Consumat Systems, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 14, 1984

273 N.L.R.B. 410 (N.L.R.B. 1984)

410 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Consumat Systems, Inc. and International Brother-
hood of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders, Black-
smiths, Forgers and Helpers. Cases 5-CA-
14719 and 5-CA-14826
14 December 1984
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS
HUNTER AND DENNIS
On 10 March 1983 Administrative Law Judge
Benjamin Schlesinger issued the attached decision.
The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting
brief, and the General Counsel filed a brief in re-
sponse to the Respondent's exceptions.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has
decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings,' and
conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order
as modified.2
As set forth in detail in the judge's decision, on
27 August 1981 the Union was certified by the
Board as the collective-bargaining representative of
the Respondent's employees and the parties com-
menced bargaining. The Union contends that on 26
August 1982 3 it accepted the Respondent's con-
tract proposal. Several days later and prior to the
execution of the contract, the Respondent refused
to sign the agreement and subsequently withdrew
recognition of the Union. The Respondent main-
tained it was privileged to refuse to sign the agree-
ment and to withdraw recognition as, relying on a
petition signed by a majority of employees, it had a
good-faith belief based on objective considerations
that the Union no longer represented a majority of
the Respondent's employees.
In evaluating the Respondent's contentions, the
judge concluded that the Respondent failed ade-
quately to demonstrate a reasonably based good-
faith doubt of the Union's majority status. The
judge based this conclusion on the fact that only
one page of a two-page petition proclaiming the
signatories no longer wanted the Union to repre-
sent them was admitted in evidence. This one page
contained signatures of only 18 of the 60 unit em-
ployees. In its exceptions and brief, the Respondent
I The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge's credibility find-
ings The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administrative
law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all
the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect Standard Dry
Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd 188 F 2d 362 (3d Or 1951)
We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing
the findings
2 The remedy section of the judge's decision is amended only to the
extent that backpay, if any, shall be computed in accordance with Ogle
Protection Service, 183 NLRB 682 (1970), with interest computed in ac-
cordance with Florida Steel Corp, 231 NLRB 651 (1977)
3 All dates are 1982 unless otherwise indicated
does not contend the judge erred in refusing to
admit page two of this petition, but rather 'argues
the Respondent's reasonably based good-faith
doubt of the Union's majority status existed as evi-
denced by both pages of this petition.
After closely examining the record, we agree
with the judge. During the hearing, the Respond-
ent moved that page two of the petition be admit-
ted into evidence. The judge refused on the ground
that it had not been properly authenticated. The
Respondent never again requested that this docu-
ment be admitted into evidence. Therefore, the
only evidence before us of the Respondent's good-
faith doubt of the Union's majority status is the
one-page document containing signatures of 18 em-
ployees. We thus conclude, in agreement with the
judge, that this is insufficient evidence of a reason-
ably based good-faith doubt that the Union re-
tained majority status. 4 Accordingly, as the Re-
spondent was not privileged to refuse to bargain or
to withdraw recognition from the Union, those ac-
tions constituted violations of Section 8(a)(5).
4 In light of this finding, we find it unnecessary to pass on the issue of
whether, as found by the judge, the Union's telegram of 26 August and
the Respondent's letter of 1 September, respectively, constituted a re-
quest and refusal to sign the collective-bargaining agreement An un-
equivocal request to sign the contract was contained in the Union's letter
of 10 September Therefore, as the Respondent has failed to show suffi-
cient evidence that it had a good-faith doubt of the Union's majority
status on 14 September when It refused to comply with the Union's 10
September unequivocal request to sign the contract, we find that it vio-
lated Sec 8(a)(5) •
Additionally, in light of the finding that the Respondent did not have a
reasonably based good-faith doubt of the Union's majority status when it
refused to execute the contract, Chairman Dotson and Members Hunter
and Dennis find it unnecessary to rely on the judge's finding that once
final agreement on the substantive terms of the contract was reached, re-
gardless of the status of any written agreement, the Respondent was not
free to refuse to bargain even if It then had lawful grounds for believing
that the Union had subsequently lost its majonty status
Member Zimmerman would adopt the judge's findings that the Union's
telegram constituted a request and the Respondent's reply letter constitut-
ed a refusal to sign the collective-bargaining agreement, and that such re-
fusal was unlawful He, like the judge, finds that even if the Respondent
had been able to establish that as early as 1 September it had a reasonable
doubt of the Union's continued majonty status, so as to legitimize its
withdrawal of recognition from the Union, the Respondent would still
have been obligated to execute its 26 August 1982 collective-bargaining
agreement with the Union, and its failure to do so would still have been,
as it was here, a violation of Sec 8(a)(5) The Respondent's obligation to
execute the collective-bargaining agreement arose, and is retroactive to,
26 August, when the Union notified the Respondent of the former's ac-
ceptance of the latter's 8 June offer Subsequent manifestations of possible
loss of majonty support for the Union would not serve to relieve the Re-
spondent of its obligation to execute and give retroactive effect to the
agreement it had reached with the Union on 26 August North Bros Ford,
Inc , 220 NLRB 1021 (1975), Utility Tree Service, 215 NLRB 806 (1974),
affd 218 NLRB 784 (1975) See also Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc , 183
NLRB 213, 217 (1970)
Member Dennis also notes that while the Respondent raised the exist-
ence of a "decertification petition" supporting its 14 September refusal to
execute the contract, the record shows that no question concerning rep-
resentation existed until 21 September when a petition was actually filed
273 NLRB No. 63
CONSUMAT SYSTEMS 411
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the
recommended Order of the administrative law
judge as modified below and orders that the Re-
spondent, Consumat Systems, Inc., Mechanicsville,
Virginia, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall take the action set forth in .the Order as
modified.
Substitute the following for paragraph 1(a).
"(a) On 14 September 1982, failing or refusing,
on request, to execute and give effect to a written
agreement incorporating the agreement reached
with the International Brotherhood of Boilermak-
ers, - Iron Shipbuilders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and
Helpers."
DECISION
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
BENJAMIN SCHLESINGER, Administrative Law Judge.
On August 27, 1981, the National Labor Relations Board
in Case 5-RC-11447 certified Charging Party Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Boilermakers; Iron Shipbuilders,
Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers (Union) as the collec-
tive-bargaining representative for a unit of "all produc-
tion and maintenance employees employed at Consumat
Systems, Inc.'s Mechanicsville, Virginia location, exclud-
ing office clerical employees, professional employees,
technicians, over the road truckdnvers and their helpers,
guards and supervisors as defined in the National Labor
Relations , Act." Thereafter, about September 4, 1981, Re-
spondent and the Union commenced bargaining and on
Feb'ruary' 9, 1981, 1 'negotiators displeased with* the offer,
presented it to the union membership, who promptly re-
jected it. -
Little progress was made over the next - several
months. Rather, Respondent's financial position, none
too t good to begin with, became worse. Contracts were
lost or postponed, some indefinitely As a consequence,
on June 8, Respondent renewed its previous written
offer, with three modifications: it withdrew its prior op-
position to the checkoff of union dues and initiation fees,
it reduced its wage offer of an annual 5-percent increase
for 3 ,years to no increase at al1, 2, and it orally agreed to
a 1-year contract, 3 rather than the 3-year, contract it
originally proposed. The union negotiators were no more
pleased with this proposal than they were with the one.,
in February; but they did not outrightly reject Respond-
ent's latest proposal either, again stating that they would
take up the proposal with the membership. That, howev-
er, did not occur until Thursday, August 26, the last day
of the Union's first year as the employee's collective-bar-
gaining representative, when Bartley sent the following .
mailgram . to Thomas J. Manely, Respondent's attorney
and principal negotiator:
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all dates refer to the year 1982
2 Union International Representative Phillip Bartley , testified that the
wage offer was orally withdrawn in March
3 Other than this oral agreement, the contract proposal was written
Please be, advised that the employees of Consumat
Systems, Inc. voted this day to accept the Compa-
ny's offer made to the Union on 6/8/82. I will be in
contact with you in the very near ;future for the
purpose of signing this, agreement.
On Monday, August 30, the next business day, 4 word
of the membership ratification spread quickly Two em-
ployees, incensed that the contract (with no wage in-
crease) had been ratified and that they had been given
insufficient notice of the action to be taken at the union
meeting the prior Thursday, circulated a petition stating
the desire of the signatories for a "fair meeting with ad-
vance notice of a vote before a labor contract is made
with" Respondent. A telephone call on Tuesday evening
from one of the employees to Bartley met with a firm
reply that the Union had already accepted the agreement
and no new vote would be taken.
On Wednesday, September 1, in response to Bartley's
refusal to conduct another vote, the same two employees
circulated a new petition proclaiming that the signatories
no longer wanted the Union to represent them. That was
forwarded to the Regional Office of the Board on Sep-
tember -2, and a copy of it, allegedly signed by 35 of 60
employees, 3 was presented to Ron Mancuso, Respond-
ent's director of manufacturing The employees' petition
apparently led to the filing of a formal decertification pe-
tition on September 21.
In the meantime, delivery -of Bartley's mailgram had
been yielayed Manley testified that 'he received it in his
office no earlier than Monday, August 30, although it
was sent the prior - Thursday and although Bartley re-
ceived a confirmation copy on Friday I find it surprising
that Manley did not forward it to his client immediately,
in any event, Mancuso, who had been told on Monday
by a 'union negotiating committee member that the con-
tract had been ratified, said he did not receive the mail-
gram - until Tuesday,'August 31, the same day, he testi-
fied, -that he was presented with the first petition. 6 The
following day Mancuso' wrote to Bartley that, before re-
ceiving the mailgram, he had "received information that
a majority of the men believed the vote , referred to was
improper and questioning the' Union's representation."
(Any "questioning [of] the' Union's representation"
ocurred, however, no earlier than September 1, the day
after Mancuso received the mailgram ) He further stated
4 Respondent was then working a 4-day workweek, Monday through
Thursday
5. The entire petition was never properly authenticated and admitted in
evidence Thus, the record proof does not adequately demonstrate that a
majority of employees did not desire the Union to represent them and
Respondent had a good-faith doubt that the Union represented a majon-
ty See Dresser Industries, 264 NLRB 1088 (1982) However, in the event
that the failure to introduce the entire petition was merely the result of
inadvertent and excusable error, and on the assumption the document
demonstrates that the Union lost majonty support, this decision would be
no different
6 Mancuso prepared a memorandum which noted that he received the
first petition on September 1, not August 31 It is unnecessary to resolve
this inconsistency, first, because good-faith doubt obtained after the
agreement was made is Irrelevant and, second, because the first petition
indicated only employee disagreement with the ratification vote and not a
clear intention that a majonty of the employees no longer wished to be
represented by the Union Gregory's Inc. 242 NLRB 644, 648 (1979)
412 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL ' LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that because Respondent had received no response to its
last offer from the Union for several months, he was in
doubt as to the "lawfulness" of concluding or not con-
cluding a contract •
On September 10 Bartley wrote Manley requesting
signed copies of the "recently negotiated" contract for
his signature. Manley replied on September 14 that Re-
spondent had not received any explanation or clarifica-
tion as requested in the September 1 letter, that the em-
ployees did nbt wish to be represented by the Union,
that the employees did not authorize the Union to con-
clude an agreement with Respondent, and that the ein-
ployees had petitioned the Board for a decertification
election: "Under the circumstances Consumat does not
believe it is lawful or appropriate to conclude - a -labor
contract with your union." Again, by letter dated Octo-
ber 18, Mancuso advised Bartley that because he had re-
ceived no clarifications from the Union in reply to his
earlier September 1 and 14 letters, because Respondent's
employees had advised Respondent that they no longer
wished to be associated with the Union, and because
they had filed a decertification petition, Respondent
"does not believe it may any longer lawfully recognize
or bargain with your union as the representative of our
employees."
Two complaints herein, as consolidated:7 allege that
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151, et seq., by
refusing since September 14 to execute a written contract
embodying the agreement which the Union accepted on
August 26 and that on October 18 Respondent withdrew
recognition of the Union as the exclusive collective-bar-
gaining representative of its production and maintenance
employees,: Respondent denied that it violated the Act in
any manner.8
In the absence of unusual circumstances, a certified,
union's majority status must be honored for 1 year, even
if an employer has evidence of the union's loss of majori-
ty. That rule was established in order to permit collec-
tive bargaining to •function and to stabilize industrial rela-
tions. Even if the decertification petition had. been filed
prior to August 26, although it would have possibly per-
mitted an election to be held, but only after the expira-
tion of the 1-year period, Respondent would not have
been permitted to rely thereon and cease bargaining
during the 1-year period. Once having continued 'to bar-
gain, an employer would be bound by any agreement it
struck during the year.
The relevant docket entries are as follows The Union filed an unfair
labor practice charge in Case 5-CA-14719 on Sejitember 27, 1982, and a
complaint issued on October 26 The Union filed its Charge in Case 5-
CA-14826 on October 29 and a compliant issued on November 22 The
complaints were consolidated by order of the Regional Director for
Region 5 on November 23 and a heanng was held before me on January
3 and 4, 1983, in Richmond, Virginia
8 There is no question as to jurisdiction herein Respondent admits, and
I find, that it is a Virginia corporation with an office and place of busi-
ness in Mechanicsville, Virginia, where it engaged in the manufacturing
of energy recovery incinerators During the 12 months preceding the Is-
suance of each complaint, it sold and shipped products valued' in excess
of $50,000 directly to points outside the State of Virginia I conclude that
It is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec 2(2),
(6), and (7) of the Act and that_the Union, as admitted by Respondent, is
a labor organization within the meaning of Sec 2(5) of the Act
That being stated, the first issue presented is whether a
contract was made on August 26. Respondent made its
last complete proposal on June 8. The Union did not
reply' to that offer until August 26, a' fact which Re-
spondent admitted in its September- 1 letter. I refuse to
credit Mancuso's testimony that; in a telephone conversa-
tion with Bartley on August 26, Mancuso told Bartley
that the offer had been withdrawn' by Respondent. Bart-
ley denied such statement, and none of Respondent's let-
ters rely on its withdrawal of the offer, or on the Union's
rejection of it, or on the fact that the offer had lapsed by
the passage of time.8
"The -Board is [not] strictly bound by the technical
rules of contract law." NLRB v. Donkin's Inn; 532 F.2d
138, 141-142 (9th Cir. 1976); Penasquitos Gardens, 236
NLRB 994, 995 fn. 8 (1978), enfd. 603 F.2d 225 (9th Cir.
1979). Even when a contract proposal has been rejected,
the Board has frequently held that the proposal survives,
enabling the party which previously rejected it to re-
verse itself and accept it. The Board affirmed thi g view
in Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 251 NLRB 187, 189 (1980), as
follows.
[A] complete package proposal made on behalf of
either party through negotiations .remains viable,
and upon acceptance in toto must be executed as
part of the statutory duty to bargain in good faith,
unless expressly withdrawn prior to- such accept-
ance, or defeased by an event upon which the offer
was expressly made contingent at a time prior to ac-
ceptance
See also -Presto Casting Co., 262 NLRB 346 (1982). Pepsi-
Cola was enforced at 659 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1981), the
Court noting at 90 fn. 3, that there appears to be con-
trary authority, some cited by Respondent, which can be
explained solely by the fact that the Board is continuing
to develop the law in this area.
Respondent's offer was on the table for 2-1/2 months -
before the Union accepted it. The Board has held that 4
months before acceptance is not unreasonable delay, bar-
ring intervening events that make it unfair to do so. Wor-
rell Newspapers, 232 NLRB 402 (1977); contra, Scientific
Research Co., 110 NLRB 393 (1954). Respondent offers
no cogent showing of unfairness. That it has suffered
losses of business is not attributed to labor costs; and its
contract offer of no wage increase is not claimed to be a
further impairment of its financial condition. 1 ° Finally, I
•
9 Mancuso testified that Bartley, prior to cOnducting 'the union vote,
called Mancuso to tell him that the employees were getting ready to vote
and inquired about the effective date of the agreement Mancuso asked
what the Union was voting 'on When Bartley replied the June offer,
Mancuso testified, he told Bartley that the present condition of Respond-
ent and the delay of 2 months in the Union's response made the offer "no
longer available" Bartley testified, however, that an entirely different
conversation took place, that he called Mancuso to inquire about whether
the effective date of the contract would be June 8, the date of the last
offer, or that day, August 26, when the Union accepted the offer, and
that Mancuso replied that the contract became effective only when it was
accepted I credit Bartley's version
10 The record is barren of what, if any, financial gains were made by
the Union
CONSUMAT SYSTEMS 413.
find that Respondent's June offer was a continuing offer.
Indeed, the day after it was made, Bartley telephoned
Manley's legal assistant to advise that he was going to
reevaluate the Union's position and, if Respondent
changed its position, that Respondent should so advise
him Respondent never advised Bartley that it withdrew
its offer or amended it in any wiy.
The Union's acceptance occurred when the Union no-
tified Respondent of that fact; and it was the transmittal
or the mailgram, not its receipt by Respondent, that gov-
erns the date of acceptance and the contract. Raybestos-
Manhattan, 183 NLRB 213, 218 (1970). Bartley's mail-
gram of August 26 to Respondent notifying that he
would soon be in contact for the purpose of signing the
agreement gave Respondent sufficient notice of a request
for its execution. Mancuso's reply of September 1 Setting
forth his "doubt" about concluding the agreement dem-
onstrated that Mancuso understood what Bartley was re-
questing and constitutes a refusal to execute the agree-
ment. It is well settled that the failure to sign, on request,
a written memorandum of the agreement made is a per
se refiisal to bargain. Section 8(d) of the Act; H.J Heinz
v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514 (1941); Big Run Coal & Clay Co,
152 NLRB 1144 (1965), enfd. 385 - F 2d 788 (6th Cir.
1967); Lozano Enterprises v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 815 (9th
Cir. 1964).
However, by the time it received Bartley's August 26
mailgram, Respondent argues, it already knew of em-
ployee discontent with the method of the ratification
vote and, a day or two later, employee desire no longer.
to be represented by the Union. Thus, the remaining
issue is whether employee action after the contract had
been made permitted Respondent to avoid what was oth-
erwise its obligation under Section 8(a)(5). To paraphase
the Board in North Bros. Ford, 220 NLRB 1021, 1022
(1975), on facts strikingly similar to those herein, final
agreement was reached no later than August 26, well
before the employee petitions disavowing representation
by the Union and for decertification were filed. Once
final agreement on the substantive terms of the contract
was reached, and regardless of the status of any written
instrument incorporating that agreement, Respondent
was not free to refuse to bargain even if it then had
lawful grounds for believing that the Union had subse-
quently lost its majority status. See, e.g., Utility Tree
Service, 215 NLRB 806 (1974), enfd. 539 F.2d 718 (9th
Cir. 1976); Raybestos-Manhattan, supra.
Finally, to the extent that Respondent continues to
urge that I erred in excluding testimony regarding the
validity of the Union's ratification vote, I adhere to my
prior rulings at the hearing. Although the Union clearly
stated that ratification by its membership was necessary
for it to make a final and binding agreement, no agree-
ment was made by the parties that made ratification nec-
essary and no requirement that this occurrence was in-
corporated into the written contract proposal prepared
by Respondent Martin J. Barry Co., 241 NLRB 1011,
1013 (1979). "Furthermore, even if ratification were a
precondition . . . Respondent has no standing to ques-
tion the validity of the procedures used by the Union in
ratifying the agreement. It is well settled that ratification
is an internal union matter which is not subject to ques-
tion by an employer" Id., M&M Oldsmobile, 156 NLRB
903, 905 (1966), enfd. on other grounds 377 F.2d 712 (2d
Cir 1967), London Chop House, 264 NLRB 638, 639
(1982)
Accordingly, I conclude that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by failing to execute
the agreement and by withdrawing recognition from the
Union. These activities occurring in connection with Re-
spondent's operations have a close, intimate, and substan-
tial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among
the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes bur-
dening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of
commerce.
THE REMEDY
I will, accordingly, recommend that Respondent be or-
dered to cease and desist from its illegal activities and
take certain affirmative action necessary to effectuate the
polices of the Act. I shall also recommend that Respond-
ent be ordered to execute the agreement which it negoti-
ated, on request of the Union, comply with all the provi-
sions thereof retroactive to August 26, 1982, the date
such agreement was consumated, and make all employ-
ees whole for any losses. they may have suffered by Re-
spondent's failUre to sign the agreement. Backpay, if any,
shall be computed in accordance with F. W. Woolworth
Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest computed in ac-
cordance with Florida Steel Corp., 231 NLRB 651
(1977) " It is possible that the 1-year agreement will
have expired before Respondent complies with the order
recommended herein. In such event, the recommended
Order will provide an option to the Union to request'
that Respondent sign the agreed-upon contract or resume
bargaining and, if an agreement is reached, embody it in
a signed agreement. Big Run Coal & Clay Co., supra;
Worrell Newspapers, supra.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and
on the entire recoid, 12 I issue the following recommend-
ed"
ORDER
The Respondent, Consumat Systems, Inc , Mechanics-
ville, Virginia, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing or refusing, on request, to execute and give
effect to, retroactive to August 26, 1982, a written agree-
ment incorporating the agreement reached with the
International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship-
builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers.
" See generally Isis Plumbing Go, 139 NLRB 716 (1962), enf denied
on other grounds 322 F 2d 913 (9th Or 1963)
" The General Counsel and Respondent both moved to correct the
official transcript in certain respects There being no opposition to Re-
spondent's motion and Respondent having agreed to the General Coun-
sel's motion, the motions are granted and the transcript amended accord-
ingly
" If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and an objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses
414 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(b) Failing or refusing to recognize and bargain with
the Union concerning issues which have arisen, or may
arise, during the terms of the aforesaid agreement.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the 'exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act:
2. Take the following affirmative action found neces-
sary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) On request of the Union, execute and give effect,
retroactive to August 26, 1982, to the written agreement
embodying, the terms reached between it and the Union;
deliver an executed copy to the Union, and make the
employees whole for any losses they may have suffered
by its failure to sign the aforesaid agreement, with inter-
est, as provided in the remedy section of this decision
(b) On request of the Union, bargain , collectively with
the Union concerning any question which has arisen or
which may arise under the terms of the aforesaid agree-
ment, including the settlement of grievances and disputes
entitled to arbitration as therein provided.
(c) In the event that the term of the aforesaid agree-
ment has expired before it is signed by Respondent, and
on -request of the Union, bargain with the Union as the
collective-bargaining representative of its employees in a
unit composed of all production and maintenance em-
ployees employed at Respondent's Mechanicsville, Vir-
ginia location, excluding office clerical employees, pro-
fessional employees, technicians, over-the-road truckdriv-
ers and their helpers, guards, and supervisors as defined
in the ,Act, and if an agreement is reached, embody the
same into a signed contract.
(d) Post at its plant in Mechanicsville, Virginia copies.
of the attached notice marked "Appendix."l 4 Copies of
the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 5, after being signed by the Respondent's au-
thorized representative, shall be posted by the Respond-
ent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 con-
secutive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure
that the notices are not altered, defaced,_ or covered by
any other material.
14 If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of "
Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor -Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to'a Judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Natimi-
al Labor Relations Board"
(e) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20
days from the date of this Order what steps the Re-
spondent has . taken to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT fail or refuse, on request, to execute 'and
give effect to, retroactive to August 26, 1982, a written
agreement incorporating the agreement reached with the
International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship-
builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers.
WE WILL NOT fail or refuse to recognize and bargain
with the Union concerning issues which have arisen, or -
may arise, during the term of the aforesaid agreement.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, on request of the Union, execute and give
effect, retroactive to August 26, 1982, to the written
agreement embodying the terms reached between us and
the Union, deliver an executed copy thereof, to the
Union, and make our employees whole for any- losses -
they may have suffered by our failure to sign the afore-
said agreement, with interest.
WE WILL, on request of the Union, bargain collective-
ly with the Union concerning any question which has
arisen or which may arise under the terms of the afore-
said - agreement, including the settlement of grievances
and disputes- entitled' to arbitration as therein provided.
WE WILL in the event that the term of the aforesaid
agreement has expired before it is signed by us and, on
request of the Union, bargain with the Union as the col-'
lective-bargaining representative of our employees in a
unit composed of all production and maintenance em-
ployees employed at our Mechanicsville, Virginia loca-
tion, excluding office clerical , employees, professional
employees, technicians, over-the-road , truck drivers and
their helpers, guards and supervisors as defined in the
Act and, if an agreement is reached, embody the same
into'a signed contract.
CONSUMAT SYSTEMS, INC.