Courtney L. Divens,1 Complainant,v.Eric K. Shinseki, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJun 10, 2011
0120101023 (E.E.O.C. Jun. 10, 2011)

0120101023

06-10-2011

Courtney L. Divens,1 Complainant, v. Eric K. Shinseki, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.




Courtney L. Divens,1

Complainant,

v.

Eric K. Shinseki,

Secretary,

Department of Veterans Affairs,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120101023

Agency No. 200H-0785-2009100754

DECISION

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405, the Commission accepts Complainant’s

appeal from the Agency’s December 11, 2009 final decision concerning

an equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint claiming employment

discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

(Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.

BACKGROUND

The record reflects that Complainant worked at the Agency’s Canteen

Service at the VA Medical Center in Bath, New York for seven years before

she temporary promoted to the position of Chief on June 8, 2008, not to

exceed December 8, 2008.

On February 27, 2009, Complainant filed the instant formal complaint.

Therein, Complainant alleged that the Agency discriminated against her

on the basis of sex (female) when:

on November 24, 2008, she was terminated from her position as Chief,

Veterans Canteen Service, during her probationary period.

After the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy

of the report of investigation and notice of the right to request a

hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). In accordance with

Complainant’s request, the Agency issued a final decision on December

11, 2009, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b).

In its December 11, 2009 final decision, the Agency found no

discrimination. The Agency found that Complainant did not establish

a prima facie case of sex discrimination. The Agency nevertheless

found that Agency management articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reasons for its actions which Complainant failed to show were a pretext

for discrimination.

Complainant’s direct supervisor (S1) was the deciding official to

terminate Complainant during her probationary period “based on the

sanitation conditions at canteen.” S1 stated that he found Complainant

“negligent in her management of the canteen. [Complainant] was given

proper training opportunities and guidance which are offered to all

canteen managers regardless of gender.” In the Proposed Removal

letter dated October 22, 2008, S1 notified Complainant that he was

proposing her termination from her Chief position on the grounds of

negligence and failure to maintain proper canteen operational oversight.

Specifically, S1 stated that as a result of a SOARS inspection, serious

sanitation/security violations were found. For instance, the temperature

logs for food and equipment were missing; food was not labeled/dated;

there were extreme unsanitary conditions in the food preparation areas;

the area hand dirty equipment and a moldy fountain drink station;

the staff did not wear the requisite hairnets, gloves and uniforms;

and there were no thermometers present. Furthermore, S1 stated that

Complainant’s sex was not a factor in his determination to terminate

her during her probationary period

The Associate Director of Operations (AD) stated that he sustained

Complainant’s proposed removal action “based on her disciplinary

record that included the proposed action, supporting documents and

her written reply. I took all of that into consideration and I found

the VCS managers who worked with the complainant and who had personal

knowledge ore creditable than the Complainant in making my decision.”

AD further stated that Complainant was terminated during her probationary

period “due to her inability to maintain a canteen.”

The Medical Center Director (D1) stated that on October 8, 2008, he closed

the canteen “based on serious sanitation/security violations during a

SOARS inspection.” Specifically, D1 stated “at the time, this part

of the facility was not meeting cleaning and monitoring standards and

represented an unsafe environment for preparing and storing food.”

D1 stated that Complainant “had a long history of needing constant

feedback to ensure cleanliness, stocking of supplies and not taking

action on difficult employees.”

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal, Complainant argues that she should not be punished “for

failures made by her superiors. I worked to the best of my ability

with the training and examples that I had received from prior Chiefs.

I feel that I should be given the ability to be reinstated to have the

proper training that was due to me.”

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-party analysis

first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). For complainant to prevail, he must first establish a prima facie

of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably

give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited

consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action. See

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,

438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Texas

Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).

Once the agency has met its burden, the complainant bears the ultimate

responsibility to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the

evidence that the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason.

See St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the

first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima

facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel

action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third

step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether

complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the

agency’s actions were motivated by discrimination. See U.S. Postal

Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);

Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159

(June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services,

EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of

the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

Complainant, on appeal, has provided no persuasive arguments indicating

any improprieties in the Agency’s findings. Therefore, after a

review of the record in its entirety, including consideration of

all statements on appeal, it is the decision of the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission to AFFIRM the Agency’s final decision because

the preponderance of the evidence of record does not establish that

discrimination occurred.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0610)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive

for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency

head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full

name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal

of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits

as stated in the paragraph above (“Right to File A Civil Action”).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

June 10, 2011

__________________

Date

1 The record reflects that Complainant also is referred to as “Lynn

Divens.”

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U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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