COOLIT SYSTEMS INC.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 25, 2020

2019003466 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 25, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/462,753 03/17/2017 Geoff Sean Lyon COOL2001USCON2 3607
22874 7590 08/25/2020
GANZ POLLARD, LLC
P O BOX 2200
HILLSBORO, OR 97123
EXAMINER
LEO, LEONARD R
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3763
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/25/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@ganzlaw.com
mail@ganzlaw.com
uspto@ganzlaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte GEOFF SEAN LYON

Appeal 2019-003466
Application 15/462,753
Technology Center 3700
____________

Before KENNETH G. SCHOPFER, BRADLEY B. BAYAT, and
ROBERT J. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges.

SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–24. An oral hearing was held on
July 30, 2020. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM-IN-PART.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as CoolIT
Systems, Inc. Appeal Br. 3.
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ILLUSTRATIVE CLAIM
1. A fluid heat exchanger for cooling an electronic
device, the heat exchanger comprising:
a plurality of walls defining a corresponding plurality of
microchannels, wherein each microchannel extends from a first
end to a second end, and wherein the plurality of microchannels
defines at least two opposed outer microchannels and a
centrally located microchannel positioned between the opposed
outer microchannels;
a fluid inlet passage configured to deliver a heat-
exchange fluid to each microchannel at a position between the
corresponding first end and the corresponding second end of the
respective microchannel; and
a fluid outlet passage having an enlarged outlet region
from the centrally located microchannel compared to a
corresponding outlet region from one or both of the opposed
outer microchannels.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Atarashi et al.
(“Atarashi” herein)
US 5,592,363 Jan. 7, 1997
Chu US 5,835,347 Nov. 10, 1998
Campbell et al.
(“Campbell” herein)
US 7,762,314 B2 July 27, 2010

REJECTIONS
I. Claims 23 and 24 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a), as
failing to comply with the written description requirement.2

2 In view of the filing date of the application at issue in this Appeal, the AIA
version of 35 U.S.C. § 112 applies.
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II. Claim 11 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b), as failing to
particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter that the inventor
or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
III. Claims 1, 2, 5–12, and 15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
as anticipated by Chu.
IV. Claims 1, 17, 23, and 24 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)
as anticipated by Campbell.
V. Claims 3, 4, 13, 14, and 16–22 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Chu and Atarashi.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The findings of fact relied upon, which are supported by a
preponderance of the evidence, appear in the following Analysis.
ANALYSIS
Written Description
Claims 23 and 24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a), as failing
to comply with the written description requirement, because the
Specification lacks disclosure for the limitation of claim 23 reciting “the
plurality of walls are evenly spaced from each other such that the plurality of
microchannels are uniformly wide” and the limitation of claim 24 reciting
“each in the plurality of microchannels has a same width as a width of each
other microchannel in the plurality.” Final 2.
Disputing the rejection, the Appellant argues that Figure 2 of the
Specification discloses uniformly wide microchannels 103. Appeal Br. 22.
Further, the Appellant argues that the Specification’s disclosure of the
microchannels being “substantially parallel with each other” and “hav[ing]
dimensions and properties which seek to reduce or possibly minimize
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pressure drop or differential of fluid flowing through the channels 103
defined therebetween” amounts to a disclosure of uniform microchannel
width. Id. (quoting Spec. 1, l. 24; 5, ll. 19–21). See also id. at 23. The
Appellant also argues that the Specification’s disclosure of forming
microchannel walls, by skiving (Spec. 11, l. 6), amounts to a disclosure of
uniform width:
A person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood, at
the time of filing the application, that skiving is a
manufacturing process that cuts into, or shaves, ductile metals
to lift the walls from a larger block of the metal, similar to the
manner in which a cheese grater cuts into, or shaves, a block of
cheese to peel small pieces of cheese from the larger block.
Blades of a skiving machine are often, but not always, evenly
spaced to form uniformly wide channels between the lifted
pieces (walls 210, in this instance).
Appeal Br. 22.
In response, the Examiner states that Specification “fails to state the
drawings are made to scale,” such that Figure 2 may not be relied upon for
any disclosure of uniformly wide microchannels. Ans. 14. Indeed, “patent
drawings do not define the precise proportions of the elements and may not
be relied upon to show particular sizes if the specification is completely
silent on the issue.” Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Avia Grp. Int’l, 222
F.3d 951, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2000). See also Nystrom v. Trex Co., Inc., 424 F.3d
1136, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re Wright, 569 F.2d 1124, 1127 (CCPA
1977) (“Absent any written description in the specification of quantitative
values, arguments based on measurement of a drawing are of little value.”)
But cf. Cummins-Allison Corp. v. SBM Co., Ltd., 484 F. App’x 499, 507
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (nonprecedential) (“As long as a person of skill in the art
could derive the claimed dimensions from the patent’s disclosure, there is no
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additional requirement that the specification must explicitly disclose the
precise proportions or particular sizes.”) Yet, even if not made to scale,
drawings can teach quantitative relationships among the elements depicted
that do not depend upon their actual dimensions. For example, Vas-Cath
Inc. v. Mahurkar and In re Heinle — both considering whether drawings
could provide written-description support for claimed subject matter —
demonstrate that drawings alone can teach relative sizes of depicted
elements. Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1566 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (concerning claims requiring “a return lumen diameter substantially
less than 1.0 but substantially greater than 0.5 times the diameter of the
combined lumens”); In re Heinle, 342 F.2d 1001, 1007 (CCPA 1965)
(concerning the claimed “circumferential width of each of said apertures
being approximately one-fourth of the circumference of said core.”) The
claimed uniformly wide microchannels of claims 23 and 24 involve such a
comparison of dimensions. However, with regard to Figure 2 of the
Appellant’s Specification, the amount of detail provided in the drawing does
not adequately disclose the relative sizes of the microchannels, so as to
determine that the microchannels have a uniform width.
Regarding the microchannels being parallel with each other and
having dimensions and properties that reduce the pressure drop (see Appeal
Br. 22, 23), the Examiner states that these characteristics have no bearing on
the spacing or width of microchannels. Ans. 14. Indeed, the Appellant
provides no explanation as to how these features might mandate
microchannels of uniform width.
As to whether disclosure of the skiving technique, in the
Specification, sufficiently supports the claimed microchannels of uniform
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width, the Examiner states that skiving “would produce a uniform width of
one microchannel by a single cutting blade, but does not assure all the
blades have the same width or are uniformly spaced apart to form the
microchannels.” Ans. 14. Further, as the Examiner emphasizes (id.), the
Appellant concedes that the “[b]lades of a skiving machine are often, but not
always, evenly spaced to form uniformly wide channels between the lifted
pieces” (Appeal Br. 22) (emphasis added). Therefore, the Specification’s
disclosure of skiving does not persuade us of error.
Accordingly, the Appellant does not persuade us of error in the
rejection for failure to comply with the written description requirement. We
sustain the rejection of claims 22 and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
Indefiniteness
Claim 11 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b), as failing to
particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter that the inventor
or a joint inventor regards as the invention. Final 3. According to the
Examiner, the limitation “the second enlarged outlet region” lacks
antecedent basis, rendering it indefinite. Id.
The Appellant does not address this rejection. See Appeal Br. 9 n.3.
Therefore, we summarily sustain the rejection of claim 11 under
35 U.S.C. § 112(b).
Anticipation by Chu
The Appellant contends that the Examiner erred in rejecting
independent claim 1, along with its dependent claims 2, 5–12, and 15, as
anticipated by Chu, because the reference lacks claim 1’s “fluid outlet
passage having an enlarged outlet region from the centrally located
microchannel compared to a corresponding outlet region from one or both of
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the opposed outer microchannels.” Appeal Br. 10–13. The Appellant states
that Chu, “in contrast to structure according to claim 1, merely vents a flow
of air from its heatsink channels to a surrounding environment, without any
outlet passage.” Id. at 10.
The Examiner maintains that the “central channel 38” (see Chu col. 3,
ll. 1–4) shown in Chu’s Figure 1 teaches the recited “centrally located
microchannel,” as well as the recited “fluid outlet passage” (including the
“enlarged outlet region” thereof). See Ans. 11. Figure 1 of the Chu
reference is reproduced below:

Figure 1 is a perspective view of Chu’s heat dissipation device. Chu col. 2,
ll. 11–13.
Thus, the Examiner construes the “fluid outlet passage,” its “enlarged
outlet region,” and the “centrally located microchannel” such that these
structural limitations may be coextensive with each other and, further, that
all three limitations could read on Chu’s “central channel 38.”
A comparison of the language of claim 1, with that of certain claims
depending therefrom, reveals a flaw in the Examiner’s position. “Because
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claim terms are normally used consistently throughout the patent, the usage
of a term in one claim can often illuminate the meaning of the same term in
other claims.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(en banc) (citations omitted). See also Fin Control Sys. Pty, Ltd. v. OAM,
Inc., 265 F.3d 1311, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he same terms appearing in
different portions of the claims should be given the same meaning unless it
is clear from the specification and prosecution history that the terms have
different meanings at different portions of the claims.”)
The Examiner’s construction of the identified claim terms conflicts
with the language of, at least, dependent claim 12. Claim 12 depends from
claim 1, further reciting: “the fluid outlet passage comprises an outlet
opening to receive fluid from each microchannel, wherein each respective
outlet opening is positioned adjacent the corresponding first end of the
respective microchannel.”
According to the Examiner, Chu’s “central channel 38” teaches the
“fluid outlet passage comprises an outlet opening to receive fluid from” and
“positioned adjacent the corresponding first end of the respective
microchannel” (per claim 12). Final 6. Consequently, this condition applies
to the “central microchannel” (as recited in base claim 1) — a feature that
the Examiner maps to Chu’s “central channel 38,” as discussed above.
However, with the “outlet opening” being “positioned adjacent the
corresponding first end of” Chu’s “central channel 38” (per the Examiner’s
mapping), then Chu’s “central channel 38” cannot satisfy claim 12’s
limitation of “the fluid outlet passage comprises an outlet opening to receive
fluid from each microchannel.” Under the Examiner’s mapping, the
recitations of claim 12 would require Chu’s “central channel 38” to “receive
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fluid from” itself. In other words, the claimed “fluid outlet passage” cannot
include the claimed “microchannel[s]” and, consequently, it cannot include
the “centrally located microchannel.” Therefore, the Examiner’s mapping of
the “centrally located microchannel” and the “fluid outlet passage”
(including its “enlarged outlet region”) to Chu’s “central channel 38” is
erroneous.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
independent claim 1 and dependent claims 2, 5–12, and 15 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b).
Anticipation by Campbell
Claim 1
The Appellant contends that the Examiner erred in rejecting
independent claim 1 as anticipated by Campbell, because the reference lacks
the following limitation of claim 1: “a fluid inlet passage configured to
deliver a heat-exchange fluid to each microchannel at a position between the
corresponding first end and the corresponding second end of the respective
microchannel.” See Appeal Br. 16–18.
The Campbell reference discloses a cooling apparatus, in which
coolant flows from a “coolant inlet plenum 155” into a “manifold structure
153” that “comprises alternating inlet and outlet passageways 151, 152
defined by an assembled plurality of manifold plates.” Campbell col. 5, ll.
57–59, col. 6, ll. 10–12, Figs. 1–7. The “[c]oolant inlet plenum 155 . . .
provides coolant to a plurality of coolant inlet passageways 151,” which
“inject coolant onto the surface to be cooled.” Id. at col. 5, ll. 61–62, col. 6,
ll. 2–3. The “coolant strikes the surface to be cooled and turns 180° for
return through the plurality of coolant outlet passageways 152.” Id. at col. 6,
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ll. 6–8. In passing from “an “inlet passageway 151” to “outlet passageway
152,” the coolant passes through “separation gap 122” between the edge of a
corresponding “manifold plate” (of the “manifold structure 153”) and the
“surface to be cooled 116.” Id. at col. 5, ll. 15–32. The “coolant outlet
passageways 152” are “in fluid communication with” “coolant outlet plenum
157,” “from which exhausted coolant exits.” Id. at col. 5, l. 64 – col. 6, l. 1.
The Examiner maps claim 1’s “fluid inlet passage” to Campbell’s
“coolant inlet plenum 155” and claim 1’s “fluid outlet passage” to
Campbell’s “coolant outlet plenum 157.” Final 7; Ans. 12. Further, the
Examiner maps the claimed “plurality of microchannels” to Campbell’s
“coolant inlet passageways 151” and “coolant outlet passageways 152.”
Final 6–7; Ans. 12. According to the Examiner’s analysis, the claimed
“centrally located microchannel” and the claimed “at least two opposed
outer microchannels” correspond to particular ones of Campbell’s “coolant
outlet passageways 152.” Final 6–7.
The Appellant argues that Campbell cannot meet claim 1’s limitation
of “a fluid inlet passage configured to deliver a heat-exchange fluid to each
microchannel,” because Campbell’s coolant flows from “coolant inlet
plenum 155” to “coolant inlet passageways 151” and then turns 180° for
return through the plurality of “coolant outlet passageways 152.” Appeal Br.
16. According to the Appellant, the language of claim 1 prohibits such an
indirect delivery of fluid from the claimed “fluid inlet passage” to the
“microchannel[s]” — the indirect delivery of Campbell including the
intermediate flow of coolant (after leaving the “coolant inlet plenum 155”)
“through the “inlet passageways 151” and the respective “separation gap
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122,” before passing into the “outlet passageways 152.” See Reply Br. 9–
11. The Appellant argues:
“Indirect delivery” is an unworkable interpretation and
ignores the specifically claimed function performed by the
claimed inlet passage, e.g., delivery to each microchannel. If
“configured to deliver . . . to” were construed to encompass
even indirect delivery, the inlet passage also could also [sic] be
constructed as being “configured to deliver heat-transfer fluid”
to every structure downstream of the inlet passage, rendering
the claim 1 recitation “to each microchannel” superfluous and
meaningless.
Id. at 10–11.
According to the Examiner, the use of the word “comprising” (an
open-ended transition term), in the preamble of claim 1, indicates that the
claim does not preclude the presence of structures additional to those that are
recited. Ans. 12. Referring to the element numerals of Campbell, in regard
to the terms of claim 1, the Examiner states: “[F]luid inlet passage 155
delivers heat-exchange fluid indirectly to each [of] microchannels 152 via
microchannels 151. The claim does not recite direct fluid communication.”
Id. at 13.
Indeed, the Appellant does not explain why the recitation “to each
microchannel” (of claim 1) would be rendered “superfluous and
meaningless” (Reply Br. 11) if the claim covered the indirect flow technique
of Campbell. The Appellant appears to place special significance on the
word “configured” of claim 1. See Reply Br. 10–11. Indeed, the phrase
“configured to” is regarded as invoking structural specificity for a particular
role — akin to the phrases “made to” and “designed to” — as opposed to
broader meaning of the phrases “suitable for” and “capable of.” In re Man
Machine Interface Techs. LLC, 822 F.3d 1282, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
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(citations omitted). However, there does not appear to be a reason why the
phrase “configured to” would mandate the so-called direct “deliver[y]” of
fluid, in the claim limitation at issue: “a fluid inlet passage configured to
deliver a heat-exchange fluid to each microchannel at a position between the
corresponding first end and the corresponding second end of the respective
microchannel.” Instead, the phrase “configured to” bears a stronger
connection to claim language referring to the location of the fluid delivery
(i.e., “at a position between the corresponding first end and the
corresponding second end of the respective microchannel”), rather than any
direct (as opposed to indirect) flow to the “microchannels.” The
Specification (for example, page 7, lines 3–22) supports this understanding,
in the disclosure regarding the spatial location of “fluid inlet opening 114,”
which corresponds to the “fluid inlet passage” of claim 1 (see Appeal Br. 4–
5). The concern expressed in the Specification relates to “[t]he delivery of
fresh fluid first to the region that is in direct communication with the heat
generating component to be cooled,” which “seeks to create a uniform
temperature at the contact region as well as areas in the heat spreader plate
away from the contact region.” Spec. 7, ll. 11–14.
Construing the language of claim 1, in a manner that permits both the
so-called direct and indirect “deliver[y]” of fluid from the “fluid inlet
passage” to “each microchannel,” accords with the guidance provided by our
reviewing court:
The correct inquiry in giving a claim term its broadest
reasonable interpretation in light of the specification is not
whether the specification proscribes or precludes some broad
reading of the claim term adopted by the examiner. And it is
not simply an interpretation that is not inconsistent with the
specification. It is an interpretation that corresponds with what
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and how the inventor describes his invention in the
specification, i.e., an interpretation that is “consistent with the
specification.” In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also
In re Suitco Surface, 603 F.3d 1255, 1259-60 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
In re Smith Int’l, Inc., 871 F.3d 1375, 1382–83 (Fed. Cir. 2017). We are
similarly mindful of admonitions against unwarranted importation of
features from the Specification into claim constructions. See McCarty v.
Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 160 U.S. 110, 116 (1895) (“[I]f we once begin to
include elements not mentioned in the claim, in order to limit such claim
. . . , we should never know where to stop”); Johnson Worldwide Assocs.,
Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“General
descriptive terms will ordinarily be given their full meaning; modifiers will
not be added to broad terms standing alone.”) (citations omitted); Virginia
Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 865–66 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(unmodified term “reciprocating” not limited to linear reciprocation);
Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981, 987 (Fed.Cir.1988)
(“Where a specification does not require a limitation, that limitation should
not be read from the specification into the claims.”); Lemelson v. U.S., 752
F.2d 1538, 1551–52 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“Even if the specification only
discloses apparatus directed to executing automatic prepositioning of the
workpiece or the measurement device or both, this does not dictate reading
such a limitation into the prepositioning step of the claim.”)
In view of the foregoing, we are not persuaded that the flowpath
through the identified elements of Campbell fails to satisfy claim 1’s
recitation of “a fluid inlet passage configured to deliver a heat-exchange
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fluid to each microchannel at a position between the corresponding first end
and the corresponding second end of the respective microchannel.”
Accordingly, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 1 as anticipated by Campbell, such that we sustain this
rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).
Claim 17
The Appellant contends that the Examiner erred in rejecting
independent claim 17, as anticipated by Campbell. Similar to the
Appellant’s interpretation of claim 1, the Appellant contends that claim 17
requires direct delivery or receipt of fluid — both from the claimed “fluid
inlet passage” to “each microchannel flow passage” and from “the first end
and the second end of each microchannel” to the “fluid outlet passage”:
Campbell’s inlet plenum 155 delivers fluid only to the
inlet passageways 151, and not to the outlet passageways 152 as
the Examiner alleged in rejecting claim 17. See Campbell, col.
5:57–63, FIGs. 1, 1A, 1B, and 2; Cf. Action, p. 8. Further,
Campbell’s separation gap 122, the only structure in Campbell
that receives fluid from the inlet passageways 151, lacks an
outlet region being smaller adjacent an outer inlet passageway
151 relative to adjacent the centrally located inlet passageway
151. Thus, Campbell does not disclose an outlet region from an
outer microchannel being smaller than an outlet region from a
centrally located microchannel, as claim 17 recites.
Appeal Br. 18–19.
As an initial matter, the Appellant does not accurately represent the
Examiner’s mapping of claim limitations to Campbell. The Examiner maps
the “fluid inlet passage” to Campbell’s “coolant inlet plenum 155”; the
Examiner maps the “microchannel[s]” to Campbell’s “coolant inlet
passageways 151” and “coolant outlet passageways 152” (with the “centrally
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located microchannel” and the “outer microchannels” being mapped only to
particular ones of Campbell’s “coolant outlet passageways 152”); and the
Examiner maps the claimed “fluid outlet passage” (including its “smaller”
“first outlet region” and its “second outlet region”) to Campbell’s “coolant
outlet plenum 157.” Final 6–8; Ans. 13. The Examiner does not map any
limitation of claim 17 to Campbell’s “separation gap 122.”
The issue of whether the relevant language of claim 17 (i.e., “a fluid
inlet passage configured to deliver a heat-exchange fluid to each
microchannel flow passage between the corresponding first end and
corresponding second end of the respective microchannel flow passage”)
requires so-called direct delivery is substantially the same issue discussed,
above, with respect to claim 1. The foregoing analysis applies equally with
respect to claim 17.
The Appellant also contends that claim 17 requires the “fluid outlet
passage” to “receive” fluid directly “from the first end and the second end of
each microchannel.” Appeal Br. 18–19; Reply Br. 12–14. According to the
Appellant:
Where, as in claim 17, the means of delivery and the
means of receiving fluid are specified, it is difficult to conclude
that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the
claim to mean anything other than direct delivery or direct
receipt. To conclude otherwise would render the recitations “to
each microchannel” and “from each microchannel” superfluous,
and meaningless.
Reply Br. 13.
The Appellant does not explain why any of the “to each
microchannel,” “from each microchannel,” or “configured to receive”
language of claim 17 should be construed to require direct receipt of fluid by
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the “fluid outlet passage” — or why construing the claim language to permit
so-called indirect receipt might render any claim language “superfluous, and
meaningless.” See id.
In view of the claim construction principles discussed, above, in
regard to the Appellant’s arguments for claim 1, we do not construe claim 17
to be limited in the manner that the Appellant suggests. Notably, the
Appellant does not identify any portion of the Specification that might
require direct flow from the claimed “microchannel[s]” to the “fluid outlet
passage” — or from the corresponding elements of the disclosed
embodiments. Rather than addressing — let alone, attaching any
significance to — the directness of flow from, e.g., “microchannels 103” to
“fluid outlet openings 124,” the Specification emphasizes other features
relating to the corresponding portion of the flow path, such as: the
“dimensions and properties” of “microchannel walls 110” that could “reduce
or possibly minimize the pressure drop or differential of fluid flowing
through the channels 103 defined therebetween” (Spec. 5, ll. 16–21); the
location of “fluid outlet openings 124” relative to the “heat spreader plate
102,” whereby, for example, “fluid passing through the channels pass axially
along the length of the channels between walls 110 and then changes
direction to pass away from surface 102a out from between the walls 110 to
exit through openings 124” (id. at 8, ll. 9–16); the shapes or dimensions of
“fluid outlet openings 124” (id. at 8, l. 25 – 9, l. 2); and the creation of “two
subflows moving away from each other and away from inlet 114 toward
openings 124 at the ends of the microchannels” (id. at 10, ll. 6–8).
In view of the foregoing, we are not persuaded that claim 17 requires
direct delivery or receipt of fluid — both from the claimed “fluid inlet
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passage” to “each microchannel flow passage” and from “the first end and
the second end of each microchannel” to the “fluid outlet passage.”
Therefore, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s mapping of the
identified claim limitation to the respective elements of Campbell.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 17 under
35 U.S.C. § 102(e).
Claims 23 and 24
Claim 23 depends from independent claim 1 and claim 24 depends
from independent claim 17, with claims 23 and 24 adding limitations
reciting that the “microchannels” of each claim have a uniform width.
Disputing the rejection, the Appellant relies upon the arguments
presented for the respective base claims 1 and 17. Appeal Br. 19.
In addition, the Appellant argues that the Examiner’s mapping of the
claimed portions of the “outlet regions” (which vary in size), to elements of
Campbell, preclude any mapping, to the reference, of the claimed uniformly
wide “microchannels” in claims 23 and 24. Id.
However, the Examiner’s analysis of claims 1 and 17 does not state
that there is any difference in width, among the elements of Campbell
(“coolant inlet passageways 151” and “coolant outlet passageways 152”)
mapped to the claimed “microchannel[s].” See Final 6–8; Ans. 13. Indeed,
the Examiner specifically states: “Figure 6B [of Campbell] discloses the
plurality of walls 300, 400 are evenly spaced from each other such that the
plurality of microchannels 151, 152 are uniformly wide.” Final 8.
Specifically, in rejecting independent claims 1 and 17, the Examiner maps
the portions of the claimed “outlet regions” (that vary in size) to different
portions of Campbell’s “coolant outlet plenum 157” — not Campbell’s
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“coolant inlet passageways 151” and/or “coolant outlet passageways 152.”
See Final 6–8.
Therefore, in view of the foregoing, as well as our analyses of the
rejections of independent base claims 1 and 17, we are not persuaded of
error in the rejection of claims 23 and 24. We sustain the rejection of claims
23 and 24 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).
Obviousness
Dependent claims 3, 4, 13, 14, and 16–22 stand rejected as obvious
over the combination of Chu with Atarashi. The rejection of these claims
relies upon the Examiner’s mapping employed in analyzing Chu’s
anticipation of independent claim 1, with Atarashi being relied upon to teach
certain further limitations. Final 8–10.
Yet, the Examiner does not rely upon Atarashi, or any aspect of the
obviousness analysis, to overcome the error, addressed above, in the
mapping of claim 1 to Chu. See Appeal Br. 20–21.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection of claims 3, 4, 13, 14,
and 16–22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
23, 24 112(a) Written
Description
23, 24
11 112(b) Indefiniteness 11
1, 2, 5–12,
15
102(b) Chu 1, 2, 5–12,
15
1, 17, 23,
24
102(e) Campbell 1, 17, 23,
24

Appeal 2019-003466
Application 15/462,753

19
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
3, 4, 13, 14,
16–22
103(a) Chu, Atarashi 3, 4, 13,
14, 16–22
Overall Outcome 1, 11, 17,
23, 24
2–10, 12–
16, 18–22

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART