Covit, Andrew B. et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 26, 2019

11106817 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Dec. 26, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/106,817 04/15/2005 Andrew B. Covit AMI 3.0-002 (11) 4506
147311 7590 12/26/2019
Botos Churchill IP Law LLP
430 Mountain Avenue
Suite 401
New Providence, NJ 07974
EXAMINER
LAM, ELIZA ANNE
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3686
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/26/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
pto@bciplaw.com
rbotos@bciplaw.com
rchurchill@bciplaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ANDREW B. COVIT, MARK E. FAMILANT, and
STUART COVIT
Appeal 2018-003431
Application 11/106,817
Technology Center 3600
Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, and
LARRY J. HUME, Administrative Patent Judges.
HUME, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant,1 Andrew B. Covit et al.,
appeals from the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 2, 4–14, 17–27,
and 29–34, which are all claims pending in the application. Appellant has
canceled claims 3, 15, 16, 28, and 35–38. See Appeal Br. 28–36 (Claims
App.). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM IN PART.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Artificial
Medical Intelligence, Inc. Appeal Br. 2.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE2
The claims are directed to a system and method for automatic
assignment of medical codes to unformatted data. See Spec. (Title).
Further, “[a]lthough the present invention is a system and method for
automatic assignment of medical codes to unformatted or uncoded document
data, which is particularly well suited for implementation as an independent
software systems and shall be so described, the present invention is equally
well suited for implementation as a functional/library module, an applet, a
plug in software application, as a device plug in, and in a microchip
implementation.” Spec. ¶ 29.
Claims 1 and 5, reproduced below, are representative of the subject
matter on appeal (emphases added to contested prior-art limitations):
Exemplary Claims
1. An automated system for determining medical
codes from unformatted medical document data comprising:
memory and a processor, wherein the memory is
configured to store:
a data structure including medical codes data associated
with medical terminology data; and
processor searching control instructions configured to:

2 Our decision relies upon Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed
July 29, 2017); Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed Feb. 14, 2018); Examiner’s
Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Dec. 14, 2017); Final Office Action (“Final Act.,”
mailed Jan. 12, 2017); and the original Specification (“Spec.,” filed
Apr. 15, 2005) (claiming benefit of US 60/562,892, filed Apr. 15, 2004 and
US 60/644,961 filed Jan. 19, 2005).
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receive an unformatted medical document that
includes raw document data generated in response to a
medical examination;
preprocess the raw document data to analyze
beginning and ending of sentences in the document;
search the preprocessed raw document data to
automatically identify medical terminology data of the
data structure located in sentences of the document;
automatically select one or more medical codes of
the data structure that are associated with the identified
medical terminology data;
automatically apply a set of expressions to context
data structures that categorize the context data of a
sentence as terminology preceding and succeeding the
identified medical terminology data;
automatically determine, using the categorized
context data, the selected one or more medical codes that
are applicable to a patient,
wherein one or more medical codes are
automatically removed from the selected one or more
medical codes based on at least one restriction rule that
represents a logical relationship between the set of
expressions applied to the context data;
automatically substitute one or more medical codes
of the selected medical codes with a further selected
medical code based on a previously selected medical
code and vague medical terminology of the sentences of
the document, the vague medical terminology contained
in a context table and having multiple medical code
associations so as to not be uniquely associated with one
particular medical code of the data structure,
wherein the previously selected medical code in
context of the vague medical terminology serves to
disambiguate the vague medical terminology according
to the context table to permit selection of the further
selected medical code; and
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processor output control instructions configured to
generate output comprising the selected medical codes
that are applicable to the patient,
wherein the processor is operable to execute the
processor search control instructions and the processor
output control instructions, and
wherein the processor searches the raw data in the
unformatted medical document to identify the medical
terminology data and processes the identified medical
terminology data from the unformatted medical
document to determine the applicable medical codes in
the context of the unformatted document.
5. The system of claim l wherein:
the restriction rule comprises a kinship phrase
identifying that the selected medical codes are for a relative of
the patient, and
the processor searching control instructions: configured
to automatically determine the selected one or more medical
codes that are applicable to the patient comprise processor
searching control instructions configured to: distinguish at least
one of the selected one or more medical codes as a result of the
context data including the kinship phrase.
Prior Art
The Examiner relies upon the following prior art as evidence in
rejecting the claims on appeal:
Ryan US 5,809,476 Sept. 15, 1998
Doerr et al. (“Doerr”) US 2002/0147615 A1 Oct. 10, 2002
Heinze et al. (“Heinze”) US 6,915,254 B1 July 5, 2005
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Rejections on Appeal
R1. Claims 1, 2, 4–14, 17–27, and 29–34 stand rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to a judicial exception (i.e., a law of nature, a
natural phenomenon), without significantly more. Final Act. 2.
R2. Claims 1, 2, 4–14, and 17–27, and 29–34 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Heinze,
Ryan, and Doerr. Final Act. 5.3
CLAIM GROUPING
Based on Appellant’s arguments (Appeal Br. 7–27) and our discretion
under 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv), we decide the appeal of patent-ineligible
subject matter Rejection R1 of claims 1, 2, 4–14, 17–27, and 29–34 on the
basis of representative claim 1; and we also decide the appeal of obviousness
Rejection R2 of claims 1, 2, 4, 6–14, 17–27, and 29–34 on the basis of
representative claim 1.
We address separately argued Rejection R2 of dependent claim 5,
infra.4

3 We note the explicit statement of Rejection R2 erroneously includes
claim 28, which has been canceled. See Appeal Br. 34 (Claims App.).
4 “Notwithstanding any other provision of this paragraph, the failure of
appellant to separately argue claims which appellant has grouped together
shall constitute a waiver of any argument that the Board must consider the
patentability of any grouped claim separately.” 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
In addition, when Appellant does not separately argue the patentability of
dependent claims, the claims stand or fall with the claims from which they
depend. In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
In reaching this decision, we consider all evidence presented and all
arguments actually made by Appellant. To the extent Appellant has not
advanced separate, substantive arguments for particular claims, or other
issues, such arguments are waived. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
We agree with particular arguments set forth by Appellant with
respect to subject matter eligibility Rejection R1 of claims 1, 2, 4–14, 17–27,
and 29–34, and obviousness Rejection R2 of claim 5.
However, we disagree with Appellant’s arguments with respect to
obviousness Rejection R2 of claims 1, 2, 4, 6–14, 17–27, and 29–34 and,
unless otherwise noted, we incorporate by reference herein and adopt as our
own: (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action
from which this appeal is taken, and (2) the reasons and rebuttals set forth in
the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellant’s arguments. We highlight
and address specific findings and arguments regarding claims 1 and 5 for
emphases as follows.
1. § 101 Rejection R1 of Claims 1, 2, 4–14, 17–27, and 29–34
Issue 1
Appellant argues (Appeal Br. 7–17; Reply Br. 2–6) the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-
ineligible subject matter is in error. These contentions present us with the
following issue:
Under the USPTO’s Revised Guidance, informed by our governing
case law concerning 35 U.S.C. § 101, is claim 1 patent-ineligible under
§ 101?
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Principles of Law
A. 35 U.S.C. § 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it is a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.5
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs.,
Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012) (brackets in original) (citing Diamond v. Diehr,
450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217–18 (2014)
(citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75–77). In accordance with that framework, we
first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S.
at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk . . . .”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);

5 This threshold analysis of whether a claim is directed to one of the four
statutory categories of invention, i.e., a process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, is referred to as “Step 1” in the USPTO’s patent-
eligibility analysis under § 101. MPEP § 2106.
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mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191); “tanning,
dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores”
(id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853)));
and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v.
Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory
does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical
formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view
respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting
to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.”
Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace
that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
Abstract ideas may include, but are not limited to, fundamental
economic practices, methods of organizing human activities, and
mathematical formulas or relationships. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–21. Under
this guidance, we must therefore ensure at step one that we articulate what
the claims are directed to with enough specificity to ensure the step one
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inquiry is meaningful. Id. at 217 (“[W]e tread carefully in construing this
exclusionary principle lest it swallow all of patent law.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘“inventive
concept”’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim
that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that
the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
[abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
B. USPTO Revised Guidance
The PTO recently published revised guidance in the Federal Register
concerning the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter
Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (January 7, 2019) (hereinafter
“Revised Guidance”) (https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-01-
07/pdf/2018-28282.pdf).
Under the Revised Guidance, we first look to whether the claim
recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings
of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods
of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes);6 and

6 Referred to as “Revised Step 2A, Prong 1” in the Revised Guidance
(hereinafter “Step 2A(i)”).
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(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application (see Manual for Patent
Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).7
See Revised Guidance 52–53.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial
exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional”
in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry,
specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.8
See Revised Guidance 56.
Step 2A(i) – Abstract Idea
Informed by our judicial precedent, the Revised Guidance extracts and
synthesizes key concepts identified by the courts as abstract ideas to explain
that the abstract idea exception includes the following groupings of subject
matter, when recited as such in a claim limitation:
(a) Mathematical concepts—mathematical relationships,
mathematical formulas or equations, mathematical calculations;
(b) Certain methods of organizing human activity —
fundamental economic principles or practices (including
hedging, insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or legal
interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts;
legal obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or

7 Referred to as “Revised Step 2A, Prong 2” in the Revised Guidance
(hereinafter “Step 2A(ii)”).
8 Items (3) and (4) continue to be collectively referred to as “Step 2B” of the
Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
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behaviors; business relations); managing personal behavior or
relationships or interactions between people (including social
activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions); and
(c) Mental processes—concepts performed in the human
mind (including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion).
Revised Guidance 52 (footnotes omitted).
Under the Revised Guidance, if the claim does not recite a judicial
exception (a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or subject matter within the
enumerated groupings of abstract ideas above), then the claim is patent-
eligible at Step 2A(i). This determination concludes the eligibility analysis,
except in situations identified in the Revised Guidance.9
However, if the claim recites a judicial exception (i.e., an abstract idea
enumerated above, a law of nature, or a natural phenomenon), the claim
requires further analysis for a practical application of the judicial exception
in Step 2A(ii).
Step 2A(ii) – Practical Application
If a claim recites a judicial exception in Step 2A(i), we determine
whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical
application of that exception in Step 2A(ii) by: (a) identifying whether there
are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial
exception(s); and (b) evaluating those additional elements individually and

9 In the rare circumstance in which an examiner believes a claim limitation
that does not fall within the enumerated groupings of abstract ideas should
nonetheless be treated as reciting an abstract idea, the procedure described in
of the Guidance for analyzing the claim should be followed. See Revised
Guidance, Section III.C.
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in combination to determine whether they integrate the exception into a
practical application.
The seven identified “practical application” sections of the MPEP,10
cited in the Revised Guidance under Step 2A(ii), are:
(1) MPEP § 2106.05(a) Improvements to the Functioning of
a Computer or To Any Other Technology or Technical
Field
(2) MPEP § 2106.05(b) Particular Machine
(3) MPEP § 2106.05(c) Particular Transformation
(4) MPEP § 2106.05(e) Other Meaningful Limitations
(5) MPEP § 2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An
Exception
(6) MPEP § 2106.05(g) Insignificant Extra-Solution Activity
(7) MPEP § 2106.05(h) Field of Use and Technological
Environment
See Revised Guidance 55.
If the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical
application as determined under one or more of the MPEP sections cited
above, then the claim is not directed to the judicial exception, and the patent-
eligibility inquiry ends. See Revised Guidance 54. If not, then analysis
proceeds to Step 2B.

10 See MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). Citations to the MPEP herein refer
to revision [R-08.2017]. Sections 2106.05(a), (b), (c), and (e) are indicative
of integration into a practical application, while §§ 2106.05(f), (g), and (h)
relate to limitations that are not indicative of integration into a practical
application.
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Step 2B – “Inventive Concept” or “Significantly More”
Under our reviewing courts’ precedent, it is possible that a claim that
does not “integrate” a recited judicial exception under Step 2A(ii) is
nonetheless patent eligible. For example, the claim may recite additional
elements that render the claim patent eligible even though one or more claim
elements may recite a judicial exception.11 The Federal Circuit has held
claims eligible at the second step of the Alice/Mayo test (USPTO Step 2B)
because the additional elements recited in the claims provided “significantly
more” than the recited judicial exception (e.g., because the additional
elements were unconventional in combination).12 Therefore, if a claim has
been determined to be directed to a judicial exception under Revised Step
2A, we must also evaluate the additional elements individually and in
combination under Step 2B to determine whether they provide an inventive
concept (i.e., whether the additional elements amount to significantly more
than the exception itself).13
Under the Revised Guidance, we must consider in Step 2B whether an
additional element or combination of elements: (1) “Adds a specific

11 See, e.g., Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187.
12 See, e.g., Amdocs Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1300,
1304 (Fed. Cir. 2016); BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T
Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1349–52 (Fed. Cir. 2016); DDR Holdings,
LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257–59 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
13 The patent eligibility inquiry may contain underlying issues of fact.
Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1325
(Fed. Cir. 2016). In particular, “[t]he question of whether a claim element or
combination of elements is well-understood, routine and conventional to a
skilled artisan in the relevant field is a question of fact.” Berkheimer v. HP
Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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limitation or combination of limitations that are not well-understood,
routine, conventional activity in the field, which is indicative that an
inventive concept may be present;” or (2) “simply appends well-understood,
routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified
at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception, which is indicative
that an inventive concept may not be present.” See Revised Guidance,
Section III.B.14
In the Step 2B analysis, an additional element (or combination of
elements) is not well-understood, routine or conventional unless the
examiner finds an evidentiary basis, and expressly supports a rejection in
writing with, one or more of the following:
1. A citation to an express statement in the
specification or to a statement made by an applicant during
prosecution that demonstrates the well-understood, routine,
conventional nature of the additional element(s). . . .
2. A citation to one or more of the court decisions
discussed in MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II) as noting the well-
understood, routine, conventional nature of the additional
element(s).

14 In accordance with existing Step 2B guidance, an Examiner’s finding that
an additional element (or combination of elements) is well-understood,
routine, conventional activity must be supported with at least one of the four
specific types of evidence required by the USPTO Berkheimer
Memorandum, as shown above. For more information concerning evaluation
of well-understood, routine, conventional activity, see MPEP § 2106.05(d),
as modified by the USPTO Berkheimer Memorandum (USPTO
Commissioner for Patents Memorandum dated Apr. 19, 2018, “Changes in
Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent
Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.)” (hereinafter
“Berkheimer Memo”).
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3. A citation to a publication that demonstrates the
well-understood, routine, conventional nature of the additional
element(s). . . .
4. A statement that the examiner is taking official
notice of the well-understood, routine, conventional nature of
the additional element(s). . . .
See Berkheimer Memo 3–4.
If the Examiner or the Board determines under Step 2B that the
element (or combination of elements) amounts to significantly more than the
exception itself, the claim is eligible, thereby concluding the eligibility
analysis.
However, if a determination is made that the element and combination
of elements do not amount to significantly more than the exception itself, the
claim is ineligible under Step 2B, and the claim should be rejected for lack of
subject matter eligibility.
Analysis
Step 1 – Statutory Category
Claim 1, as a system (machine) claim, recites one of the enumerated
categories of eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, the issue
before us is whether it is directed to a judicial exception without
significantly more.
Step 2A(i): Does the Claim Recite a Judicial Exception?
The Examiner determined that the claims “are directed to the abstract
idea of analyzing a document to determine applicable medical codes, as
explained in detail below.” Final Act. 2. “[T]he description in claims 1, 14,
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27, and 32 of analyzing a document to determine applicable medical codes is
an abstract idea.” Final Act. 4.
We conclude claim 1 does not recite the judicial exceptions of either
natural phenomena or laws of nature. We evaluate, de novo, whether
claim 1 recites an abstract idea based upon the Revised Guidance.
First, we look to the Specification to provide context as to what the
claimed invention is directed to. In this case, the Specification discloses that
the “invention is a system and method for automatic assignment of medical
codes to unformatted data.” Spec. ¶ 5.
Appellant’s Abstract describes the invention as:
A system and method for automatic assignment of
medical codes to unformatted data is, for example, a computer
software module or engine. The engine automatically assigns
medical codes such as ICD codes (ICD9 and ICD10 as well as
other versions) to unformatted or uncoded medical documents
(e.g. medical notes, discharge summaries, etc.). The system
reads a document and then scans (assesses) it for diagnoses
associated with the medical codes. When diagnosis is
identified, the system can also examine the language context in
which the diagnosis appears. Using rules derived from syntactic
and semantic usage, the system decides whether to apply an
identified ICD code to the document being processed or not.
The output of the module, a set of medical codes and the
corresponding diagnoses that conform to the widely accepted
syntactic and semantic rules associated with coding, can then be
stored in or applied to a number of different mediums, such as
data base entries, attachments to the document itself, email to
the owner of the document, electronic or paper forms, etc.
Spec. 42 (Abstract).
In TABLE 1 below, we identify in italics the specific claim
limitations in claim 1 that we conclude recite an abstract idea. We
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additionally identify in bold the additional (non-abstract) claim limitations
that are generic computer components and techniques, and underline
limitations representing extra or post-solution activity:
TABLE 1
Independent Claim 1 Revised Guidance
An automated system for
determining medical codes from
unformatted medical document
data comprising:
A system (device) is a statutory subject
matter class. See 35 U.S.C. § 101.
[L1] memory and a processor,
wherein the memory is
configured to store:
A memory and a processor are generic
computer components.
[L2] a data structure including
medical codes data associated
with medical terminology data;
and processor searching control
instructions configured to:
Storing data using a data structure is a
well-understood, routine and
conventional computer technique.
[L3] receive an unformatted
medical document that includes
raw document data generated in
response to a medical
examination;
Receiving information, i.e., data
gathering, is merely insignificant
extra-solution activity that does not
add significantly more to the abstract
idea to render the claimed invention
patent-eligible. See In re Bilski, 545
F.3d 943, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en
banc), aff’d on other grounds, 561
U.S. 593 (2010) (“[T]he involvement
of the machine or transformation in the
claimed process must not merely be
insignificant extra-solution activity”);
see also MPEP § 2106.05(g); and see
buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765
F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(computer receives and sends
information over a network).
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Independent Claim 1 Revised Guidance
[L4] preprocess the raw
document data to analyze
beginning and ending of
sentences in the document;
Analyzing a sentence is an abstract
idea, i.e., an “observation, evaluation,
judgment, opinion” which could be
performed as a mental process. See
Revised Guidance 52.
[L5] search the preprocessed
raw document data to
automatically identify medical
terminology data of the data
structure located in sentences of
the document;
Identifying particular data or data type
is an abstract idea, i.e., an
“observation, evaluation, judgment,
opinion” which could be performed as
a mental process. See Revised
Guidance 52.
[L6] automatically select one or
more medical codes of the data
structure that are associated
with the identified medical
terminology data;
Selecting one or more codes
(information) associated with
particular data is an abstract idea, i.e.,
an “observation, evaluation, judgment,
opinion” which could be performed as
a mental process. See Revised
Guidance 52.
[L7] automatically apply a set
of expressions to context data
structures that categorize the
context data of a sentence as
terminology preceding and
succeeding the identified
medical terminology data;
Applying information, e.g., a set of
expressions, to a context data structure
for categorization purposes is an
abstract idea, i.e., categorizing and
applying information is an
“observation, evaluation, judgment,
opinion” which could be performed as
a mental process. See Revised
Guidance 52.
[L8] automatically determine,
using the categorized context
data, the selected one or more
medical codes that are
applicable to a patient,
Determining a medical code applicable
to a patient is an abstract idea, i.e., an
“observation, evaluation, judgment,
opinion” which could be performed as
a mental process. See Revised
Guidance 52.
[L9] wherein one or more
medical codes are automatically
removed from the selected one
Removing medical codes based upon a
rule is an abstract idea, i.e., certain
methods of organizing human activity
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Independent Claim 1 Revised Guidance
or more medical codes based on
at least one restriction rule that
represents a logical relationship
between the set of expressions
applied to the context data;
in the form of managing relationships
or interactions, including following
rules or instructions. See Revised
Guidance 52.
[L10] automatically substitute
one or more medical codes of
the selected medical codes with
a further selected medical code
based on a previously selected
medical code and vague
medical terminology of the
sentences of the document,
the vague medical terminology
contained in a context table and
having multiple medical code
associations so as to not be
uniquely associated with one
particular medical code of the
data structure,
See Step 2A(ii) analysis, infra.
[L11] wherein the previously
selected medical code in context
of the vague medical
terminology serves to
disambiguate the vague medical
terminology according to the
context table to permit selection
of the further selected medical
code; and
See Step 2A(ii) analysis, infra.
[L12] processor output control
instructions configured to
generate output comprising the
selected medical codes that are
applicable to the patient,
Computer instructions to generate
output are well-understood, routine,
and conventional computer activity.
[L13] wherein the processor is
operable to execute the
A processor executing instructions,
including search control instruction, is
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Independent Claim 1 Revised Guidance
processor search control
instructions and the processor
output control instructions,
and wherein the processor
well-understood, routine, and
conventional computer activity.
[L14] searches the raw data in
the unformatted medical
document to identify the
medical terminology data and
Searching a set of data to identify
specific data is an abstract idea, i.e., an
“observation, evaluation, judgment,
opinion” which could be performed as
a mental process. See Revised
Guidance 52.
[L15] processes the identified
medical terminology data from
the unformatted medical
document to determine the
applicable medical codes in
the context of the unformatted
document.
Determining an applicable code is an
abstract idea, i.e., an observation,
evaluation, judgment, opinion” which
could be performed as a mental
process. See Revised Guidance 52.
Appeal Br. 28–29 (Claims App.).
Under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard,15 we conclude
the limitations above recite actions and/or functions that would ordinarily
occur when analyzing a document to determine and assign medical codes to
unformatted data. See Final Act. 2. In particular, we find limitations L4–

15 During prosecution, claims must be given their broadest reasonable
interpretation when reading claim language in light of the specification as it
would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad. of
Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Under this standard,
we interpret claim terms using “the broadest reasonable meaning of the
words in their ordinary usage as they would be understood by one of
ordinary skill in the art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way
of definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by the written description
contained in the applicant’s specification.” In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048,
1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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L8, L14, and L15 recite abstract ideas as identified, supra. For example,
searching and analyzing information contained in the beginning and ending
of sentences containing medical terminology, i.e., unformatted data, and
selecting medical codes to apply to the medical terminology, is an operation
that generally occurs when determining which code or codes is/are
applicable to a particular medical procedure or condition. Further, we
conclude such identification, analysis, and selection of codes, as in claim 1,
recites an abstract idea, whether initiated person-to-person, on paper, or
using a computer.
We determine that claim 1, overall, recites a mental process that may
also be performed by pen and paper. This type of activity, i.e., assignment
of medical codes to unformatted data, as recited in the claim limitations and,
aside from any computer-related aspects, includes longstanding conduct that
existed well before the advent of computers and the Internet, and could be
carried out by a human with pen and paper. See CyberSource Corp. v. Retail
Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“That purely mental
processes can be unpatentable, even when performed by a computer, was
precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson.”).16

16 Our reviewing court recognizes that “[a]n abstract idea can generally be
described at different levels of abstraction.” Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc.,
842 F.3d 1229, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2016). That need not and, in this case does
not, “impact the patentability analysis.” Id. at 1241. Further, “[t]he Board’s
slight revision of its abstract idea analysis does not impact the patentability
analysis.” Id. Moreover, merely combining several abstract ideas does not
render the combination any less abstract. RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo
Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Adding one abstract idea (math)
to another abstract idea . . . does not render the claim non-abstract.”); see
also FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1093–94 (Fed.
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Thus, under Step 2A(i), we agree with the Examiner that claim 1’s
“system for determining medical codes from unformatted medical document
data” recites a judicial exception. We conclude claim 1, under our Revised
Guidance, recites a judicial exception of assignment of medical codes to
unformatted data, i.e., a mental process, and thus is an abstract idea.
Step 2A(ii): Judicial Exception Integrated into a Practical Application?
If the claims are directed to a judicial exception, as we conclude
above, we proceed to the “practical application” Step 2A(ii) in which we
determine whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical
application of that exception by: (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s); and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether they integrate the exception into a practical application.
As to the specific limitations, we find limitations L4–L8, L14, and
L15 recite abstract ideas as delineated in TABLE 1, above, and limitation L3
recites insignificant data gathering. See MPEP § 2106.05(g). Data
gathering, as performed by the steps or function in Appellant’s claims, is a
classic example of insignificant extra-solution activity. See, e.g., In re
Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d sub nom, Bilski v.
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
In addition to the abstract steps identified in Step 2A(i), supra, and the
extra-solution activity recited by limitation L3, claim 1 further recites:
“[L10] automatically substitute one or more medical codes of the selected

Cir. 2016) (determining the pending claims were directed to a combination
of abstract ideas).
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medical codes with a further selected medical code based on a previously
selected medical code and vague medical terminology of the sentences of the
document, the vague medical terminology contained in a context table and
having multiple medical code associations so as to not be uniquely
associated with one particular medical code of the data structure,” and
“[L11] wherein the previously selected medical code in context of the vague
medical terminology serves to disambiguate the vague medical terminology
according to the context table to permit selection of the further selected
medical code.”
For the reasons discussed below, we conclude limitations L10 and
L11 integrate the abstract idea into a practical application as determined
under at least one of the MPEP sections cited above.17
Appellant argues, “[t]he present application can also be resolved of at
the first step of the Mayo/Alice framework. The claims of the present
application are rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a
problem specifically arising in computer medical records processing.”
Appeal Br. 8.
In support of Appellant’s argument, we note the Specification
discloses:
[0033] Descriptive health-related data can comprise an
unlimited number of combinations of terms and is, therefore,
inherently intractable. To handle descriptive data, each
individual clinician develops his or her own preferred
terminology and approach to recording the data, ranging from

17 See, e.g., MPEP § 2106.05(a) “Improvements to the Functioning of a
Computer or To Any Other Technology or Technical Field,” and
§ 2106.05(e) “Other Meaningful Limitations.”
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transcription to handwriting, to hiring staff to write or record
for them. Automating such unruly data has not been efficient.
Moreover, because of the wide variety of methods adopted by
individual clinicians for handling such data, efforts to automate
the collection of descriptive data typically disrupt the
established work patterns of the clinicians.
[0034] On the other hand, functional data, such as
diagnoses and care plan elements, are described by a limited set
of enumerable terms, such as the diagnoses promulgated in the
ICD classification and codes. Care plan items, such as ordering
a specific test or carrying out certain procedures, can be
described by a limited number of enumerated terms. Even
prescription of medication follows codified rules and highly
defined data sets. Moreover, while descriptive data is critically
important to the thought processes of the clinician in assessing
the patient, and is used for later review by clinicians, insurance
companies, and occasionally attorneys, the functional data is
more directly related to the actual practice and business of
medicine. . . .
[0039] Generally, as illustrated in FIG. 2, the present
system and method contemplates automatic assignment of
medical codes to unformatted or uncoded data such as the
unformatted data contained in medical documents or reports
generated by physicians or medical practitioners during medical
examination which must subsequently be converted to specific
codes for subsequent processing or analysis.
Spec. ¶¶ 33–34, 39.
Appellant further argues:
[T]he solution provided by the present invention is tethered to
the technology that created the problem and is designed to
improve medical coding, (See also Appellant’s specification
¶¶ [00531-[0064] and [0064]-[0072] concerning methods for
mitigating machine under-coding and over-coding
respectively.) . . . . the methods and instructions recited in
Applicant’s claims improve the ability of processors to identity
and process medical procedures from the human created
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medical .records data so as to associate them with standard
industry medical codes. Applicant’s claims are directed at
solving this particular problem, not some vague abstract idea.
Appeal Br. 10 (emphasis added).
We are persuaded by Appellant’s argument that carrying out the
functions recited in limitations L10 and L11 provide improvements to the
underlying technology or technical field, namely, medical coding systems.
See MPEP § 2106.05(a) or, alternatively, § 2106.05(e) “Other Meaningful
Limitations.”
With respect to these other meaningful limitations, we find guidance
in MPEP § 2106.05(e), which summarizes and relies upon the Supreme
Court’s holding in Diehr, cited supra, and our reviewing court’s holdings in
Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (decision on remand from the Supreme Court, which had vacated
the lower court’s prior holding of ineligibility in view of Bilski v. Kappos).
In Diehr, the Court evaluated the additional non-abstract limitations,
and found them to be meaningful, because they sufficiently limited the use
of the (abstract idea) mathematical equation to the practical application of
molding rubber products. MPEP § 2106.05(e) (citing Diehr, 450 U.S.
at 184, 187).
In Classen, the Federal Circuit held that, although the analysis step
was an abstract mental process that collected and compared known
information, the (practical application) immunization step was meaningful
because it integrated the results of the analysis into a specific and tangible
method that resulted in the method “moving from abstract scientific
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principle to specific application.” MPEP § 2106.05(e) (citing Classen, 659
F.3d at 1066–68).
We find these other meaningful limitations L10 and L11 identified
above provide a technological improvement to medical coding systems.
Appeal Br. 10. Accordingly, we conclude, when the claim is considered as a
whole, the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application
as determined under either MPEP sections 2106.06(a) or 2106.05(e), cited
above, such that the claim is patent-eligible.
Because the claims are directed to a patent-eligible concept, this
concludes the patent-eligibility inquiry.
Therefore, based upon the findings and legal conclusions above, on
this record and in consideration of the Revised Guidance, we are persuaded
the claims are directed to patent-eligible subject matter, such that we do not
sustain the § 101 rejection of claim 1, and grouped claims 2, 4–14, 17–27,
and 29–34 which stand therewith. See Claim Grouping, supra.
2. § 103(a) Rejection R2 of Claims 1, 2, 4, 6–14, 17–27, and 29–34
Issue 2
Appellant argues (Appeal Br. 18–25; Reply Br. 6–11) the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over the
combination of Heinze, Ryan, and Doerr is in error. These contentions
present us with the following issues:
Did the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art combination teaches
or suggests “[a]n automated system for determining medical codes from
unformatted medical document data” wherein the processor control
instructions are configured to, inter alia:
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(a) “automatically apply a set of expressions to context data structures
that categorize the context data of a sentence as terminology preceding and
succeeding the identified medical terminology data;” wherein,
(b) “one or more medical codes are automatically removed from the
selected one or more medical codes based on at least one restriction rule that
represents a logical relationship between the set of expressions applied to the
context data,” as recited in claim 1?
Analysis
(a) Applying a set of Expressions to Context Data Structures
The Examiner finds Ryan teaches or suggests contested limitation (a),
i.e., “automatically apply a set of expressions to context data structures that
categorize the context data of a sentence as terminology preceding and
succeeding the identified medical terminology data to identify context for
determining whether the selected one or more medical codes are applicable,”
as recited in claim 1. Final Act. 7 (citing Ryan col. 6, ll. 35–67, col. 7,
ll. 1–35). “It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at
the time of the invention to utilize context data in light of identified medical
terminology data to improve speed of operation.” Id. (citing Ryan col. 8,
ll. 64–67).
Appellant contends, “[t]he Examiner’s reliance on Ryan is
misplaced,” because “Ryan merely describes . . . certain words require
reanalysis to express their meanings in context . . . and compared to
surrounding information by the Lexicon Application’s context resolver
algorithm, program, procedure, table, array or other method to interpret the
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word in context.” Appeal Br. 19–20 (quoting Ryan col, 6, ll. 35–67 and
col. 7, ll. 1–35. Appellant further argues:
In these paragraphs, the Ryan reference is merely describing a
consideration of surrounding text in “clusters” with no
indication that such text or information should have data
structures limited to a particular “sentence” as claimed. (See,
Appellant’s Specification at ¶¶ 60–62.) Moreover, that
surrounding information in the data structures is not
“categorized” as claimed in “preceding and succeeding”
fashion. The Ryan reference merely considers “surrounding”
information with no concern for its relative orientation as
claimed.
Appeal Br. 20.
The Examiner responds by determining:
Ryan discloses a system that determines a medical code based
on input text recorded by a surgeon. In column 3, Ryan
discloses that the “clusters” may represent a sentence and
therefore that the data input by the surgeon is in a form built of
sentences. In column 6 lines 35–67 and column 7 lines 1–35,
Ryan teaches that the “words” can be compared to surrounding
text in a single cluster (if the system determines “if the cluster
is still incomplete . . .” then the first iteration is performed on
the single cluster). Additionally, Appellant argues that Ryan
merely considers “surrounding” information with no concern
for its relative orientation as claimed. However, categorizing
the data as terminology preceding and succeeding the identified
terminology does not require determining a relative orientation,
rather, determining surrounding data determines the conjunctive
“preceding and succeeding” category.
Ans. 7.
We find Ryan’s teaching of comparing words to surrounding text in
the form of a cluster, and then iterating the cluster, teaches or at least
suggests the recited “apply[ing] a set of expressions to context data
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structures that categorize the context data of a sentence as terminology
preceding and succeeding the identified medical terminology data.”
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments concerning the
purported errors in the Examiner’s findings concerning the teachings and
suggestions of Ryan and, under the broadest reasonable interpretation
standard,18 we agree with and adopt as our own the Examiner’s claim
construction (quoted above) applied with respect to disputed limitation (a).
(b) Removal of Medical Codes Based upon a Restriction Rule
The Examiner cites to paragraph 60 of Doerr as teaching or
suggesting disputed limitation (b), i.e., “the one or more medical codes are
automatically removed from the selected one or more medical codes based
on at least one restriction rule that represents a logical relationship between
the set of expressions applied to the context data,” as recited in claim 1.
Final Act. 8. Doerr discloses:
Selecting any of the Edit links in the left column takes the
physician 12 to a screen (not shown) allowing the physician to
suppress the display of that diagnosis entry (so as to simplify
the display) without removal, however, of the diagnosis or
treatment from the underlying database. General conditions for
automatic removal of certain diagnosis codes lines (for
example, for certain diagnoses older than a predetermined

18 During prosecution, claims must be given their broadest reasonable
interpretation when reading claim language in light of the specification as it
would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad. of
Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d at 1364. Under this standard, we interpret claim
terms using “the broadest reasonable meaning of the words in their ordinary
usage as they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, taking
into account whatever enlightenment by way of definitions or otherwise that
may be afforded by the written description contained in the applicant’s
specification.” In re Morris, 127 F.3d at 1054.
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number of months) can also be used. Further, diagnoses can be
deleted with their treatments merged into another indicated
diagnosis.
Doerr ¶ 60.
Appellant contends, contrary to the Examiner’s findings cited above,
the combination of Heinze, Ryan, and Doerr does not teach or suggest
disputed limitation (b). Appeal Br. 23. In particular, Appellant argues:
[The] cited portion of Doerr merely concerns (i) an editing
screen which allows a physician to “suppress the display of that
diagnosis entry (so as to simplify the display) without removal,
however, of the diagnosis or treatment from the underlying
database, and (ii) the automatic removal of diagnosis codes
lines, based on a time constraint.” These features are plainly
irrelevant to Applicant’s system for determining applicable
medical codes. Nevertheless, neither are sufficient to render
Appellant’s invention obvious or make up for what is admitting
missing in Heinze and Ryan.
Appeal Br. 24.
The Examiner responds, and we agree, “Appellant’s claims do not
require that the code be removed from the underlying database, the removal
of a code from the graphical user interface meets the language of the claim.”
Ans. 8. We agree with the Examiner because Appellant’s argument is not
commensurate with the scope of the claim which does not explicitly recite a
database, or removal of one or more medical codes from a database.19

19 “Applicant concedes that the present claims do not require that the recited
medical codes be removed from an underlying database. However, the
present claims do explicitly recite a type of data structure that the medical
codes need to be ‘removed’ from.” Reply Br. 10. We find Doerr teaches or
at least suggests the recited “one or more medical codes are automatically
removed from the selected one or more medical codes based on at least one
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Therefore, based upon the findings above, on this record, we are not
persuaded of error in the Examiner’s reliance on the cited prior art
combination to teach or suggest the disputed limitation of claim 1, nor do we
find error in the Examiner’s resulting legal conclusion of obviousness.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
independent claim 1, and grouped claims 2, 4, 6–14, 17–27, and 29–34
which fall therewith. See Claim Grouping, supra.
3. § 103(a) Rejection R2 of Claim 5
Issue 3
Appellant argues (Appeal Br. 25–27; Reply Br. 12–13) the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 5 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious
over the combination of Heinze, Ryan, and Doerr is in error. These
contentions present us with the following issue:
Did the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art combination teaches
or suggests “[t]he system of claim l wherein . . . the restriction rule
comprises a kinship phrase identifying that the selected medical codes are
for a relative of the patient,” as recited in claim 5?
Analysis
The Examiner finds Heinze teaches or suggests the disputed limitation
of claim 5. Final Act. 9 (citing Heinze col. 10, ll. 28–54).
In response to the Examiner’s finding, Appellant responds by
asserting “the relied upon portions of Heinze describe that ‘[a]natomical

restriction rule that represents a logical relationship between the set of
expressions applied to the context data.”
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terms used in reference to other people . . . are morphed to a form that will
not be confused with the patient’s anatomy.’” Appeal Br. 26 (quoting
Heinze col. 10, ll. 28–54). Appellant further argues their “system by
contrast, uses the context in which the kinship phrase exists and this context
allows distinguishing of the selected code because it is associated with a
relative ‘rather than the patient who is the subject of the document. Thus,
the system may distinguish a determined code from absolute assignment as
discussed above because in the context of the sentence it would be
describing the medical condition of a mother, father, brother, sister,
grandparent, etc.’” Id. (quoting Spec. ¶ 87); see also Reply Br. 12–13.
We have reviewed Heinze at the portions cited by the Examiner, and
also the entirety of Heinze, and find no teaching or suggestion of utilizing a
kinship, i.e., a familial relationship, in the manner claimed in claim 5, or as
contemplated by Appellant’s Specification.
For essentially the same reasons argued by Appellant, above, we
reverse the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claim 5.
REPLY BRIEF
To the extent Appellant may advance new arguments in the Reply
Brief (Reply Br. 2–13) not in response to a shift in the Examiner’s position
in the Answer, arguments raised in a Reply Brief that were not raised in the
Appeal Brief or are not responsive to arguments raised in the Examiner’s
Answer will not be considered except for good cause (see 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.41(b)(2)), which Appellant has not shown.
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CONCLUSIONS
(1) Under our Revised Guidance, governed by relevant case law,
we conclude the Examiner erred in concluding claims 1, 2, 4–14, 17–27,
and 29–34 are patent-ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101, and we do not sustain
the rejection.
(2) The Examiner did not err with respect to obviousness Rejection
R2 of claims 1, 2, 4, 6–14, 17–27, and 29–34 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over
the cited prior art combination of record, and we sustain the rejection.
(3) The Examiner erred with respect to obviousness Rejection R2
of claim 5 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the cited prior art combination of
record, and we do not sustain the rejection.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Basis /
References
Affirmed Reversed
1, 2, 4–14,
17–27, 29–34
101 Subject Matter
Eligibility
1, 2, 4–14,
17–27, 29–34
1, 2, 4–14,
17–27, 29–34
103(a) Obviousness
Heinze, Ryan,
Doerr
1, 2, 4, 6–14,
17–27, 29–34
5
Overall
Outcome
1, 2, 4, 6–14,
17–27, 29–34
5
FINALITY AND RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED IN PART