Crystal Hart, Complainant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionNov 17, 2000
01985856 (E.E.O.C. Nov. 17, 2000)

01985856

11-17-2000

Crystal Hart, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Crystal Hart v. U.S. Postal Service

01985856

November 17, 2000

.

Crystal Hart,

Complainant,

v.

William J. Henderson,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01985856

Agency No. 4F-945-1135-96

Hearing No. 370-97-2172X

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal of a final agency decision (FAD)

concerning her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination on the

bases of race (white), national origin (German) and reprisal (prior EEO

activity) in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.<1> For the reasons stated herein,

the agency's FAD is affirmed.

According to the record, the agency hired complainant in December 1994 as

a Rural Carrier Relief (RCR)<2> in a California facility of the agency.

While a RCR, complainant held the dual appointment of casual clerk.

Both positions were limited term appointments and expired in July 1995.

In September 1995, the agency hired complainant as a Rural Carrier

Associate (RCA)<3> with a probationary period of 90 worked days

or one year, whichever came first. In a letter dated January 11,

1996, the agency terminated complainant's RCA appointment effective

January 24 charging her with failure to report for duty as scheduled

and unsatisfactory work performance. Believing she was a victim of

discrimination, complainant sought EEO counseling and, subsequently,

filed a complaint alleging that the agency discriminated against her

based on race (white), national origin (German), and reprisal (prior

EEO activity)<4> when it terminated her appointment.

At the conclusion of the complaint's investigation, complainant received a

copy of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC

Administrative Judge (AJ). The AJ issued a decision after a hearing,

finding no discrimination. The AJ concluded that the agency articulated

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions and that complainant

failed to establish pretext. The agency issued a FAD concurring with

the AJ's finding of no unlawful employment discrimination. This appeal

followed.<5>

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings

by an Administrative Judge will be upheld if supported by substantial

evidence in the record. Substantial evidence is defined as �such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate

to support a conclusion.� Universal Camera Corp. v. National

Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (citation omitted).

A finding that discriminatory intent did not exist is a factual finding.

See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982).

In the instant case, the AJ found that complainant's termination from

her RCA appointment was not predicated upon discriminatory reasons.

The Commission has reviewed the full administrative record and we find

that the AJ's factual findings support his ultimate factual conclusion

of no discrimination based on race or national origin. Based on the

foregoing, we AFFIRM the agency's decision of no discrimination.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0900)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the office of federal operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

November 17, 2000

__________________

Date

1On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal

sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply

to all federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the

administrative process. Consequently, the Commission will apply

the revised regulations found at 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 in deciding the

present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the

Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.

2A RCR substituted for absent regular carriers on an emergency basis.

3As a RCA, complainant was expected to work at least one day a week,

typically on Mondays, and to work on an as needed basis for an absent

regular carrier.

4Prior to the hearing on the matter herein, the Administrative Judge

issued a Partial Order finding no discrimination based on reprisal.

He concluded that a letter that discussed various adverse actions by

the responsible management official (RMO) in this case, was addressed

to a union state steward and was signed by five employees of the RMO

including complainant, did not constitute prior EEO activity. The bases

that remained were race and national origin.

5The Commission notes that, on appeal, complainant indicated that the

agency failed to comply with a discovery order and that the AJ would

not compel discovery. Based on the record and pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �

1614.109(d), we find that the AJ's action was within his discretion.