Curtis Johnson, Appellant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 12, 1999
01981174 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 12, 1999)

01981174

03-12-1999

Curtis Johnson, Appellant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Curtis Johnson, )

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Appeal No. 01981174

) Agency No. 1-J-609-1001-96

William J. Henderson, ) Hearing No. 210-97-6195X

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service, )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

On November 19, 1997, Curtis Johnson (hereinafter referred to as

appellant) timely appealed the agency's final decision, dated November 13,

1997, concluding he had not been discriminated against in violation of

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e

et seq. In his complaint, appellant alleged that agency officials

discriminated against him on the bases of his race (black) and sex

(male) when he was not selected for one of the Supervisor Distribution

Operations positions, EAS-16, under vacancy announcements 94-108 and

94-109. This appeal is accepted in accordance with the provisions of

EEOC Order No. 960.001.

The record establishes that appellant was employed by the agency as a

PSDS Technician, PS-6, at the agency's Forest Park, Illinois facility.

On November 16, 1994, appellant applied for a Supervisor Distribution

Operations position under vacancy announcements 94-108 and 94-109.

A review committee evaluated approximately 103 applications including

that of appellant. Appellant was among approximately 57 applicants that

were interviewed by the review committee. Appellant was also among 29

applicants that were recommended as best qualified for the positions.

A selection committee composed of three individuals reviewed the

applications of the 29 best qualified applicants and submitted selection

recommendations to the Plant Manager. The three member committee was

composed of a black female, a black male, and a white male. Eleven

individuals, not including appellant, were selected for the subject

positions. The selectees included 4 black males, 2 white males, and 5

black females. The 18 best qualified candidates who were not recommended

for selection included 9 black males, one white male, and 8 black females.

The record reveals that appellant filed a formal EEO complaint with the

agency on January 30, 1996, alleging that the agency had discriminated

against him as referenced above. The agency accepted the complaint and

conducted an investigation. At the conclusion of the investigation,

appellant requested an administrative hearing before an Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Administrative Judge (AJ).

On September 30, 1997, following a hearing at which three witnesses

testified, the AJ issued a decision finding that the agency had

discriminated against appellant on the bases of his race and sex when

he was not selected for one of the subject positions. In reaching this

decision, the AJ found that the agency failed to meet its burden to

articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not forwarding

appellant's name to the Plant Manager for final consideration,

and alternatively, that any reasons are not worthy of credence.

The AJ applied an adverse inference against the agency because two

of the three individuals on the selection committee failed to appear

as witnesses. The AJ noted that the investigative affidavits of both

of these individuals did not provide substantive detail with regard to

their own deliberative process in choosing among the 29 best qualified

candidates nor did they explain how the selection committee reached

a consensus on the candidates that were considered most qualified for

the subject position. Further, the AJ noted that both witnesses that

did not appear had been approved well in advance as witnesses. The AJ

concluded that the ambiguity surrounding these selection committee

members' deliberative process was directly attributable to the agency's

failure to provide these witnesses at the hearing.

With regard to the one selection committee member that did testify at

the hearing, the AJ noted that he testified that he did not consider

appellant to be among the most qualified candidates. At the hearing,

this committee member testified that he did not include appellant's name

on his list of recommended candidates because the knowledge, skills,

and abilities set forth by appellant on his job application did not

demonstrate his ability as a supervisor. Rather, he explained that

such knowledge, skills, and abilities were more geared towards a craft

employee in the position of PSDS, which is a timekeeping office.

The AJ also found that ample evidence exists, aside from the

discrediting of the agency's articulated reasons, to support a finding

of discrimination. According to the AJ, even taking into account the

vague selection criteria cited by the selection committee members,

appellant was at least highly competitive with three of the selectees.

In a final decision dated November 13, 1997, the agency rejected

the findings and conclusions of the AJ, and entered a finding of no

discrimination. It is from this decision that appellant now appeals.

As an initial matter, we will address the propriety of the adverse

inference drawn by the AJ against the agency. Pursuant to 29

C.F.R. �1614.109(d), if a party fails �without good cause shown

to respond fully and in timely fashion to requests for documents,

records, comparative data, statistics, affidavits, or the attendance

of witness(es),� an AJ may, in appropriate circumstances, draw an

adverse inference that the requested information or testimony would have

reflected unfavorably on the party refusing to provide the information.

In this case, having considered the evidence of record, we find that

the AJ acted properly in drawing an adverse inference.

As noted, the agency was aware well in advance that both of the

individuals at issue were expected to testify. The agency had requested

that the hearing be reconvened to allow for the appearance of the two

requested witnesses at another time. The AJ was not informed by the

agency until the day of the hearing that these witnesses would not be

available. We find that sufficient cause existed for the AJ to invoke

an adverse inference against the agency.

After a careful review of the record in its entirety, including the

statements submitted on appeal, we find that the AJ's recommended decision

set forth the relevant facts and properly analyzes the appropriate

regulations, policies and laws.

As the AJ correctly noted, appellant's complaint constitutes a claim of

disparate treatment which is properly analyzed under the three-tiered

analytical framework outlined in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). See also, Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467

U.S. 867 (1984); U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens,

460 U.S. 711, 715-716 (1983); Texas Department of Community Affairs

v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-256 (1981). Applying this legal standard,

the AJ properly concluded that appellant established a prima facie case of

race and sex discrimination. Moreover, we find that the AJ was correct

in further finding that the agency failed to produce a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its decision to not select appellant for

the subject position. The failure of two selection committee members

to testify at the hearing in conjunction with their cursory affidavits

supports the AJ's decision. Further, we agree with the AJ that appellant

proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency's articulated

reasons for its actions in this matter lacked credibility and that its

actions were more likely motivated by discrimination. Nothing proffered

by the agency in its final decision or on appeal differs significantly

from the arguments raised before, and given full consideration by the AJ.

Accordingly, it is the decision of the the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission to REVERSE the agency's final decision which rejected the

AJ's finding of discrimination. In order to remedy appellant for its

discriminatory actions, the agency shall comply with the following Order.

ORDER

The agency is ORDERED to take the following remedial actions:

(A) Within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes

final, the agency is directed to offer appellant a position as a

Supervisor, Distribution Operations, EAS-16, effective August 1995,

and that he be given all benefits he would have received had he been

selected in or about August 1995, including but not limited to back pay,

including interest.

(B) The agency shall post at the Forest Park, Illinois Post Office

copies of the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being

signed by the agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted

by the agency within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision

becomes final, and shall remain posted for sixty (60) consecutive days,

in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees

are customarily posted. The agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure

that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by other material.

The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer

at the address cited in the paragraph entitled �Implementation of the

Commission's Decision,� within ten (10) calendar days of the expiration

of the posting period.

(C) The agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as

provided in the statement entitled �Implementation of the Commission's

Decision.� The report shall include evidence that the corrective action

has been implemented.

ATTORNEY'S FEES (H1092)

If appellant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by 29

C.F.R. �1614.501 (e) (1) (iii)), he/she is entitled to an award of

reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint.

29 C.F.R. �1614.501 (e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid

by the agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees

to the agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,

Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this

decision becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim for

attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. �1614.501.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0595)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the appellant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the appellant may petition the Commission for enforcement of

the order. 29 C.F.R. �1614.503 (a). The appellant also has the right

to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's

order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.

See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.408, 1614.409, and 1614.503 (g). Alternatively,

the appellant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying

complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File

A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.408 and 1614.409. A civil action for

enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to

the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. �2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1993). If the

appellant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the

complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.

See 29 C.F.R. �1614.410.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0993)

This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative

processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil

action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United

States District Court. It is the position of the Commission that you

have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. You should be aware, however, that courts in some

jurisdictions have interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner

suggesting that a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS from the date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your

civil action is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN

THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision

or to consult an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the

jurisdiction in which your action would be filed. In the alternative,

you may file a civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR

DAYS of the date you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your

appeal with the Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME

AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY

HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME

AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work.

Filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of

your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

March 12, 1999

DATE Ronnie Blumenthal, Director

Office of Federal Operations