01983327_r
06-02-1999
Consuela C. Beltran, Appellant, v. Bruce Babbitt, Secretary, Department of the Interior, Agency.
Consuela C. Beltran, )
Appellant, )
)
v. ) Appeal No. 01983327
) Agency Nos. LLM-94-031
Bruce Babbitt, ) LLM-94-104
Secretary, ) LLM-94-105
Department of the Interior, ) LLM-95-023
Agency. )
______________________________)
DECISION
On March 29, 1998, appellant filed a timely appeal with this Commission
from the agency's February 24, 1998 final decision (FAD) received by her
on February 27, 1998, finding that it was in compliance with the terms of
the August 21, 1995 settlement agreement into which the parties entered.
See 29 C.F.R. ��1614.402, .504(b); EEOC Order No. 960, as amended.
The settlement agreement provided, in pertinent part, that:
(3) Training. Within 60 days of the execution of this Settlement
Agreement the Administrative Officer (AO) and Employee will develop an
Individual Development Plan (IDP) which will include training and/or
developmental assignments designed to give Employee training to serve as
a backup Purchasing Agent and enhance [E]mployee's competitiveness for
higher graded positions in the field of procurement for which [E]mployee
may apply and qualify. That Employee's FY 1996 IDP and Training Plan
will include attendance at the following General Service Administration
(GSA), training classes:
Basic Procurement
Small Purchases Fundamentals
By letter to the agency dated July 20, 1997, appellant alleged that the
agency was in breach of the settlement agreement, and requested that
the agency specifically implement the terms. Specifically, appellant
alleged that the agency failed to provide her the training specified
by the agreement. In a September 16, 1997 letter to her Congressional
Representative, appellant acknowledged that she was provided a Simplified
Acquisitions training course in February 1996, and a home study course,
but alleged that she was unable to complete the latter course because
the agency failed to provide her assistance in the duties of her position.
In its February 24, 1998 FAD, the agency asserted that within 60 days of
the execution of the settlement agreement, the AO and appellant developed
the IDP contemplated by the agreement, and included, therein, attendance
at the Basic Procurement and Small Purchases Fundamentals GSA training
classes. The agency contended that although appellant was scheduled to
attend the Basic Procurement course on March 18-22, 1996, she requested
that she attend the course at a different time due to conflicting personal
obligations. As a result of appellant's conflicting obligations, the
agency maintained that it instead approved appellant's request to take a
correspondence course entitled �Certified Purchasing Manager.� The agency
also asserted that although appellant was originally scheduled to attend
the Small Purchases Fundamentals class during the week of February 5-9,
1996, the course was canceled by the GSA at the beginning of FY 1996.
Consequently, the agency determined that appellant was instead enrolled
in a substantially similar course entitled �Simplified Acquisitions�
between March 31 and April 5, 1996. In support of its assertions, the
agency provided a copy of appellant's training authorization forms, and
an affidavit from the AO attesting to the actions taken by the agency
in compliance with the settlement agreement.
EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.504(a) provides that any settlement
agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached at
any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both parties.
The Commission has held that a settlement agreement constitutes a
contract between the employee and the agency, to which ordinary rules
of contract construction apply. See Herrington v. Department of Defense,
EEOC Request No. 05960032 (December 9, 1996). The Commission has further
held that it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract,
not some unexpressed intention, that controls the contract's construction.
Eggleston v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795
(August 23, 1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard
to the terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally
relied on the plain meaning rule. See Hyon v. United States Postal
Service, EEOC Request No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states
that if the writing appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face,
its meaning must be determined from the four corners of the instrument
without resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery
Elevator Co. v. Building Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).
In the instant case, the plain language of the settlement agreement
provided only that appellant would be provided an IDP and training in
�Basic Procurement� and �Small Purchases Fundamentals.� The agency
provided un-rebutted evidence, including the AO's affidavit and the
training authorization forms, showing that appellant was provided
substantially equivalent courses within the time contemplated by the
agreement.
Appellant's contention that the agency breached the settlement agreement
by failing to provide her sufficient opportunity to complete the
correspondence course is belied by the fact that she was originally
scheduled to attend the course at another city, and only provided
the correspondence course after she requested a different training
date due to personal conflicts. Moreover, any such concerns are more
appropriately addressed as a separate complaint, rather than as an
allegation of breach since this matter appears to be beyond the scope
of the settlement agreement.
Based on the foregoing, we find that the agency was in compliance with
the August 21, 1995 settlement agreement. Accordingly, the agency's
final decision is AFFIRMED for the reasons set forth herein.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0795)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available
when the previous decision was issued; or
2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,
regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or
3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial
precedential implications.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST
BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this
decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive
a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in
opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider
MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party
WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request
to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments
must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of
Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box
19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,
the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received
by the Commission.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances
have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,
a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the
delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your
request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests
for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited
circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).
RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)
It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file
a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN
NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.
You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have
interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that
a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the
date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action
is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)
CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult
an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction
in which your action would be filed. In the alternative, you may file a
civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR DAYS of the date
you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the
Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT
IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT
HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE.
Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.
"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the
local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
June 2, 1999
____________________________
DATE Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director
Office of Federal Operations