Cooper Tire & Rubber Company

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Jun 5, 2015

08-CA-087155 (N.L.R.B. Jun. 5, 2015)

JD–33–15
Findlay, OH

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
COOPER TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY
and Case 08–CA–087155
UNITED STEEL, PAPER AND FORESTRY, RUBBER,
MANUFACTURING, ENERGY, ALLIED INDUSTRIAL
AND SERVICE WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION,
AFL-CIO/CLC
Kelly Freeman, Esq.,
for the General Counsel.
Nancy Noall, Esq.,
for the Respondent.
James Porcaro, Esq.,
for the Charging Party
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
THOMAS M. RANDAZZO, Administrative Law Judge. The complaint in this case
alleges that Cooper Tire & Rubber Company (the Respondent) violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1)
of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) by discharging Anthony Runion on or about March
1, 2012, because he engaged in union and/or concerted activities. The Respondent, in its answer,
denied that it violated the Act as alleged.1
A hearing on the complaint allegations was originally scheduled on March 17, 2015.
However, on March 16, 2015, the hearing was indefinitely postponed. On March 19, 2015, the
parties filed a joint motion requesting a decision without a hearing based solely on a stipulated
record. Consistent with Section 102.35(a)(9) of the Board’s Rules and Regulations (the Rules),
the motion included the parties’ stipulation of facts with attached exhibits, statement of the

1 The underlying charge was filed by the United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing,
Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union, AFL-CIO/CLC and its Local 207L
(collectively referred to as the Charging Party or the Union) on August 13, 2012, and amended on January
20, 2015. The complaint and notice of hearing issued on January 20, 2015.
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issues, and short statements of position from the General Counsel, the Charging Party, and the
Respondent.
By order dated March 26, 2015, I granted the joint motion and approved the stipulation of
facts. The General Counsel, the Charging Party, and the Respondent subsequently filed briefs, 5
which I have considered. Based on the entire stipulated record2 and the briefs, I make the
following
FINDINGS OF FACT10
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent, a Delaware corporation, with an office and place of business in Findlay,
Ohio (the Findlay facility), as well as additional facilities located in Texarkana, Arkansas, and 15
Tupelo, Mississippi, has been engaged in the business of manufacturing tires. Annually, the
Respondent, in conducting its business operations described above, has derived gross revenues in
excess of $500,000 and has purchased and received at its Findlay, Ohio facility goods and
materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points located outside the State of Ohio.
20
The Respondent admits, and I find, that it is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act, and that the Union has been a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES25
A. Background
The Respondent and the Union, along with its predecessor local unions, have had a
collective-bargaining history at the Findlay, Ohio facility for at least 70 years. At all times 30
material, the Union and its Local 207L have been designated as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of the unit consisting of approximately 1044 production and
maintenance employees at the Findlay facility. This recognition has been embodied in
successive collective-bargaining agreements, the most recent of which is effective by its terms
from February 27, 2012, to February 28, 2017, and which has been extended by the parties until 35
midnight, February 28, 2020.
The facts of the instant case, however, occurred at the time the previous contract expired.
That previous collective-bargaining agreement was effective from 2008 to 2011 and expired on
October 31, 2011. From approximately September 7, 2011, until February 23, 2012, the parties 40
engaged in negotiations for a successor collective-bargaining agreement. On November 22,
2011, the Respondent made its last, best, and final offer, which the Union presented to its
membership. However, that ratification vote failed. On November 28, 2011, the Respondent

2 No consideration has been given to any facts set forth in the briefs that are not supported by the
stipulated record.
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locked out the bargaining unit employees at the Findlay facility, and it began operating
that facility with supervisors, managers, and replacement workers from its Tupelo plant, and it
contracted with Strom Engineering to supply replacement workers.
The parties continued to bargain during the lockout and eventually reached a tentative 5
agreement that was ratified by the union membership on February 27, 2012. The lockout ended
on February 28, 2012, and the Respondent began recalling the locked out employees to work on
or about March 3, 2012.
On December 6, 2011, the Union filed a charge in Case 08-CA-070209 alleging, inter 10
alia, that the Respondent’s lockout of the employees was unlawful. On March 30, 2012, the
Regional Director dismissed the charge allegation that the Respondent’s lockout of the
employees violated the Act. On December 14, 2012, the Office of Appeals upheld the Regional
Director’s dismissal of that allegation.
15
B. The Facts
1. Anthony Runion’s conduct on the picket line on January 7, 2012
As mentioned above, during the lockout the Respondent operated the Findlay plant with 20
temporary replacement workers. The Union set up picket lines at the commencement of the
lockout, and it manned six separate picket stations at and around the Findlay facility. Each
picket station was staffed by various numbers of employees, both day and night. The
Respondent hired security guards for the lockout, and much of the picketing activity was
recorded on video by the Respondent’s security guards. 25
Throughout the lockout, the Respondent and the Union communicated with each other to
address any issues regarding conduct on the part of either the locked out workers or the
replacement workers that might increase tensions in an effort to keep the picket lines peaceful.
At no time during the lockout was there a court order or injunction limiting the number of 30
picketers at the entrances to the Respondent’s Findlay facility or otherwise regulating the
conduct of picketing at the facility. In addition, it is undisputed that no physical violence
occurred on the picket line on January 7, 2012, or at any time during the lockout.
During the lockout, the Respondent’s nonunion employees and replacement workers 35
crossed the picket lines when arriving at and leaving the facility each workday. Many
replacement workers, both from the Respondent’s Tupelo plant and those provided by Strom
Engineering, were of African-American descent.
Anthony Runion, who started working for the Respondent in November 2006, was one of 40
the bargaining unit employees locked out by the Respondent, and he was an active participant in
the picketing throughout the lockout. On January 7, 2012, the local union held a hog roast for
the locked out employees and their families at the union hall, which is located on Lima Avenue,
approximately 50 yards from the Findlay plant’s main entrance. Runion attended the hog roast
with his girlfriend, and her young son, Collin. Many of the people who attended the hog roast 45
joined the picket line that evening just outside the Respondent’s main gate on the corner of Lima
and Western Avenues. After the hog roast, at approximately 6 p.m., Runion joined the picketing
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outside the main entrance. The picketers stood along both sides of Western Avenue between the
intersection and the main gate shortly before the plant’s shift change when replacement workers
began crossing the picket line. The picketing activity outside the Respondent’s main entrance
was video recorded by one of the Respondent’s security guards, and is part of the record in this
case (Co. Exh. 6).3 The parties stipulate: to the authenticity of Company’s Exhibit 6; that it5
contains true and accurate copies of video taken of activities on the picket line during the
evening of January 7, 2012; and that it accurately reflects the picket line events during that
evening shift change on January 7, 2012.4
The recording shows van loads of replacement workers with their windows closed being 10
driven intermittently toward the main gate while groups of picketers on both sides of Western
Avenue, between the intersection and the main gate, held up signs and yelled objections to the
replacements entering the plant, which included profanity, name-calling, accusations that the
replacement workers were un-American and were stealing the locked out employees’ jobs,
statements that the picketers did not want them there, and demands that they “go home” and “get 15
out of here.” The replacement workers in the vans and their activity cannot be seen on the video.
The video recording establishes that at the 5:10 time mark on the video, Runion and a
young boy whom the parties stipulate is Collin, the son of Runion’s girlfriend, walk from the east
side of Western Avenue where a majority of the picketers are located, to the west side of 20
Western Avenue, in front of and to the left of the security guard who is recording the video.
Runion and Collin stand with two other locked out employees whom the parties stipulate are
David Burns and Todd Carnes. At the 6:03 time mark, two vans carrying replacement workers
to the plant’s main entrance drive past the picketers and Burns holds up his picket sign and yells
various comments, including “Go home,” “Get out of here,” and “Go back where you came 25
from.” Runion and Carnes display their middle fingers as the vans pass them. After the two
vans pass by, someone yells “scab cabs are coming.”
The next van carrying replacement workers crosses the intersection at Lima Avenue at
approximately the 6:56 time mark. As the van travels towards the main gate and passes the 30
picketers at the 6:58 time mark on the video, Runion and Carnes display their middle fingers.
Burns holds up his sign and yells, “Piece of shit!” at approximately the 7:02 time mark on the
video. After the van passes by, at approximately the 7:03 time mark on the video, Carnes yells,
“Hope you get your fucking arm tore off, bitch!” At approximately the 7:04 time mark on the
video, Runion, standing with both of his hands in his coat pockets, turns toward the main gate 35
where the van had gone, and yells, “Hey, did you bring enough KFC for everyone?” After
Runion makes the “KFC” statement, an unidentified individual yells, “Go back to Africa, you
bunch of fucking losers.” At approximately the 7:25 time mark on the video, Runion, standing
with his hands still in his coat pockets, faces across the street toward the other picketers, and as
his mouth and jaw are moving, the following statement can be heard on the video: “Hey, 40

3 The parties stipulate that a number of exhibits from the July 10, 2012 arbitration hearing for
Runion’s discharge grievance are included in this record. For simplicity, any exhibits from the arbitration
hearing that are included in the stipulated record are identified by the exhibit numbers used at the
arbitration hearing.
4 Co. Exh. 6 is a DVD of the videos, consisting of a long version lasting 52 minutes and 12 seconds,
and a shorter version lasting 22 minutes and 3 seconds. The shorter version consists of an excerpt of the
longer video. References to time signature marks on the video pertain to the shorter version of the video.
JD–33–15
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anybody smell that? I smell fried chicken and watermelon.” Immediately after the statement is
made, some of the picketers across the street from Runion can be heard on the video briefly
chuckling and laughing.
The parties stipulate that Runion admitted he made the “KFC” statement, but he denied 5
that he made the “fried chicken and watermelon” statement. Based on its review of the video,
the Respondent attributed the “fried chicken and watermelon” statement to Runion, and it
discharged him on March 1, 2012, solely on the basis that he made the “KFC” statement and
allegedly the “fried chicken and watermelon” statement while on the picket line.
10
The record contains no stipulation as to whether Runion made the “fried chicken and
watermelon” statement. Instead, the parties stipulate that the video footage of Runion’s conduct
and statements on the picket line “speaks for itself,” thereby leaving the determination of
whether Runion made the “fried chicken and watermelon” statement unresolved. Since there has
been no hearing in this case with testimony from witnesses that may conflict, this case does not 15
require the traditional credibility resolutions based on the witnesses’ testimonial demeanor or the
content of their testimonies. However, as the finder of fact, I must nevertheless determine
whether Runion made the “fried chicken and watermelon” statement contrary to his denial, based
on the videotape evidence which the parties have agreed is an accurate representation of what
transpired on the picket line. Credibility determinations do not have to rely solely upon witness 20
demeanor or the content of witness testimony. Determinations regarding the facts of a case may
rely on a variety of factors, including the weight of the evidence, established or admitted facts,
reasonable inferences drawn from the record as a whole, and the inherent probabilities of the
allegations. Double D Construction Group, 339 NLRB 303, 305 (2003); Daikichi Sushi, 335
NLRB 622, 623 (2001) (citing Shen Automotive Dealership Group, 321 NLRB 586, 589 (1996)), 25
enfd. 56 Fed. Appx. 516 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
Having carefully reviewed the video recording, I find that the undisputed record
establishes that Runion made the “fried chicken and watermelon” statement, and any assertion by
him in this record to the contrary is discredited. Even though Runion is not facing the camera 30
when the “fried chicken and watermelon” statement is made, his mouth and jaw are moving in
synchronization with the comment, his body tenses with the shout of the statement, and the voice
of the person making the comment sounds like the voice of the person who made the “KFC”
statement. In addition, based on the evidence in this stipulated record, I find it plausible that
Runion made the statement based on Collin’s reaction immediately after the statement was made. 35
In this regard, immediately after the statement: “Hey, anybody smell that? I smell fried chicken
and watermelon,” Collin, who was standing directly in front of Runion, turned around to face
Runion, he looked up at Runion and stated, “You know what I smell? You know what I smell? I
smell (inaudible) scabs.” Therefore, I find that the video clearly establishes that Runion made
both the “KFC” and the “fried chicken and watermelon” statements.40
After Runion’s statements that lead to his discharge were made, Runion can be seen on
the video at approximately the 14:45 time mark taking Collin by the hand and crossing the street
against the light, which temporarily impedes a van driving towards the gate. At approximately
the 15:58 time mark, a police officer walks across Lima Avenue and walks Runion back across 45
Lima Avenue to the police officer’s car, which is not seen on the video. The parties stipulate that
off camera, Runion was given a citation for the jaywalking depicted in the video, and the parties
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agree that Runion’s discharge was not based on the jaywalking infraction. The parties further
stipulate that shortly after receiving the citation for jaywalking, Runion left the picket line.5
2. The Respondent’s policies prohibiting racial harassment
5
The Respondent has maintained a harassment policy prohibiting unlawful harassment
based upon race, color, religion, sex, age, or national origin. That policy dated December 1,
2002, provides its purpose is to outline “. . . the respect to which all Cooper employees are
entitled as human beings; to work in an environment free of all forms of harassment and to be
treated with dignity, respect and courtesy.” (Co. Exh. 1.) The Respondent’s policy provides that 10
“[h]arassment consists of unwelcome comments or conduct relating to race, color, religion, sex,
age or national origin, which fails to respect the dignity and feelings of any Cooper employee.”
It further provides that “[h]arassment will not be condoned nor tolerated under any
circumstances, whether committed by Cooper employees, vendors, customers or other visitors,”
and that “any Cooper employees found to be harassing others will be subject to disciplinary 15
action, up to and including discharge.” The parties stipulated that Runion signed his orientation
check sheet acknowledging that he received a copy of the harassment policy and that he
understood the policy.
3. The Respondent discharged Runion on March 1, 2012, solely on the basis of his racially 20
charged statements on the picket line
During the week following the incident, the Respondent identified Runion on the
recording and thereafter, Human Resource Manager Jodi Rosendale and Plant Manager Jack
Hamilton decided to terminate Runion for making those racial comments on the picket line. On 25
March 1, 2012, the Respondent discharged Runion for “gross misconduct” for his “KFC” and
“fried chicken and watermelon” statements on the picket line on January 7, 2012.6 The
Respondent admits that it discharged Runion for these statements only, and not for any other
conduct he engaged in on the picket line.
30
4. The Union filed a grievance alleging that Runion’s discharge violated the collective-
bargaining agreement and it processed the grievance to arbitration
As mentioned above, the parties reached a new agreement that was ratified by the union
membership on February 27, 2012. On March 12, 2012, the Union filed grievance 2012-3 35

5 The parties also stipulated that after Runion left the picket line, at the 16:27 and 17:29 time marks,
respectively, an unidentified person shouted, “fucking monkey scabs” and “fucking nigger scabs.” (Stip.
Facts at 74.) The parties are in agreement that the person who made those racist statements was not
Runion.
6 The parties stipulated that Runion was one of three employees terminated for alleged misconduct on
the picket line during the lockout. The other two employees discharged were Dave Gilbert and Carl
Bowers. Gilbert was discharged for standing in front of a van carrying replacement workers on January
7, 2012, which is recorded at approximately the 17.21 time mark of Co. Exh. 6. Bowers was terminated
for allegedly making threatening remarks to a truckdriver on January 17, 2012, while on the picket line.
Both Gilbert and Bowers had grievances filed and they were reinstated pursuant to a settlement between
the Union and the Respondent whereby their discharges were reduced to suspensions.
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alleging that Runion’s discharge was not for just cause, and therefore violated the terms of the
collective-bargaining agreement. The Respondent and the Union agreed to arbitrate any
grievances filed over the discharge of bargaining unit employees during the lockout, and they
agreed that such arbitrations would be governed by the terms of the newly negotiated collective-
bargaining agreement’s contractual grievance-arbitration procedure. 5
On July 10, 2012, an arbitration hearing was held on Runion’s discharge grievance before
Arbitrator Roger C. Williams, in Findlay, Ohio. At the arbitration hearing, the Union and the
Respondent stipulated that the issue before the arbitrator was whether Runion’s discharge was
for just cause and, if not, what the remedy should be. The parties have stipulated in this case that10
the grievance was properly before the arbitrator both procedurally and substantively, and that the
procedure was fair and equitable.
On August 13, 2012, the Union filed the charge in this matter alleging, inter alia, that
Runion was discharged in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. The Regional Director15
deferred consideration of the charge in this case to the grievance-arbitration procedure pending
its resolution.
C. The Arbitrator’s Award
20
The Arbitrator, in his Opinion and Award issued on May 14, 2014, found that Runion
made the “KFC” statement, and the “fried chicken and watermelon statement.” The Arbitrator
also determined that Runion was “engaged in activity with a clear connection to his employment
with the Respondent while he was on the picket line,” and both statements violated the explicit
terms of the Respondent’s harassment policy because both statements were related to race and 25
were disrespectful of the dignity and feelings of African-American replacement workers. The
Arbitrator held that while the evidence proved that no violence occurred on the picket line, either
on January 7, 2012, or on any other occasion during the lockout, the use of racial slurs on the
picket line increased the possibility that the constant verbal exchanges between the picketers and
the replacement workers would escalate into violence. The Arbitrator held that Runion’s 30
statements “. . . would have been serious misconduct in any context, but in the context of the
picket line, where there was a genuine possibility of violence, his comments were even more
serious.” Despite the fact that the Union presented evidence that in August 2011, Cliff Baxter,
an African-American bargaining unit employee and former union executive board member was
suspended, but not discharged, by the Respondent for conduct that included making a racist 35
remark, the Arbitrator determined that there was no evidence of disparate treatment. The
Arbitrator therefore denied the grievance and upheld Runion’s discharge as being for “just
cause” under the collective-bargaining agreement.
After the Arbitrator issued his Award, the Union requested that the Regional Director 40
refuse to defer to the Arbitrator’s award upholding Runion’s discharge. Thereafter, the Regional
Director refused to defer, and complaint issued alleging that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by discharging Runion for engaging in union and/or concerted
activities.
45
JD–33–15
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D. The Issues
The parties stipulate that the issues presented in this matter are whether the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by discharging Runion, and whether the Board should
defer to the Arbitrator’s decision that the Respondent discharged Runion for just cause.5
E. The Contentions of the Parties
The General Counsel alleges that while the Respondent was entitled to be offended by
Runion’s racial comments, it was not privileged to discharge him under the Act. The General 10
Counsel, citing, inter alia, the Board’s decisions in Airo Die Casting, Inc., 347 NLRB 810
(2006), and Detroit Newspapers, 342 NLRB 223 (2004), contends that the racially charged
statements did not tend to coerce or intimidate employees in their Section 7 rights because they
were not accompanied by threats or aggressive behavior, and the statements were not made until
after the vans had passed where Runion was standing. The General Counsel argues that Runion 15
was discharged in violation of the Act, and that the Arbitrator only considered whether the
discharge was justified under the harassment policy, not whether Runion’s actions were
protected by the Act. The General Counsel further argues that the Arbitrator’s award is
repugnant to the Act. On that basis, the General Counsel asserts that deferral to the Arbitrator’s
award is not appropriate. 20
The Charging Party asserts that while it does not condone Runion’s conduct, it believes
his conduct was protected and that his statements, which were unaccompanied by threats or
intimidation, were insufficient to lose the protection of the Act. On that basis, the Charging
Party contends that Runion’s discharge was unlawful. In addition, the Charging Party asserts 25
that even if Runion’s conduct was not protected by the Act, his discharge was nevertheless
unlawful because the evidence shows that other employees violated the Respondent’s harassment
policy and were suspended, not discharged, including Baxter, an African-American employee
who called his white supervisor a “dumb white hillbilly asshole.” (CP Br. at p. 8.)7 Finally, the
Charging Party argues that since the Arbitrator only considered the just cause issue, and did not 30
consider (and did not have the authorization of the parties to consider) the statutory issue, and
because the Arbitrator’s award is repugnant to the Act, the Board should not defer to the award.
To the contrary, the Respondent argues that Runion’s comments specifically violated its
harassment policy and therefore he was discharged for just cause. The Respondent contends that 35
“while a certain amount of profanity or racial invective may be tolerated by the Act, it is not
protected by the Act,” and therefore, Runion’s racist statements should not be considered
“protected activity.” (R. Statement of Position, p. 2.) In support of this argument, the
Respondent contends that the award is susceptible to interpretation consistent with the Board’s
decision in Atlantic Steel Co., 245 NLRB 814, 816 (1979), and its progeny, which hold that even 40
if an employee is engaging in protected activity, the employee can lose the protection of the Act

7 The record reveals that while it is not entirely clear to whom this remark was addressed, it appears
that Baxter directed it to his white manager, as well as members of the local union’s executive board who
were trying to calm him down. In this connection, the record establishes that Baxter yelled to the group,
“You are all a bunch of white hillbilly assholes.” (Arbitration Exh. S, at p. 2.)
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if he also engages in unprotected offensive, vulgar, and/or racist statements during the course of
his protected activity. (R. Br. at p. 29.)
The Respondent argues that deferral is appropriate because, contrary to the contentions of
the General Counsel and the Charging Party, the Arbitrator adequately considered the statutory 5
rights at issue as the “just cause” inquiry in the arbitration was “factually parallel” to the
statutory issue in this case, and the Arbitrator was presented with those facts. Furthermore, the
Respondent argues that the Arbitrator’s award is not “clearly repugnant” to the Act because it is
susceptible to an interpretation that is consistent with Clear Pine Mouldings, 268 NLRB 1044
(1984). The Respondent specifically contends that since the Arbitrator stated that the comments 10
were “disrespectful of the dignity and feelings of African-American replacement workers,” the
statements coerced or intimidated employees in the exercise of their rights protected under the
Act. In addition, the Respondent argues that the Arbitrator addressed the “coercive impact” of
Runion’s statements when he found that the comments “inspired more hate-filled racist speech,”
and it “increased the potential for violence.” (R. Statement of Position, pp. 2-3.) Finally, the 15
Respondent argues that the Arbitrator’s conclusion that Runion was discharged for cause
warrants deferral, not only under the applicable standard for deferral, but under Section 10(c) of
the Act,8 and that failure to defer should be contrary to public policy.
F. Analysis20
It is well established that the Board has considerable discretion in determining whether to
defer to the arbitration process when doing so will serve the fundamental aims of the Act. Wonder
Bread, 343 NLRB 55 (2004), see Dubo Mfg. Corp., 142 NLRB 431 (1963); Collyer Insulated Wire,
192 NLRB 837 (1971); and United Technologies Corp., 268 NLRB 557 (1984). The Board’s 25
standard for deferring to arbitral awards is also solely a matter for its discretion, as Section 10(a)
of the Act expressly provides that the Board is not precluded from adjudicating unfair labor
practice charges even though they might have been the subject of an arbitration proceeding and
award.
30
In Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 NLRB 1080 (1955), the Board held that it would defer to
arbitral decisions in cases in which the proceedings appear to have been fair and regular, all
parties agreed to be bound, and the decision of the arbitrator is not clearly repugnant to the
purposes and policies of the Act. Id. at 1082. In Olin Corp., 268 NLRB 573 (1984), the Board
held that it will condition deferral on the arbitrator having adequately considered the unfair labor 35
practice issue, which is satisfied if: (1) the contractual issue is factually parallel to the unfair
labor practice issue, and (2) the arbitrator was presented generally with the facts relevant to
resolving the unfair labor practice. Id. at 574. The Board stated that it will not require an
arbitrator’s award to be totally consistent with Board precedent, however, deferral will not be
found appropriate under the clearly repugnant standard where the arbitration award is “palpably 40
wrong” or “not susceptible to an interpretation consistent with the Act.” Id.9 Under Spielberg,

8 See R. Statement of Position, pp. 2-3, and R. Br. at pp. 18-23.
9 It is important to note that in Babcock & Wilcox Construction Co., 361 NLRB No. 132 (2014), the Board
recently modified its longstanding postarbitral deferral standards in Sec. 8(a)(3) and (1) cases. The Board
specifically held, however, that it would apply this modified standard only “prospectively (in future cases),” and
not “retroactively (i.e., in all pending cases).” Since the arbitration hearing in the instant case occurred on July
10, 2012, approximately 2-1/2 years before the Babcock & Wilcox Construction Co. decision issued, the
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supra, and Olin Corp., supra, the burden of proof is on the party—here, the General Counsel—
who opposes deferral to the arbitration award. Airborne Freight Corp., 343 NLRB 580, 581
(2004).
In the instant case, the parties have stipulated that the arbitration proceeding has been fair 5
and regular and that all the parties have agreed to be bound by the arbitration award. Thus, the
only deferral factor in dispute is whether the arbitration award is “clearly repugnant” to the Act.
1. Whether Anthony Runion’s discharge for his conduct during protected picketing activity
constituted a violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act10
Section 7 of the Act gives employees the right to peacefully strike, picket, and engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection. In the instant case, it is undisputed that Runion was engaged in picketing activity,
which was protected by the Act, and that he was discharged because of his conduct during that 15
picketing activity. The Board has long held that an important feature of picketing is the posting
by a labor organization of individuals at the approach to a place of business to accomplish a
purpose which advances the cause of the union. . . .” Verizon New England, 362 NLRB No. 24,
slip op. 4; quoting Lumber & Sawmill Workers Local 2797 (Stoltze Land & Lumber Co.), 156
NLRB 388, 394 (1965). In other words, personal confrontation is a necessary element of 20
picketing. Verizon New England, supra at slip op. 4; citing Carpenters Local 1506 (Eliason &
Knuth of Arizona, Inc.), 355 NLRB 797, 802 (2010). However, even though the Act protects the
right to picket during a strike, or in this case an employer’s lockout, and a certain degree of
confrontation is expected during those activities, it is clear that Congress never intended to afford
special protection to all picket line conduct. The question is thus whether Runion’s conduct 25
while engaging in picketing was sufficient to warrant removal of the Act’s protection.
The Board has long recognized a distinction between employee conduct in the workplace
and employee conduct on the picket line. Unlike situations involving employee conduct in the
working environment, picket line misconduct is governed by the Board’s standards established in 30
Clear Pine Mouldings, 268 NLRB 1044 (1984), enfd. 765 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied
474 U.S. 1105 (1986). In that case, the threatening statements unaccompanied by acts of
violence from striker Rodney Sittser who was denied reinstatement were: (1) that a nonstriking
employee was taking her life in her hands by crossing a picket line and would live to regret it; (2)
that a nonstriking employee’s house or garage might be burned; (3) that the hands of certain 35
employees should be broken; and (4) that an employee should be “straighten[ed] out.” In Clear
Pine Mouldings, the Board noted that “serious acts of misconduct which occur in the course of a
strike may disqualify a striker from the protection of the Act.” Id. The Board specifically
addressed the issue of whether striker misconduct in the form of verbal threats, unaccompanied
by physical acts, would be sufficient to remove the protection of the Act. In that case, the Board40
specifically rejected the proposition that words alone can never, without more, warrant a denial
of reinstatement. Id. at 1045-1046. Instead, the Board adopted an objective test formulated by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in NLRB v. W. C. McQuaide, Inc., 552

Board’s newly modified standard is not applicable to this case. Accordingly, the issue of deferral in this case is
to be decided under the standard adopted in Olin Corp., supra. See Verizon New England, Inc., 362 NLRB No.
24, slip op. 1 at fn. 2 (2015).
JD–33–15
11
F.2d 519, 527 (3d Cir. 1977), denying enf. in part to 220 NLRB 593 (1975), for determining
whether verbal threats by strikers directed at fellow employees justify an employer’s refusal to
reinstate. According to that test, an employer can lawfully deny reinstatement to a striker if his
misconduct is such that under the circumstances, it may reasonably tend to coerce or intimidate
employees in the rights protected under the Act. Id. at 1046. In that case, the Board determined 5
that the threatening statements were sufficient to remove the protection of the Act and warranted
a denial of reinstatement. Id. at 1048.
Since the Clear Pine Mouldings standard is an objective one, it does not involve an
inquiry into whether any particular employee was coerced or intimidated. Mohawk Liqueur Co., 10
300 NLRB 1075 (1990); Detroit Newspapers, 342 NLRB 223, 229 (2004). This standard also is
applicable to misconduct directed at nonemployees such as supervisors, security guards, and
independent contractors. General Chemical Corp., 290 NLRB 76, 82 (1988); Detroit
Newspapers, supra at 229.
15
While the remarks attributed to the striking employees in Clear Pine Mouldings were
directly or indirectly threatening in character, the Board has also addressed whether profane
epithets unaccompanied by an overt or indirect threat might also be coercive or intimidating. In
Catalytic, Inc., 275 NLRB 97 (1985), after the commencement of a strike, a striking employee
called the home of a nonstriking employee and when his wife answered the phone, he stated,20
“[Y]ou God damned bitch,” and immediately hung up the phone. Id. In determining whether that
conduct reasonably tended to coerce or intimidate under the standard set forth in Clear Pine
Mouldings, the Board noted that the profane epithet did not threaten her person or property, and
it was not violent in character. Id. at 98. The Board determined that where a profane epithet was
unaccompanied by an overt or indirect threat and there was no reasonable likelihood raised of an 25
imminent physical confrontation, there was no tendency to coerce or intimidate within the
meaning of Clear Pine Mouldings. Id. On that basis, the Board found in that case that the
employer violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by discharging the striking employee.
Even though the Clear Pine Mouldings standard arose in the context of striker 30
misconduct, those same principles apply to employees discharged when engaging in picketing
activities following an employer’s lockout of its bargaining unit employees. Thus, the standard
articulated by the Board in Clear Pine Mouldings is applicable to the instant case where it is
undisputed that Runion was discharged for his picket line statements, unaccompanied by threats
or acts of violence, to presumably African-American replacement workers. As mentioned above, 35
approximately 8 seconds after the replacement workers in the vans passed by Runion, he yelled:
“Did you bring enough KFC for everybody?” Also, approximately 27 seconds after the
replacement workers passed him, Runion, directing his comments to the picketers across the
street, stated: “Hey, anybody smell that? I smell fried chicken and watermelon.” The question
before me is thus whether Runion’s statements may reasonably tend to coerce or intimidate 40
employees in their rights protected under the Act or whether those statements raised a reasonable
likelihood of an imminent physical confrontation.
Based on the record evidence, I find that under the Board’s Clear Pine Mouldings
standard, Runion’s conduct and statements did not tend to coerce or intimidate employees in the 45
exercise of their rights under the Act, nor did they raise a reasonable likelihood of an imminent
physical confrontation. Runion’s “KFC” and “fried chicken and watermelon” statements most
JD–33–15
12
certainly were racist, offensive, and reprehensible, but they were not violent in character, and
they did not contain any overt or implied threats to replacement workers or their property. The
statements were also unaccompanied by any threatening behavior or physical acts of intimidation
by Runion towards the replacement workers in the vans. In fact, while making both statements,
Runion stood with his hands in his coat pockets and he was not making any threatening gestures 5
or movements when he made the statements. In addition, the statements were made after the
replacement workers had passed by Runion. In this regard, the “KFC” statement was made 6
seconds after the van passed, and the “fried chicken and watermelon” statement was made 27
seconds after the replacement workers had passed, and it was directed not at the replacement
workers, but the picketers across the street. The record evidence in this case does not establish 10
that Runion’s statements were coercive or intimidating to the exercise of employees’ Section 7
rights, and it does not establish that the statements raised the likelihood of imminent physical
confrontation.
While the Respondent has specifically alleged that Runion’s statements had a “coercive 15
impact” because they allegedly inspired more “hate-filled racist speech” and increased the
potential for violence, such assertions are unsupported by the record. Although the record
reveals that there were several racist statements made on the picket line by unidentified
individuals after Runion made his “KFC” and “fried chicken and watermelon” statements, and
after he left the picket line,10 the record does not establish that those individuals were provoked 20
or inspired to make those statements by anyone. In addition, there is certainly no evidence to
establish that Runion in any way inspired or caused those persons to make those racist
statements. There is likewise no evidence to establish that Runion’s statements “Did you bring
enough KFC for everybody?” and “Hey, anybody smell that? I smell fried chicken and
watermelon,” increased the potential for violence on a picket line where there was undisputedly 25
no evidence of any picket line violence on that day, nor on any other day during the lockout. I
find that even though Runion’s statements were offensive and racist, and certainly may have
been disrespectful to the dignity and feelings of African-American replacement workers, there is
no evidence to establish that the statements contained overt or implied threats, that they coerced
or intimidated employees in the exercise of their rights protected under the Act, or that they 30
raised a reasonable likelihood of an imminent physical confrontation.
I note that my findings in this matter are consistent with well-established Board
precedent. The Board has held that a striker’s or picketer’s use of even the most vile language
and/or gestures, standing alone, does not forfeit the protection of the Act, so long as those actions 35
do not constitute a threat. Airo Die Casting, Inc., 347 NLRB 810 (2006); Nickell Moulding, 317
NLRB 826, 827-828 (1995); Calliope Designs, Inc., 297 NLRB 510, 521 (1989). In Nickell
Moulding, striking employee Cleata Draper carried a homemade sign on the picket line that read
“Who is Rhonda F [with an X through the F] Sucking Today?” The sign made reference to
Rhonda Yarborough, an employee who chose to work during the course of the strike. The 40
employer discharged Draper based solely on the picket sign in question. The administrative law
judge found that Draper’s sign did not directly or indirectly threaten either Yarborough’s person
or property, it was not violent in character, and there was no showing of the likelihood of an

10 As mentioned above, the parties stipulated that after Runion left the picket line (at the 16:27 and
17:29 time marks, respectively), an unidentified person whom the parties agree was not Runion, shouted
“fucking monkey scabs” and “fucking nigger scabs.” (Stip. Facts at 74.)
JD–33–15
13
imminent physical confrontation as a result of the sign. Id. at 828. In that case, the Board
affirmed the administrative law judge’s finding that although the sign in question was offensive,
under the application of Clear Pine Mouldings, supra, it did not rise to the level that would
justify the employer’s denial of reinstatement to Draper. Id. at 828-829.
5
In Calliope Designs, Inc., supra at 521, a striking employee called a nonstriker a “whore”
and a “prostitute” and stated to her that she was having sex with the employer’s president. He
also called another nonstriker a “whore” and told her she could earn more money by selling her
daughter, another nonstriker, at the flea market. The Board affirmed the administrative law
judge’s finding that the statements were “obscene, insulting and indecent,” but not sufficient 10
under the Clear Pine Mouldings standard to remove the striking employee from the protection of
the Act. Id.
In Airo Die Casting, supra, a case that I find is directly on point with the instant case, the
Board found in particular that racially charged comments of a similar nature to those of this case 15
have been insufficient to remove the protection of the Act. In that case, the Board examined a
picketer’s racial slurs directed at African-American nonstriking employees. Shortly after a strike
began, the employer hired replacement workers who were transported into the facility in vehicles
past the picket lines at the main gate. The pickets frequently shouted obscenities and made
obscene gestures at the replacements. The replacements responded with obscene gestures and 20
calling the pickets names, often behind closed car windows. Id. at 811. Ronald Lawson, one of
the picketing employees, came towards one of the cars carrying replacement workers and an
African-American security guard. With both hands raised and extending his middle fingers,
Lawson yelled, “[F]uck you nigger” at the security guard. Id. In that case, the Board found that
Lawson’s use of obscene language, gestures, and a racial slur, standing alone without any threats 25
or violence, did not rise to the level where he forfeited the protection provided by the Act. Id. at
812.
In addition, in Detroit Newpapers, 342 NLRB 223, 268-269 (2004), the administrative
law judge found that striker James Ritchie’s use of vile and vulgar language on the picket line, 30
including racial epithets such as “you fuckin’ bitch, nigger lovin’ whore,” did not deprive him of
the protection of the Act under Clear Pine Mouldings, so long as those actions did not constitute
a threat. In that decision, the Board did not rule on that determination because Ritchie settled his
charge allegation before the Board issued its decision. Id. at 223-224.11 Since the Board did not
rule on that determination, I do not rely on it in support of my findings. I do, however, find it 35
persuasive on the treatment of alleged misconduct in the form of racial slurs used on the picket
line under the Clear Pine Mouldings standard.12

11 In the Detroit Newspapers decision, the Board granted the General Counsel’s motion to sever the
cases of all but 10 strikers from those proceedings, it approved the charging parties’ request to withdraw
the relevant charges, and dismissed the corresponding complaint allegations (Id. at fn. 4). The Board
affirmed the judge’s findings regarding the allegations pertaining specifically to those 10 remaining
strikers, for the reasons stated in the judge’s decision. Ritchie’s name was not listed in that decision as
being one of those 10 strikers whose allegations were addressed by the Board. Id. at 223-224.
12 In addition, in Wayne Stead Cadillac, Inc., 303 NLRB 432, 436 (1991), a striking employee on the
picket line grabbed his testicles and gyrated his hips back and forth while mouthing the words “fuck you”
towards a nonemployee and his 8-year-old daughter who were in their car attempting to leave the
employer’s premises. In that case, the administrative law judge determined that the striker’s conduct did
JD–33–15
14
The Respondent argues in its Statement of Position that Runion’s racist comments do not
deserve the protection of the Act. The Respondent specifically asserts that it’s “position on the
8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) aspect of the complaint is very simple—making racist comments is not
protected activity” and “[a]ccordingly, firing an employee because he makes racist comments 5
cannot violate the Act.”13 In this connection, the Respondent asserts that the racist statements
should not be protected and that Runion violated its harassment policy by making the racist
statements, thereby requiring his discharge. I find this argument lacks merit as it infers that
Runion’s statements should be evaluated in isolation, as separate and distinct from his picketing
activity, or that the statements should be evaluated in the context of the normal workplace10
environment. The Respondent correctly asserts that pursuant to its harassment policy, employees
who violate it may be disciplined or discharged. Clearly, the Respondent has the authority to
enforce company policy in the workplace. Contrary to Respondent’s assertions, however,
Runion’s racist comments cannot be analyzed in a vacuum, separate from the fact that those
statements were made during, and in the context of engaging in picketing activity protected by 15
the Act. In this regard, the harassment policy makes no reference to conduct on the picket line in
situations in which such policy violations occurred in the context of conduct protected by the
Act. In addition, as mentioned above, the Board distinguishes between conduct occurring in the
workplace and conduct occurring on the picket line. In Airo Die Casting, supra, the Board
affirmed the administrative law judge’s finding that the picket line comments in that case were 20
repulsive and offensive, but they did not occur during his working time or in his workplace. The
administrative law judge, with Board approval, stated that “Picket-line misconduct is accordingly
evaluated by a different standard than similar conduct in a working environment.” Airo Die
Casting, supra at 812.
25
In its brief, the Respondent also argues that even if Runion was privileged to exercise his
Section 7 rights by picketing, his racial invective took him out of the protection of the Act.14 In
support of this argument, the Respondent argues that Runion’s conduct should be analyzed under
the Board’s decision in Atlantic Steel, 245 NLRB 814 (1979), and its progeny, in which the
Board set forth a four-part test for determining whether an employee’s outburst while engaging 30
in protected concerted activity removes the employee from the protection of the Act and thereby
justifies the discipline imposed. (R. Br. at p. 29.)15 I find, however, that the Respondent’s
reliance on Atlantic Steel and it progeny is misplaced.

not threaten the individuals and the employer’s failure to reinstate him violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of
the Act. The Board did not rule on that determination as the Respondent did not file exceptions to any of
the 8(a)(3) and (1) violations found by the judge. Id. at 432, fn. 2. This case therefore has no precedential
value on this issue, and I do not rely on it in support of my findings. I do, however, find it persuasive on
this issue.
13 R. Statement of Position at p. 1.
14 R. Br. at pp. 28-35.
15 In Atlantic Steel, supra, the Board found that even an employee who is engaged in protected
concerted activity can, by opprobrious conduct, lose the protection of the Act. Id. at 816. Under that test,
the Board examines four factors: “the place of the discussion; the subject matter of the discussion; the
nature of the employees’ outburst; and whether the outburst was, in any way, provoked by the employer’s
unfair labor practices.” Id. at 816.
JD–33–15
15
Atlantic Steel and the related cases cited by the Respondent are factually distinguishable
from the instant case, as they all involved protected activity that occurred in the workplace, and
not on the picket line. In Atlantic Steel, supra, an employee called his foreman a “lying son of a
bitch” while engaging in protected activity on the shop floor. Id. Those facts are substantially
different from the facts of the instant case, where Runion’s statements occurred while engaged in 5
protected activities on the picket line.16 As mentioned above, the Board has recognized a
distinction between protected conduct in the workplace, and protected conduct on the picket line,
and it has evaluated picket line misconduct by a different standard than similar conduct in the
work environment. See Airo Die Casting, supra at 812. In addition, the Board has specifically
held in Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille, 361 NLRB No. 31 (2014), that the Atlantic Steel10
analytical framework “is tailored to workplace confrontations with the employer.” In that case,
the Board held that it would not apply the Atlantic Steel test to analyze the issue of whether
employees’ Facebook comments lost the protection of the Act, noting in particular that the
framework of Atlantic Steel was utilized for balancing “employee rights with the employer’s
interest in maintaining order in the workplace,” and was “typically” applied “to analyze whether 15
direct communications, face-to-face in the workplace, between an employee and a manager or
supervisor constituted conduct so opprobrious that the employee lost the protection of the Act.”
Id. slip op. at 4.
Consistent with the Board’s determination that picketing activity is evaluated by a 20
different standard than workplace activity, the Board held in Siemens Energy & Automation,
Inc., 328 NLRB 1175 (1999), that alleged discharges for strike or picket line misconduct are not
analyzed by the framework for alleged workplace discrimination under Wright Line, 251 NLRB
1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982). In that case,
the administrative law judge recommended dismissal of the complaint alleging a striker was 25
unlawfully suspended and subsequently discharged for engaging in serious strike misconduct
(i.e., throwing roofing nails on the roadway at a vehicular entrance to the plant during the strike,
and kicking a car as it passed through the picket line). Id. The Board, in adopting the judge’s
recommended dismissal of the complaint, found he inappropriately applied the analysis of
Wright Line, and that in cases where the issue is whether an employer may lawfully refuse to 30
reinstate (and thus discharge) an employee on the basis of alleged strike misconduct, the standard
of Clear Pine Mouldings is applied as the first part of a two-part analysis. Id.17

16 I find that the other cases relied on by the Respondent similarly involve protected activity that
occurred in the workplace, and are likewise distinguishable from the instant case. See Foodtown
Supermarkets, 268 NLRB 630 (1984) (employee called employer’s president “a son of a bitch” during the
course of a discussion at work regarding the employee’s grievance); North American Refractories Co.,
331 NLRB 1640, 1642-1643 (2000) (employee lost the Act’s protection by calling his supervisor a
“stupid mother fucker” during a meeting that otherwise constituted protected concerted activity); Verizon
Wireless, 349 NLRB 640, 641-642 (2007) (employee otherwise engaged in protected activity lost the
Act’s protection by referring to a supervisor as “that bitch” and to other supervisors as “fucking
supervisors”).
17 In Siemens, the Board set forth the two-part analysis as follows:
First, under the standard in Clear Pine Mouldings [citations omitted] an employer may
lawfully deny reinstatement to a striker whose strike misconduct under the circumstances
may reasonably tend to coerce or intimidate employees in the exercise of rights protected
under the Act. Second, under the framework for analysis in Rubin Bros., 99 NLRB 610
JD–33–15
16
Based on the standards of Clear Pine Mouldings and the well-established Board
precedent discussed above, I find that Runion was discharged for engaging in picketing activity
protected by Section 7 of the Act, and that his conduct on the picket line, while racist and
offensive, was not violent in character, not accompanied by violent or threatening behavior, it 5
did not raise a reasonable likelihood of an imminent physical confrontation, and it did not
reasonably tend to coerce or intimidate employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights. On
that basis, I find that Runion’s picket line statements were not sufficient under the standards of
Clear Pine Mouldings to remove the protection of the Act. Therefore, I find that the Respondent
discharged Runion on March 1, 2012, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.10
2. Whether deferral to the Arbitrator’s award is appropriate
Having found that the Respondent violated the Act by discharging Runion, I must now
determine whether it is appropriate to defer to the Arbitrator’s award holding that Runion was 15
discharged for just cause. For the reasons stated below, I find that deferral to the Arbitrator’s
award is not appropriate.
On the issue of deferral to an arbitrator’s award, the Board noted in Babcock & Wilcox
Construction, supra, that:20
An arbitrator applying the ‘just cause’ provision in the contract—and sustaining
the discharge—may well depart from the standards that the NLRB would apply
because they are issues of legal characterization, in light of the policies of the
NLRA, and are therefore not likely to have been precisely addressed by the 25
arbitrator. Babcock & Wilcox Construction, supra at slip op. 8, citing Robert A.
Gorman & Matthew W. Finkin, Basic Text on Labor Law 1028 (2d ed. 2004).

(1952), General Telephone Co., 251 NLRB 737 (1984), and Axelson, Inc., 285 NLRB
862 (1987), once the General Counsel has initially established that a striker was denied
reinstatement for conduct related to the strike, the burden of going forward with the
evidence shifts to the employer to establish that it had an honest belief that the striker in
question engaged in the strike misconduct. If the employer establishes that, then the
burden of going forward shifts back to the General Counsel to establish that the striker in
question did not in fact engage in the alleged misconduct. [Id.]
As mentioned above, I find that under the Board’s Clear Pine Mouldings standard, Runion’s conduct
and statements did not tend to coerce or intimidate employees in the exercise of their rights under the Act,
and therefore the first part of the analysis has not been met.
The second part of the two-part test involves shifting burdens which attempt to determine if the
striker in question did in fact engage in the picket line misconduct that was alleged. In the instant case, it
is undisputed that Runion uttered the racist “KFC” statement, and the parties have stipulated that, with
regard to the “fried chicken and watermelon” statement, the video recording was an accurate
representation of that statement, and the recording speaks for itself. As mentioned above, I find based on
the undisputed record evidence, that Runion had in fact made the “fried chicken and watermelon”
statement. Since I have determined that Runion made both statements, there is no question as to whether
he in fact engaged in the alleged misconduct. Therefore, I find it unnecessary to evaluate this case under
the shifting burdens of the second part of the test.
JD–33–15
17
In addition, in cases where arbitrators measure employee conduct against a standard
which conflicts with or contradicts Board law, the Board has found the awards repugnant to the
Act and has refused to defer. In Union Fork & Hoe Co., 241 NLRB 907 (1979), the Board held
that where an arbitrator ruled that an employee was discharged for just cause, but failed to
consider well-established Board law regarding whether that employee’s conduct was protected 5
by the Act, such an award was found to be “repugnant to the Act.” In that case, the arbitrator
ruled that a union steward was insubordinate (and therefore was discharged for just cause), and
failed to consider well-established Board law which holds that a steward is protected by the Act
when fulfilling his role in processing grievances. On that basis, the Board reasoned that the
arbitrator measured the steward’s conduct against a standard which conflicted with Board law, 10
and the arbitration award was clearly repugnant to the policies and purposes of the Act, and was
not entitled to deference. Id. at 907-908.
Even though the Respondent in the instant case argues that the facts presented to the
arbitrator were “factually parallel” to the unfair labor practice allegations,18 the Arbitrator 15
considered only whether Runion’s discharge was for just cause under the collective-bargaining
agreement, based on his alleged violation of the Respondent’s harassment policy. The statutory
rights at issue were clearly not considered by the Arbitrator, and he measured Runion’s conduct
on the picket line against a standard which conflicts with or contradicts Board law. In this
regard, the Arbitrator failed to consider well-established Board precedent holding that picketing 20
activity is protected by Section 7 of the Act, that the Board distinguishes between conduct in the
workplace and conduct on the picket line, and that a picketer’s use of even the most offensive
language and/or gestures, standing alone, does not forfeit the protection of the Act, so long as
those actions do not constitute a threat. In fact, the Arbitrator’s award is devoid of any reference
to the Act in any regard. In addition, contrary to the Board law establishing that conduct on the 25
picket line is protected unless it is threatening to other employees’ Section 7 rights, the Arbitrator
held that Runion’s statements “. . . would have been serious misconduct in any context, but in the
context of the picket line, where there was a genuine possibility of violence, his comments were
even more serious.” (Jt. Exh. T, p. 12.) Such reasoning provides less protection for picket line
conduct than the Act affords, and such a determination by the Arbitrator is inconsistent with the 30
purposes and policies of the Act, and the well-established Board precedent. On that basis, I find
that the award is “palpably wrong” and simply not susceptible to an interpretation that is
consistent with the Act. Therefore, I find that the Arbitrator’s award is “clearly repugnant” to the
Act.
35
I note that the Board has recognized similar occasions where it has refused to defer to
arbitration awards that upheld discipline or discharges under a “just cause” analysis for conduct
protected by the Act, where such awards were repugnant to the Act. Babcock & Wilcox
Construction, supra, slip op. 8; See, e.g., Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing, U.S., 325 NLRB
176, 177-179 (1997), enfd. 200 F.3d 230 (5th Cir. 1999) (refusing to defer to arbitrator’s 40
decision where it upheld discipline based on employee’s protected concerted activities—the
employee was discharged for complaining that the employer intended to discharge him for his
union activities); Garland Coal & Mining Co., 276 NLRB 963, 964-965 (1985) (arbitrator’s
decision that union president’s protected activity in refusing to sign a memo for the safety
director which supported the employer’s opposition to consolidation of the mine and safety 45

18 See R. Statement of Position at p. 3; R. Br. pp. 20-22.
JD–33–15
18
committees, constituted insubordination upholding his suspension (but not discharge), was
“repugnant to the Act”); see also Cone Mills Corp., 298 NLRB 661 (1990) (arbitrator’s finding
that employee’s suspension from filing a complaint under the contract was improper, but her
refusal to leave the building as instructed constituted insubordination under the just cause
doctrine and was sufficient to warrant denial of backpay, was “repugnant to the Act”). 5
Based on the above, I find that the General Counsel has satisfied its burden of
establishing that the Arbitrator’s award does not satisfy the Board’s standard for deferral under
Spielberg and Olin Corp., supra, and therefore the award is not entitled to deference.
10
The Respondent also argues in its brief that the Arbitrator’s award is consistent with
Section 10(c) of the Act, and that Runion can be denied reinstatement and backpay, even if the
employer interfered with the employee’s Section 7 rights, so long as the employee was
discharged for his misconduct and not for any protected activity.19 In support of this argument,
the Respondent, citing Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 351 NLRB 644 (2007), asserts that the Arbitrator 15
found that Runion was discharged “for cause” because he “engaged in misconduct by yelling
racist statements at African-American replacement workers.”20
Section 10(c) of the Act provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o order of the Board shall
require the reinstatement of any individual as an employee who has been suspended or 20
discharged, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was suspended or
discharged for cause.” In Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 351 NLRB 644, the Board noted that in an
earlier case21 it initially held that the employer violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by
failing to give notice and bargain with the union prior to installing and using hidden surveillance
cameras. The Board, however, relying on Section 10(c), denied a make-whole remedy to the 25
employees whom it discharged or suspended for misconduct discovered through the use of those
cameras. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed
the Board’s decision that the employer violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1), but it remanded the case
to the Board to further address if the remedy should include make-whole relief for the employees
disciplined by the employer for engaging in the misconduct discovered through the use of the 30
cameras. See Brewers & Maltsters Local 6 v. NLRB, 414 F.3d 36 (D.C. Cir. 2005). On remand,
in its Supplemental Decision and Order, the Board upheld its denial of the make-whole remedy
for those employees, finding that the employees in that case were all disciplined “for cause.” Id.
at 646-647. In that case, the Board explained the reasons why Section 10(c)’s prohibition of a
make-whole remedy where discipline was “for cause” should be interpreted as including the 35
situation in that case, where the misconduct in question was uncovered through unilateral and
unlawfully implemented means. Id. at 647. The Board found that the legislative history of
Section 10(c) showed that Congress’ purpose in enacting Section 10(c) was to insure that
employees who engaged in misconduct were subject to discipline for that misconduct. Id., citing
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 217 (1964). 40
In analyzing the Respondent’s argument, it is important to note that the Arbitrator did not
find that Runion was discharged “for cause” as the Respondent alleges, rather, he found that the

19 R. Statement of Position at p. 3; R. Br. at pp. 36-38 and 48.
20 R. Br. at p. 37.
21 342 NLRB 560 (2004).
JD–33–15
19
discharge of Runion was upheld as “. . . having been for just cause in accordance with the
[collective-bargaining] agreement.” (Arbitrator’s Opinion and Award, Exh. A, p. 14) (emphasis
added). In Anheuser-Busch, Inc., supra, the Board noted that Congress did not explicitly define
the term “for cause.” The Board has, however, explained that in the context of the Act, the term
“for cause” referred to discipline “that is not imposed for a reason that is prohibited by the Act.” 5
Id. at 647. The Board stated:
Cause, in the context of Sec. 10(c), effectively means the absence of a prohibited
reason. For under our Act: “Management can discharge for good cause, bad
cause, or no cause at all. It has, as the master of its own business affairs, 10
complete freedom with but one specific, definite qualification: it may not
discharge when the real motivating purpose is to do that which [the Act] forbids.”
Id. at 647; citing Taracorp Industries, 273 NLRB [221,] at 222 fn. 8 [(1984)
(quoting NLRB v. Columbus Marble Works, 233 F.2d 406, 413 (5th Cir. 1956))].
15
The Board further noted that “[i]t is important to distinguish between the term ‘cause’ as it
appears in Section 10(c ) and the term ‘just cause’ . . . . Just cause encompasses principles such
as the law of the shop, fundamental fairness, and related arbitral doctrines. Cause, in the context
of Section 10(c), effectively means the absence of a prohibited reason.” Id. at 647; Taracorp
Industries, supra at 222 fn. 8; accord: Elkouri & Elkouri, How Arbitration Works 974 (6th ed.20
2003) (“‘[c]ause’ as used in Section 10(c), should not be confused with ‘just cause’ as the term is
used by arbitrators”).
I find the facts of the instant case are distinguishable from Anheuser-Busch, where the
discipline was not imposed for a prohibited reason, and was “for cause.” In the instant case, 25
despite the Arbitrator’s determination that there was “just cause” for Runion’s discharge in
accordance with the contract, the evidence establishes that Runion was discharged for a
prohibited reason—the protected activity of engaging in picketing. The fact that his picketing
activity included the use of two racist statements was simply insufficient under extant Board law
to remove the protection from his picketing activity, and he was therefore discharged for 30
engaging in protected activity. The Board specifically held in Anheuser-Busch, Inc., that “[a]
termination of employment that is motivated by protected activity is unlawful under Section
8(a)(1) and/or (3), and is not ‘for cause,’ and as the termination is unlawful, ‘the Board can order
reinstatement and backpay.’” Id. at 648. On that basis, I find the Respondent’s argument lacks
merit, and that Section 10(c) of the Act does not prohibit the Board from ordering reinstatement 35
and a make-whole remedy for Runion. In fact, as the Board recently held in E.I. Dupont, 362
NLRB No. 98 (May 29, 2015), such relief “…is not only within the Board’s ‘broad’ remedial
discretion under Section 10(c) [citing NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co. of Miami, 344 U.S. 344,
346 (1953)], but is necessary to ‘restore as nearly as possible the situation that would have
prevailed but for the unfair labor practices.’” Id. slip op. at 5; citing State Distributing Co., 28240
NLRB 1048 (1987).
Finally, the Respondent argues that “it is contrary to public policy for the Board to
continue to tolerate racism on the picket lines and to provide employees making racist statements
the same level of protection under the Act as employees uttering curse words or making other 45
JD–33–15
20
vulgar statements.”22 As discussed above, however, extant Board law establishes that Runion’s
statements, while racist and offensive, were not sufficient to remove the protection of the Act
from his protected picketing activity, and that his discharge violated the Act. I am bound to
apply established Board precedent which the Supreme Court has not reversed, leaving “for the
Board, not the judge, to determine whether that precedent should be varied.” Waco, Inc., 273 5
NLRB 746, 749 fn. 14 (1984); accord: Pathmark Stores, Inc., 342 NLRB 378, 378 fn. 1 (2004);
See also, Los Angeles New Hospital, 244 NLRB 960, 962 fn. 4 (1979), enfd. 640 F.2d 1017 (9th
Cir. 1981); and Iowa Beef Packers, Inc., 144 NLRB 615, 616 (1963), enfd. in part 331 F.2d 176
(8th Cir. 1964).
10
Based on the record evidence in this case, and the well-established Board law discussed
above, I find that the Arbitrator’s award is palpably wrong and not susceptible to an
interpretation that is consistent with the Act, and it is therefore “clearly repugnant” to the Act.
Accordingly, deferral to the Arbitrator’s award is inappropriate, and I find that by discharging
Runion for engaging in union and protected concerted activities on the picket line, the 15
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
20
1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied
Industrial and Service Workers International Union, AFL-CIO/CLC is a labor organization 25
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By discharging its employee Anthony Runion on March 1, 2012, for engaging in
union and/or protected concerted activities, including his participation in picketing activities, the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) and of the Act. 30
4. The above unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY35
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall
order it to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate
the policies of the Act.
40
The Respondent, having unlawfully discharged employee Anthony Runion in violation of
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, must offer him reinstatement and make him whole for any loss
of earnings and other benefits he may have suffered as a result of the discrimination against him.
Backpay shall be computed on a quarterly basis, less any interim earnings, as prescribed in F. W.
Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest at the rate prescribed in New Horizons, 283 45

22 R. Br. at p. 48.
JD–33–15
21
NLRB 1173 (1987), compounded daily as prescribed in Kentucky River Medical Center, 356
NLRB No. 8 (2010).
The Respondent shall file a report with the Social Security Administration allocating
backpay to the appropriate calendar quarters. The Respondent shall also compensate Runion for 5
the adverse tax consequences, if any, of receiving one or more lump-sum backpay awards
covering periods longer than 1 year. Don Chavas, LLC d/b/a Tortillas Don Chavas, 361 NLRB
No. 10 (2014).
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law, and on the entire record, I issue the 10
following recommended23
ORDER
15
The Respondent, Cooper Tire & Rubber Company, Findlay, Ohio, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
20
(a) Discharging employees for engaging in union and/or protected concerted activities,
including participating in picketing activities.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.25
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.

(a) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer Anthony Runion full reinstatement
to his former job, or if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, 30
without prejudice to his seniority or any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed,
(b) Make whole Anthony Runion for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a
result of the discrimination against him, in the manner set forth in the remedy section
of this decision. 35
(c) Compensate Anthony Runion for adverse tax consequences, if any, of receiving a
lump-sum backpay award, and file a report with the Social Security Administration
allocating the backpay award to the appropriate calendar quarters for said employee.
40
(d) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove from its files any references to its
unlawful discharge of Anthony Runion, and within 3 days thereafter notify said

23 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted
by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
JD–33–15
22
employee in writing that this has been done and that the discharge will not be used
against him in any way.
(e) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such additional time as the Regional
Director may allow for good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place designated 5
by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment records,
timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records, including an
electronic copy of such records if stored in electronic form, necessary to analyze the
amount of backpay due under the terms of the Order.
10
(f) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facility in Findlay, Ohio, copies
of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”24 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 8, after being signed by the Respondent’s
authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to 15
employees are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices,
notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or
an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent customarily
communicates with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any 20
other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the
Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of
the notice to all current employees and former employees employed by the
Respondent at any time since March 1, 2012.25
(g) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn
certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the
steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
30
Dated, Washington, D.C. June 5, 2015
__________________________35
Thomas M. Randazzo
Administrative Law Judge

24 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice
reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations
Board.”
JD–33–15
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO:
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose a representative to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discriminate against you for engaging in union and/or
protected concerted activities, including participation in picketing activities.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer Anthony Runion full reinstatement
to his former job, or if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without
prejudice to his seniority or any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed.
WE WILL make Anthony Runion whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits resulting
from his discharge, less any net interim earnings, plus interest.
WE WILL compensate Anthony Runion for the adverse tax consequences, if any, of receiving a
lump-sum backpay award, and WE WILL file a report with the Social Security Administration
allocating the backpay award to the appropriate calendar quarters for said employee.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove from our files any reference to
the unlawful discharge of Anthony Runion, and WE WILL, within 3 days thereafter, notify said
employee in writing that this has been done and that his discharge will not be used against him in
any way.
COOPER TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY
(Employer)
Dated: ____________ By: ______________________________________________
(Representative) (Title)
JD–33–15
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below or you may call the Board’s toll-free number 1-866-667-NLRB (1-866-667-6572).
Hearing impaired persons may contact the Agency’s TTY service at 1-866-315-NLRB. You may also obtain
information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
1240 East 9th Street, Room 1695
Cleveland, OH 44199-2086
(216) 522-3715
Hours: 8:15 a.m. to 4:45 p.m.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/08-CA-087155 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE
ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR
COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (216) 522-3715.