Cree Fayetteville, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Nov 16, 2020

15441857 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Nov. 16, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/441,857 02/24/2017 Austin Curbow 99077.25301 2719
30734 7590 11/16/2020
BakerHostetler
Washington Square, Suite 1100
1050 Connecticut Ave. N.W.
Washington, DC 20036-5304
EXAMINER
KIM, JUNG H
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2842
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/16/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
edervis@bakerlaw.com
eofficemonitor@bakerlaw.com
patents@bakerlaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte AUSTIN CURBOW and DANIEL MARTIN
Appeal 2020-001134
Application 15/441,857
Technology Center 2800
Before JAMES R. HUGHES, JOHN A. EVANS, and JOYCE CRAIG,
Administrative Patent Judges.
CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–12, 14–18, and 20–22. See Final Act.
1. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
An oral hearing was held on October, 27, 2020.
We affirm.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as CREE
FAYETTEVILLE, INC. Appeal Br. 3.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to a power module having an integrated clamp
circuit. Spec. ¶ 3. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed
subject matter:
1. A power module apparatus, comprising:
a power substrate;
at least one power device electrically connected to the
power substrate;
a gate-source board mounted relative to the power
substrate, the gate-source board electrically connected to the at
least one power device;
a housing secured to the power substrate;
a clamping circuit electrically connected to the at least one
power device; and
the clamping circuit being configured to reduce a voltage
charge up at a gate of the at least one power device to within 8 V
of a desired voltage.
Appeal Br. 90 (Claims Appendix).
REJECTION
Claims 1–12, 14–18, and 20–22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103
as unpatentable over the combination of McPherson et al. (US 9,426,883 B2,
issued Aug. 23, 2016) (“McPherson”) and Pang (US 9,300,285 B2, issued
Mar. 29, 2016). Final Act. 3–9.
ANALYSIS
Independent Claims 1, 10, and 16
With respect to independent claim 1, Appellant contends the cited
portions of McPherson and Pang do not teach or suggest “a power module
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apparatus, comprising: ... a clamping circuit electrically connected to the at
least one power device,” as recited in claim 1. Appeal Br. 8–13. Specifically,
Appellant argues that “MCPHERSON does not disclose a clamping circuit;
and PANG does not disclose a clamping circuit being integrated in the
power module apparatus.” Id. at 12 (emphasis omitted).
Appellant’s arguments do not persuade us that the Examiner erred.
Appellant attacks McPherson and Pang individually, even though the
Examiner relied on the combination of McPherson and Pang in rejecting
claim 1. In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing In re
Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981)). The test for obviousness is not
whether the claimed invention is expressly suggested in any one or all of the
references, but whether the claimed subject matter would have been obvious
to those of ordinary skill in the art in light of the combined teachings of
those references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d at 425. Here, Appellant provides
no persuasive argument that the claimed subject matter would not have been
obvious in light of the combined teachings of McPherson and Pang.
For these reasons, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in
finding that the combination of McPherson and Pant teaches or suggests the
disputed limitation of claim 1.
Appellant next argues that neither McPherson nor Pang teaches or
suggests “the clamping circuit being configured to reduce a voltage charge
up at a gate of the at least one power device to within 8 V of a desired
voltage,” as recited in claim 1. Appeal Br. 13. In response to the Examiner’s
assertion that such specific parameters in the degree of clamping do not
support the patentability of the subject matter encompassed by the prior art
unless there is evidence indicating the parameters are critical (Final Act. 5),
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Appellant argues that Figures 26–28 and paragraphs 97–109 of Appellant’s
Specification support the criticality of the recited performance parameters.
Appeal Br. 14. Appellant further argues that Pang teaches away from the
disputed limitation because Pang “is a configuration of a clamp circuit with
a gate driver—not a power module.” Id. at 15–16.
Appellant’s arguments do not persuade us of Examiner error. The
relevant case law supports a prima facie case of obviousness and a shifting
of the burden to Appellant to show criticality in the claimed voltage. See
Final Act 5 (citing In re Aller, 220 F.2d 454, 456 (CCPA 1955)). To show
criticality of a claimed range, “it is not inventive to discover the optimum or
workable ranges by routine experimentation.” Aller, 220 F.2d at 456. “Only
if the ‘results of optimizing a variable’ are ‘unexpectedly good’ can a patent
be obtained for the claimed critical range.” In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465,
1469 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (internal citation omitted).
In this case, Appellant does not show that the recited reduction in a
voltage charge achieves unexpectedly superior results. See Appeal Br. 14–
15; see also Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 752 F.3d
967, 977 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“To be particularly probative, evidence of
unexpected results must establish that there is a difference between the
results obtained and those of the closest prior art, and that the difference
would not have been expected by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time
of the invention.”). Rather, paragraphs 97–109, relied on by Appellant,
describe experimental results involving “a clamped inductive load (CIL) test
fixture schematic to provide test performance data for power modules”
(Figure 26), “graphs of test data for a power module with no gate clamping”
(Figure 27), and “graphs of test data for a power module with a clamping
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circuit located on a gate driver” (Figure 28). Spec. ¶¶ 97, 101, 102. We agree
with the Examiner that, although the cited sections of the Specification
describe why clamping located with the power module is advantageous
compared to other embodiments, the cited sections do not describe why
limiting the voltage charge up at a gate of the at least one power device to
within 8 V of a desired voltage is critical. See Ans. 6.
Appellant’s “teaching away” argument also fails because Appellant
has not identified where Pang actually criticizes, discredits, or otherwise
discourages “the clamping circuit being configured to reduce a voltage
charge up at a gate of the at least one power device to within 8 V of a
desired voltage,” as recited in claim 1. See In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201
(Fed. Cir. 2004); DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567
F.3d 1314, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“A reference does not teach away,
however, if it merely expresses a general preference for an alternative
invention but does not ‘criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage’
investigation into the invention claimed”) (citing Fulton).
For these reasons, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in
concluding that the determination of the optimum or workable range(s)
given the guidance of the prior art would have been obvious to the skilled
artisan. See Final Act. 7.
Appellant next argues that the Examiner erred in combining the
teachings of McPherson and Pang because “MCPHERSON provides no
reasoning or teaching to alter the disclosed configuration of the power
module as set forth in the Official Action” and “PANG provides no
reasoning or teaching to alter the disclosed configuration of the gate driver
as set forth in the Official Action.” Appeal Br. 17. Appellant contends that
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the Examiner engaged in impermissible hindsight in combining the cited
references. Id. at 18. Appellant further argues that Pang teaches away from
the claimed invention because Pang “teaches an implementation of the
clamping circuit in the gate driver.” Id. at 20.
We are not persuaded that the combination of McPherson and Pang is
the result of improper hindsight, as the Examiner has set forth articulated
reasoning with rational underpinnings for the combination. Ans. 7.
Appellant has not identified any knowledge relied upon by the Examiner that
was gleaned only from Appellant’s disclosure and that was not otherwise
within the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention. See In re
McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971). Nor has Appellant
provided objective evidence of secondary considerations, which “operates as
a beneficial check on hindsight.” Cheese Sys., Inc. v. Tetra Pak Cheese and
Powder Sys., Inc., 725 F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
Appellant’s “teaching away” argument also fails because Appellant
has not identified where Pang actually criticizes, discredits, or otherwise
discourages the combination of teachings proposed by the Examiner. See In
re Fulton, 391 F.3d at 1201; DePuy Spine, 567 F.3d at 1327. For these
reasons, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in combining the cited
teachings of McPherson and Pang.
Appellant also attacks the Examiner’s taking Official Notice that a
half bridge may be formed of an upper NMOSFET connected to a power
supply and an output and a lower NMOSFET connected between the output
and ground, and that the MOSFETs receive opposite gate signals to
alternately turn on the transistors. See Appeal Br. 21; see also Final Act. 3–4
(citing US 7,292,451 to Rodriguez), Ans. 7. Appellant contends in a
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conclusory manner that “the noticed fact is not considered to be common
knowledge or well-known in the art.” Appeal Br. 21. In support, Appellant
argues only that “Appellant has reviewed the claims and no half bridge is
recited by the claims.” Appeal Br. 21.
We are not persuaded of error by Appellant’s arguments. Appellant
does not adequately challenge the Examiner’s Official Notice that it was
notoriously well known that that a half bridge may be formed of an upper
NMOSFET connected to a power supply and an output and a lower
NMOSFET connected between the output and ground, and that the
MOSFETs receive opposite gate signals to alternately turn on the transistors.
To adequately traverse the taking of Official Notice, Appellant must come
forth with information or argument that, on its face, casts reasonable doubt
regarding the justification of the Official Notice. See In re Boon, 439 F.2d
724, 728 (CCPA 1971) (explaining that an applicant has the right to
challenge the official notice and demand production of evidence in support
thereof, provided such challenge is accompanied by adequate information or
argument that, on its face, creates a reasonable doubt regarding the
circumstances justifying the official notice); see also MPEP § 2144.03(C).
Because Appellant does not state persuasively why the noticed fact is
not considered common knowledge or well-known in the art, Appellant has
not adequately traversed the Examiner’s taking of Official Notice. Thus, the
facts of which the Examiner took Official Notice are admitted prior art. See
In re Ahlert, 424 F.2d 1088, 1091 (CCPA 1970) (where an applicant for a
patent has failed to challenge a fact officially noticed by the Examiner, and it
is clear that the applicant has been amply apprised of such finding so as to
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have the opportunity to make such challenge, the Examiner’s finding shall
be considered conclusive).
For these reasons, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in
concluding that claim 1 is obvious in light of the teachings of McPherson
and Pang.
With regard to independent claim 10, Appellant makes a similar
argument as that presented for claim 1 regarding the limitation “power
module apparatus, comprising: ... a clamping circuit electrically connected to
the at least one power device, the clamping circuit configured to clamp an
input to a gate of the at least one power device,” as recited in claim 10.
Appeal Br. 21. Appellant argues that “MCPHERSON does not disclose a
clamping circuit; and PANG does not disclose a clamping circuit being
integrated in the power module apparatus.” Id. at 26 (emphasis omitted).
For the reasons discussed above with regard to claim 1, we are not
persuaded that the Examiner erred in finding that the combined teachings of
McPherson and Pang teach or suggest the disputed limitation.
Also with regard to claim 10, Appellant makes an argument similar to
that presented for claim 1 regarding the limitation “the clamping circuit is
configured to clamp a voltage at the gate of the at least one power device to
less than 10 V peak to peak,” as recited by claim 10. Id. at 27. Appellant
makes similar arguments regarding the criticality of the clamping parameters
(id. at 27–29), and argues that Pang teaches away from the recited limitation
because “PANG is a configuration of a clamp circuit with a gate driver - not
a power module.” (id. at 29).
For the reasons discussed above for claim 1, we are not persuaded that
the Examiner erred in concluding that the determination of the optimum or
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workable range(s) given the guidance of the prior art would have been
obvious to the skilled artisan. See Final Act. 7.
Appellant next argues that neither McPherson nor Pang teaches or
suggests the limitation:
power module apparatus, ... wherein the clamping circuit
comprises a transistor discretely holding the at least one power
device off; wherein the transistor is connected to the gate of the
at least one power device; and wherein the transistor is
connected to at least one of the following: a source/emitter of
the at least one power device and a negative voltage bias (V),
as recited by claim 10. Appeal Br. 30. Appellant argues that “[t]he control
circuit 120 of PANG does not connect to ‘at least one of the following: a
source/emitter of the at least one power device and a negative voltage bias (-
V)’ as recited by claim 10.” Id.
The Examiner found that the “clamping circuit” comprises a transistor
(e.g., MN31 in Figures 2 and 3 of Pang) that is connected to the gate of the
at least one power device (e.g., one of the upper NMOSFET and the lower
NMOSFET making up the half bridge of 600 in Figure 2 of McPherson),
connected between the output and ground and the MOSFETs to receive
opposite gate signals to alternately turn on the transistors, wherein the
transistor is connected to a source/emitter of the power device via the
common ground (as shown in Figures 2 and 3 of Pang). Ans. 8.
Because Appellant attacks Pang individually and presents no
persuasive arguments regarding the Examiner’s findings directed to the
combined teachings of McPherson and Pang (see Reply Br. 17), we are not
persuaded that the Examiner erred in finding that the combined teachings of
McPherson and Pang teach or suggest the disputed limitation of claim 10.
See Keller, 642 F.2d at 425.
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Appellant next argues that the Examiner erred in combining the
teachings of McPherson and Pang. Appeal Br. 31–35. Appellant contends
that the Examiner engaged in impermissible hindsight in combining the cited
references. Id. at 33. Appellant further argues that Pang teaches an
implementation of the clamping circuit in the gate driver, which teaches
away from the claimed invention. Id. at 34.
For the reasons discussed above with regard to claim 1, we are not
persuaded that the combination of McPherson and Pang is the result of
improper hindsight, or that Pang teaches away from the claimed invention.
Appellant’s challenge to the Examiner’s taking of Official Notice with
regard to claim 10 are similar to Appellant’s challenge to the Official Notice
taken with respect to claim 1. Appeal Br. 20–21, 35.
For the reasons set forth above with regard to claim 1, Appellant has
not adequately traversed the Examiner’s taking of Official Notice for claim
10.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of
independent claim 10.
Appellant makes similar arguments for independent claim 16 (Appeal
Br. 35–49), which we find unpersuasive for the reasons discussed above for
claims 1 and 10.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of
independent claim 16.
Dependent Claims 2 and 11
Claim 2 depends from claim 1 and further recites “a control circuit
implemented in the power module apparatus and configured to receive a gate
drive signal from a gate driver, wherein the clamping circuit comprises a
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Miller clamp; and wherein the clamping circuit is responsive to the control
circuit.” Appeal Br. 90 (Claims Appendix).
In addition to the arguments made for claim 1, discussed above,
Appellant argues that the gate driver of Pang does not include a control
circuit implemented in the power module apparatus and configured to
receive a gate drive signal from a gate driver, as claim 2 requires. Id. at 50.
Appellant further argues that modifying the power module in McPherson in
view of Pang’s gate driver to include “a control circuit implemented in the
power module apparatus and configured to receive a gate drive signal from a
gate driver ... and wherein the clamping circuit is responsive to the control
circuit” would be “improper, unsupported, and an arbitrary rearrangement
and positioning of the various components of MCPHERSON and PANG
consistent with impermissible hindsight.” Id. at 51.
We are not persuaded that the Examiner erred. Appellant’s arguments
are conclusory, merely reciting the claim limitation, the teachings of Pang,
and stating that the two are not the same. Id. As stated by the Federal
Circuit, Rule 41.37 “require[s] more substantive arguments in an appeal
brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and a naked assertion that
the corresponding elements were not found in the prior art.” In re Lovin, 652
F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Moreover, the test for obviousness is not
whether the claimed invention is expressly suggested in any one or all of the
references, but whether the claimed subject matter would have been obvious
to those of ordinary skill in the art in light of the combined teachings of
those references. See Keller, 642 F.2d at 425. Here, Appellant has not
persuasively rebutted the Examiner’s findings that the combination of
McPherson and Pang teaches or suggests the disputed limitation.
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We are also not persuaded that the combination of McPherson and
Pang is the result of improper hindsight, as the Examiner has set forth
articulated reasoning with rational underpinnings for the combination. Ans.
7. Appellant has not identified any knowledge relied upon by the Examiner
that was gleaned only from Appellant’s disclosure and that was not
otherwise within the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention.
In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d at 1395. Nor has Appellant provided objective
evidence of secondary considerations, which “operates as a beneficial check
on hindsight.” Cheese Sys., 725 F.3d at 1352.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claim 2. Appellant’s arguments for dependent
claim 11 are similarly conclusory. See Appeal Br. 69–70. Accordingly, we
sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of dependent claims 2 and 11.
Dependent Claims 3, 12, and 18
Claim 3 depends from claim 1 and further recites:
a signal line configured to receive a gate drive signal
from a gate driver, wherein the clamping circuit is connected to
the signal line between gate drive connectors and the at least
one power device;
wherein the clamping circuit is configured to clamp an
input to the gate of the at least one power device; and
wherein the clamping circuit is integrated in the power
module apparatus and the clamping circuit is arranged with at
least one of the following: a base plate, the power substrate, one
of at least two power contacts, the at least one power device, the
gate-source board, the gate drive connectors, and the housing.
Appeal Br. 90–91 (Claims Appendix).
The Examiner found that McPherson, as modified for claim 1, fails to
teach that the clamping circuit is integrated with power device 500, as claim
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3 requires. Final Act. 6. The Examiner found, however, that it was
notoriously well known to an artisan of ordinary skill that a clamping circuit
may be integrated with a power device. Id. The Examiner took official
notice of that fact, citing US 2015/0162321 to Briere. Id. The Examiner
found that Briere teaches that a gate of MOSFET 220/420 in Figure 4 of
Briere may be protected from high voltage using clamp 430, where the entire
structure in Figure 4 may be monolithically integrated on common die 450.
Id. (citing Briere ¶¶ 25, 38).
In addition to the arguments made for claim 1, Appellant contends in
a conclusory manner that modifying the McPherson power module in view
of Pang’s gate driver to include the limitations of claim 3 “would be
improper, unsupported, and an arbitrary rearrangement and positioning of
the various components of MCPHERSON and PANG consistent with
impermissible hindsight.” Appeal Br. 52–53. Appellant also argues in a
conclusory manner, with regard to Briere, that “Appellant hereby states that
the noticed fact is not considered to be common knowledge or well-known
in the art.” Id. at 53. Appellant further argues that:
[t]he ESD of BRIERE does not teach nor fairly disclose a
“clamping circuit being configured to reduce a voltage charge
up at a gate of the at least one power device to within 8 V of a
desired voltage” as recited by claim 1, “clamping circuit is
configured to clamp a voltage at the gate of the at least one
power device to less than 10 V peak to peak” as recited by
claim 11, and “clamping circuit is configured to reduce a
voltage charge up at the gate of the at least one power device by
at least 10%” as recited by claim 16.
Appeal Br. 53.
Appellant’s arguments do not persuade of Examiner error. Appellant
does not put forth persuasive argument or objective evidence to rebut the
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Examiner’s finding that it was notoriously well known that a clamping
circuit may be integrated with a power device. See id. Nor has Appellant
persuasively rebutted the Examiner’s finding that gate drive connectors 700
in Figure 2 of McPherson “are disclosed in power module 100
corresponding to the power module apparatus of claim 3 and may be used to
attach the clamping circuit integrated with power module 100.” Ans. 11.
Moreover, for the reasons set forth above, we are not persuaded that the
combination of McPherson and Pang is the result of improper hindsight.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of dependent
claim 3. Appellant’s arguments for dependent claims 12 and 18, which
depend from independent claims 10 and 16, respectively, are similarly
unpersuasive. See Appeal Br. 70–72, 79–81. Accordingly, we sustain the
Examiner’s § 103 rejection of dependent claims 3, 12, and 18.
Dependent Claims 4 and 14
Claim 4 ultimately depends from claim 1 and further recites “wherein
the clamping circuit is configured to clamp a voltage at the gate of the at
least one power device to less than 8 V peak to peak.” Appeal Br. 91
(Claims Appendix). As in claim 1, the Examiner found that such specific
parameters in the degree of clamping by the clamping circuit will not
support the patentability of the subject matter encompassed by the prior art
unless there is evidence indicating the parameters are critical. Final Act. 6–7
(citing In re Aller, 220 F.2d 454, 456 (CCPA 1955)).
In addition to the arguments made for claim 1, Appellant contends
that, here again, the recited parameters in the degree of clamping by the
clamping circuit are critical (Appeal Br. 55–56) and that Pang teaches away
from them (id. at 56–57).
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We agree with the Examiner that, just as Appellant has not shown that
reducing a voltage charge up at a gate of the at least one power device to
within 8V of a desired voltage, as recited in claim 1, is not critical, Appellant
also has not persuasively shown that clamping a voltage at the gate of the at
least one power device to less than 8V peak to peak is critical. See Ans. 12.
Moreover, Appellant’s “teaching” away” arguments with regard to Pang are
unpersuasive for the reasons set forth above with regard to claim 1. Thus, we
agree with the Examiner that the recited parameters in the degree of
clamping by the clamping circuit will not support the patentability of the
subject matter encompassed by the prior art for at least the same reasons
discussed above for claim 1.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of dependent
claim 4. Appellant’s arguments with regard to dependent claim 14 are
similar and similarly unpersuasive. Appeal Br. 72–76. Thus, we also sustain
the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of claim 14.
Dependent Claim 5
Claim 5 ultimately depends from claim 1 and further recites “wherein
the clamping circuit comprises a transistor discretely holding the at least one
power device off; wherein the transistor is connected to the gate of the at
least one power device; and wherein the transistor is connected to at least
one of the following: a source/emitter of the at least one power device and a
negative voltage bias (-V).” Appeal Br. 91 (Claims Appendix).
In addition to the arguments made for claim 1, Appellant argues that
McPherson and Pang do not teach or suggest “wherein the transistor is
connected to at least one of the following: a source/emitter of the at least one
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power device and a negative voltage bias (-V).” Appeal Br. 58. Appellant
argues that:
the control circuit 120 of PANG is arranged with the gate driver
as illustrated in Figures 2 and 3. Moreover, the control circuit
120 of PANG includes the transistor MN31 connected to
ground. The control circuit 120 of PANG does not connect to
‘at least one of the following: a source/emitter of the at least
one power device and a negative voltage bias (-V),’ as recited
by claim 5.
Id.
Appellant attacks Pang individually, and has not addressed or
persuasively rebutted the Examiner’s findings based on the combined
teachings of McPhereson and Pang. For example, the Examiner found that:
the transistor (e.g., MN31 in Figs. 2 and 3 of Pang) is connected
to the gate of the at least one power device (e.g., one of the
upper NMOSFET and the lower NMOSFET making up the half
bridge of 600 in Fig. 2 of McPherson) connected between the
output and ground and the MOSFETs receive opposite gate
signals to alternately turn on the transistors, wherein the
transistor is connected to a source/emitter of the power device
via the ground.
Final Act. 7; see Lovin, 652 F.3d at 1357; Keller, 642 F.2d at 425.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of dependent
claim 5.
Dependent Claims 6 and 15
Claim 6 depends from claim 1 and further recites “a sense and control
circuit electrically connected to the clamping circuit, the sense and control
circuit configured to control the clamping circuit as a function of a driver
control signal.” Appeal Br. 92 (Claims Appendix).
In addition to the arguments made for claim 1, Appellant further
argues that McPherson and Pang do not teach the limitation additionally
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recited in claim 6 because “the control circuit 120 of PANG is arranged with
the gate driver as illustrated in Figures 2 and 3.” Appeal Br. 59.
Appellant also argues in a conclusory manner that modifying
McPherson’s power module in view of Pang’s gate driver to include “a
sense and control circuit electrically connected to the clamping circuit, the
sense and control circuit configured to control the clamping circuit as a
function of a driver control signal” would be “improper, unsupported, and an
arbitrary rearrangement and positioning of the various components of
MCPHERSON and PANG consistent with impermissible hindsight.” Id. at
59–60.
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive because Appellant argues
claim 6 in a conclusory manner and attacks the Pang reference individually.
Id.; see Lovin, 652 F.3d at 1357; Keller, 642 F.2d at 425. Appellant makes
similar arguments for dependent claim 15 (Appeal Br. 76–77), which
depends from independent claim 10 and recites limitations similar to those
recited in claim 6 (id. at 94). Moreover, for the reasons set forth above, we
are not persuaded that the combination of McPherson and Pang is the result
of improper hindsight.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of dependent
claims 6 and 15.
Dependent Claims 7 and 17
Claim 7 depends from claim 6 and further recites “wherein the sense
and control circuit is configured to control the clamping circuit as a function
of the driver control signal based on a falling edge delay and rising edge
pass through operation.” Appeal Br. 92.
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In addition to arguments similar to those made for claims 1 and 6,
Appellant argues that McPherson and Pang do not teach or suggest the
limitation recited in claim 7. Id. at 60. In particular, Appellant argues that the
gate signal SG in Pang would not necessarily be present or inherent such that
“the sense and control circuit is configured to control the clamping circuit as
a function of the driver control signal based on a falling edge delay and
rising edge pass through operation,” as recited in claim 7. Id. at 61.
We are not persuaded that the Examiner erred. The Examiner found:
in a semiconductor circuit such as the one shown in Fig. 3 [of
Pang], there is always some delay through a path that a signal
passes and logic gates forming part of such a semiconductor
circuit also each have a delay between its input and output.
Thus, the logic gates 121, 122, and 123 forming part of the
semiconductor circuit in Fig. 3 of Pang and forming a path
between SE and SF has an inherent delay.
Ans. 13. In the Reply Brief, Appellant repeated the conclusory argument
made in the Appeal Brief that the gate signal SG would not necessarily be
present or inherent such that the disputed limitation is taught or suggested.
Reply Br. 27. It is well settled that mere attorney arguments and conclusory
statements, which are unsupported by factual evidence, are entitled to little
probative value. In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see
also In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974) (attorney argument is
not evidence).
For these reasons, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in
finding that the combination of McPherson and Pang teaches or suggests the
disputed limitation of claim 7.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of claim 7.
Appellant makes similar arguments for dependent claim 17, which are
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similarly unpersuasive. Appeal Br. 78–79. Thus, we also sustain the
Examiner’s § 103 rejection of claim 17.
Dependent Claims 8 and 9
Claim 8 depends from claim 1 and further recites “wherein the
clamping circuit is configured to reduce the voltage charge up at the gate of
the at least one power device by at least 10%.” Appeal Br. 92. Claim 9
depends from claim 1 and further recites “wherein the clamping circuit is
configured to reduce a voltage charge up at a gate of the at least one power
device to within 6 V of a desired voltage.” Id.
Appellant makes similar arguments for claims 8 and 9 as were
presented for claim 1—namely, that the combination of McPherson and
Pang do not teach or suggest a clamping circuit integrated into the power
module apparatus, and that the parameters recited regarding the voltage
charge are critical to the invention. Appeal Br. 62–69.
For the reasons discussed above with regard to claim 1, we are not
persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 8 and 9 under § 103.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of claims 8
and 9.
Dependent Claim 20
Claim 20 depends from claim 16 and further recites “wherein the
clamping circuit is configured to reduce the voltage charge up at the gate of
the at least one power device by at least 30%.” Appeal Br. 96.
Appellant makes similar arguments for claim 20 as were presented for
claims 1 and 16—namely, that the combination of McPherson and Pang do
not teach or suggest a clamping circuit integrated into the power module
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20
apparatus, and that the parameters recited regarding the voltage charge are
critical to the invention. Appeal Br. 62–69.
For the reasons discussed above with regard to claim 1, we are not
persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 20 under § 103.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of claim 20.
Dependent Claims 21 and 22
Claims 21 and 22 depend from claims 1 and 10, respectively. Both
claims 21 and 22 recite the additional limitation “further comprising gate
drive connectors configured to receive a gate drive signal from a gate driver,
wherein the clamping circuit is connected to a signal line between the gate
drive connectors and the at least one power device.” Appeal Br. 96.
In addition to the arguments presented for claims 1 and 10, Appellant
argues that modifying McPherson’s power module in view of Pang’s gate
driver to include the power module apparatus of claim 1 or claim 10,
“further comprising gate drive connectors configured to receive a gate drive
signal from a gate driver, wherein the clamping circuit is connected to a
signal line between the gate drive connectors and the at least one power
device” would be “improper, unsupported, and an arbitrary rearrangement
and positioning of the various components of MCPHERSON and PANG
consistent with impermissible hindsight.” Appeal Br. 85–87.
For the reasons set forth above, we are not persuaded that the
combination of McPherson and Pang is the result of improper hindsight.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of dependent
claims 21 and 22.

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21
DECISION
We affirm the decision of the Examiner rejecting claims 1–12, 14–18,
and 20–22.

DECISION SUMMARY

Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–12, 14–18,
20–22
103 McPherson, Pang 1–12, 14–18,
20–22

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED