0120121532
08-03-2012
Cynthia L. Barnes, Complainant, v. Michael B. Donley, Secretary, Department of the Air Force, Agency.
Cynthia L. Barnes,
Complainant,
v.
Michael B. Donley,
Secretary,
Department of the Air Force,
Agency.
Appeal No. 0120121532
Agency No. 9B1C10001
DECISION
Complainant filed a timely appeal with this Commission from a final decision (FAD) by the Agency dated January 12, 2012, finding that it was in compliance with the terms of the settlement agreement into which the parties entered. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.402; 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(b); and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.
BACKGROUND
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Child and Youth Program Assistant at the Agency's Child Development Center facility in Langley AFB, Virginia. Believing that the Agency subjected her to unlawful discrimination, Complainant contacted an Agency EEO Counselor to initiate the EEO complaint process. On November 15, 2011, Complainant and the Agency entered into a settlement agreement to resolve the matter. The settlement agreement provided, in pertinent part, that:
(2) The Agency will adjust Complainant's duty status from termination without prejudice to a paid non-work status from 18 September 2010 to 14 November 2011, and shall be awarded back pay ($29, 263.97) for this period as if she were still employed during that time subject to all the standard deductions from her pay.
By letter to the Agency dated December 14, 2011, Complainant alleged that the Agency was in breach of the settlement agreement, and requested that the Agency specifically implement its terms. Specifically, Complainant alleged that the Agency's award of back pay to Complainant included non-standard deductions for health insurance for the period from September 18, 2010 to November 14, 2011. Complainant alleges that the Agency violated the settlement agreement between the parties when it deducted health insurance premiums from Complainant's backpack award as provided in the agreement. Specifically, the Complainant asserts that because she was not employed with the Agency during the time the health insurance premium was deducted, she was paying for a benefit she did not receive. Complainant further alleges that health insurance premiums are not standard deductions as provided for in the November 15, 2011 settlement agreement entered into by the parties.
In its January 12, 2012 FAD, the Agency concluded that it had fully complied with the settlement agreement. Specifically, the Agency indicated that the Complainant's back pay award included all those deductions which were part of her last paycheck, including payments for health care benefits. The agreement obligated the Agency to provide Complainant back pay for the period of September 18, 2010 to November 14, 2011 "as if she were still employed during that time subject to all the standard deductions from her pay." Moreover, provision 6 of the agreement provides that Complainant will be allowed to retain her health insurance benefits during her LWOP status, and indicates that Complainant is responsible to pay her employee share of this benefit. In that regard, the Agency found that Complainant failed to demonstrate that it breached the settlement agreement as alleged.
ANALYSIS
EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(a) provides that any settlement agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached at any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both parties. The Commission has held that a settlement agreement constitutes a contract between the employee and the Agency, to which ordinary rules of contract construction apply. See Herrington v. Dep't of Def., EEOC Request No. 05960032 (December 9, 1996). The Commission has further held that it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract, not some unexpressed intention, that controls the contract's construction. Eggleston v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795 (August 23, 1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard to the terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally relied on the plain meaning rule. See Hyon O v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states that if the writing appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face, its meaning must be determined from the four corners of the instrument without resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery Elevator Co. v. Building Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).
In the instant case, the Commission finds that Complainant has failed to demonstrate that the Agency has breached the settlement agreement between the parties. Specifically, the record indicates that the Agency was obligated to award Complainant back pay for the time period of September 18, 2010 to November 14, 2011 as if she were still employed during that time period subject to all the standard deductions from her pay, including her share of her health insurance premium. If Complainant had intended that the standard deductions referred to in the settlement agreement not included health insurance benefits, she should have negotiated for such to be incorporated into the agreement executed by the parties. In that regard, we find that Complainant has failed to demonstrate that the Agency breached the November 15, 2011 settlement agreement entered into by the parties.
CONCLUSION
Upon review, the Commission finds that the Agency's decision was proper. The Agency's determination of compliance is hereby affirmed for the reasons set forth herein.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0610)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File a Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
August 3, 2012
__________________
Date
2
0120121532
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
2
0120121532