CONDUENT BUSINESS SERVICES, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 2, 2020

14547706 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jun. 2, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/547,706 11/19/2014 MICHAEL D. SHEPHERD 20140575US01 1157
144759 7590 06/02/2020
Gibb & Riley, LLC
FREDERICK W. GIBB, III
537 Ritchie Highway
Suite 2F
Severna Park, MD 21146
EXAMINER
BLANCHETTE, JOSHUA B
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3626
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/02/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Conduent.PatentDocketing@conduent.com
support@gibbiplaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MICHAEL D. SHEPHERD, DENNIS F. QUEBE JR,
JING ZHOU, FAMING LI, JENNIE ECHOLS, JINHUI YAO,
and LINA FU
Appeal 2019-003169
Application 14/547,706
Technology Center 3600
Before ERIC S. FRAHM, JOYCE CRAIG, and MATTHEW J. McNEILL,
Administrative Patent Judges.
CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–5, 7–12, 14–19, and 21–23. See Final
Act. 1. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Conduent Business
Services, LLC, Dallas, TX. Appeal Br. 3.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to a system and method for automated
analytic process flows to improve health outcomes and manage healthcare
costs. Spec. Title, ¶ 4. Claim 7, reproduced below, is illustrative of the
claimed subject matter:
7. A method, comprising:
acquiring medical data associated with patients'
healthcare encounters with managed care organizations (MCOs)
from a database comprising said medical data, using a
processor, said medical data comprising relations between
services provided to said patients by said MCOs and said
healthcare encounters and patient demographics;
presenting, on a graphic user interface (GUI) operatively
connected to said processor, analytical process suggestions
based on predefined categories of concern for said MCOs, said
predefined categories of concern comprising one or more of:
Emergency Department (ED) utilization,
Hospital Admission and Re-admissions,
Demographic Disparity in Care,
Service Utilization by Members with Chronic
Conditions,
Preventive Care, and
Network Adequacy;
enabling selection, on said GUI, of analytic processes
and flows from an existing library of analytical processes for
tracking said services provided by said MCOs, said existing
library of analytical processes being stored in said database and
comprising a plurality of analytic processes organized into
analytic flows, said analytic processes and flows being based on
clinical expertise, each analytic flow comprising a sequence of
specific analytic processes to provide findings, predictions, and
recommendations for specific questions in said predefined
categories of concern for said MCOs, based on said medical
data;
following a first analytic flow according to a category of
concern selected on said GUI, using said processor, said first
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analytic flow having a specific sequence of first analytic
processes, the analytic processes of said first analytic flow
automatically sending findings as input to subsequent analytic
processes in said first analytic flow;
said processor performing said first analytic processes in
said selected category of concern for said MCOs, using said
medical data, and identifying relations between said services
provided by said MCOs and said patients' healthcare
encounters, based on said medical data;
said processor extracting first utilization statistics from
said medical data with said first analytic processes and flows
selected from said existing library of analytical processes;
said processor analyzing said first utilization statistics
and determining information relevant to said healthcare
encounters, based on said medical data;
said processor outputting, on said GUI, first results of
said analyzing said first utilization statistics based on said
information;
applying, using said GUI, pre-defined rules obtained
from clinical experts, wherein the rules define branching points
for flows between said analytic processes, said branching points
directing compositions of analytic flows between said analytic
processes based on available findings to generate a second
analytic flow according to said category of concern selected on
said GUI, said second analytic flow having a specific sequence
of second analytic processes;
following said second analytic flow according to said
category of concern selected on said GUI, using said processor,
using said first results of said analyzing said first utilization
statistics relevant to said healthcare encounters as input to said
second analytic processes, the analytic processes of said second
analytic flow automatically sending findings to subsequent
analytic processes in said second analytic flow, said second
analytic processes being in the same selected category of
concern as said first analytic processes;
said processor performing said second analytic processes
in said selected category of concern for said MCOs, using said
medical data, and identifying relations between said services
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provided by said MCOs and said healthcare encounters, based
on said medical data; and
said processor extracting second utilization statistics
from said medical data with said second analytic processes and
flows selected from said existing library of analytical processes
according to said pre-defined rules.
REJECTION
Claims 1–5, 7–12, 14–19, and 21–23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 because the claimed invention is directed to patent-ineligible subject
matter. Final Act. 2–4.
ANALYSIS
Appellant argues the Examiner’s rejection of claim 7 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter is in error. Appeal Br.
16–27. To the extent Appellant has not advanced separate, substantive
arguments for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments are waived.
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Appellant argues claims 1–5, 7–12, 14–19, and
21–23 as a group. Appeal Br. 27. Given our discretion under 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv), we decide the § 101 rejection of claims 1–5, 7–12, 14–19,
and 21–23 based on representative claim 7.
Principles of Law
“Whether a claim is drawn to patent-eligible subject matter is an issue
of law that we review de novo.” SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601
F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
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abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.”
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Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court also
indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the
abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citation omitted)
(citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that
an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second part
of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of
the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient
to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an
abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id.
(alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely
requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(“2019 Revised Guidance”).2 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of

2 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance.
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internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51; see
also October 2019 Update at 1.
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we
first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed.
Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).3
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under
Step 2B, to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56.

USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October
2019 Update”) (available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p
df).
3 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84
Fed. Reg. 54–55.
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Step 1
Claim 7, as a method claim, falls within the process category of § 101.
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53–54 (citing MPEP
§§ 2106.03, 2106.06).
Step 2A(i): Does the Claim Recite a Judicial Exception?
The Examiner determined that claim 7 is directed to “the concept of
comparing new and stored data and using rules to identify options,” which is
an idea of itself, and thus an abstract idea. Final Act. 3. The Examiner
identified the following steps as part of the recited abstract idea: “acquiring
medical data, presenting processes, enabling selection of analytical
processes, following a first analytic flow, performing analytic processes,
extracting statistics, analyzing statistics, outputting recommendations,
applying pre-defined rules that define branching points, following second
analytic flow, and extracting second statistics.” Id. at 2–3.
Consistent with Appellant’s description of the claims (See, e.g., Spec.
¶¶ 4–6), we find that the recited following a first analytic flow, performing
analytic processes, extracting statistics, analyzing statistics, applying pre-
defined rules that define branching points, following second analytic flow,
and extracting second statistics describe concepts performed in the human
mind, or practicably with pen and paper, that are fairly characterized as
involving an observation, evaluation, judgment, or opinion, and which fall
into the mental process category of abstract ideas. See 2019 Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
Appellant argues that the Examiner erred because “the claimed
process uses a specific sequence of processes of the first flow to obtain
certain findings and uses the findings as input to a specific sequence of
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processes of the second flow, according to specific rules, to obtain results,”
and, thus, is not abstract. Appeal Br. 19–20 (emphasis omitted); Reply Br. 4.
We are not persuaded that the Examiner erred. The rule-based tasks
identified above can be performed by the human mind or with pen and
paper. The 2019 Revised Guidance explains that “mental processes” include
acts that people can perform in their minds or using pen and paper, even if
the claim recites that a generic computer component performs the acts. See
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 n.14 (“If a claim, under its
broadest reasonable interpretation, covers performance in the mind but for
the recitation of generic computer components, then it is still in the mental
processes category unless the claim cannot practically be performed in the
mind.”) (emphasis omitted); see also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v.
Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[W]ith the
exception of generic computer-implemented steps, there is nothing in the
claims themselves that foreclose them from being performed by a human,
mentally or with pen and paper.”), quoted in 2019 Revised Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 52 n.14.
Because we agree with the Examiner that the claim recites an abstract
idea, we proceed to Prong Two of Step 2A to determine if the idea is
integrated into a practical application, in which case the claim as a whole
would not be “directed to” merely an abstract idea.
Step 2A(ii): Judicial Exception Integrated into a Practical Application?
Because we determined that claim 7 recites a patent-ineligible
concept, we next determine whether the recited judicial exception is
integrated into a practical application of that exception by: (a) identifying
whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the
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judicial exception(s); and (b) evaluating those additional elements
individually and in combination to determine whether they integrate the
exception into a practical application.
We use the term “additional elements” for claim features, limitations,
or steps that the claim recites beyond the identified judicial exception. See
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n.24. In claim 7, the additional
elements include the “acquiring medical data,” “presenting,” “enabling
selection,” and “outputting” steps, as recited in claim 7, as well as the recited
“database,” “processor,” “library,” and “graphical user interface (GUI)
operatively connected to said processor.”
The Examiner determined that none of the additional limitations is
sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception
because the additional computer elements are “described at a high level in
the specification” and amount to no more than a generic computer. Final
Act. 3.
We agree with the Examiner. Regarding the “processor” limitation,
the Specification states that “[t]he computer 111 may comprise any form of
processor.” Spec. ¶ 26; see also Spec. ¶ 7. The Specification also describes
the recited “database” at a high level, describing that “[d]atabase 122 may be
any organized collection of data operating with any type of database
management system.” Spec. ¶ 27. The recited GUI is also described at a high
level, as the Specification describes that “the user interface may comprise a
graphic user interface (GUI).” Spec. ¶ 42. The library is also described at a
high level, as the Specification describes that the library can be “on a
computerized storage device operatively connected to the user interface,”
without further explanation. Spec. ¶ 6.
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Moreover, the data-collecting and data-presenting limitations
constitute insignificant extra-solution activity. See, e.g., Mayo, 566 U.S. at
79; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611–12; OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788
F.3d 1359, 1363–64 (Fed. Cir. 2015); CyberSource Corp. v. Retail
Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011). As an example of
insignificant extra-solution activity, in the Federal Circuit has held that (1)
presenting offers to potential customers and (2) gathering statistics
concerning customer responses were “conventional data-gathering activities
that d[id] not make the claims patent eligible.” OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at
1363–64. Consistent with those decisions, the Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure (“MPEP”) identifies “gathering data” as an example of
insignificant pre-solution activity. MPEP § 2106.05(g).
Here, the “acquiring medical data” limitation amounts to mere data
gathering, which is insignificant extra-solution activity and does not
integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. See 2019 Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n.31; MPEP § 2106.05(g). Similarly, the
“presenting” and “enabling selection” steps amount to mere data gathering,
as analytical process suggestions are presented on a GUI, on which the
selection of analytic processes is enabled. See OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1363–
64. The “outputting” step simply outputs the results of analyzing the first
utilization statistics. This limitation, therefore, does not impose meaningful
limits on the claimed method and thus amounts to insignificant extra-
solution activity that does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical
application.
Appellant argues that claim 7 integrates the recited abstract idea into a
practical application because claim 7 is directed to a specific implementation
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of a solution to a problem. Appeal Br. 20 (citing Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft
Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). In particular, Appellant argues that
claim 7 is directed to an innovation in computer technology, “namely
performing analytic processes in a first analytic flow and using the output of
those process as input to additional analytic process in a second analytic
flow, in which the analytic flows use predefined rules to direct the flows.”
Appeal Br. 21, 25–26.
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. Under the 2019 Revised
Guidance, the focus in this step is on the additional elements and whether
they, individually or in combination, integrate the abstract idea into a
practical application. Here, Appellant’s arguments are based on the abstract
idea itself, not the additional elements.
Moreover, Appellant’s claims are unlike the technology-based
integrations cited by Appellant. See Appeal Br. 20. The Enfish court found
the claims directed to “a specific improvement to the way computers
operate, embodied in the self-referential table” (Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1336),
and explained that the claims are “not simply directed to any form of storing
tabular data, but instead are specifically directed to a self-referential table for
a computer database” that functions differently than conventional databases
(id. at 1337) (emphasis omitted).
The Enfish court distinguished between claims that focus on a specific
improvement in computer capabilities, on the one hand, and an abstract idea
that merely invokes computers as a tool, on the other. Enfish, 822 F.3d at
1336. This case is the latter. Appellant does not claim to have invented new
networking hardware or software. Nor does Appellant claim to have
invented HTTP header fields, user identifiers, encryption techniques, or any
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other improvement in the network technology underlying its claims. The
Specification states that the invention filled a need for automating analytic
process flows to avoid “manually driven” analysis and workflow tools. Spec.
¶ 2. But this goal is in the abstract realm—“to improve health outcomes and
manage healthcare costs”—not an improvement in networking or computer
functionality. See id. None of these alleged improvements “enables a
computer . . . to do things it could not do before.” Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat
Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (emphasis added). Such
claims, whose focus is “not a physical-realm improvement but an
improvement in wholly abstract ideas,” are not eligible for patenting. SAP
Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
In other words, automating analytic process flows, as in claim 7,
“does not improve the functioning of the computer, make it operate more
efficiently, or solve any technological problem.” Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v.
IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1378, 1384–85 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Rather, the claim
simply “includes instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer”
and “does no more than generally link the use of a judicial exception to a
particular technological environment or field of use.” 2019 Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55; Ans. 3.
Appellant further alleges claim 7 is patent-eligible because its practice
does not preempt practice by others. Appeal Br. 21–22, 24, 25, 27. While
preemption may signal patent-ineligible subject matter, the absence of
complete preemption “does not demonstrate patent eligibility . . . [w]here a
patent’s claims are deemed only to disclose patent ineligible subject matter
under the Mayo framework, as they are in this case, preemption concerns are
fully addressed and made moot.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc.,
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788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at
1362–63 (“[T]hat the claims do not preempt all price optimization or may be
limited to price optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make them
any less abstract”); see Ans. 4.
Considering claim 7 as a whole, then, Appellant’s invention lacks a
technical solution to a technical problem like the claims in these cases.
Claim 7 as a whole merely uses instructions to implement the abstract idea
on a computer or, alternatively, merely uses a computer as a tool to perform
the abstract idea. Here, the additional limitation(s) do not integrate the
judicial exception into a practical application. More particularly, the claims
do not recite (i) an improvement to the functionality of a computer or other
technology or technical field (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)); (ii) a “particular
machine” to apply or use the judicial exception (see MPEP § 2106.05(b));
(iii) a particular transformation of an article to a different thing or state
(see MPEP § 2106.05(c)); or (iv) any other meaningful limitation
(see MPEP § 2106.05(e)). See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
Rather, claim 7 recites an abstract idea as identified in Step 2A(i), supra, and
none of the limitations integrates the judicial exception into a practical
application.
Therefore, because the abstract idea is not integrated into a practical
application, we conclude that the claim is directed to the judicial exception.
Step 2B — “Inventive Concept” or “Significantly More”
If the claims are directed to a patent-ineligible concept, as we
conclude above, we proceed to the “inventive concept” step. For Step 2B we
must “look with more specificity at what the claim elements add, in order to
determine ‘whether they identify an “inventive concept” in the application of
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the ineligible subject matter’ to which the claim is directed.” Affinity Labs of
Texas, LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(quoting Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed.
Cir. 2016)). We look to see whether there are any “additional features” in the
claims that constitute an “inventive concept,” thereby rendering the claims
eligible for patenting even if they are directed to an abstract idea. Alice, 573
U.S. at 221. Those “additional features” must be more than “well-
understood, routine, conventional activity.” Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79.
In the Reply Brief, with regard to step 2B of the § 101 analysis,
Appellant essentially repeats arguments made in step 2A. Appellant argues
that the claimed process “uses a specific sequence of processes of the first
flow to obtain certain findings and uses the findings as input to a specific
sequence of processes of the second flow, according to specific rules, to
obtain results.” Reply Br. 5–6. Appellant also argues that claim 7 claims an
innovation in computer technology. Id. at 6.
Appellant does not direct our attention to anything in the Specification
that indicates the computer components perform anything other than well-
understood, routine, and conventional functions, such as receiving data,
looking up data in a database, attempting to execute commands, and
presenting data. See buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (“That a computer receives and sends the information over
a network—with no further specification—is not even arguably inventive”);
In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 614 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(server that receives data, extracts classification information from the
received data, and stores the digital images insufficient to add an inventive
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concept); Alice, 573 U.S. at 225–26 (receiving, storing, sending information
over networks insufficient to add an inventive concept).
Because the Specification describes the additional elements in general
terms, without describing the particulars, we conclude the claim limitations
may be broadly but reasonably construed as reciting conventional computer
components and techniques, particularly in light of Appellant’s’
Specification, as cited above. See Berkheimer Memo4 § III.A.1; Spec. ¶¶ 6,
7, 26, 27, 42. We conclude claim 7 does not have an inventive concept
because the claim, in essence, merely recites various computer-based
elements along with no more than mere instructions to implement the
identified abstract idea using the computer-based elements.
Because the claims are directed to a judicial exception without
significantly more, we sustain the Examiner’s § 101 rejection of independent
claim 7 and grouped claims 1–5, 8–12, 14–19, and 21–23, not argued
separately with particularity.
DECISION
We affirm the decision of the Examiner rejecting claims 1–5, 7–12,
14–19, and 21–23.

4 “Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter
Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP,
Inc.)” at 3 (Apr. 19, 2018) (explaining that a specification that describes
additional elements “in a manner that indicates that the additional elements
are sufficiently well-known that the specification does not need to describe
the particulars of such additional elements to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)” can
show that the elements are well understood, routine, and conventional).
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DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/
Basis
Affirmed Reversed
1–5, 7–12, 14–19,
21–23
101 Eligibility 1–5, 7–12,
14–19, 21–23

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED