. NLRB, 296 F.3d 292, 297 (4th Cir.
2002), citing Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 786 (1996) and Baltimore Sun Co. v. 30
NLRB, 257 F.3d 419, 427 (4th Cir. 2001).
Accretion may occur when a new group of employees, beyond the existing bargaining
unit, develops after recognition or during the term of a collective bargaining agreement. Kaiser
Foundation Hospitals, 343 NLRB 57, 64 (2004). To wait to make a determination when all 35
employees transferred, Respondent must prove that, at the time of withdrawal of recognition,
Respondent had a well-defined plan or timetable to achieve fuller functional integrations. In re
Comar, Inc., 339 NLRB 903, 910 (2003), enfd. 111 Fed. Appx. 1 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
The accretion policy is applied restrictively because accreted employees are deprived of 40
the choice of whether they wish to be represented by a labor organization, balanced against
maintaining industrial peace. Frontier Telephone of Rochester, Inc., 344 NLRB 1270, 1271
(2005), enfd. 181 Fed. Appx. 85 (2d Cir. 2006). Doubts about whether the additional
employees share an overwhelming community of interest with an existing unit are resolved in
favor of the election process. NLRB v. Superior Protection, Inc., 401 F.3d 282, 288 (5th Cir. 45
2005), cert. denied 546 U.S. 874 (2005). Accretion should not be forced when the employees
sought may constitute an appropriate unit themselves. In re Comar, 339 NLRB at 910.
Further, if the number of employees in the “group to be accreted overshadows the number of
employees in the existing unit,” accretion is not the answer. NLRB v. Superior Protection, 401
F.3d at 288-289. These restrictions on accretion preclude cutting off employees’ rights. 50
Comar, supra.
JD-10-19
26
In a situation such as Harte, supra, the Board emphasized it analyzed that it must
balance the interests of any newly hired employees against the transferees’ interests in
retaining representation. Harte, 278 NLRB at 950. These interests were: no one contended
that any delay in the transfer was designed to frustrate the representational interests of the new 5
employees in the new facility; the period to complete transfers was not unreasonable given the
size and complexity of the employer’s operations and an unexpected surge of orders;
acquisition of the new facility was a pre-condition before any transfers could occur and the
employer was not planning on continuing operations at the old facility while operating the new
facility; and, no other union competed for claims in the new facility. Harte, 278 NLRB at 950. 10
Lastly, “national labor policy favors industrial stability achieved through the collective-bargaining
process.” Harte, 278 NLRB at 950, citing Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U.S. 574,
578 (1960).
For the non-bargaining unit employees to be accreted into the bargaining unit, the 15
additional employees must have little or no separate group identity and share an overwhelming
community of interest with the pre-existing unit. Sara Lee Bakery Group, Inc. v. NLRB, 296
F.3d 292, 297 (4th Cir. 2002). The traditional community of interest factors applied include:
“functional integration, level of management control, similarity of working conditions, bargaining
history, employee interchange, job skills and functions, and physical proximity.” In re Comar, 20
supra, citing NLRB v. Food Employers Council, Inc., 399 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1968). Employee
interchange and common day-to-day supervision receive particular emphasis. Gitano, 308
NLRB at 1174.
3. Discussion25
I have already determined that the Forest Park unit, as transferred to DFW Center,
remains appropriate. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Buffalo, 325 NLRB at 313. I now discuss
whether Respondent had a well-defined plan to move the employees from the other facilities. If
Respondent had a definite plan, I would use the date of the transfers into DFW Center, which 30
Respondent claims was later in 2018. This determination fixes the date on which the accretion
analysis should take place.
As part of the accretion analysis, I revisit the employee numbers for departments to
determine whether the Forest Park bargaining unit employees comprised majorities in certain 35
departments. I then turn to whether the employees from the other facilities have little or no
separate group identity and whether the groups share an overwhelming community of interest.
See, e.g., Baltimore Sun Co. v. NLRB, 257 F.3d at 427-428.28
a. Did Respondent have a well-defined plan to move the other employees from 40
other facilities?
I first consider whether Respondent had a well-defined plan to move in the remaining
employees from Heritage Park and Love Field. See Comar, supra. If so, the remainder of the
discussion would be moot. In examining whether Respondent presented objective factors to 45
show it had a well-defined plan or timeable to achieve full integration, I find none. Northland
Hub, Inc., 304 NLRB 665, 677 (1991), enfd. mem. 29 F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 1994).

28 The Board has not overruled the “overwhelming community of interest” standard for accretions.
Compare PCC Structurals, Inc., 365 NLRB No. 160 (2017).
JD-10-19
27
Respondent admits it required a number of delays to complete transfers into DFW
Center. (R.Br. at 16-17.) Given the number of iterations, Respondent’s plans have always
been fluid. Allen could not recall all the different phases or the number of plans. Even by the
time of hearing, approximately 1 ½ years after Respondent withdrew recognition of the majority
of the Forest Park bargaining unit located at DFW Center, Respondent still had not moved all 5
employees from Heritage Park. Respondent admitted difficulties in moving the different product
lines and obtaining FAA certifications. The majority of the Forest Park bargaining unit was in
place at DFW Center for over 1 ½ years by the time of hearing and was still the majority of
employees. I therefore must find that Respondent did not have well-defined plans regarding
moving employees from other locations when Respondent unlawfully withdrew recognition in 10
January 2017. The remainder of the accretion analysis therefore takes place in January 2017,
when Respondent refused to bargain with Lodge 776.
b. Do the proposed accretions have little or no separate group identity and thus
cannot be considered a separate appropriate unit? If so, do the subject 15
employees share an overwhelming community of interest with the bargaining
unit to which they would be accreted?
As previously noted, a significant majority of the employees at DFW Center were
relocated from Forest Park. The table above shows that, between October 2016 and January 20
2017, Forest Park’s employee complement decreased by 145. In addition to the Rolls Royce
Spey/Tay production line, the employees relocated from Forest Park included accessory,
cleaning, component repair, maintenance, NDI, quality control, scheduling, test cell,
warehouse, scheduling, preservation and production control. By January 2017, Heritage Park
had transferred 35 Honeywell TFE employees, plus 35 employees for test cell and component 25
repair. Relying on Respondent’s documentation at the end of January 2017, those employees
were significantly outnumbered by the Forest Park relocated employees.
The former Forest Park employees were now in the same job descriptions as the
Heritage Park employees, so except for the work performed in the separate product lines, the 30
other departments should not be considered separately. They were required to have the same
skills and job qualifications. The maps shown during the DFW Center tours of summer 2016
also reflect that each department had its own specific location within the new facility. Anecdotal
evidence shows these employees shared working areas. Nothing reflects that within these
departments the individuals were located according to previous working site. As I have decided 35
that Respondent was permitted to apply the terms and conditions already in place at DFW
when the Forest Park employees were relocated, they shared the same working conditions and
terms of employment. Logically, the former Heritage Park employees had to share supervision
with the former Forest Park employees because Respondent admitted that 60 percent of the
Forest Park supervisors were still in position. I therefore find that, in addition to the production 40
and maintenance employees relocated from Forest Park, the employees in the following
departments shared an overwhelming community of interest and are accreted into the
bargaining unit: accessory, cleaning, component repair, maintenance, NDI, quality control,
scheduling, test cell, warehouse, scheduling, preservation and production control.
45
For the product lines, such as Honeywell TFE and Rolls Royce Spey/Tay, which
relocated respectively from Heritage Park and Forest Park, the evidence reflects that all
production workers evince similar skill requirements, as noted by the common job descriptions
for employees adopted by Respondent for all locations. Factors favoring accretion include that
the lines are within the same building and therefore close geographically; the human resources 50
and management functions are centralized at the DFW Center location; and, terms and
JD-10-19
28
condition of employment are dictated for all by the handbook. The group identity, however,
remains tied to the product line. For the production workers on the different lines, I find that
interchange between the specific product lines is limited to those employees that transferred
from Forest Park to Heritage Park and Love Field in 2014 and 2015. The employees assigned
to each production line primarily remains assigned to that production line. Although General 5
Counsel and Lodge 776 prove the employees possibly could be moved and the work is similar,
each line has its own schematics and requires familiarization with the process. Anecdotal
testimony reflects that 3 employees from a different line came for about 3 weeks to the Rolls
Royce line and only one stayed. This evidence is insufficient to prove an overwhelming
community of interest for the engine product lines. I therefore find that the Honeywell product 10
line employees do not share an overwhelming community of interest with the relocated Forest
Park employees and are therefore excluded from the bargaining unit.
Therefore, the appropriate unit is:
15
All production, maintenance and warehouse employees located at Respondent’s Forest
Park and DFW Center facilities, excluding production employees in the Honeywell TFE line, all
other employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
III. UNILATERAL CHANGES: DOES THE FOREST PARK COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 20
APPLY TO THE 2016-2017 RELOCATED EMPLOYEES
In most circumstances, the Forest Park collective bargaining agreement would apply to
the Forest Park bargaining unit when transferred. However, Respondent contends that it was
privileged to make changes because of the plain language in the 2015 Closure Agreement, 25
which it negotiated in good faith with Lodge 776.
A. Case Law Usually Directs Application of the CBA When the Bargaining Unit
Relocates
30
When an employer relocates an entire bargaining unit to a different facility, the employer
must apply the existing collective-bargaining agreement. Rock Bottom Stores, supra; see
generally In re Comar, 339 NLRB at 912. Any waiver of such rights must be clear and unmis-
takable. Here, the matter is more complicated as the parties had negotiated an agreement
covering Respondent’s exit from Forest Park and terms to apply to the affected bargaining unit 35
employees.
B. Issue of Waiver
Section 8(a)(5) and Section 8(d) define the duty to bargain collectively, which requires
an employer “to meet . . . and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 40
terms and conditions of employment.” NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 742–743 (1962). A
violation of Section 8(a)(5) does not require a finding of bad faith. Id. at 743 and 747. A
unilateral change acts no differently than a “flat refusal” to bargain by skipping out on a union’s
input when the union has so requested to do so. Id. at 743. An unlawful unilateral change
“frustrates the objectives of Section 8(a)(5),” because such a change “’minimizes the influence 45
of organized bargaining’ and emphasizes to the employees ‘that there is no necessity for a
collective bargaining agent.’” Pleasantview Nursing Home v. NLRB, 351 F.3d 747, 755 (6th Cir.
2003) (quoting Katz, supra at 744, and Loral Defense Systems-Akron v. NLRB, 200 F.3d 436,
449 (6th Cir. 1999)); Mercy Hospital of Buffalo, 311 NLRB 869, 873 (1993).
JD-10-19
29
A defense to a unilateral change is waiver. A waiver of a union's statutory rights,
including the right to bargain about wages, must be clear and unmistakable and cannot be
inferred lightly. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693 (1983); Timken Roller Bearing
Co., 138 NLRB 15, 16 (1962). “A clear and unmistakable waiver may be found in the express
language and structure of the collective-bargaining agreement or by the course of conduct of 5
the parties. The burden is on the party asserting waiver to establish that such a waiver was
intended.” Leland Stanford Junior University, 307 NLRB 75, 81 (1992) (information request
case). See also: NLRB v. New York Telephone Co., 930 F.2d 1009 (2d Cir. 1991), enfg. 299
NLRB 44 (1990); Finley Hospital, 362 NLRB No. 102, slip op. at 3 (2015), affd. in rel. part 827
F.3d 720, reh’g and reh’g en banc denied (8th Cir. 2016) (assent to change must reflect mutual 10
intent to allow the change in spite of a duty to bargain). Silence in a bargaining agreement
does not demonstrate a clear and unmistakable waiver. S-B Mfg. Co., Ltd., 270 NLRB 485,
490 (1984), citing Timken Roller Bearing Co v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 746, 751 (6th Cir. 1963).
Respondent relies upon the language in the 2015 Closure Agreement that the terms 15
and conditions of the location to which the Forest Park employees transfer will apply. The
language of this agreement also applies until the closure of the Forest Park facility.
Respondent also notes that it continued to apply the collective bargaining agreement to those
employees who remained at Forest Park until the facility. The 2015 Closure Agreement
specifically discusses pay, vacation etc. and the catch-all “all others” will apply as well. 20
Here, I agree that Respondent was within its rights to apply its terms and conditions of
employment, already established at DFW Center, when the Forest Park bargaining unit
relocated. The 2015 Closure Agreement was drafted with Lodge 776’s consent and input. The
documents reflect that the parties knew a number of contingencies, known and unknown, 25
existed in 2015. The plain language of this agreement waives Lodge’s 776’s rights to apply the
terms and conditions of the collective bargaining agreement. I therefore recommend dismissal
of the unilateral change allegations. But see In re Comar, supra, at 911 (respondent should not
benefit from its unlawful conduct).
30
IV. AMBASSADORS AS AN ALLEGED SECTION 8(A)(2) VIOLATION
To determine whether Respondent violated Section 8(a)(2), I first examine whether the
Ambassador program was a labor organization under Section 2(5). If I find that Respondent
operated the Ambassadors as a labor organization, I then examine whether Respondent
dominated the Ambassador program. Electromation, Inc., 309 NLRB 990, 994 (1992), enfd. 35 35
F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994); EFCO Corp. v. NLRB, 215 F.3d 1318 (4th Cir. 2000), enfg. 317
NLRB 372 (1998). Respondent’s intent in formation of the Ambassador program is irrelevant
to the analysis of a possible 8(a)(2) violation: The statute applies whether intent is “benevolent
or malevolent.” Alta Bates Hospital, 266 NLRB 485, 491 (1976).
“Labor organization” is defined in Section 2(5) of the Act as:40
. . . [A]ny organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation
committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the
purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances,
labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.
The definition of labor organization is broadly construed and is a question of fact. NLRB 45
v. Peninsula General Hospital Med. Center, 36 F.3d 1262, 1269 (4th Cir. 1994); Electromation,
supra. The organization is not required to have a formal structure, elected officers, constitution
JD-10-19
30
or bylaws, nor is it required to meet regularly. Id. at 994. Even without this formal framework or
regular meetings, the group may meet the definition of Section 2(5). Id.
In examining whether the definition of labor organization applies to a group, the Board
applies a four-part test: (1) employee participation; (2) purpose to “deal with” employers; (3) the
dealing concerns conditions of employment or other statutory subjects; and (4) for employee 5
representation committees, evidence that the committee has some representation of
employees. Electromation, 309 NLRB at 996.
I find that General Counsel did not demonstrate sufficiently that the purpose of the
ambassadors was to deal with the employers on statutory subjects. Most of the evidence
reflects various versions of meetings and do not demonstrate sufficient evidence that the 10
employees made decisions on behalf of the other employees. For example, the discussions on
safety were vaguely presented. Safety is indeed a statutory issue, but the evidence does not
show the ambassadors dealt with the employers or the committee members represented other
employees. I therefore dismiss this allegation as the ambassadors did not act as a labor
organization. 15
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent Dallas Airmotive, Inc., a subsidiary of BBA Aviation Co., (Respondent) is
an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6) and (7) of the Act.20
2. Charging Party International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-
CIO, District Lodge 776 is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
25
3. The following are supervisors within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act and/or
agents within the meaning of Section 2(13) of the Act:
a. Stephanie Hanes
b. Terry Hooker30
c. Zara Baker
d. Bill Bell
e. Tracy Myers
f. David Higgins
g. Max Allen35
h. Nandu Madireddi
i. David Daniel
4. As of January 13, 2017, the following unit was an appropriate bargaining unit pursuant
to Section 9(a) of the Act:40
All production, maintenance and warehouse employees located at Respondent’s
Forest Park and DFW Center facilities, excluding production employees in the
Honeywell TFE line, all other employees, guards and supervisors as defined in
the Act. 45
5. On January 13, 2017, Respondent unlawfully withdrew recognition and since then, has
refused to bargain with District Lodge 776.
JD-10-19
31
6. The above unfair labor practices affect commerce as stated in the Act.
7. The Act has not been violated in any other way.
REMEDY5
Because Respondent unlawfully withdrew recognition of the Forest Park bargaining unit,
it must bargain in good faith with Lodge 776. In doing so, an affirmative bargaining order is
necessary to ensure Respondent will bargain for a reasonable time with Lodge 776 to give the
bargaining relationship a chance to succeed before Respondent can question Lodge 776’s 10
representative status. Waymouth Farms, 314 NLRB at 963-964.
Respondent will also be ordered to post an appropriate information notice, as described
in the attached appendix. This notice shall be posted in Respondent’s DFW Center facility or
wherever notices to employees are regularly posted for 60 days without anything obscuring or15
defacing its contents. In addition to the physical posting of paper notices, notices shall be
distributed electronically, such as by e-mail, posting on an intranet or internet site, and/or other
electronic means (including, but not limited to, Yammer if still in use), if Respondent customarily
communicates with its employees in such a manner. In the event that, during the pendency of
these proceedings, Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved herein, 20
Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current
employees and former employees employed by Respondent at any time since January 9, 2017.
On the findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended2925
ORDER
Respondent, Dallas Airmotive, Inc., a subsidiary of BBA Aviation Company, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall30
1. Cease and desist from:
a. Withdrawing recognition from International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, Aeronautical Industrial District Lodge 776 (Lodge 35
776) and failing and refusing to bargain with Lodge 776 as the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative in the following appropriate unit:
All production, maintenance and warehouse employees located at Respondent’s
Forest Park and DFW Center facilities, excluding production employees in the 40
Honeywell TFE line, all other employees, guards and supervisors as defined in
the Act.
b. In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.45

29 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the
findings, conclusions and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
JD-10-19
32
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
a. Recognize and, on request, bargain in good faith the Union as the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of the employees in the following
appropriate unit concerning terms and conditions of employment, and if an 5
understanding is reached, embody the understanding in a signed agreement:
All production, maintenance and warehouse employees located at Respondent’s
Forest Park and DFW Center facilities, excluding production employees in the
Honeywell TFE line, all other employees, guards and supervisors as defined in10
the Act.
b. Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such additional time as the
Regional Director may allow for good cause shown, provide a reasonable place
designed by the Board or its agents, all payrolls records, social security payment 15
records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records,
including an electronic copy of such records if stores in electronic form,
necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order.
c. Within 14 days after service the Region, post at its DFW Center facilities copies 20
of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”30 Copies of this notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 16, after being signed by
Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by Respondent and
maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. In addition to physical 25
posting of paper notices, notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by
Yammer, email, posting on intranet or an internet site, and/or other means of
electronic communication, if Respondent customarily communicates with its
employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to
ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other 30
material. If Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved
in these proceedings, Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense,
a copy of the notice to all current and former employees employed by
Respondent at any time since January 13, 2017.
35
d. Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director for
Region 16 a sworn certificate of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that Respondent has taken to comply.
40
Dated, Washington, DC January 25, 2019
Sharon Levinson Steckler
Administrative Law Judge45

30 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice
reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United Stated Court of Appeals enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations
Board.”
~~~ ~~ ~ H ~~
JD–10–19
APPENDIX
Notice to Employees
Posted By Order of the National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered
us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT withdraw recognition from the International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, Aeronautical Industrial District Lodge 776 (Lodge 776), and fail
and refuse to bargain with Lodge 776 as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of our
employees in the following appropriate unit:
All production, warehouse, maintenance employees located at Respondent’s
Forest Park and DFW Center facilities, excluding production employees in the
Honeywell TFE line, all other employees, guards and supervisors as defined in
the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the
exercise of the rights listed above.
WE WILL recognize, and on request, bargain with Lodge 776 as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of our bargaining unit employees concerning terms and conditions of
employment and, if an understanding is reached, embody the understanding in a signed
collective-bargaining agreement.
DALLAS AIRMOTIVE, INC., A SUBSIDIARY OF BBA
AVIATION COMPANY
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the
National Labor Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want
union representation and it investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To
find out more about your rights under the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak
confidentially to any agent with the Board’s Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain
information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov
819 TAYLOR STREET, ROOM 8A24, FORT WORTH, TX 76102-6178
(817) 978-2921, HOURS: 8:15 A.M. TO 4:45 P.M.
JD-10-19
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/16-CA-192780 or by using
the QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary,
National Labor Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-
1940.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING
AND MUST NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY
QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE
DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (682) 703-7489.