DECISIONS OF NATIONAL L.ABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Construction, Production & Maintenance Laborers'
Local Union 383, Laborers' International Union
of North America, AFL-CIO and Carter-
Glogau Laboratories, Inc. Case 28-CB-1710
March 30, 1982
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JENKINS, ZIMMERMAN, AND
HUNTER
On October 16, 1981, Administrative Law Judge
Clifford H. Anderson issued the attached Decision
in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed ex-
ceptions and a supporting brief, the Charging Party
filed cross-exceptions, and the General Counsel and
Charging Party filed answering briefs to which Re-
spondent filed an answering brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find-
ings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt his recommended Order, as
modified herein. '
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modi-
fied below, and hereby orders that the Respondent,
Construction, Production & Maintenance Laborers'
Local Union 383, Laborers' International Union of
North America, AFL-CIO, Glendale, Arizona, its
officers, agents, and representatives, shall take the
action set forth in the said recommended Order, as
so modified:
1. Substitute the following paragraphs for para-
graphs l(a) and (b):
"(a) Threatening employees who remain working
during our strike against Carter-Glogau Laborato-
ries, Inc., at its Glendale, Arizona, facility with
damage to their personal property; harm to the em-
ployees or their families; and the planting of an ex-
plosive device on the struck premises.
"(b) Causing the employees to fear injury or ret-
ribution by making obscene and sexual suggestions;
following their automobiles at high rates of speed;
and by taking their photographs and recording
their automobile license numbers.
We have modified the Administrative Law Judge's recommended
Order to clearly and properly set forth therein the violations found in the
text of his Decision.
"(c) Blocking entrances to the facility and dam-
aging and striking commercial vehicles, including
ambulances, as they attempt to enter the facility.
"(d) Damaging employee vehicles by striking ve-
hicles by picket sign, chain, or kick; letting air out
of the tires; placing nails on the road; throwing
acid or a similar substance on vehicles; and striking
windshields.
"(e) Assaulting employees with such things as
picket signs or baseball bats.
"(f) In any like or related manner restraining or
coercing employees in the exercise of rights guar-
anteed them by the National Labor Relations Act."
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
C lIFFORD H. ANDERSON, Administrative Law Judge:
This matter was heard by me at Phoenix, Arizona, on
August 11, 1981, pursuant to a complaint and notice of
hearing issued on January 21, 1981, by the Regional Di-
rector for Region 28 of the National Labor Relations
Board (Director and Board respectively) and an amend-
ed complaint and notice of hearing issued on February 4,
1981, by the Director. The complaint and amended com-
plaint were based upon a charge in Case 28-CB-1710
filed by Carter-Glogau Laboratories, Inc. (the Employer
or the Charging Party), against Construction, Production
& Maintenance Laborers' Local Union 383, Laborers' In-
ternational Union of North America, AFL-CIO (Re-
spondent or the Union), on December 12, 1980. The
amended complaint as further amended orally at the
hearing alleges a variety of picket line misconduct as vio-
lative of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (Act). Respondent does not deny that the al-
leged conduct is attributable to it but denies that the ad-
mitted acts constitute violations of the Act. The Union
and the Employer also raise certain procedural objec-
tions to the processing of the case.
All parties were given full opportunity to participate
at the hearing, to introduce evidence, to examine and
cross-examine witnesses, to argue orally, and to file
briefs.' Upon the entire record herein, including the
pleadings, stipulations, and post-hearing briefs of the par-
ties,2 I make the following:
' Respondent and the General Counsel entered into a stipulation of
facts and, based upon my acceptance of that stipulation, rested their cases
without adducing testimony The Charging Party did not enter into the
stipulation Counsel for the Charging Party objected to closing the
record without a full "evidentiary hearing" In light of the positions of
the General Counsel and Respondent and in view of my determination
announced at the hearing, that the stipulation of facts was sufficient to
support findings of fact with respect to all contested allegations of the
complaint, I reaffirm my previous ruling that the objection of the Charg-
ing Party is without merit Hlumana Corp d/b/a Sunrise Htospital Medical
Center, 254 NLRB 1377 (1981)
2 At the close of the hearing I set September 15, 1981, as the due date
for submission of briefs. On the request of counsel for Respondent, the
due date was extended by Deputy Chief Administrative Law Judge
James T. Barker to October 5, 1981. Briefs from the General Counsel,
the Charging Party, and Respondent were timely submitted
260 NLRB No. 192
1340
LABORERS' LOCAL UNION 383
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT THAT THE ISSUANCE
OF THIS DECISION SHOULD BE DEL AYEI)
Judges, including administrative law judges, should
not delay in issuing decisions where the record is proper-
ly closed, briefs submitted, and the issues considered.
Counsel for Respondent argues that I should withhold
the issuance of my decision in this matter for a substan-
tial period for the following reasons.3
The Director sought and obtained from a United
States district court a pendente lite order against Re-
spondent pursuant to Section 100j) of the Act which
order will remain in effect until the Board's decision in
the case. 4 Respondent has appealed that order to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and
contemplates a decision by the court sometime after the
time that the instant Decision would issue in the normal
course. It is also likely, in Respondent's estimation, that
the Board's decision in the instant case would also issue
before the court of appeals issues its decision on the
appeal of the district court's injunction. Counsel for Re-
spondent asserts the not unlikely proposition that the
court of appeals would be ill-disposed to reach the merits
of Respondent's appeal of the district court's injunction,
if the Board has issued its decision herein. Respondent
contemplates that if the Board does not delay its process-
ing of this case, Respondent will be deprived of an op-
portunity to obtain review of the district court's order in
the court of appeals. 5 Further the parties will be exposed
to the unnecessary cost of multiple litigation. For these
reasons Respondent urges delay.
The most obvious rationale for pressing cases to deci-
sion without delay for collateral matters is the traditional
aphorism that justice delayed is justice denied. Rights of
aggrieved parties must be protected. Delay harms those
who seek the protection of the court and who seek the
redress of wrong done them. In the instant case Re-
spondent seeks delay. The Employer, the alleged ag-
grieved party, and the General Counsel do not concur.
Respondent is able to assert that the order of the court
now laid against it is essentially equivalent to any Board
Order which would ultimately issue should Respondent
lose the case on the merits.7 Since it is seeking delay in
' Respondent also moved for a continuance at the commencement of
the hearing which motion I denied
' The fact that such an injunction was sought and/or was obtained by
the Director is irrelevant to any determination of the merits of the case
before me. Therefore, these events are considered only in evaluating Re-
spondent's arguments regarding the timing of the issuance of the instant
Decision.
I The basis or theory of Respondent's appeal of the district court's
10(j) injunction is irrelevant to any issue before me. I do find, however.
that Respondent's appeal has been made in all apparent good faith and
that its argument before me concerning delay in the issuance of my Deci-
sion is also made in good faith.
Respondent, on brief, cites the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, Antonio R. Leyva. er al v. Certified Grocers of Cali-
fornia. Ltd., 593 F.2d 857 (1979), for the proposition that a trial court
may grant such a stay as requested here. I find, however, that the issue is
one of the exercise of discretion rather than one regarding my power to
grant the stay.
' Respondent also notes the district court's current order is arguably
more effective than a Board Order for the court's order is immediately
enforceable by means of its contempt power
the Board's decision only to the time it obtains the court
of appeals' decision in its 10(j) appeal, Respondent argues
it will gain no substantive benefit from Board delay and,
equally, the Charging Party will incur no substantive loss
as a result of the delay. Given no prejudice to the
Charging Party and the described effect of an undelayed
decision, argues Respondent, I should grant the request-
ed delay.
I have determined that there is insufficient reason for
me to delay issuance of this Decision based upon the re-
quest of Respondent. The Board may determine to delay
its own decision in this matter should appropriate excep-
tions to this Decision place the issue before them. Imme-
diate issuance of my Decision does not preclude the
Board from delaying its own determination if it finds it
appropriate to do so. Delay in the issuance of my Deci-
sion could, however, preclude the Board from determin-
ing delay is not appropriate. Thus, the immediate issu-
ance of this Decision preserves for the Board a final de-
cision on Respondent's arguments which a delay of this
Decision could preclude.
I do not however decline to delay issuance of this De-
cision only to preserve the issue for the Board. I strongly
believe that the tempo of the judicial process should not
be modified to suit the tactical needs of parties litigant. It
is true that issuance of the Board decision in the normal
course may prevent Respondent from obtaining a deci-
sion on its appeal of the district court's order. Indeed,
even if such court review were forthcoming, subsequent
developments occurring after the court of appeals' deci-
sion could cause that court or the Supreme Court to
vacate any appellate decision on the 10(j) issue.' It is the
essential nature of pendente lite relief that it is soon ren-
dered moot. Indeed, the circuit courts of appeals, which
are charged with hearing appeals from district court
10(j) decisions, have had occasion to lament the some-
times slow procedures of the Board which fail to decide
the underlying issues of the unfair labor practice case
before the court hears the appeal of a district court 10(j)
decision in the same matter. See, e.g., Samuel M. Kay-
nard v. Mego Corp., 633 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1980). Given
all the above, it is clear the courts prefer the Board to
proceed with alacrity on the underlying unfair labor
practices. I do not feel it appropriate that I withhold or
delay my decision to in effect force the court of appeals
to reach issues it might otherwise choose to forgo.9 Ac-
cordingly, I will not delay the issuance of this Decision
and I shall therefore deny Respondent's motion to delay
issuance. Lex reprobat moram.
11. JURISDICTION
The Employer is, and has been at all times material
herein, a corporation duly organized under, and existing
by virtue of, the laws of the State of Ohio with a place
I See, for example., McLeod v. General Electric Co.. er al, 385 U.S 533
(1967), vacating as moot 366 F.2d 847 (2d Cir 1966).
9 In this sense Respondent is asking that I take action which may be
viewed by the court as an attempt by the Board and its judges to pass to
the court issues better initially resolved by this Agency. I reject the
notion that the court ought to decide cases so that I may avoid doing so.
I suspect the court would agree
1341
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of business in Glendale, Arizona, where it is engaged in
the business of manufacturing and packing injectible
medications.
The Employer annually purchases goods and materials
valued in excess of $50,000 for use in its Glendale, Arizo-
na, operations and caused these goods and services to be
transported to it from suppliers located outside the State
of Arizona.
111. I ABOR ORGANIZATION
The Union has at all relevant times been a labor orga-
nization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
IV. THE AlI..EGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Agency
The General Counsel alleged and Respondent denied
the agency status of certain named individuals. Respond-
ent and the General Counsel chose to rest on the factual
stipulation that "various agents of Respondent engaged
in, acquiesced in, ratified or otherwise failed to disavow"
the conduct involved herein. This stipulation does not
support specific allegations as to the agency of named in-
dividuals in the complaint. Therefore, I find that there is
insufficient evidence to support those allegations. '° I fur-
ther find however, and Respondent does not contest,
that the stipulation is sufficient to attribute to Respond-
ent the conduct adopted by reference in the stipulation
without specific findings as to the name of the particular
agent(s) of Respondent identified with particular con-
duct.
B. The Events
At all relevant times, Respondent has had a labor dis-
pute with the Employer. In furtherance to the position,
Respondent, since on about November 18, 1980, and
continuing to the time of the hearing, picketed the Em-
ployer's Glendale, Arizona, operations. During the same
period the Employer has continued its business oper-
ations.
Based on the stipulation of fact, I find that Respond-
ent's agents at the facility engaged in the following acts
and conduct on the dates indicated:
1. On or about November 21, 1980, and December 3,
1980, agents of Respondent blocked an entrance to the
Carter-Glogau plant, thereby preventing or otherwise
impeding ingress to and egress from said facility.
2. On or about December 5, 1980, agents of Respond-
ent kicked the vehicle of a nonstriking employee.
3. On or about December 8, 1980, agents of Respond-
ent threatened nonstriking employees with damage to
their personal property.
4. In or about the week of December 1, 1980, agents
of Respondent repeatedly scratched the vehicles of non-
striking employees with a picket sign.
'o The Charging Party's assertions on brief that conduct may be as-
sessed to the individuals named in the complaint based upon the stipula-
tion are rejected. The factual stipulation did not include named agents
and Respondent's denial of the agency allegations in its answer was un-
changed.
5. On or about December 17, 1980, agents of Respond-
ent threatened a nonstriking employee and that striking
employee's family with harm because that employee was
working behind the picket line.
6. On or about December 18, 1980, agents of Respond-
ent threatened a nonstriking employee with bodily harm
because that employee was working behind the picket
line.
7. On or about December 24, 1980, agents of Respond-
ent threatened a nonstriking employee with bodily harm
because that employee was working behind a picket line.
8. On or about December 29, 1980, agents of Respond-
ent threatened a nonstriking employees with bodily harm
and with damage to that employee's vehicle because that
employee was working behind the picket line.
9. From November 18, 1980, and continuing till Febru-
ary 4, 1981, on a daily basis, agents of Respondent
blocked the entrances to the Carter-Glogau plant, there-
by preventing or otherwise impeding ingress to or egress
from the plant.
10. On or about January 8, 1981, and various other
dates, agents of Respondent threatened nonstriking em-
ployees with physical harm if they continued to work
behind the picket line.
11. On or about January 8, 1981, and various other
dates, agents of Respondent threatened nonstriking em-
ployees with bodily harm if they continued to work
behind the picket line.
12. Since November 18, 1980, agents of Respondent
damaged the vehicles of nonstriking employees as they
were entering or leaving the plant.
13. On or about January 8, January 22, and February
2, 1981, and on other dates, agents of Respondent pur-
sued or otherwise followed at high rates of speed the ve-
hicles of nonstriking employees after the employees had
exited from the Carter-Glogau premises thereby placing
said employees in apprehension that they would be
harmed or otherwise endangering said employees by
reason of the pursuit.
14. On or about January 8, 1981, agents of Respondent
physically assaulted a nonstriking employee by striking
him with a picket sign.
15. On or about January 14, 1981, agents of Respond-
ent entered upon the Carter-Glogau premises and there-
on proceeded to let the air out of the tires of a vehicle
belonging to a nonstriking employee.
16. In or about January 1981, agents of Respondent
struck the windshield of the car of a nonstriking employ-
ee with a picket sign.
17. During the week of January 19, 1981, at various
times and on a daily basis, agents of Respondent placed
nails on the Carter-Glogau premises, thereby causing nu-
merous instances of damage to the automobiles of non-
striking employees.
18. Since on or about December 15, 1980, and on a
daily basis thereafter, agents of Respondent have intimi-
dated nonstriking employees by taking pictures of them
and/or writing down the license plate numbers of the ve-
hicles of nonstriking employees.
19. On January 29, 1981, and on various other dates,
agents of Respondent intimidated and coerced nonstrik-
1342
LABORERS' LOCAL UNION 383
ing employees by making obscene remarks and gestures
of a sexually suggestive nature to nonstriking female em-
ployees as the latter worked behind the picket line. "
20. On or about January 30, 1981, agents of Respond-
ent threatened a nonstriking employee with bodily harm.
21. On or about February 2, 1981, agents of Respond-
ent threatened a nonstriking employee with bodily harm
while brandishing a baseball bat.
22. On or about January 20, 1981, agents of Respond-
ent threatened a nonstriking employee with bodily harm.
23. On or about February 3, 1981, agents of Respond-
ent damaged the vehicle of a nonstriking employee by
hitting said vehicle with a chain.
24. On or about Janury 19, 1981, agents of Respondent
threatened to damage the physical facility of the Em-
ployer by planting an explosive device in said facility,
thus endangering the lives of nonstriking employees, su-
pervisors, and other persons.
25. On or about February 20 and 23, 1981, and various
other dates, agents of Respondent damaged the vehicles
of nonstriking employees by throwing acid, or a similar
substance on said vehicles as they crossed the picket line.
26. On or about March 13, 1981, agents of Respondent
struck an ambulance with a picket sign while it was at-
tempting to exit the premises.
C. Analysis and Conclusion
While the stipulated facts are not in dispute and the
conduct described has traditionally been found to violate
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, Respondent raises several
arguments in opposition to the allegations and in support
of dismissal of the complaint. First, Respondent notes the
"vast majority" of the allegations allege threats of physi-
cal harm and the General Counsel has not alleged that
the threats were "followed up." Respondent thus argues
the threats were "idle" and hence not unlawful conduct,
citing Board cases in which apparent threats were held
to constitute mere extravagant language or a "moment of
animal exuberance." 2
The Board has noted that in cases of picket line mis-
conduct:
. . . the conduct of the threatening parties should
be analyzed to inquire if such conduct gave "a sense
of immediacy and credence" to the threat, such as
past or accompanying violence. Gold Kist, Inc., 245
NLRB 1095, 1099, fn. 7 (1979), characterizing the
decision in W. C McQuaide, Inc., 220 NLRB 593
(1975).
The stipulation of fact on which the instant findings rely
does not contain such factual context. I find, however,
that the stipulated threats-the stipulation adopts the
word "threatened"-sustain the General Counsel's prima
facie case as to each allegation. Being unrebutted, the
i" Counsel for the Charging Party's arguments on brief regarding this
allegation include assertions of much more specific conduct by Respond-
ent's agents. These assertions are without factual support on the record
and I do not rely on them. The conduct found is more specific than that
set forth here.
'' A frequently cited phrase taken from Milk Wagon Drivers Union of
Chicago. Local 753. e al. v Meadowmoor Dairies Inc., 312 U S. 287, 293
(1941).
above findings of fact support the additional finding of a
violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act in each and
every instance of alleged threats. i3
Respondent argues similarly with respect to item 18,
supra, that there is a legitimate union objective in photo-
graphing and recording license numbers of nonstriking
employees and that the General Counsel has offered "no
evidence of coercive [Union] objective." While Respond-
ent is correct that noncoercive conduct of the type de-
scribed is not violative of the Act, where such conduct
in fact intimidates employees it may be inferred that the
actions were calculated by the union to instill fear of ret-
ribution among the employees involved. Such conduct
does violate the Act. Dover Corporalion, Norris Division,
211 NLRB 955 (1974). Based on the stipulation-which
uses the verb "intimidated" in describing the effect of
this conduct on the nonstriking employees-I find that
the General Counsel has sustained its prima facie case.
Being unrebutted, the stipulation supports a finding of a
violation of Section 8(b)(l)(A) here. 14
Respondent argues that the complaint's "blockage" al-
legations and damage allegations are of indeterminate se-
verity, are generally isolated, and constitute minor inci-
dents. Thus Respondent seeks dismissal of these counts
as de minimis. I view the entire stipulation with its multi-
ple acts and conduct as rebutting any defense of de mini-
mis on this record. '5 The totality of Respondent's acts as
a course of conduct lends support to the finding that
each action is separately violative of the Act. Again the
stipulation, in my view, sustains the General Counsel's
prima facie case as to these allegations. The failure of Re-
spondent to rebut or supply an explaining context to the
admitted conduct sustains the violation in each instance
and when taken as a single course of conduct.
The General Counsel in his brief, which is otherwise
heavy with case citations, offers no authority for the
proposition that "making obscene remarks and gestures
of a sexually suggestive nature to nonstriking female em-
ployees" violates Section 8(b)(l)(A) of the Act. Counsel
for the Charging Party, disregarding the more specific
factual references contained in her brief (see fn. I11),
makes an eloquent argument that such conduct is tanta-
mount to or even more violative of the Act than threats
of serious physical injury and should be so regarded. Re-
spondent argues that the narrowly described conduct is
insufficient to support a finding of a violation. The stipu-
lation by its terms states that Respondent's conduct as to
this allegation "intimidated and coerced nonstriking em-
ployees." Thus by the stipulation Respondent has ad-
13 The parties do not dispute the conventional notion that threats to
employees violate Sec. 8(b)(1)A), and the General Counsel's lengthy ci-
tations of authority for this proposition will not be repeated here.
4 Similarly with respect to item 13, supra, I find the language of the
stipulation that Respondent's conduct "thereby plac[ed] employees in ap-
prehension that they would be harmed . " carnes the General Coun-
sel's prima facie case and I find that employees were wrongfully re-
strained and coerced thereby
'" The General Counsel cites Shopmen's Local Union No. 455. ei al.
(Stokvts Mulhi-Ton Corp.), 243 NLRB 340., 343 (1979), for the proposition
that even a brief blockage of exits and entrances may violate the Act. He
also cites District 34. Internaional Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers. AFL-CIO, etc. (The Wolf Machine Company). 254 NLRB 282
(1981), in support of his "tire damage" allegation.
1343
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL. LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
mitted the necessary restraint and coercion which sus-
tains a finding of a violation of Section 8(b)(l)(A) of the
Act. I rely on that admission to find the violation here
and make no additional findings on the per se effect on
employees of this conduct. 16
In summary I find that, in each instance as described
in items 1-26, supra, and in their totality as a course of
conduct, Respondent has restrained and coerced employ-
ees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights and thereby
violated Section 8(b)(l)(A) of the Act. With respect to
the allegations not specifically analyzed, these constitute
traditional violations of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act and
Respondent does not seriously contest such a conclusion
save by the de minimis argument rejected, supra. With
respect to the bulk of the remaining violations, I have
concluded that the stipulation of fact entered into by the
General Counsel and Respondent supports a finding that
as to each allegation the General Counsel has sustained
his prima facie case which, because unrebutted by Re-
spondent, in turn supports the finding of a violation of
the Act in each instance.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease
and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the purposes of the Act.
The General Counsel and the Charging Party seek a
broad cease-and-desist order. The General Counsel also
seeks an order requiring the mailing of the remedial
notice to employees. Respondent opposes the issuance of
a broad order and, apparently in ignorance of the fact
that the General Counsel would seek such relief on brief,
did not address the question of an order requiring mail-
ing of the notice to employees."
Under all the circumstances of the case I do not feel it
appropriate to order mailing of notices to employees.
The Charging Party, consistent with normal Board reme-
dies, will be afforded an opportunity to post the notice at
its facility. No special facts were offered at the hearing
to indicate this posting will not prove adequate. Nor,
since Respondent was not aware such relief was or
would be requested by the General Counsel, did Re-
spondent adduce any evidence on the question. It is true
that the Board has ordered such relief in appropriate sit-
uations. See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher
Workmen of North America and Local 222 (Iowa Beef Pro-
cessors, Inc.), 233 NLRB 839 (1977). Where, as here, the
record is a narrow factual stipulation and the remedy
issue was not litigated, I find it inappropriate to grant the
requested relief.
The Charging Party's and the General Counsel's re-
quest for a broad order is also without merit. There is no
evidence that Respondent has a proclivity to violate the
Act. While the conduct involved herein is serious and
" I also decline to adopt any suggestion that obscene remarks or sexual
references are in some manner of less consequence when directed at male
employees.
17 There is no record evidence that Respondent should have been
aware of the proposed remedy. The terms of the settlement proffered Re-
spondent by the General Counsel before the hearing did not include pro-
vision for the mailing of notices to employees.
occurred over a substantial period of time, it was con-
fined to the one facility during an ongoing economic dis-
pute. In these circumstances a broad order is not appro-
priate. Bartenders, HIotel, Restaurant and Cafeteria Em-
ployees Union Local 36, et al. (Action One, Inc.), 222
NLRB 821 (1976).
The Charging Party seeks an order making Respond-
ent and the General Counsel whole for litigation ex-
penses. I do not find such an order appropriate here.
First, Respondent entered into a stipulation which obvi-
ated the need for the taking of testimony. I have rejected
Respondent's argument for delay in issuance of my Deci-
sion, but found the argument to have been made in good
faith. Therefore I do not find Respondent's conduct in
management of this litigation frivolous. The Charging
Party's cited cases are distinguishable.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, and the entire
record herein, I make the following:
CONCI USIONS OF LAW
1. The Employer is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent has violated Section 8(b)(l)(A) of the
Act by engaging in the conduct set forth in section IV,B,
items 1-26, of this Decision.
4. The unfair labor practices set forth above affect
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and the record as a whole, and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recom-
mended:
ORDER 'i
The Respondent, Construction, Production & Mainte-
nance Laborers' Local Union 383, Laborers' Internation-
al Union of North America, AFL-CIO, Glendale, Arizo-
na, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Engaging in the conduct described in section IV,B,
items 1-26, of this Decision.
(b) In any other manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed under Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is nec-
essary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at its business offices and meeting halls copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix.""9 Copies of
' In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 10246 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided
in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto
shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
'9 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu-
ant to a Judgment of ihe United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
1344
LABORERS' LOCAL UNION 383
said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 28, after being duly signed by its authorized
representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediate-
ly upon receipt thereof, and be maintained for 60 con-
secutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including
all places where notices to members are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or cov-
ered by any other material.
(b) Furnish the Regional Director with signed copies
of the notice for posting by Carter-Glogau Laboratories,
Inc., if willing, at all places at its Glendale, Arizona, fa-
cility where notices to its employees are customarily
posted.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 28, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDEoR 01 THE
NATIONAL LABOR REI.AiIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all sides had an opportunity to
present evidence and state their positions, the National
Labor Relations Board found that we have violated the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and has or-
dered us to post this notice.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees who remain
working during our strike against Carter-Glogau
Laboratories, Inc., at its Glendale, Arizonia, facility
with damage to their personal property; harm to the
employees or their families; and the planting of an
explosive device on the struck premises.
WE WILL NOT cause the above employees to fear
injury or retribution by making obscene and sexual
suggestions; following their automobiles at high
rates of speed; and by taking their photographs or
recording their automobile license numbers.
WE WILt NOT block entrances to the facility or
damage or strike commercial vehicles, including
ambulances, as they attempt to enter the facility.
WE WILL NOT damage employee vehicles by
striking vehicles by picket sign, chain, or kick; let-
ting air out of tires; placing nails on the road;
throwing acid or a similar substance on vehicles;
and striking windshields.
WE WILL NO]r assault employees by means of
picket signs or baseball bats.
WE WILt NOT in any like or related manner re-
strain or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by the National Labor Rela-
tions Act.
CONSTRUCTION, PRODUCTION & MAINTE-
NANCE LABORERS' LOCAL UNION 383, LA-
BORERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION OF
NORTH AMIRICA, AFL-CIO
1345
