Cynthia J. Robinett, Complainant,v.Michael Chertoff, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, (Immigration and Customs Enforcement), Agency.<1>

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionOct 6, 2005
01a54016_r (E.E.O.C. Oct. 6, 2005)

01a54016_r

10-06-2005

Cynthia J. Robinett, Complainant, v. Michael Chertoff, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, (Immigration and Customs Enforcement), Agency.


Cynthia J. Robinett v. Department of Homeland Security

01A54016

October 6, 2005

.

Cynthia J. Robinett,

Complainant,

v.

Michael Chertoff,

Secretary,

Department of Homeland Security,

(Immigration and Customs Enforcement),

Agency.<1>

Appeal No. 01A54016

Agency No. ICE-05-C143

DECISION

Complainant filed a timely appeal with this Commission from the final

agency decision dated April 15, 2005, dismissing her formal EEO complaint

of unlawful employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e

et seq. and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),

as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq.

In her formal complaint, filed on February 11, 2005, complainant claimed

that she was subjected to discrimination on the bases of race, sex,

age and in reprisal for prior protected activity when on July 21, 2004,

she was removed from her position as a Contract Security Guard.

The record reflects during the relevant time, complainant was a Security

Guard through a corporate entity identified as Superior Protection,

Inc. (hereinafter referred to as �Superior�), and worked at the agency's

Federal Protective Service (FPS) facility in Houston, Texas. The record

further reflects that complainant was removed from her position after

an agency official elected to re-file misdemeanor charges against her

for unlawful carrying of a weapon.

The agency dismissed complainant's complaint pursuant to the regulation

set forth at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(1), for failure to state a claim,

finding that complainant was not a federal employee.

Complainant raises no new contentions on appeal.

In response, the agency contends that complainant was not an

agency employee; and that she was a contract employee of Superior.

The agency determined that Superior, controlled the "means and manner"

of complainant's performance; served as complainant's supervisor;

gave her assignments at work and appraised her job performance; paid

complainant's salary and provided her with benefits; provided her

uniform; and was responsible for disciplining complainant. In support

of its contentions, the agency submitted a copy of the contract between

Superior and the agency; and a declaration from a Contracting Official.

Before the Commission or the agency can consider whether the agency has

discriminated against complainant in violation of Title VII, it first

must determine whether complainant is an agency employee or applicant

for employment within the meaning of Section 717(a) of Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e-16(a)

et seq.

The Commission has applied the common law of agency test to determine

whether complainants are agency employees under Title VII. See Ma

v. Department of Health and Human Services, EEOC Appeal No. 0 1962390

(June 1, 1998)(citing Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden, 503

U.S. 218, 323-24 (1992)). Specifically, the Commission will look to the

following non-exhaustive list of factors: (1) the extent of the employer's

right to control the means and manner of the worker's performance; (2)

the kind of occupation, with reference to whether the work is usually done

under the direction of a supervisor or is done by a specialist without

supervision; (3) the skill required in the particular occupation; (4)

whether the "employer" or the individual furnishes the equipment used and

the place of work; (5) the length of time the individual has worked; (6)

the method of payment, whether by time or by the job; (7) the manner in

which the work relationship is terminated, i.e., by one or both parties,

with or without notice and explanation; (8) whether annual leave is

afforded; (9) whether the work is an integral part of the business of the

"employer;" (10) whether the worker accumulates retirement benefits; (11)

whether the "employer" pays social security taxes; and (12) the intention

of the parties. See Ma v. Department of Health and Human Services, supra.

In Ma, the Commission noted that the common-law test contains,

"no shorthand formula or magic phrase that can be applied to find

the answer .... [A]ll of the incidents of the relationship must be

assessed and weighed with no one factor being decisive." Id., (citations

omitted). The Commission in Ma also noted that prior applications of the

test established in Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826 (D. C. Cir. 1979),

using many of the same elements considered under the common law test,

were not appreciably different from the common law of agency test. Id.

Under this test, the Commission finds that complainant was not an

employee with the agency. First, the record contains a document

identified as "Amendment of Solicitation/Modification of Contract,"

dated November 18, 2003 (Contract No. GS-07F-0325L). Therein, it

provides that Superior would provide armed guard services for the

agency's Houston/Conroe/Galveston, Texas facilities for the period of

October 1, 2003 to September 30, 2004. The record further reflects that

in accordance with a "Description of Services," Superior "shall provide

all management, supervision, manpower, materials, supplies, and equipment

(except as otherwise noted), and shall plan, schedule, coordinate and

assure effective performance of all services described here."

Second, the record also contains a copy of a declaration from a

Contracting Officer (Officer). Therein, the Officer stated that Superior

had the authority to discipline complainant; was responsible for the

payment of complainant's salary; and was responsible for providing

complainant with insurance, leave and benefits. The Officer further

stated that as indicated in a document identified "Guard Unfavorable

Adjudication," the FPS "will notify Superior Protection, Inc. whenever a

contract guard (such as [Complainant]) is unsuitable for employment under

a federal government contract. Whenever FPS provides this unsuitability

adjudication this does not mean that Superior Protection, Inc. is required

to terminate the contract guard. To the contrary, Superior Protection,

Inc. is free to continue employing the contract guard as long as the

contract guard does not work under a federal contract."

Finally, we note that in her complaint and the Counselor's Report,

complainant identified herself as an employee of Superior, contracted

by the agency to provide security services.

For the reasons set forth herein, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's

dismissal of the instant complaint.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

October 6, 2005

__________________

Date

1The complaint here was originally filed

against the Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization

Service. The Immigration and Naturalization Service is now a component of

the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement.