Consolidated Aluminum Corporation

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 25, 1981

258 N.L.R.B. 281 (N.L.R.B. 1981)

CONSOLIDATED ALUMINUM CORPORATION
Consolidated Aluminum Corporation and Aluminum
Workers International Union, Local Union No.
220 (AFL-CIO). Case 26-CA-8284
September 25, 1981
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND
ZIMMERMAN
On December 4, 1980, Administrative Law
Judge Claude R. Wolfe issued the attached Deci-
sion in this proceeding. Thereafter, the General
Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and
to adopt his recommended Order.
Contrary to our dissenting colleague, the facts
do not support a finding that Respondent violated
the Act. In March 1978, the General Counsel sub-
penaed employee Robert Wiles to appear in an
unfair labor practice proceeding involving the
Union, of which he was an official, and another
employer. After appearing, Wiles claimed witness
fees under article 15 of the collective-bargaining
agreement from Respondent, who was not a party
to the proceeding. ' Respondent denied the griev-
ance through three steps of the grievance proce-
dure on the grounds that Wiles was appearing
solely on union business and that Respondent did
not consider the National Labor Relations Board
"a court of law" within the meaning of article 15.
In November 1978, the parties settled the grievance
short of arbitration as part of a general disposition
of several grievances pending at the time.
The 1978 hearing resumed in January 1980, and
the General Counsel again subpenaed Wiles. Wiles
filed a claim for witness pay, and Respondent re-
fused it. This time neither Wiles nor the Union
filed a grievance. Instead, the Union filed on Wiles'
behalf a charge alleging that Respondent's refusal
to pay Wiles' claim was discriminatorily motivated
and violative of Section 8(a)(1), (3), (4), and (5) of
the Act.
Art. 15 of the collective-bargaining agreement reads:
A. An employee who is called to Jury Service or as a result of
being subpoenaed as a witness in a court of law shall be excused
from work for the days on which he has been called to appear and
he shall receive for such hours his base hourly wage rate, excluding
shift differential and the payment he receives for such service. The
employee will present proof of service and of the total amount of
money received therefrom.
258 NLRB No. 33
Our dissenting colleague contends that the Gen-
eral Counsel is legally correct in arguing that the
settlement of Wiles' first grievance established pre-
cedent and thus became part of the collective-bar-
gaining agreement. We disagree with our col-
league's understanding of both the law and the
facts of this case. In the first place, there is no evi-
dence in the record that Respondent had agreed, as
our dissenting colleague asserts, that the National
Labor Relations Board is a court of law under arti-
cle 15 of the collective-bargaining agreement. On
the contrary, Respondent has consistently main-
tained that the National Labor Relations Board is
not a court of law under the agreement, and the
basis for our dissenting colleague's assertion that
the parties have agreed that Board proceedings are
"courts of law" remains unclear.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that the par-
ties intended the settlement to be binding prece-
dent. Our dissenting colleague cites approvingly
the General Counsel's argument that, by enumerat-
ing two situations of article 6(E) and (F) of the
contract in which grievance resolutions do not
become precedent, 2 the collective-bargaining
agreement manifests the parties' intent that all
other grievance resolutions do become precedent.
In our view, however, the contract is at best am-
biguous on the point. Thus, for example, one could
argue with as much force that, while clauses E and
F were intended by the parties to describe two sit-
uations where the parties agreed beforehand that
settlements were not to become precedent, all
other situations involving the precedential value of
grievance resolutions were to be decided by the
parties on a case-by-case basis. Nor has the General
Counsel succeeded in adducing parole evidence to
prove that the parties intended the result which the
General Counsel, and our dissenting colleague,
contend they did. As noted, the agreement is spe-
cific as to the parties' intent only with respect to
the precedential value of two types of grievance
settlements. On the other hand, article 1 of the
agreement explicitly states that: "There are no
agreements or understandings between the parties
hereto except as expressly set forth in this Agree-
ment." Indeed, the record shows that Respondent
2 Clauses E and F of the collective-bargaining agreement read:
E. If a grievance is not referred or appealed by the Union to the
next step within the specified time limits, and an extension has not
been agreed to, it shall be considered as having been withdrawn
without precedent to either party.
F. Failure by the Company to render its decision in Step 1, 2 or 3
within the time limits herein provided for (including mutually agreed
to extension periods) shall be deemed to constitute a granting of, and
restricted to, the particular grievance at dispute. Any grievance so
granted through default will not constitute in any way a precedent
nor prejudice the Company's position in identical, similar or related
grievance matter
281
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
has never before or since settling Wiles' grievance
paid out witness pay to employees for attendance
at administrative or regulatory proceedings. What-
ever the significance of the settlement might be is
further diminished by the fact that it was part of a
general house cleaning of all outstanding plant
grievances by the parties.
Finally, precedent lends no aid to the General
Counsel's argument or to the dissent. Our dissent-
ing colleague cites Bethlehem Steel Company. Ship-
building Division, and Bethlehem-Sparrows Point
Shipyard. Inc., 89 NLRB 341 (1950), for the propo-
sition that grievance settlements become the law of
the shop. In Bethlehem Steel the Board held, inter
alia, that an employer violated Section 8(a)(5) of
the Act by insisting as a condition of executing the
contract that the Union agree to a clause permit-
ting the union steward to be present at the initial
stage of grievance adjustment by the shop foreman
but only if the aggrieved so elected. The Board
noted the importance of grievance resolutions:
"Grievances are usually more than mere personal
dissatisfactions or complaints of employees and
their adjustment frequently involves the interpreta-
tion and application of the terms of a contract or
otherwise affects the terms and conditions of em-
ployment not covered by a contract." Bethlehem
Steel, supra at 344. And footnote 7 of the Board's
Decision quotes Professor Cox for the proposition
that: "The rulings tend to become precedents and
may eventually constitute a body of industrial
common law supplementing the formal agree-
ment." (Emphasis supplied.) This language hardly
supports our dissenting colleague's blanket asser-
tion that all grievance settlements establish fixed
and binding rules of the shop. Indeed, although our
dissenting colleague apparently would have it oth-
erwise, nothing in the Board's Decision suggests
that Board law dictates that all informal grievance
settlements per se must be awarded binding prece-
dential value under a collective-bargaining agree-
ment.
For the above reasons we disagree with our dis-
senting colleague and adopt the Decision of the
Administrative Law Judge.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the complaint be, and it hereby
is, dismissed in its entirety.
MEMBER FANNING, dissenting in part:
I would find that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(l), (5), and (4) as contended by the General
Counsel.
The facts are not in dispute. In March 1978,
Wiles, an employee of Respondent, was subpenaed
by the General Counsel to testify in an unfair labor
practice case involving the Union and another em-
ployer. Thereafter, Wiles requested that Respond-
ent pay him witness pay in accordance with article
15 of the collective-bargaining agreement. 3 Re-
spondent denied this request and Wiles filed a
grievance. The grievance was denied by Respond-
ent through the third step of the grievance proce-
dure. However, in November, without arbitration
the grievance was settled by Respondent's agree-
ment to pay Wiles for being a witness at the Board
proceeding.
In January 1980, Wiles was again subpenaed by
the General Counsel. Wiles requested witness pay
and Respondent refused. Respondent's refusal was
based on its contention that Wiles was on union
business and that Board proceedings are not courts
of law. These were the same reasons Respondent
denied Wiles' initial grievance which it later set-
tled. Respondent's denial resulted in the filing of
the charges in this case.
I agree with the General Counsel's contention
that the settlement of the first greivance was with
precedent and accordingly it became the law of the
shop and part of the collective-bargaining agree-
ment by which both parties are bound. In support
of this contention the General Counsel submitted
other sections of the agreement which set forth
only two situations in which a grievance will be
deemed to have been settled without precedent.
These are: (1) when the Union fails to appeal a
grievance, or (2) when the Company fails to
answer a grievance in a timely fashion. Neither sit-
uation happened here. Not only is the General
Counsel's argument well founded, based solely on
the collective-bargaining agreement, but the Board
and others have long held that grievance settle-
ments become the law of the shop.4
I also do not find my colleagues' response to the
General Counsel's argument to be persuasive. The
Administrative Law Judge's finding that the initial
Art. 15:
A. All employer who is called to Jury Service or as a result of
being subpoenaed as a wilness in a court of law shall be excused
froml sork for the days (on which he has been called to appear and
he shall receive for such hours his base hourly wage rate, excluding
shift differential and the payment he receives for such service The
employee will present proof of service and of the total amount of
montey received therefrom.
4 ethlehemn Sieel Cormpuav. Shipbuilding Dviision. and Bethlehem-Spar-
rows Point Shipyard. Itr.. 89 NLRB 341 (1950): see also Cox, "Some As-
pects of the L.abor Management Relations Act. 1947." hI Hare L. Rev
274, 302 (1948).
282
CONSOLIDATEI) ALUMINUM CORPORATIO()N
grievance settlement applied only to that grievance
is an ipse dixit. In an attempt to bolster this finding
the Administrative Law Judge cites a provision in
the agreement which states that there are no agree-
ments or understandings between the parties except
as set forth in the agreement. However, this is not
a side agreement or an understanding in contraven-
tion of the collective-bargaining agreement. It is an
interpretation of an existing provision of the agree-
ment which was mutually arrived at by the par-
ties-an occurrence which happens with great fre-
quency in the day-to-day administration of collec-
tive-bargaining agreements.5
Nor is this a case of the Board construing the
terms of a collective-bargaining agreement-the
parties themselves have agreed that Board proceed-
ings are "Courts of Law."6 Indeed, in finding a
violation in this case the Board would only be
doing that which it has an obligation to do-en-
forcing the statutory rights of employees. 7 Because
my colleagues are reluctant to enforce the rights of
the employees in this case, I dissent in part. I oth-
erwise approve the Decision.
Indeed. Sec. 8(d) of the Act requires this type (of negoatiation.
I express no opinion as to whether or not Hoard proceedings are
"Courts of La"" as a matter of law. But hen Respondent settled the
first grievance. which was hased on the language of art. 15, it was agree-
ing with the Union's interpretation that a Board proceeding in an unfair
labor practice case is a court of law. W'ere it otherwise Respondent
would have maintained its position and arbitrated the issue. This is not to
say that the parties cannot agree that the settlement of any specific grie -
ance is without precedent. However. ahwnt any evidence that the grie-
ance in this case was settled in that manner. I agree with the General
Counsel.
I Sea Bay Manor Home For .dulrs. 253 NLRH 739 (1980): B . Beard
Company, 231 NLRB 191 (1977)
DECISION
STATEME NT OF THE CASE
CL.AUDE R. WOILFE, Administrative Law Judge: The
hearing in this case' was held before me in Jackson,
Tennessee, on June 19, 1980, pursuant to charges timely
filed by Aluminum Workers International Union, Local
Union No. 220 (AFL-CIO), 2 against Consolidated Alu-
minum Corporation and a complaint duly issued thereon.
The complaint alleges (I) violations of Section 8(a)(1),
(3), (4), and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act. as
amended, consisting of a refusal to pay Robert H. Wiles
witness pay because he testified at a National Labor Re-
lations Board hearing; (2) unlawful advice to employees
that the witness pay was withheld because of union ac-
tivities; and (3) a refusal to bargain in good faith by items
(I) and (2).
i This case. originally consolidated with Case 26-CA 8269 for hearing.
was severed therefrom by agreement of the parties. The formal docu-
ments relating to Case 26-CA-8269 found in hllis record are irrelevant to
the instant case.
z The name of the Charging PartN is hereby amended IO show its affili-
ation with the AFL-CI()
The General Counsel. on July 29, 1980, filed a motion
to amend the complaint and reopen the record. Respond-
ent opposed it. Thereafter, the parties entered into a stip-
ulation of facts as new evidence to be considered.
waived the introduction of facts as to new evidence to
be considered. and waived the introduction of any addi-
tional evidence and reopening of the hearing. The Gen-
eral Counsel's motion to amend the complaint to allege a
violation of Section 8(a)(1) (3), (4) and (5) of the Act
consisting of a refusal to pay witness fees to Robert
Wiles and Thomas Ayers for the time lost appearing
before me at the hearing on June 19, 1980, was granted
and the stipulation of facts was received in evidence by
me on September 15, 19 80 .
:
3
Upon the entire record, the demeanor of the witnesses
testifying before me, and with due regard for the argu-
ments of counsel for the parties, I make the follow ing:
FIN)IN(GS ANI) CONCI USIONS
I. JURISI)ICTION
Respondent meets the Board's 50,000 direct inflow
and outflow standards for the assertion of jurisdiction.
1. TfHI I ABOR OR(;ANIZATION INVOI VEI)
The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of the Act.
Il,. THI AlI.IEGE.D UNFAIR ABOR PRACTICES
A. Events Prior to June 19, 1980
Respondent and the Union are party to a collective-
bargaining agreement which includes a provision read-
ing, in pertinent part, as follows:
ARIICI 15-JURY AND WITNESS PAY
A. An employee who is called to Jury Service or
as a result of being subpoenaed as a witness in a
court of law shall be excused from work for the
days on which he has been called to appear and he
shall receive for such hours his base hourly wage
rate, excluding shift differential and the payment he
receives for such service. The employee will pres-
ent proof of service and of the total amount of
money received therefrom.
By bulletin of September 25, 1979, Respondent's em-
ployee relations manager, Edward Denniston, reminded
employees of the procedures set forth in article 15 above
for collection of jury or witness pay. The bulletin neither
added to nor detracted from the requirements set forth in
article 15.
Union officials are paid by the Union for time spent on
official union business requiring their absence from work,
including attendance at arbitration proceedings.
In March 1978, Robert H. Wiles, secretary-treasurer of
the Union and holder of various union committee posi-
:1 The General Cllsel' , moltion and Respo'ndents opposition have
been placed in the official ehibits file as AL.J Exhs I and 2. respectlic-
283
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tions, was subpenaed by the General Counsel to appear
and testify in an unfair labor practice case involving the
Union and another employer. Respondent herein was not
a party in that case. Wiles filed a claim for witness pay
for March 22, 23, and 24, 1978. Respondent denied the
claim and Wiles filed a grievance. Respondent's answer
at the first grievance step reads:
Pay denied. Consolidated Aluminum contends this
lawsuit was primarily union business and that the
union should bear the burden of any lost time in-
volved in this action.
The grievance proceeded to the second step of the
grievance procedure where Respondent again denied the
grievance, stating:
Grievance denied. Matter appears to be strictly
union business. Subpoena from NLRB is from an
Administrative Law Judge which also appears to
raise certain legal aspects and/or questions.
The grievance was again denied by Respondent at the
third step for the following stated reasons:
Disposition: This grievance was filed asking for
witness pay for three days that an employee was
subpoenaed for attendance at an NLRB Hearing
concerning Local 220 and Valley West Welding.
The company did not pay the witness pay for two
reasons:
1. The employee was subpoenaed as an official
and employee of Local 220, not as an employee of
Consolidated Aluminum; and
2. there is a question as to whether or not a
NLRB Hearing is a court of law.
The employee has not presented the company
with any proof of service nor the amount of money
received for his attendance. The company does not
feel the Labor Agreement terms cover this matter.
Therefore, grievance is denied.
Finally, on November 14, 1978, the grievance was set-
tled, along with six others on other subjects, with the
Company agreeing to pay Wiles the difference between
his base hourly wage rate and the witness fee he had re-
ceived from the General Counsel for the 3 days' attend-
ance at the Board proceeding.
Wiles was again subpenaed by the General Counsel to
appear and testify in an unfair labor practice proceeding
on January 7, 1980. Respondent was not a party to this
proceeding, which was a continuation or resumption of
the 1978 hearing. Wiles appeared, as required, on Janu-
ary 7 but did not testify until January 8. On the next
working day Wiles handed a claim for witness pay to his
supervisor, Randall Hampton, who told him that he
would not be paid because he was engaged in union busi-
ness. Wiles filed no grievance, nor did the Union.
In mid-January 1980 Union President Pate, who is also
Respondent's employee, spoke to Respondent's staff as-
sistant, Robbins, about the Wiles claim. Robbins said he
would have to check to see whether he could pay it or
not and what the practice had been. Pate explained the
disposition of the earlier claim; Robbins repeated he
would have to check into it further.
On February 13 or 14, Pate and International Repre-
sentative Hatton 4 had a grievance meeting with Edward
Denniston regarding some third-step grievances. As the
meeting concluded, Pate asked Dennison to explain why
he was not paying Wiles, and Hatton asked Denniston
why he did not go ahead and pay it because it was really
a petty thing. Denniston responded that Hatton knew the
Company did not consider the NLRB a court of law.
Hatton asked if that were the only reason. Denniston an-
swered, "No, because of Mr. Wiles' union work." Hatton
asked what he meant, and Denniston said, "Well, his
union work." Hatton asked if Denniston was talking
about Wiles' "union activities," and Denniston answered,
"Yes." Hatton pressed Denniston with, "Now, Mr. Den-
niston, do you want to make that flat statement?" Den-
niston said, "Yes."
Conclusions
The General Counsel contends, in substance, that the
issue of whether witness pay is due Wiles and Ayers
under the collective-bargaining agreement has been de-
termined by the November 1978 settlement of Wiles'
grievance because that settlement constitutes a binding
precedent requiring Respondent to pay such claims. This
was the first time the issue of witness pay for attendance
at Board hearings, or other administrative proceedings,
arose, and there is no showing that the parties arrived at
any understanding, express or implied, that the settle-
ment was to be a definitive clarification of article 15 to
be followed in all future instances.
The 1978 settlement was simply an agreed-upon dispo-
sition of that grievance at that time. The General Coun-
sel points to the following contractual provisions, and
argues that the "language excepting certain decisions
from precedence manifests the intent of the parties that
other grievance decisions should be accorded, per gener-
al rule, precedential value:
E. If a grievance is not referred or appealed by
the Union to the next step within the specified time
limits, and an extension has not been agreed to, it
shall be considered as having been withdrawn with-
out precedent to either party.
F. Failure by the Company to render its decision
in Steps 1, 2, or 3 within the time limits herein pro-
vided for (including mutually agreed to extension
periods) shall be deemed to constitute a granting of,
and restricted to, the particular grievance at dispute.
Any grievance so granted through default will not
constitute in any way a precedent nor prejudice the
Company's position in identical, similar or related
grievance matter.
The argument is novel, but not convincing. Moreover,
it is contrary to the express language of the contract
itself which states, "There are no agreements or under-
4 Any conflicts between the testimony of Pale and Hatton are resolved
in Hatton's favor because he was the more definite and certain of the two
and appeared to be credible,
284
CONSOLIDATED AI.UMINUM CORI'()RAIO()N
standings between the parties hereto except as expressly set
forth in this Agreement." 5
In short, the General Counsel's contention that the
1978 grievance settlement requires Respondent to there-
after pay all witness pay claims made by employees testi-
fying at Board hearings is unconvincing," and I conclude
that the contract was neither modified or clarified by the
settlement.
That Respondent consistently took the position that
Wiles was engaged in business on behalf of the Union
when called as a witness in the Board proceedings, and
therefore should be recompensed by the Union per its
practice when union officers engaged in other official
union business, does not give rise to any inference of re-
taliation against Wiles because Respondent was opposed
to either his work on behalf of the Union or his appear-
ance as a witness in a Board proceeding. All Respondent
was contending in this regard is that it was not required
to pay Wiles for work performed on behalf of the Union.
It visited no other reprisals on him, or said anything to
him designed to deter him from testifying or engaging in
any other protected activity. Nor do I draw any infer-
ence of unlawful motivation from the statements of Den-
niston to Pate and Hatton. It appears to me that Dennis-
ton's answers to their questions amounted only to a reit-
eration of Respondent's stand that it was not required to
pay for time spent away from work on union business;
were not made with reference to any other union activi-
ties; and did not have any reasonable tendency to inter-
fere with, restrain, or coerce Pate, or any other employ-
ee, in the exercise of his Section 7 rights.
The real issue before me is whether Respondent may
refuse witness pay to an employee for time spent as a
witness for the General Counsel at a Board proceeding
to which Respondent was not a party. This is not a case
where Respondent may legitimately refuse witness pay
to its employees who testify against Respondent, 7 nor is
it a case where Respondent has, apart from the payment
of witness fees, denied the witnesses of opposing parties
the benefit of some term or condition of employment
which it granted its own employee witnesses. Wiles did
not appear as an opposition witness in January 1980;
Wiles has not been denied anything other than witness
pay; and Respondent was not a party who called em-
ployee witnesses on its own behalf.
I need not decide whether Wiles' appearance as a wit-
ness called by the General Counsel in a case where the
Union was the charging party is properly classifiable as
"union business" for which the Union must bear the
burden of reimbursement; nor need I decide whether or
not Respondent's interpretation of the witness pay clause
in the contract is correct. Reliance on either or both by
Respondent raises no inference of unlawful motivation. I
have found no direct or circumstantial evidence that Re-
spondent's motive in denying the witness pay was to pre-
vent or inhibit Wiles from giving testimony before the
Board or to retaliate against him for testifying, or was di-
* Art. I, "Purpose of Agreement," (emphasis supplied).
6 Cases relied upon by the General Counsel on this point are clearly
inapposite.
I General lectric Company, 230 NLRB 683 (1977); Electronic Research
Co., 190 NLRB 778 (1971).
rected toward restricting him in any other fashion. Wiles
was not discouraged or prevented from testifying, and
was not discriminated against with respect to his employ-
ment relationship because he did appear and testify. I am
persuaded that requiring Respondent to pay the differ-
ence betwecn the witness fees received and wages lost
by Wiles is unwarranted because this would, in effect,
make Respondent, in the absence of an express contrac-
tual mandate or unlawfully motivated withholding, the
guarantor of the wages of any employee called by any
party to a Board proceeding whether Respondent was a
party or not, to the extent any party to that proceeding
elected not to pay. 1 For all these reasons, I find that Re-
spondent did not violate Section 8(a)(4), (3), and (1) of
the Act by refusing payment, nor does the evidence or
theory advanced by the General Counsel make out a vio-
lation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
B. Events Subsequent to June 19. 1980
The parties stipulated to the following facts:
1. On or about June 30, 1980. Robert Wiles and
Thomas Ayers, who gave testimony in this proceeding
pursuant to subpena," requested from Respondent wit-
ness fees pursuant to article 15(A) of the collective-bar-
gaining agreement between Respondent and the Union,
for appearing in this proceeding.
2. The requests of Robert Wiles and Thomas Ayers
were in accord with procedures required by article
18(C).
3. The requests of Robert Wiles and Thomas Ayers
were denied by Respondent.
Conclusions
The Board has stated:
[T]here is nothing unlawful in an employer using
the wages of witnesses as the measure of his com-
pensating them for witness fees while not also paying
employees called by other parties the difference be-
tween witness fees they receive from such parties and
what they would have been paid as wages for the time
they testified, since the employers actions are not di-
rected at the employment relationship. [General Elec-
tric Company, supra at 686 (emphasis supplied.)]
I am persuaded that the refusal to pay opposition wit-
nesses Wiles and Ayers for time lost on June 19, 1980, is
not unlawful. Respondent called no employee witnesses
on its behalf and therefore paid no wages to any employ-
ee witness for time spent at the hearing. Considering the
Board's holding that an employer "is not as a general
proposition obligated to pay opposition witnesses any-
thing in connnection with witness fees" and that such a
failure to pay is not per se discriminatory,' 0 I find that
the failure to pay witness pay to Wiles and Ayers for
losses occasioned by their appearance as opposition wit-
nesses on June 19, 1980, unaccompanied by any discrimi-
nation with respect to the employment relationship or by
" See Gelneral Electri Compan)'. wupra at 685
!) Wiles and Ayer, testified before me on June 1'). 198
"' General El'ctrir (C'onpny, supra.
285
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
any showing of unlawful motivation, did not violate Sec-
tion 8(a)(1), (3), (4), or (5) of the Act.
For all the foregoing reasons, I shall recommend that
the complaint be dismissed in its entirety.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of the Act.
3. The General Counsel has not established by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that Respondent has violated
the Act as alleged in the complaint.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and the entire record, and pursuant Section 10(c) of
the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER "
The complaint is dismissed.
I In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided
in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto
shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
286