01973518
03-05-1999
Craig D. Renschler, Appellant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Pacific/Western Areas), Agency.
Craig D. Renschler v. United States Postal Service
01973518
March 5, 1999
Craig D. Renschler, )
Appellant, )
) Appeal No. 01973518
v. ) Agency No. 4E-852-1077-94
) EEOC No. 350-96-8094X
William J. Henderson, )
Postmaster General, )
United States Postal Service )
(Pacific/Western Areas), )
Agency. )
___________________________________)
DECISION
Appellant timely appealed the agency's final decision that it had not
discriminated against him in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq., and Section 501 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �791 et seq.
The Commission accepts this appeal in accordance with EEOC Order
No. 960.001.
Appellant filed a formal complaint of discrimination in which he claimed
discrimination on the bases of sex (male) and physical disability
(retinal lesion), when on January 26, 1994, his disability was not
accommodated, and he was separated from employment with the agency.
The agency accepted the complaint and conducted an investigation.
At the conclusion of the investigation, appellant requested a hearing
before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission administrative judge
(AJ). Although a hearing was scheduled for January 23, 1997, appellant
did not appear. The AJ noted that by letter dated December 16, 1996,
appellant requested that the hearing be rescheduled. However, the
AJ found that appellant had waived his right to a hearing on his EEO
complaint in light of the fact that: (1) he had failed to state a reason
why postponement of the hearing was necessary and required by reasons
beyond his control; (2) he sent the AJ several ex parte communications,
despite orders against such communications; and (3) he moved out of the
state without informing the agency of his new address. As a result,
the AJ remanded the complaint to the agency with instructions to proceed
in accordance with 29 C.F.R. �1614.
On February 28, 1997, the agency issued a final decision based on the
existing record. In its FAD, the agency found that appellant failed to
establish that he was discriminated against, as alleged. Specifically,
the agency found that appellant failed to prove a prima facie case of
discrimination on either bases in that he failed to demonstrate he was
treated differently than any other comparative employee in a similar
situation. In addition, the agency found that it had articulated
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. Specifically,
appellant was separated from employment based on his failure to qualify on
his assigned scheme, and failed to work as requested by his supervisor.
Appellant, a Part Time Flexible Clerk, maintained that he had a doctor's
appointment scheduled for 8:30 a.m., when his shift ended, on January
26, 1994. He stated that his supervisor allowed two other women to
leave before their shifts ended. However, appellant testified that
he was told he could leave at the end of his shift only if his work
was finished. Later, his supervisor told him that he had to stay after
his shift ended and work overtime in order to complete one of the other
employees' work. Instead, appellant left and went to see his optometrist.
He was terminated for failing to qualify on his assigned scheme, and
for failing to work as requested by his supervisor.
Appellant's supervisor denied that appellant told him he had a doctor's
appointment, but rather, told him he had an "appointment". Furthermore,
appellant failed to fill out the required Form 3971 for a request for
leave of absence. He testified that appellant was separated due to his
inability to learn his scheme, and provided supporting documentation
thereof. Appellant's optometrist provided an affidavit wherein she
testified that appellant did not have a scheduled appointment on January
26, 1994, but rather, came in to the office that day in order to schedule
a referral for an ophthalmologist.
As appellant's complaint constitutes a claim of disparate treatment,
the agency properly analyzed it under the three-tiered analytical
framework outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973). See also St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993);
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981);
Prewitt v. U.S. Postal Service, 662 F.2d 292, 305 n.19 (5th Cir. 1981).
Applying this legal standard to appellant's complaint, the Commission
finds that assuming arguendo that appellant established a prima
facie case, the agency successfully rebutted any initial inference
of discrimination raised by appellant by articulating a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Specifically, appellant was
separated when he failed to qualify on his assigned scheme, and failed
to work as requested by his supervisor.
After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that appellant
failed to establish that the agency's reasons for its actions were pretext
for discrimination. We find that appellant's contentions on appeal are
without merit. Specifically, he failed to present sufficient evidence
which established an inference of discrimination or established that
the agency's reasons for its actions were pretext for discrimination.
Accordingly, it is the decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission to AFFIRM the agency's final decision that it did not
discriminate against appellant, as alleged.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0795)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if appellant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available
when the previous decision was issued; or
2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,
regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or
3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial
precedential implications.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST
BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this
decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive
a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in
opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider
MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party
WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request
to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments
must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of
Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box
19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,
the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received
by the Commission.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances
have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,
a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the
delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your
request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests
for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited
circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).
RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)
It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file
a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN
NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.
You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have
interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that
a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the
date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action
is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)
CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult
an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction
in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil action,
YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE
OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS
OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in
the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the
national organization, and not the local office, facility or department
in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a
civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative
processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
_ March 5, 1999 ____________________________
DATE Ronnie Blumenthal, Director
Office of Federal Operations