Cree Fayetteville, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 1, 2020

2019003598 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 1, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/382,172 12/16/2016 Austin Curbow 99077.25300 1065
30734 7590 07/01/2020
BakerHostetler
Washington Square, Suite 1100
1050 Connecticut Ave. N.W.
Washington, DC 20036-5304
EXAMINER
KIM, JUNG H
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2842
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/01/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
edervis@bakerlaw.com
eofficemonitor@bakerlaw.com
patents@bakerlaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte AUSTIN CURBOW and DANIEL MARTIN
Appeal 2019-003598
Application 15/382,172
Technology Center 2800
Before JAMES R. HUGHES, LINZY T. McCARTNEY, and
JOYCE CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judges.
CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20. See Final Act. 1. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
An oral hearing was held on June 11, 2020.
We affirm.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as CREE
FAYETTEVILLE, INC. Appeal Br. 3.
Appeal 2019-003598
Application 15/382,172

2
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to power modules having an integrated clamp
circuit. Spec. ¶ 2. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed
subject matter:
1. A power module apparatus, comprising:
a power substrate;
at least one power device electrically connected to the
power substrate;
a gate-source board mounted relative to the power
substrate, the gate-source board electrically connected to the at
least one power device;
a housing secured to the power substrate;
a clamping circuit electrically connected to the at least one
power device, the clamping circuit configured to clamp an input
to a gate of the at least one power device, the input to the gate
comprising gate drive signals generated from a gate driver
implemented separate from the power module apparatus; and
the clamping circuit being integrated in the power module
apparatus and the clamping circuit being arranged with at least
one of the following:
a base plate, the power substrate, one of at least two power
contacts, the at least one power device, the gate-source board,
gate drive connectors, and the housing.
REJECTION
Claims 1–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over the combination of McPherson et al. (US 9,426,883 B2, issued Aug. 23,
2016) (“McPherson”) and Pang (US 9,300,285 B2, issued Mar. 29, 2016).
Final Act. 3–8.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the rejections of claims 1–20 in light of
Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner erred. We have considered in this
decision only those arguments Appellant actually raised in the Briefs. Any
Appeal 2019-003598
Application 15/382,172

3
other arguments Appellant could have made, but chose not to make, in the
Briefs are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive of error. We agree with and
adopt as our own the Examiner’s findings of facts and conclusions as set
forth in the Answer and in the Action from which this appeal was taken. We
provide the following explanation for emphasis.
With respect to independent claim 1, Appellant contends the cited
portions of McPherson do not teach or suggest a “clamping circuit being
integrated with the power device,” as recited in claim 1. Appeal Br. 8
(emphasis omitted). Appellant also argues that the cited portions of Pang do
not teach or suggest that limitation. Appeal Br. 10. Appellant argues that
“McPherson does not disclose a clamping circuit; and Pang does not disclose
a clamping circuit being integrated in the power module apparatus.” Id. at 11
(emphasis omitted).
Appellant’s arguments do not persuade us that the Examiner erred.
Appellant attacks McPherson and Pang individually, even though the
Examiner relied on the combination of McPherson and Pang in rejecting
claim 1. In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing In re
Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981)). The test for obviousness is not
whether the claimed invention is expressly suggested in any one or all of the
references, but whether the claimed subject matter would have been obvious
to those of ordinary skill in the art in light of the combined teachings of
those references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d at 425. Here, Appellant provides
no persuasive argument that the claimed subject matter would not have been
obvious in light of the combined teachings of McPherson and Pang.
Appeal 2019-003598
Application 15/382,172

4
For these reasons, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in
finding that the combination of McPherson and Pant teaches or suggests the
disputed limitations of claim 1.
Appellant next argues that the Examiner erred in combining the
teachings of McPherson and Pang because “there is no proper ‘reason that
would have prompted’ a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine the
elements as set forth in the Office Action.” Appeal Br. 13. Appellant
contends that the Examiner engaged in impermissible hindsight in
combining the cited references. Id.
We are not persuaded that the combination of McPherson and Pang is
the result of improper hindsight, as the Examiner has set forth articulated
reasoning with rational underpinnings for the combination. Ans. 5–6.
Appellant has not identified any knowledge relied upon by the Examiner that
was gleaned only from Appellant’s disclosure and that was not otherwise
within the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention. See In re
McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971). Nor has Appellant
provided objective evidence of secondary considerations, which “operates as
a beneficial check on hindsight.” Cheese Sys., Inc. v. Tetra Pak Cheese and
Powder Sys., Inc., 725 F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
For these reasons, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in
combining the cited teachings of McPherson and Pang.
Appellant also attacks the Examiner’s use of Lui (US 9,013,848 B2
issued Apr. 21, 2015) as an example in taking Official Notice that it was
notoriously well known that a clamping circuit may be integrated with a
power device. Appeal Br. 16–17; see also Final Act. 5, Ans. 6. Appellant
argues that “Lui teaches a clamp protection circuit 100 connected across a
Appeal 2019-003598
Application 15/382,172

5
drain and source of a power transistor M1,” which is not a “clamping circuit
configured to clamp an input to a gate of the at least one power device,” as
recited in claim 1. Appeal Br. 16.
We are not persuaded of error by Appellant’s arguments regarding
Lui. Appellant does not adequately challenge the Examiner’s Official Notice
that it was notoriously well known that a clamping circuit may be integrated
with a power device, as recited in claim 1. Final Act. 5; Ans. 6 (citing Lui
Figs. 4 and 5, col. 6:6–15). Rather, Appellant argues, with regard to a
different claim limitation, that Lui does not teach “a clamping circuit
clamping a gate input of a power device.” Appeal Br. 16–17.
The Examiner also provided Briere (US 2015/0162321 A1, published
June 11, 2015) as another example in taking Official Notice that it was
notoriously well known that a clamping circuit may be integrated with a
power device. Ans. 6. The Examiner found that Briere discloses that a gate
of MOSFET 220/420 in Figure 4 of Briere may be protected from high
voltage using clamp 430, where the entire structure in Figure 4 may be
monolithically integrated on common die 450. Ans. 6 (citing Briere ¶¶ 25,
38). Appellant responds only that Briere does not teach a “clamping circuit
configured to clamp an input to a gate of the at least one power device, the
input to the gate comprising gate drive signals generated from a gate driver
implemented separate from the power module apparatus,” as recited by
claim 1. Reply Br. 11.
To adequately traverse the taking of Official Notice, Appellant must
come forth with information or argument that, on its face, casts reasonable
doubt regarding the justification of the Official Notice. See In re Boon, 439
F.2d 724, 728 (CCPA 1971) (explaining that an applicant has the right to
Appeal 2019-003598
Application 15/382,172

6
challenge the official notice and demand production of evidence in support
thereof, provided such challenge is accompanied by adequate information or
argument that, on its face, creates a reasonable doubt regarding the
circumstances justifying the official notice); see also MPEP § 2144.03(C).
Because Appellant does not state persuasively why the noticed fact
that it was notoriously well known that a clamping circuit may be integrated
with a power device is not considered common knowledge or well-known in
the art, Appellant has not adequately traversed the Examiner’s taking of
Official Notice. Thus, the facts of which the Examiner took Official Notice
are admitted prior art. See In re Ahlert, 424 F.2d 1088, 1091 (CCPA 1970)
(where an applicant for a patent has failed to challenge a fact officially
noticed by the Examiner, and it is clear that the applicant has been amply
apprised of such finding so as to have the opportunity to make such
challenge, the Examiner’s finding shall be considered conclusive).
For these reasons, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in
concluding that claim 1 is obvious in light of the teachings of McPherson
and Pang. Appellant makes similar arguments for independent claims 10 and
16 (Appeal Br. 17, 26), which we find unpersuasive for the reasons
discussed above.
Appellant next argues that the Examiner erred in rejecting dependent
claim 2, which recites “wherein the clamping circuit comprises a Miller
clamp; and wherein the Miller clamp is integrated into the power module
apparatus.” Appeal Br. 35. Appellant argues that “Pang does not explicitly
disclose ‘a Miller clamp.” Id. Appellant argues that Pang’s teaching that “the
NMOS transistor MN31 is turned on and enhances a pull down of the gate of
Appeal 2019-003598
Application 15/382,172

7
the power switch element PSW, thereby performing a miller clamp function”
does not teach or suggest the recited “Miller clamp.” Id. at 36.
We are not persuaded that the Examiner erred. Appellant’s argument
is conclusory, merely reciting the claim limitation, the teachings of Pang,
and stating that the two are not the same. Id. As stated by the Federal
Circuit, Rule 41.37 “require[s] more substantive arguments in an appeal
brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and a naked assertion that
the corresponding elements were not found in the prior art.” In re Lovin, 652
F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Moreover, the test for obviousness is not
whether the claimed invention is expressly suggested in any one or all of the
references, but whether the claimed subject matter would have been obvious
to those of ordinary skill in the art in light of the combined teachings of
those references. See Keller, 642 F.2d at 425.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claim 2. Appellant’s arguments for dependent
claim 11 are similarly conclusory. See Appeal Br. 42. Accordingly, we are
not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner erred in rejecting
these claims.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of
independent claims 1, 10, and 16, as well as the Examiner’s § 103 rejection
of dependent claims 2 and 11.
Appellant presented no separate arguments for dependent claims 4, 7,
9, 13, 15, and 18. Accordingly we sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of
dependent claims 4, 7, 9, 13, 15, and 18.
Appellant argues claims 3, 5, 6, 8, 12, 14, 17, 19, and 20 in a
conclusory manner by attacking the McPherson and Pang references
Appeal 2019-003598
Application 15/382,172

8
individually. Appeal Br. 36–49; see Lovin, 652 F.3d at 1357; Keller, 642
F.2d at 425. Because Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive, we also
sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of dependent claims 3, 5, 6, 8, 12, 14,
17, 19, and 20.
DECISION
We affirm the decision of the Examiner rejecting claims 1–20.

DECISION SUMMARY

Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–20 103 McPherson, Pang 1–20

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED