EEOC Appeal No. 0120133300
05-12-2015
Complainant v. U.S. Postal Serv.
Complainant
v.
Megan J. Brennan,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service
(Great Lakes Area),
Agency.
Appeal No. 0120133300
Hearing No. 470-2012-00211X
Agency No. 4J-460-0004-12
DECISION
Complainant filed an appeal from the Agency's August 8, 2013, final decision concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The Commission accepts the appeal pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the Commission MODIFIES the Agency's final decision.
ISSUE PRESENTED
The issue presented is whether the Final Agency Decision properly found that Complainant failed to prove that she was subjected to unlawful discrimination or harassment.
BACKGROUND
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a part-time Flexible Carrier at the Lafayette, Indiana Post Office.
On February 10, 2012, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency harassed and discriminated against her on the bases of race (Japanese-Asian),1 sex (female), and in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity under Title VII when:
1. On May 28, 2011, Complainant's supervisor (S1) informed her that on May 31, 2011, she would be switched from a mounted route to a route with walking;
2. From June 13, 2011, to June 22, 2011, Complainant was subjected to excessive supervision, including S1 standing behind her, staring at her, following her in the parking lot, and coming out to her route;
3. On July 23, 2011, Complainant was not allowed to leave work until 12:37 p.m. to attend her baby's 1:00 p.m. funeral service;
4. On October 27, 2011, Complainant was subjected to an investigative interview, and on November 2, 2011, she received a letter of warning (LOW);
5. On November 2, 2011, another supervisor (S2) yelled "How many times must I repeat myself?";
6. On or about November 16, 2011, management exposed Complainant's confidential information regarding her EEO interview;
7. On November 26, 2011, management conducted an investigative interview regarding an incident occurring on November 25, 2011, and subsequently on December 13, 2011, Complainant was issued a seven-day "no time off" suspension;
8. On February 8, 2012, S1 refused to recognize her medical restrictions documentation;2 and
9. On March 28, 2011, and unspecified dates, S1 and an Acting Supervisor (AS) cursed, which Complainant found offensive.
Complainant requested relief including, inter alia, compensatory damages.
In an investigative statement, Complainant stated that S1 reassigned her from a mounted route to a walking route on the basis that she had previously worked a walking route, but the union told S1 that he could not change Complainant's route without her consent. Complainant stated that she refused to work on the walking route, and management reassigned her to mounted Route CR967. Complainant also stated that S1 subjected her to excessive supervision when she would stand three to four feet behind Complainant for ten minutes, asked Complainant what she was doing, waited for her at Burberry Apartments on two days in June 2011, and followed her to a postal truck on June 17, 2011.
With respect to claim 3, Complainant stated that, on July 21, 2011, she asked S1 for bereavement leave for the entire day on July 23, 2011, so that she could attend her baby's funeral. She stated that S1 denied her request, told her to report to report to work at 6:45 a.m., and did not allow her to leave work until 12:37 p.m. on the day of the funeral. Regarding claim 4, Complainant stated that management subjected her to an investigative interview in October 2011, and subsequently, issued her a LOW on the basis that she failed to follow instructions. Complainant stated that on October 25, 2011, S1 directed her to carry Route CR940 prior to carrying Route CR942, but she misunderstood his instructions and carried CR942 first.
Regarding claim 5, Complainant stated that on November 2, 2011, she did not want to misunderstand her orders, so she asked S2 to repeat which truck, scanner, and route she should work on first. Complainant stated that S2 repeated the assignment very quickly and said, "How many times do I repeat myself?" Regarding claim 6, Complainant stated that on November 17, 2011, she found a yellow "post-it note" on her time card that said, "Norma [sic], Conference call for EEO tomorrow @ 8:30." Complainant stated that employee time cards are located together, visible to the entire facility, and everyone could see the note.
Regarding claim 7, Complainant stated that management subjected her to an investigative interview and issued her a notice of a seven-day "no time off" suspension. Complainant further stated that she thought she had her lap belt on while in her vehicle, but S2 looked for any possible infraction to harass Complainant. Regarding claim 8, Complainant stated that she submitted medical restrictions on February 6 and 8, 2011, that stated that could only work eight hours per day, six days per week. Complainant stated that management wanted her to work more than eight hours per day, but she has not worked more than eight hours per day. Complainant stated that management did not think her documentation was sufficient because it did not specify Complainant's "illness." Complainant stated that her medical information is confidential and "none of management's concern," and the Postmaster and S3 are not qualified to render an opinion about her health and how it could affect her performance. Report of Investigation (ROI), Affidavit A, p. 28.
Regarding claim 9, Complainant stated that on March 28, 2012, AS and S1 were talking at the supervisors' desk, and S1 said, "Fucking serious?" Complainant stated that she was at her case approximately 15 feet away, was not involved in the conversation, and said nothing to them. She stated that she had no evidence the conversation was directed at her or about her.
Final Agency Decision
At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing but subsequently withdrew her request.
Consequently, the Agency issued a final decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b). The Agency concluded that Complainant failed to prove that she had been subjected to discrimination or harassment as alleged. Specifically, the Agency found that the alleged actions were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute a hostile work environment. The Agency also found that Complainant failed to establish a prima facie case of sex or race discrimination for any of her claims because she did not demonstrate that similarly situated individuals outside her protected classes were treated more favorably in similar circumstances.
The Agency further found that the Agency provided legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions. Specifically, the Agency noted with respect to claim 1, S1 stated that he did not inform Complainant that she would be switched to a walking route, but he asked her to reconsider switching from Route CR538 because it was a heavy volume route, and it would be difficult for Complainant to complete her route within her eight-hour restrictions. S1 also stated that he suggested that Complainant consider Route CR520, and she requested time to think about that matter. S1 stated that Complainant called him that afternoon, and informed him that she could be switched to Route CR967, and the union representative concurred. S1 further stated that she was switched, after first getting Complainant's consent, from a high-volume, strenuous route to a much lower volume, less strenuous route out of her respect for her condition and because management did not want to have to provide auxiliary assistance daily to get Route CR 538 carried.
Regarding claim 2, S1 stated that he noticed on several occasions that Complainant had spent office time working on "review" mail, and he informed her that she was not to spend office time on that mail because that was the responsibility of the T-6 Carrier, who was responsible for that route. S1 further stated that he again noticed Complainant working on the review mail, and he asked the union president to accompany him so he could inform Complainant that she was not to work the review mail at the case. S1 stated that he monitored Complainant to ensure that his instructions were followed, but not for ten minutes.
Regarding claim 3, S1 stated that he asked Complainant if she was available to work the next morning and could come in early, and she said that she could. S1 stated that he asked Complainant when she needed to be off work, and it was his understanding that she needed to be off before 1:00 p.m. He stated that he thought that he had accommodated Complainant's request.
Regarding claim 4, the Agency noted that S1 stated that it was his decision to initiate an investigative interview and to request a LOW. S1 stated that Complainant was working for a delivery unit at another location, but the supervisor at that location asked S1 to conduct the investigative interview. S1 stated that he assigned Complainant to case and carry Route CR942 along with a 1.5 hours assignment on Route CR940. He stated that approximately 15 minutes later, Complainant approached him as he was talking to the Postmaster, and said that the assignment would take closer to two hours to complete. S1 stated that he then told Complainant to carry the Route CR940 assignment before she carried Route CR942. S1 also stated that it was standing policy to carry auxiliary assignments prior to carrying an assigned route, and that Complainant was issued the LOW because she did not follow instructions.
Regarding claim 5, S2 stated that she instructed Complainant to carry one hour of auxiliary time and then go carry the other route in its entirety. She stated that the instructions were repeated three times, and then another supervisor came over to repeat the same instructions. S2 further stated that Complainant continued to repeat the opposite of what was said to her each and every time, and each time, management said "No," that is not what was said and repeated the instruction.
Regarding claim 6, S3 stated that she could not recall placing a post-it note about Complainant's EEO meeting in an area visible to other employees, but the general practice is to put personal notes in the carrier's case. She stated that the ledge of the case is the most private place to leave a note, and generally, other carriers do not make it a practice of going to other cases "just to be nosy." S3 also stated that Complainant's case was behind her desk, and that would have been the most convenient and appropriate place for her leave a note to ensure it was received.
Regarding claim 7, the Agency noted that a City Carrier stated that he supervised Complainant
while she was on detail, and S3 conducted a driving observation and saw that Complainant failed to use a seat belt while driving and left her vehicle unlocked and unattended when she entered a building. He stated that S3 then made the decision for him to give Complainant an investigative interview. The City Carrier stated that he observed Complainant talking on a telephone while driving an Agency vehicle, and that Complainant was suspended because she had prior discipline. S3 stated that, during the interview, Complainant could not remember if she used her seat belt while driving, and she was issued a suspension because she was observed driving without her seat belt and leaving her vehicle unsecured. S3 further stated that Agency regulations and Indiana state law required seat belts to be worn at all times when a vehicle was in motion.
Regarding claim 8, S3 stated that Complainant presented her with medical documentation that said that she could only work eight hours per day, but the documentation did not say why she could only work eight hours. S3 further stated that she checked with the Postmaster to see if the documentation was adequate, and Human Resources advised the Postmaster that Complainant needed to provide additional information. S3 stated that a letter was then issued to Complainant advising her to provide additional documentation. S3 stated that Complainant was not scheduled to work more than eight hours as soon as she provided documentation to substantiate this request. Regarding claim 9, S1 and the AS stated that they did not have any knowledge of this matter.
CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
On appeal, Complainant maintains that the Agency's final decision erred in finding that she was not subjected to unlawful discrimination or harassment and reiterates her allegations. For example, Complainant maintains that she provided management with medical documentation to substantiate her eight-hour per day work restrictions on November 19, 2011. Complainant further maintains that she had a motorized route but was then reassigned to a walking route. Complaint also maintains that S1 subjected her to excessive supervision by standing behind her, staring at her, following her to the parking lot, and coming to her route.
Complainant argues that, on July 21, 2011, she verbally made a request to S1 to have the entire day off on July 23, 2011, so that she could attend her baby's 1:00 p.m. funeral, but S1 forced her to work on that day until 12:37 p.m. Complainant maintains that she had to change into funeral clothes in the Agency restroom because S1 denied her requested bereavement leave. Complainant also maintains that she did not need excessive supervision from June 13, 2011, until June 22, 2011, because, during this time period, she never failed to follow instructions. Complainant further contends that on October 25, 2011, S1 told another supervisor (S4) that Complainant was on the wrong route, but S1 did not tell Complainant at that time that she was on the wrong route, which would have prevented the need for the investigative interview. Complainant maintains that she does not doubt that S1 told her not to perform auxiliary assignments first, but management knew she misunderstood the instructions.
Complainant also maintains that on November 16, 2011, S3 disclosed her confidential EEO activity when she put Complainant's EEO information on Complainant's time card, which was centrally located and visible to postal facility personnel as they clocked in to work. Complainant maintains that the EEO information was on a "post-it note" attached to time cards. The Agency does not present any arguments on appeal.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b), the Agency's decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9, � VI.A. (Nov. 9, 1999) (explaining that the de novo standard of review "requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker," and that EEOC "review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission's own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law").
EEO Activity Revealed
The Commission has stated that adverse actions need not qualify as "ultimate employment actions" or materially affect the terms and conditions of employment to constitute retaliation. EEOC Compliance Manual Section 8: Retaliation, No. 915.003. at 8-15 (May 20, 1998); see Burlington N. and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (finding that the anti-retaliation provision protects individuals from a retaliatory action that a reasonable person would have found "materially adverse," which in the retaliation context means that the action might have deterred a reasonable person from opposing discrimination or participating in the EEOC charge process). The statutory retaliation clauses prohibit any adverse treatment that is based upon a retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to deter the charging party or others from engaging in protected activity. Lindsey v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05980410 (November 4, 1999).
In this case, Complainant contends, and management does not deny, that S3 placed a "post-it note" on her time card that stated that she had an EEO appointment. Complainant stated that the note was placed in a public space and could be seen by co-workers. The Agency maintains that this is not reprisal because Complainant has not shown that other employees saw the note. However, placing information about Complainant's EEO activity in such a public, exposed place was inappropriate and could have revealed her EEO activity to numerous other employees. We find that S3's conduct is reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in EEO activity, and therefore violates Title VII's prohibition on retaliation.
Disparate Treatment and Hostile Work Environment
The remainder of Complainant's complaint can be analyzed as both a disparate treatment and hostile work environment claim. Generally, claims of disparate treatment are examined under the tripartite analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology. Inc., 425 F. Supp. 318, 324 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976). For Complainant to prevail, she must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
Once Complainant has established a prima facie case, the burden of production then shifts to the Agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). If the Agency is successful, the burden reverts back to Complainant to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the Agency's reason(s) for its action was a pretext for discrimination. At all times, Complainant retains the burden of persuasion, and it is her obligation to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715-16 (1983).
In order to establish a claim of hostile environment harassment, Complainant must show that: (1) she belongs to a statutorily protected class; (2) she was subjected to harassment in the form of unwelcome verbal or physical conduct involving the protected class; (3) the harassment complained of was based on her statutorily protected class; (4) the harassment affected a term or condition of employment and/or had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the work environment and/or creating an environment, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) there is a basis for imputing liability to the employer. See Henson v. City of Dundee. 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
In this case, we assume for purposes of analysis, and without so finding, that Complainant established a prima facie case of discrimination on each alleged bases. Nevertheless, we find that the Agency provided legitimate, non-discriminatory explanations for its actions, as recounted in detail above.
We note that Complainant acknowledges that during the relevant time period, she never worked beyond her medical restrictions, nor did she actually walk her route. Additionally, although Complainant maintains that she should not have been asked to bring in medical documentation explaining why she needed to be restricted to working only eight hours per day, six days per week, we determine that the Agency was entitled to request this information because her need for such a schedule was not apparent to management.
Regarding the investigative interview that led to a LOW, we note that Complainant acknowledges that she misunderstood management's instructions and carried the wrong route first, in violation of management's instructions. Regarding the investigative interview that led to a suspension, Complainant contends that she thought she had her lap belt on while in her vehicle, but she does not dispute management's contention that she left her vehicle unlocked and unattended when she entered a building, and talked on the telephone while driving.
Further, while Complainant overheard a management official inappropriately used profanity in the workplace, there is no evidence that this behavior was based on race, sex, or EEO activity. Finally, although Complainant claimed that management denied her request to have the day off to attend her baby's funeral, management disputes that Complainant asked for the entire day off, and there is no documentation of the request because Complainant made the request verbally. We note that this dispute about crucial facts could have been resolved through hearing testimony before an AJ, but Complainant withdrew her hearing request.
We find that Complainant has not provided any evidence that persuasively rebuts the Agency's explanations for its actions, and therefore, has not shown that the Agency's legitimate, non-discriminatory explanations for its actions were pretext for unlawful discrimination.
Further, under the standards set forth in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993), Complainant's claim of a hostile work environment must also fail. See Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (Max. 8, 1994). A finding of a hostile work environment is precluded by our determination that Complainant did not establish that any of the actions taken by the Agency as set forth above were motivated by discriminatory animus. See Oakley v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01982923 (Sept. 21, 2000). Consequently, we also find that the Agency properly found that Complainant did not prove that she was subjected to unlawful harassment.
CONCLUSION
Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the Agency's findings with respect to claims 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, and 9. The Commission also AFFIRMS the Agency's finding that Complainant was not subjected to sex or race discrimination with respect to claim 6. The Commission REVERSES the Agency's finding of no discrimination on the basis of reprisal with respect to claim 6 and REMANDS this matter to the Agency for further processing in accordance with this decision and the ORDER below.
ORDER
The Agency is ORDERED to undertake the following actions:
1. Within one hundred and twenty (120) calendar days from the date this decision becomes final, the Agency will conduct and complete a supplemental investigation on the issue of Complainant's entitlement to compensatory damages, and will afford her an opportunity to establish a causal relationship between the Agency's disclosure of her EEO activity and her pecuniary or non-pecuniary losses, if any. Complainant will cooperate in the Agency's efforts to compute the amount of compensatory damages, and will provide all relevant information requested by the Agency. The Agency will issue a final decision on the issue of compensatory damages. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110. The final decision shall contain appeal rights to the Commission. The Agency shall submit a copy of the final decision to the Compliance Officer at the address set forth herein.
2. Within one hundred and twenty (120) calendar days from the date this decision becomes final, the Agency shall provide at least eight hours of EEO training to the responsible management official identified as S3 regarding her responsibilities under Title VII, with special emphasis on the duty to avoid reprisal and improper disclosure of EEO activity.
3. The Agency shall consider taking appropriate disciplinary action against the responsible management official identified as S3l. The Agency shall report its decision to the Compliance Officer referenced herein. If the Agency decides to take disciplinary action, it shall identify the action taken. If the Agency decides not to take disciplinary action, it shall set forth the reason(s) for its decision not to impose discipline. If the responsible management official identified as S3 has left the Agency's employment, the Agency shall furnish documentation of her departure date.
4. The Agency shall post the notice referenced in the paragraph below entitled, "Posting Order."
5. The Agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision." The report shall include evidence that the corrective action has been implemented.
POSTING ORDER (G0914)
The Agency is ordered to post at its Lafayette, Indiana Post Office facility copies of the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being signed by the Agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted both in hard copy and electronic format by the Agency within 30 calendar days of the date this decision becomes final, and shall remain posted for 60 consecutive days, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. The Agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer at the address cited in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision," within 10 calendar days of the expiration of the posting period.
ATTORNEY'S FEES (H0610)
If Complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), she is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid by the Agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees to the Agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this decision becoming final. The Agency shall then process the claim for attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0610)
Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory. The Agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. The Agency's report must contain supporting documentation, and the Agency must send a copy of all submissions to the Complainant. If the Agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the Complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The Complainant also has the right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the Complainant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File a Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the Complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0610)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (T0610)
This decision affirms the Agency's final decision/action in part, but it also requires the Agency to continue its administrative processing of a portion of your complaint. You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision on both that portion of your complaint which the Commission has affirmed and that portion of the complaint which has been remanded for continued administrative processing. In the alternative, you may file a civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date you filed your complaint with the Agency, or your appeal with the Commission, until such time as the Agency issues its final decision on your complaint. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File a Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
May 12, 2015
Date
1 Complainant identifies her race as "Japanese-Asian."
2 We note that, although medical restrictions are relevant to this complaint, Complainant has not alleged she was subjected to discrimination on the basis of disability. Therefore, we do not review this complaint under the Rehabilitation Act.
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0120133300
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
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0120133300