Connecticut Foundry Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 23, 1967

165 N.L.R.B. 916 (N.L.R.B. 1967)

916 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Teamsters Local 536, International Brother-
hood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America
and The Connecticut Foundry Company.
Case 1-CB-1175.
June 23, 1967
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS FANNING
AND ZAGORIA
On March 29, 1967, Trial Examiner David S.
Davidson issued his Decision in the above-entitled
case, finding that the Respondent had engaged in
and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices
within the meaning of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, and recommending that it cease
and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's
Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent filed
exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a
supporting brief. Briefs were also filed by the
Charging Party and the General Counsel.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
Act, the National Labor Relations Board has
delegated its powers in connection with this case to a
three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and
the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the
Trial Examiner.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the
Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner and
hereby orders that the Respondent, Teamsters Local
536, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America, its officers, agents, and representatives,
shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's
Recommended Order.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
DAVID S. DAVIDSON, Trial Examiner: Upon a charge
filed October 5, 1966, by The Connecticut Foundry
Company, referred to herein as the Company, the General
Counsel issued a complaint against Respondent,
Teamsters Local 536, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America. The complaint as amended at the hearing alleges
that Respondent violated Section 8 (b)(1)(A) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended . Respondent 's answer
denies the commission of any unfair labor practices.
This proceeding was heard before me in Hartford,
Connecticut , on December 20, 1966 , and January 9, 1967.
Following the close of the hearing , all parties filed briefs.
Upon the entire record in this case and from my
observation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make
the following:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY
The Company, a Connecticut corporation, maintains its
principal office and place of business at Rocky Hill,
Connecticut, where it engages in the manufacture, sale,
and distribution of iron castings and related products. In
the course of its business, the Company annually ships
products valued in excess of $50,000 from its Rocky Hill
plant to points located outside the State of Connecticut.
Respondent admits and I find that the Company is
engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act and
that assertion of jurisdiction is warranted.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Teamsters Local 536, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters , Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America , is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of theAct.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Facts
1. Introduction
During September 1966 Respondent and the Company
were in the process of negotiating a collective-bargaining
agreement. On September 7, 1966, a strike against the
Company started which was still in progress at the time of
the hearing. During the course of the strike, nine incidents
occurred which are the subject matter of this complaint.
The General Counsel contends that Respondent was
responsible for all of the incidents and that Respondent
thereby violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. Respondent
denies responsibility for any of the incidents and denies
that any was violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A).I
2. The incident at the railroad siding
At or about 9 a.m., on Saturday, September 17, John
Kastele and Milton Wright, two employees of the
Company, went to a railroad siding near the plant with a
portable crane and two trucks to unload iron from a
railroad car. Kastele was to load the iron into the trucks
and Wright was to drive them to the plant and unload
them. When Kastele went to the siding, Harold Flenke,
whose status as an agent of Respondent is in issue, drove
up to the siding in a tan Oldsmobile, bearing Connecticut
registration Z-8 and parked the car on railroad property on
Although Respondent denies the occurrence of any of these
Incidents , Respondent rested without introducing any evidence to
controvert the testimony of the witnesses presented by the
General Counsel I have credited their uncontradicted testimony
as to the occurrence of these incidents
165 NLRB No. 133
CONNECTICUT FOUNDRY COMPANY
the paved driveway leading to the siding. Kastele and
Wright unloaded about three or four loads of iron with the
Oldsmobile in that position as Wright was able to drive
around the Oldsmobile without substantial difficutly,
utilizing the unpaved shoulder of the driveway. About an
hour after they started work, Julius W. (Bill) Miller, an
employee on strike, drove his Chevrolet station wagon to
the siding and parked it on the unpaved shoulder beside
the Oldsmobile blocking the access from the road to the
railroad car. Miller, Flenke, and seven or eight others
picketed at the entrance to the driveway.2 Kastele and
Wright were unable to continue unloading the iron.
Kastele went to a local police officer who was nearby and
asked him if he could move one of the cars so that the
unloading could continue. The officer said he could do
nothing about it. Kastele called the owner of the Company,
and at or about 3 p.m., railroad police arrived.3 A railroad
policeman spoke to Flenke, and both cars were then
removed. Kastele and Wright did not resume the
unloading that day, but did so the following week.
3. The incident at Buzz Inn
On Saturday afternoon, October 1, Paul Rebot, John
Harris, and Caruso, all employees of the Company, left the
plant in a company truck to drive home after work. After
leaving Caruso at his home in Cromwell, Connecticut,
Rebot and Harris drove toward Middletown. En route they
passed the tan Oldsmobile with registration Z-8 parked by
the side of the road. Flenke and Miller were sitting inside,
with Flenke behind the wheel. The car pulled out on the
highway behind the truck and began to follow it. Rebot
who was driving the truck made several turns and the car
continued to follow, even after Rebot entered a high school
parking lot and started to drive in circles around a
telephone pole in the lot. Rebot left the parking lot and
went to the main street of Middletown with the car
following closely behind. Rebot stopped and parked near
Buzz Inn. He and Harris walked to the tavern, passing the
Oldsmobile which had been parked between the truck and
the tavern.
A few minutes later Miller walked into the tavern and
went to the bar where he stood not far from Harris and
Rebot.4 After some preliminary exchanges, Miller advised
Harris not to go into work the following Monday, telling
him that if he did, he would be a dead man. Rebot told
Miller to stop making threats, but Harris told Rebot to let it
go because he did not want any trouble. Rebot, Harris, and
a friend of Harris went from the bar to a table where they
sat drinking beer and watching a football game on
television. A short while later Harris returned to the bar to
get more beer. Miller, who had been sitting in a separate
booth, came back to the bar and again told Harris that if he
2 Several pickets were present and picketing at the driveway
before Miller parked his car there Flenke was present from the
time the unloading started until the cars were removed later in the
day.
3 At some point before the railroad police arrived, as Kastele
was walking by Miller, Miller told Kastele that he had been about
to move his car but Kastele had laughed at him and he changed
his mind
I Rebot, Harris, and Carmine Grillo, the owner of Buzz Inn,
who was tending the bar at this time , all testified as to this
incident . Although there are minor variances in their testimony,
there is no reason to discredit them Where differences exist, I
have relied principally on the testimony of Harris to whom Miller
spoke and whose memory appeared most accurate.
917
went to the plant on Monday he would be dead. Harris told
Miller not to talk like that. Miller replied that he was not
fooling and told Harris to put his hand in Miller's pocket.
Harris did and felt something hard. He told Miller if it was
a gun to get rid of it because he did not want to see Miller
get in trouble. Miller replied, "Never mind, I am just
telling you again, don't go down to the plant Monday."
Harris asked Miller to sit down with him, and Miller
brought Harris a beer and sat down with him at a separate
booth, adjacent to where Rebot was sitting. They
continued to discuss the Union and the strike for some
time, with Harris continuing to attempt to persuade Miller
to get rid of what he had in his pocket.
At some point while Miller and Harris were talking,
Rebot went outside to check the truck and noticed that
Flenke was still sitting in the Oldsmobile parked outside.
Shortly thereafter, Miller was called to the telephone.
After taking the call, Miller spoke to Harris a few minutes
more and left, telling Harris as he left not to forget that if
he went to the plant on Monday, "you have had it." Rebot
and Harris stayed at the tavern for 5 or 10 minutes more
and then left and drove home. They were not followed
after they left the tavern. After arriving home Rebot
reported the incident to Ernest Brown, plant
superintendent for the Company. Brown in turn called
Harris, and thereafter Harris went to the police and filed a
complaint against Miller.
4. The firecracker incident
On October 6, Milton Wright drove a truck making
deliveries for the Company. He was accompanied by
Julius Ferrari, Sr., coreroom foreman for the Company 5
While en route to make a delivery to the Stanley Company
at New Britain, Connecticut, Wright and Ferrari noticed
that they were being followed by a car driven by William
Smiths Also in the car was Julius Miller and Sinclair
Butler, another striking employee of the Company. At
Stanley the occupants of the car picketed while Wright
made his delivery. Wright left New Britain and headed
toward Meriden, Connecticut, to make another delivery at
the Kelsey Company. The car driven by Smith again
followed. A mile or two before the Meriden line, Smith
passed the truck. As his car was pulling back into the lane
in front of the truck, Miller, who was sitting on the right
side of the front seat, threw some objects out of the car
which exploded as the truck passed them. Some exploded
under the truck and one on top of the hood.? Smith then
increased his speed and pulled away from the truck. A
short while later, the truck passed Smith's car parked on
the side of the road. Smith pulled out and again followed
the truck to the Kelsey plant where the occupants of the
car again picketed while the truck was unloading . Wright
5 Wright and Ferran both testified as to this incident Except as
indicated below, there were no material differences in their
testimony.
6 Both described the car as a red Mercury which they testified
was owned by Smith, a striking employee
Wright testified that Miller opened the door, put his hand out
the door, and threw something behind him. Immediately
thereafter , he heard several explosions and saw one explosion on
the hood of the truck. Ferran testified that he saw Miller's arm
come out of the window on the right side of the car and move
down. He then saw a series of small flashes and heard several
explosions which sounded to him like firecrackers. As the
substance of this testimony is uncontradicted , it is unnecessary to
determine who more accurately observed Miller.
299-352 0-70-59
918 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and Ferrari then returned to the Company' s plant and
were again followed by Smith's car.
5. The October 31 incident
On or about October 31, Wright was driving from the
company plant to make a delivery at the Underwood plant
in Hartford, Connecticut. As Wright left the foundry,
Miller followed him in his station wagon. As Wright
approached a point where the highway divided,8 he turned
on his left turn signal and started to move over from the
right side of the road to get into the proper lane on the left.
Miller pulled up alongside the truck on the left. When
Wright increased his speed to pass Miller, Miller
increased his speed and stayed beside Wright. When
Wright slowed down to drop behind Miller, Miller slowed
down and stayed beside Wright. Wright then pulled over
to the right side of the road and stopped. Miller drove on
up the road. Wright then pulled out again and moved into
the proper lane. As he did, Miller, who was up ahead,
slowed down and stayed in front of Wright in the left lane.
When Wright reached the exit from Route 91, which he
had planned to take, Miller remained ahead of him and
both proceeded up a hill at the exit. About halfway up the
hill, Miller slowed down so that Wright was forced to shift
into second gear and Miller drove slowly up the hill with
Wright behind. Nothing was in front of Miller to cause him
to slow down. At the top of the hill, Miller moved over to
the right and Wright proceeded without further difficulty.
6. The November 9 incident
On November 9, employee Julius Ferrari, Jr., drove a
truck for the Company. He left the plant and was headed
for Providence, Rhode Island, on Route 91 with a load of
about 45 thousand pounds of iron castings. He was
followed from the plant by the tan Oldsmobile bearing
Connecticut registration Z-8. Flenke was driving and
Miller was riding in the car as a passenger. As Ferrari
approached the exit from the highway to the Charter Oak
Bridge, he turned on his signal to move from the right lane
in which he was driving to the left lane which leads to the
ramp to the bridge. As Ferrari moved into the left lane, the
Oldsmobile passed him on the right and cut in front of him,
causing him to make almost a complete stop to avoid
hitting the Oldsmobile. The Oldsmobile then moved slowly
up the ramp to the bridge slowing down six or seven times
so as to cause Ferrari to come almost to a stop each time.
There was nothing in front of the Oldsmobile to cause it to
slow down. After reaching the crest of the hill, both the
truck and the car proceeded normally to the tollgate of the
bridge. After passing through the tollgate, the Oldsmobile
left the highway, and the truck proceeded on to
Providence.
8 Wright was driving on Route 91, which at that point is a
divided highway with four lanes headed in the direction in which
he was driving
" LaBella was standing with his back facing Miller and Smith
He did not see them throw anything, but heard the crash of glass 5
or 10 feet behind him.
10 LaBella testified that in the rearview mirror on his side of the
truck, he also saw Smith get out of the car and cock his arm as if
to throw something He jumped out of the cab, heard a crash, and
saw broken glass scattering across the road under the trailer
n The markings of the truck identified it as a Hertz truck and
not as a truck belonging to the Company
7. The glass-throwing incident
On November 23, Julius Ferrari, Jr., drove a tractor-
trailer truck for the Company to make a delivery to
Bassick Castings Company in Bridgeport, Connecticut.
Employee Angelo LaBella rode with him. The truck was
followed from the plant by two cars driven by employees
Bracey and Harrington. There were three passengers in
one car and four in the other. William Smith and Julius
Miller rode with Bracey. After Ferrari arrived at Bassick,
he maneuvered in the yard of the plant to back his trailer
up for unloading. The men who had followed him from the
foundry were picketing on the sidewalk outside a fence
around the Bassick plant. As Ferrari pulled forward at one
point to straighten his truck out, he saw Smith and Miller
each throw something in the direction of the truck, and a
stone and a bottle landed in front of the truck. At the time
LaBella was standing at th., side of the truck near the front
wheel directing Ferrari.9
After completing the delivery Ferrari drove a short
distance from the plant and stopped for a traffic light. In
his rearview mirror Ferrari saw William Smith get out of
Bracey's car and throw a bottle which bounced off the tire
of an oncoming car and under the wheels of the trailer. 10
8. The Dempster incident
On December 1, 1966, Julius Ferrari, Jr., drove a leased
Hertz truck" from the plant headed for East Windsor,
Connecticut, carrying a load of approximately 35 thousand
pounds of iron castings. Again he was accompanied by
LaBella. Miller followed him from the plant in his station
wagon. As Ferrari was passing through Hartford on Route
91 driving in the right-hand lane of two northbound lanes,
Miller passed on his left. As Miller drew abreast of the
trailer, he turned his right directional signal on.12 Ferrari
slowed down and both proceeded for a while in this
fashion. Miller turned off his directional signal, remained
in the left lane, and moved on ahead of Ferrari. Within a
matter of seconds thereafter a Dempster truck13 passed
Ferrari on the left and moved into the Hertz truck, striking
the left front of the Hertz truck with the right rear of the
Dempster and forcing it off the road. There was nothing in
the road ahead of the Dempster truck to cause it to veer
over toward Ferrari's truck and hit it. The Hertz truck
went off the shoulder of the road, knocked down several
guard rails at the side of the road, and came to a stop.
Ferrari caught a glimpse of the driver of the Dempster
truck and thought he recognized him as Edmund Hackett,
an employee of the foundry who had gone out on strike at
its start.14 The Dempster truck did not stop. LaBella
jumped out of the Hertz truck, stopped a passing car, and
asked the driver to follow the Dempster which was then 4
12 Ferrari testified that he saw the signal come on in his
rearview mirror
13 Ferrari testified that the Dempster truck bore the name of a
waste disposal company
14 Five to ten minutes later while standing at the side of the
road, Ferrari saw the Dempster truck come back from the
opposite direction and confiri.ted his earlier impression On one
other occasion when making a delivery at the Underwood plant in
Hartford, Ferrari had observed Hackett following him in a
Dempster truck similar to the one he was driving on December 1
CONNECTICUT FOUNDRY COMPANY
to 5 hundred yards ahead. As they followed LaBella lost
sight of the Dempster truck behind a rise in the road. On
coming over the rise, LaBella no longer saw the Dempster
ahead. LaBella asked the driver to stop. He left the car
and crossed the guard rails to a parallel road. He started to
walk south back toward where the Hertz truck was
stopped. After about 5 minutes, he saw a green Dempster
truck approaching, coming north on the parallel road. As it
came up to him, the truck stopped. LaBella started to look
for the registration number of the truck after observing a
dent on the fender which he thought he had seen at the
time the Hertz truck was hit. As he looked, he saw a man
coming around from the back of the truck and recognized
him as Hackett. LaBella asked Hackett if he had
sideswiped him up the road. Hackett grabbed LaBella by
the throat and said he would kill LaBella if LaBella said
Hackett had sideswiped him. LaBella swung around,
broke Hackett's grip, and started toward the rear of the
truck. Hackett followed with his fists clenched. LaBella
turned, stopped, and raised his fists, telling Hackett to
watch it. Hackett stopped about 3 feet from LaBella, put
his hand in his pocket, told LaBella he would cut him to
pieces, and took his hand out of his pocket holding a knife
which he tried to open. LaBella struck Hackett as he tried
to open the knife, and Hackett was unable to drop his
guard to open the knife. Hackett kicked at LaBella
missing him. Hackett then ran to the cab of the truck,
uttered another threat, and grabbed a metal object which
he banged against the truck. LaBella started away from
the truck toward the highway. Hackett followed a short
way and stopped. Hackett returned to the truck and drove
off. LaBella then walked to a nearby building and called
the police. A short while later a police cruiser came,
picked him up, and drove him back to the scene of the
accident where he and Ferrari reported what had
happened to the police.
9. The December 2 incident
On or about December 2, Wright made another delivery
to the Underwood plant in Hartford . En route from the
company plant to Underwood , he observed that he was
being followed by William Smith in Smith 's car. After
completing the delivery at Underwood , Wright went on to
his next stop at the Associated Express Company in
Newington , Connecticut , with Smith again following.
Wright gave his papers to the dispatcher and the two of
them went out on the dock . Wright backed his truck in and
started to unload . Smith and Miller ' s came up on the dock
and said something to the dispatcher . The dispatcher told
them to leave and left himself. Miller started to use vulgar
language and called Wright names. 's The dispatcher
returned shortly with two or three other persons. He again
told Miller and Smith to leave. They left with Miller telling
15 According to Wright, lie had not seen Miller with Smith
before coming out on the dock to unload
15 According to Wright, Miller was trying to provoke him into a
fight and said, "Come on" to him a number of times.
17 The Company has provided bus service to its employees for
some years. Before the strike the bus loaded outside the plant
gate. After the strike started, the bus loaded inside the plant gate
18 LaBella testified that he saw the car there between 3 45 and
3 55. Ferran, Senior, testified that he saw it shortly after
4 o'clock
Is There is a slight discrepancy between the testimony of
LaBella and Ferran, otherwise uncontradicted, as to the time the
bus was in the yard after the car left This discrepancy does not
affect credibility as to the substance of the incident I have
919
Wright they were going to get him anyway. While Wright
finished unloading, Miller and Smith picketed on the road
outside. Wright then started back to the road to return to
the company plant. While waiting at a traffic light at the
highway, he looked in his rearview mirror and saw Miller
running toward the truck. As Miller reached the truck, the
light turned green and Wright drove off. After Wright
reached the foundry and drove in the gate, he saw Miller
get out of his car. Miller called to him from outside the
plant gate to come on, that he was waiting for him. Wright
told Miller to go home, take care of his family, and leave
him alone. Wright went in the plant. Later when Wright
was outside the plant, Miller stood outside-the gate with
doubled up fists and called to Wright to come on and fight
him. Wright did not.
10. The plant gate incident
Every working day, a few minutes before 4 p.m., a bus
arrives at the plant to pick up employees and take them
home.17 On Tuesday, December 6, shortly before 4 p.m.
and before the bus had entered the plant gate, the tan
Oldsmobile with registration Z-8 was observed parked on
the street outside the plant across the driveway and
directly in front of the plant gate. Miller was seen standing
beside the car. The car was parked so as to make it
impossible for a vehicle to drive in or out of the gate.18
While the car was there, the bus was seen standing out on
the street waiting for the car to move so that the bus could
enter the gate. About 20 employees were observed waiting
in the plant yard to board the bus. At some point before
4:20, a policeman walked toward the car, whereupon
Miller got in it and moved it away. The bus then entered
the gate. The bus normally waits until about 4:20 to finish
loading and leave the plant. The bus left that day about
4:20.19
11. The evidence relating to agency
The complaint, as amended, alleges that Harold Flenke
is a business agent of Respondent, that Julius W. Miller
and William Smith are employees of the Company and
negotiating committee members, and that Edmund
Hackett is an employee. The complaint alleges that these
four persons were at all times material agents of
Respondent acting in its behalf.
As to Flenke, the evidence does not establish that he is a
business agent of Respondent.20 However, the evidence
shows that Flenke regularly drove the tan Oldsmobile
bearing Connecticut registration Z-8, and that this
automobile is registered in the name of Milk Drivers Union
Local 536, at 155 Gudy Lane, South Windsor, Connecticut.
That address is identified as Flenke's home address. The
affidavits of service for the charge, the complaint, and the
credited Ferrari who had a more direct connection with the
incident.
20 The only evidence in the record to this effect is found in the
affidavit of Paul Rebot, which was introduced by the General
Counsel on the redirect examination of Rebut after he had been
cross-examined with respect to it. Rebut was not questioned about
Flenke' s status, and as I indicated at the hearing, the affidavit was
received for the limited purpose of placing in context the
statements from it on which Respondent relied in cross-
examination In these circumstances and in view of the fact that
there is no evidence to show the basis or extent of Rebot's
knowledge of Flenke's status, I find the affidavit insufficient to
establish the allegation that Flenke is a business agent of
Respondent
920 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
notice of intent to amend the complaint show that copies of
these documents were mailed to Flenke in care of
Teamsters Local 536, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America, and that receipts were signed for them in
Flenke's behalf by the same persons who signed separate
receipts for the Respondent. In addition to the evidence
set forth above with respect to Flenke's activities during
the strike, the evidence also shows that Flenke was
frequently seen in the vicinity of the foundry driving the
Oldsmobile.
With respect to Julius Miller and William Smith, the
evidence shows that after September 20 five meetings
between the Company and Respondent were called by
Federal and State mediators, three of which were attended
by Miller and two by Smith. Three other employees also
attended some of these meetings. None of the employees
spoke during any of these meetings. In the absence of any
other evidence, I find this evidence insufficient to
establish that Miller and Smith were negotiating
committee members.
During the strike, Miller and Smith appeared at the
plant almost every day and picketed every day the plant
was picketed. On days that there was no picketing, they
were observed sitting in cars parked near the plant.
Miller's car was observed by Brown, the plant
superintendent, parked outside Respondent's head-
quarters at 6 a.m. almost every day after the strike started.
Miller also has been observed driving the tan
Oldsmobile on a number of occasions, sometimes with
Flenke in the car and sometimes alone. On one occasion
the company truck was followed from the plant to
Providence, Rhode Island, by this car with Miller driving
and Flenke riding as a passenger. On several occasions the
plant bus taking employees home from work was followed
by this car twice with Miller driving and Flenke riding as a
passenger.
As to Hackett, the evidence shows only that he was
employed by the Company when the strike began, that he
went out on a strike, and that he was seen on the picket
line for 3 or 4 weeks after the strike started but not
thereafter.
B. Conclusions
1. Restraint and coercion
Section 8(b)(1)(A) provides that it shall be an unfair labor
practice for a labor organization or its agents to restrain or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
by Section 7. There can be little doubt that the conduct of
Flenke, Miller, Smith, and Hackett, described above,
restained and coerced various nonstriking employees in
the exercise of their Section 7 rights.
The parking of the cars in the driveway of the railway
siding on September 17 frustrated the efforts of Kastele
and Wright to perform their assigned work. The similar
incident on December 5 during which the plant gate was
2i Local 761, International Union of Electrical, Radio and
Machine Workers, AFL-CIO (General Electric Company), 126
NLRB 123, 124-125, enfd 287 F 2d 565 (C A. 6)
22 It is immaterial whether or not Harris believed that he had
persuaded Miller not to carry out his threat of violence
International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, C.I O.
(Sunset Line and Twine Company), 79 NLRB 1487, 1505, United
Furniture Workers of America, Local 309 (Smith Cabinet
Manufacturing Company), 81 NLRB 886, 888, Local 761,
blocked by the tan Oldsmobile preventing the bus from
entering the plant in order to transport employees home,
however brief its duration, was also clearly intended to
obstruct the egress of employees from the plant.21 The
threats made by Miller to Harris at the Buzz Inn on
October 1 and Miller's attempts to harass and provoke
Wright both away from and at the plant on December 2
were threats of violence and reprisal to Harris and Wright
for continuing to work during the strike.22
The throwing of the firecrackers on October 5 by Miller,
the harassment of Wright by Miller while Wright was
attempting to leave the highway on October 31, and the
similar harassment of Ferrari by Flenke on November 9
while Ferrari was trying to leave the highway were clearly
designed to harass and intimidate Wright and Ferrari in
the performance of their work.23 Bearing in mind that
Wright and Ferrari were at the time driving trucks at
highway speeds carrying loads from Respondent's plant,
these incidents cannot be dismissed as minor or mere
pranks. The remaining incidents, the throwing of a stone
and bottles at the company truck and LaBella on
November 23 and the forcing off the road of the Hertz
truck by Hackett on December 1 are even more serious
instances of violence.
Although Respondent sought to characterize the
December 1 incident at the hearing as an "accident," I
cannot dismiss it as such. Miller used his turn signal after
he pulled abreast of the Hertz truck and then turned it off
without turning or changing lanes. The Dempster struck
the Hertz truck without any apparent cause to be found in
traffic conditions at the time. The Dempster failed to stop
after striking the Hertz truck and forcing it off the road.
The Dempster was driven by Hackett who had gone out on
strike from the plant on September 7. Hackett reacted
violently upon encountering LaBella a few minutes after
the incident. In these circumstances it is more reasonable
to infer that Hackett deliberately struck the Hertz truck
upon signal from Miller than to conclude that the above
were a series of unrelated coincidences surrounding an
accidental collision of the two trucks.
It must be determined then whether Respondent is
responsible for any of this conduct, for if it is, Respondent
violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
2. Responsibility
The general principles applicable to the determination
of Respondent 's responsibility for the acts found herein to
have occurred are those set forth in International
Longshoremen 's and Warehousemen's Union , C.I.O.
(Sunset Line and Twine Company), supra, 1507-09.24 The
burden of establishing responsibility rests upon the
General Counsel , and it is his burden to prove both the
existence of an agency relationship and the nature and
extent of the agents' authority . In this case there is no
direct evidence that any of the persons involved were
agents of Respondent . However , such inferences as are
reasonable may be drawn and may sustain the General
International Union of Electrical Radio and Machine Workers,
AFL-CIO (General Electric Company), supra
23 Local 612, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers ofAmerica (Denton Truck
Line, Inc), 146 NLRB 498, 504-506
24 See also International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers ofAmerica, Local Union No 377(,411-
American Stamp and Premium Corporation of New York), 159
NLRB 1313
CONNECTICUT FOUNDRY COMPANY
Counsel's burden of proof where as here there is no
evidence to rebut them.
The principal link between Respondent and the
misconduct found above is the tan Oldsmobile registered
in the name of Milk Drivers Union Local 536 at the home
address of Harold Flenke. Although there is a variance
between the name of the Union which appears on the
registration form and the name of the Union which appears
in the complaint in this case, the Local numbers are
identical. In the light of the acceptance of service for
Flenke by Respondent Union and in the absence of any
other evidence to show that the Local 536 in whose name
the car is registered is different from Respondent Union, I
find that the facts are sufficient to establish that the car
which was registered at Flenke's address and which
Flenke regularly drove was registered in the name of
Respondent.
Under Connecticut law registration of a motor vehicle
by any person who is not the owner is punishable by fine. 25
Connecticut courts hold that registration is prima facie
evidence of ownership of the vehicle described in the
registration form.26 As ownership of a motor vehicle is
governed by State law and there is no evidence to rebut
the inference to be drawn from the registration, I find that
proof of the registration is sufficient to establish that
Respondent is the owner of the tan Oldsmobile bearing
Connecticut registration Z-8.
As set forth above, the record shows that Flenke was
frequently seen at or near the company plant or following
nonstrikers with this car. Indeed, the car is itself directly
involved in several of the incidents alleged to have violated
Section 8(b)(1)(A). Under principles applicable to tort
claims in Connecticut and many other States, an operator
other than the owner of a motor vehicle is presumed to be
the agent or servant of the owner operating the vehicle
within the scope of his authority or employment.27 While
one of the policies underlying this presumption relates to
consideration of placement of the risk of using an
automobile as between the owner and the victim of an
accident, other policies which support the presumption in
the tort field also support its application here. The
considerations as to the ordinary habits of owners of
automobiles in permitting the use of their vehicles and the
relative ease of access to the necessary facts relating to
agency favor the presumption here as there. Moreover,
where more than an isolated use of the vehicle is
established as here, it is equally appropriate as a matter of
policy to place responsibility for permitting improper use
of a vehicle on its owner. Thus, I conclude in the absence
of any evidence to the contrary that Respondent's
25 "Owner" as defined in the statute includes any person, firm,
corporation , or association holding title to or having legal right to
register a vehicle including purchasers under conditional bills of
sales III Connecticut General Statutes Revision of 1958 (revised
to 1966), Sees 14-1 (33), 14-12. See also 9 Wigmore, Evidence §
2510a (3d ed 1940)
26 Scalora v. Shaughnessy, 151 Conn 252, 196 A 2d 763
29 IX Connecticut General Statutes Revision of 1958, Sec.
52-183, Wigmore, supra at fn. 25.
28 1 cannot accept Respondent 's contention that it was Miller
rather than Flenke who blocked the driveway on September 17 In
the absence of any explanation the evidence is sufficient to
establish that Flenke sought to interfere with Respondent 's trucks
by blocking the paved driveway with the car The fact that Wright
was able to maneuver around the parked car until Miller arrived
would not remove the violation In any event , Flenke's failure to
remove Respondent's car after Miller parked and blocked the
driveway places direct responsibility on Flenke for the blockage.
921
ownership of the tan Oldsmobile warrants the conclusion
that Flenke was an agent of Respondent acting within the
scope of his authority at all times when he used
Respondent's car.
Moreover, in the light of the additional facts that Flenke
was observed driving this car in connection with strike
activities, that the car was registered at Flenke's home
address, and that Respondent accepted service of
documents for Flenke, I am satisfied that the evidence is
sufficient to support an inference, which Respondent
could have sought to rebut but chose not to, that Flenke's
agency for Respondent extended beyond the driving of the
car and that his authority at least extended to all the strike
activities in which he participated.
Thus, Respondent's responsibility for Flenke's
interference with Ferrari's truck on November 9, and for
the blocking of the railroad gate on September 17, follow
directly from the above.28 Likewise although Flenke was
not present when Miller threatened Harris on October 1, it
was Flenke who deliberately followed the company truck,
parked outside the tavern, and waited in the parked car
while Miller entered the tavern and talked to Harris for a
substantial time. Whether or nor Flenke authorized Miller
specifically to threaten Harris, in the absence of any
explanation by Respondent the only reasonable inference
to be drawn is that Flenke authorized or approved Miller's
attempt to persuade Harris to refrain from working, and
Respondent is responsible for the threats made by Miller
in the course of seeking to achieve that purpose.29
Flenke's direct involvement in the misconduct alleged
in the complaint is limited to the three incidents described
above. However, Flenke's participation in the strike was
not so limited, and from his participation other inferences
may be drawn bearing upon the remaining misconduct
alleged in the complaint. The evidence establishes that at
least on one occasion 10 days after the strike started
Flenke was present at the picket line and participated in
the picketing when signs were being carried which clearly
identified the strike as a strike by Respondent. There is no
evidence that Flenke or any other agent of Respondent
ever took steps to repudiate the conclusion that would be
drawn by any observer of the picket signs. In addition the
evidence shows that the strike started while negotiations
were in progress between the Company and the Union and
that meetings between them continued after the strike
commenced. Moreover, the testimony of Plant
Superintendent Brown establishes that during the strike
the car of Miller, who was among the most active pickets,
has been seen almost daily at 6 o'clock in the morning
parked outside Local 536's headquarters. Although there
Moreover, in view of my findings as to Flenke's agency and
Flenke's failure to take any action to repudiate Miller's conduct,
Respondent is responsible for Miller's conduct on this occasion as
well International Ladles' Garment Workers Union, AFL-CIO (F
R. Knitting Mills, Inc), 145 NLRB 10, 12 Indeed without further
explanation the evidence with respect to this incident is sufficient
to establish that Flenke and Miller were acting as joint venturers
on this occasion Painters' District Council No 6 (The Higbee
Company), 97 NLRB 654, enfd 202 F 2d 957 (C A 6), cert denied
345 U S. 995
2s International Longshoremen 's and Warehousemen 's Union,
C.1.O (Sunset Line and Twine Company), supra at 1509. Apart
from the indicated basis for holding Respondent responsible for
this incident , it would again appear that Flenke and Miller were
engaged in a joint venture in following the company truck and in
the incident which ensued See Painters' District Council No 6
(The Higbee Company), supra
922 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
is no direct evidence in the record that the strike at the
Company's plant was authorized by Respondent, I find
these facts sufficient in the absence of any contrary
evidence to support the inference that the strike was an
authorized strike by Respondent.
In all the remaining incidents, Julius Miller was involved
either singly or in conjunction with other strikers. In the
incident which occurred on December 5 at the gate to the
plant the violation rests on Miller's use of Respondent's
tan Oldsmobile. For the reasons set forth above I find
Respondent responsible for Miller's use of the car and that
this incident is therefore attributable to Respondent. The
remaining activities all occurred during or arose out of
instances in which Respondent's trucks and employees
were followed from the plant by strikers including Miller.
As found above two of the incidents in which Flenke was
directly involved also occurred while Flenke in the
company of Miller followed employees from the plant after
work and followed a truck of Respondent's from the plant
in the course of making a delivery. The record establishes
that Flenke accompanied by Miller followed nonstrikers
on other occasions as well and that at times Miller drove
the car and Flenke rode as a passenger. In the light of
these circumstances I find that Flenke approved the
following of nonstrikers by Miller and established a
pattern of conduct which was followed by Miller and the
other strikers in following company employees and trucks
away from the Company's plant. The evidence also
establishes that Flenke himself participated in misconduct
away from the plant thereby setting an example and
suggesting approval of misconduct by strikers away from
the plant while following nonstrikers."
Accordingly, I find Respondent responsible for Miller's
action as a passenger in Smith's car on October 5 in
throwing firecrackers at the company truck while
following it from New Britain to Middletown, for Miller's
harassing maneuvers while following Wright in his truck
on October 31, for Miller's attempts to provoke a fight with
Wright and his threats to Wright on December 2, and for
the conduct of Miller and Smith on November 23 at
Bridgeport in throwing bottles and a stone.
With respect to the December 1 incident, although
Hackett's status as a striker at the time of the incident is
unclear, I have found that Hackett acted on signal from
Miller while following the truck leased by the Company.
Since Miller set in motion the forcing of the truck off the
road by Hackett while Miller was following the truck on a
delivery from the plant, I conclude that Respondent is
responsible for forcing the truck off the road. I find it
unnecessary to decide whether Respondent should also be
charged with Hackett's subsequent conduct upon
encountering LaBella a few minutes later, as it may be
disputed whether this encounter was a reasonably
foreseeable consequence of the events which Miller set in
motion, and the remedy recommended herein would not
be affected in view of the other violations found.
Accordingly, I find that Respondent violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act in all respects as alleged in the
complaint as amended at the hearing with the exception of
Hackett's encounter with LaBella.
30 International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union,
C.10 (Sunset Line and Twine Company), supra at 1511, Painter's
District Council No 6 (The Higbee Company), supra,
International Woodworkers of America, AFL-CIO (W T Smith
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with the Company's
operations described in section I, above, have a close,
intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and
commerce among the several States and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow thereof.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in
certain unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it be
ordered to cease and desist therefrom and that it take
certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the
policies of the Act.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and the
entire record in this case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Teamsters Local 536, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America, is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
2. The Connecticut Foundry Company is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2),
(6), and (7) of the Act.
3. By restraining and coercing the employees of The
Connecticut Foundry Company in the exercise of rights
guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act as set forth in the
decision above, the Respondent has engaged in and is
engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce
within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions of law and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby recommend that Respondent, Teamsters
Local 536, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, its
officers, agents, and representatives, shall:
1. Cease and desist from restraining and coercing
employees of The Connecticut Foundry Company by
obstructing entrances to the plant or the nearby railroad
siding so as to obstruct ingress and egress of employees or
vehicles; by throwing firecrackers, stones, bottles, or
otherwise committing acts of violence against employees;
by threatening employees with physical violence because
of their desire to cross a picket line and refrain from
joining a strike; by operating motor vehicles in such a
manner as to collide with, block, harass, endanger, or
otherwise interfere with employees in the performance of
their duties; and in any other manner restraining or
coercing employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
Lumber Company), 116 NLRB 507, 509, enfd 243 F.2d 745
(C.A 5), Local 761, International Union of Electncal Radio and
Machine Workers, AFL-CIO (General Electric Company), supra at
131
CONNECTICUT FOUNDRY COMPANY 923
2. Take the following affirmative action which the
Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at the offices and the meeting halls of the
Respondent copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix."31 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by
the Regional Director for Region 1, after being duly signed
by official representatives of the Respondent labor
organization , shall be posted by it immediately upon
receipt thereof, and be maintained,by it for 60 consecutive
days thereafter , in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to its members are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent labor
organization to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(b) Mail signed copies of the notice to the Regional
Director for Region 1 for posting, The Connecticut
Foundry Company willing, at all locations where notices to
the Company's employees are customarily posted.
(c) Notify said Regional Director , in writing , within 20
days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps
Respondent has taken to comply herewith..12
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify you that:
WE WILL NOT obstruct entrances to The
Connecticut Foundry Company plant, or the nearby
railroad siding so as to obstruct the ingress and egress
of employees or vehicles.
WE WILL NOT throw firecrackers , stones, bottles, or
otherwise commit acts of violence against employees
of The Connecticut Foundry Company.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees or other persons
with physical violence because of their desire to cross
a picket line and refrain from joining a strike.
WE WILL NOT operate motor vehicles in such a
manner as to collide with , block , harass, endanger, or
otherwise interfere with employees in the
performance of their duties.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner restrain or
coerce employees of The Connecticut Foundry
Company in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in
Section 7 of the Act, including the right to refrain
from any or all concerted activities as guaranteed by
the Act.
31 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the
Board , the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for
the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the
notice . In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by
a decree of a United States Court of Appeals , the words " a Decree
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall
be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order "
32 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the
Board , this provision shall be modified to read "Notify said
Regional Director , in writing, within 10 days from the date of this
Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS OF TEAMSTERS LOCAL 536,
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS,
CHAUFFEURS , WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF
AMERICA
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 536,
INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD OF
TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS,
WAREHOUSEMEN AND
HELPERS OF AMERICA
(Labor Organization)
Dated By
(Representative ) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered , defaced,
or covered by any other material.
If members have any question concerning this notice or
compliance with its provisions , they may communicate
directly with the Board's Regional Office, 20th Floor, John
F. Kennedy Federal Building , Cambridge and New
Sudbury Streets, Boston , Massachusetts 02203,
Telephone 223-3300.