Complainant,v.Penny Pritzker, Secretary, Department of Commerce (Bureau of the Census), Agency.Download PDFEqual Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 15, 20130120122284 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 15, 2013) Copy Citation U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Complainant, v. Penny Pritzker, Secretary, Department of Commerce (Bureau of the Census), Agency. Appeal No. 0120122284 Hearing No. 480-2011-00323X Agency No. 10-63-02902 DECISION On April 18, 2012, Complainant filed an appeal from the Agency’s April 3, 2012, final order concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s final order. BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Field Representative at the Agency’s Los Angeles Regional Office in Los Angeles, California. On August 28, 2010, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against him on the basis of his disability when, beginning in June 2010, management reduced his work hours and did not permit him to work 40 hours per week.1 1 In his formal complaint, Complainant also alleged that he was subjected to unlawful disability discrimination when: (1) in July 2009, management denied him a promotion to the position of Senior Field Representative; (2) in May 2010, management “wrote him up” for using more time than was allowed per case; and (3) the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs failed to pay him for the hours he did not work. In its Notice of Partial Acceptance, the Agency dismissed claims (1) and (2), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. §1614.107(a)(2), for untimely EEO Counselor contact. The Agency also dismissed claim (3), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. §1614.107(a)(1), as a collateral attack on another forum’s proceedings. Complainant did not challenge the Agency’s dismissal of these claims before the AJ and does not raise the issue on 0120122284 2 At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing. The AJ found that, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Complainant, a decision without a hearing was appropriate as there were no genuine issues of material fact in dispute, and issued a decision without a hearing on March 21, 2012, finding no discrimination. The Agency subsequently issued a final order adopting the AJ’s finding that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected him to discrimination as alleged. Complainant makes no arguments on appeal. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS As an initial matter we note that, as this is an appeal from a final decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b), the Agency’s decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). The Commission’s regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court’s function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party’s favor. Id. at 255. An issue of fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non- moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip.Corp., 846 F.2D 102, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is “material” if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, it is not appropriate for an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing. In the context of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly issue a decision without a hearing only upon a determination that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition. Petty v. Defense Security Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003); Murphy v. Dept. of the Army, EEOC Appeal No. 01A04099 (July 11, 2003). After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that a decision without a hearing was appropriate, as no genuine dispute of material fact exists. To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, Complainant must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme appeal. As such, the Commission declines to address these claims in the instant decision. Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (MD-110), 9-10 (Nov. 9, 1999) provides that the Commission has the discretion to only review those issues specifically raised on appeal. 0120122284 3 fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Complainant must generally establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that he was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). The prima facie inquiry may be dispensed with where the Agency has articulated legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct. See U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-17 (1983); Holley v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05950842 (Nov. 13, 1997). To ultimately prevail, Complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency’s explanation is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); Holley, supra; Pavelka v. Dep’t of the Navy, EEOC Request No, 05950351 (Dec. 14, 1995). Here, we find that, assuming arguendo, Complainant established a prima facie case of disability discrimination, the Agency nonetheless articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. Specifically, the record shows that Complainant was employed as an intermittent field representative assigned to conduct interviews of members of the public either by telephone or in person. As an intermittent employee, Complainant was not guaranteed a set number of hours, and the work was unpredictable as the number of hours worked by field representatives depended entirely on the number of cases assigned and the time spent completing each case. The record shows that during the period at issue, Complainant was assigned 137 cases, a higher workload than the majority of field representatives at Complainant’s facility. Further, we note that Complainant worked fewer hours during the period at issue because he took less time to complete each case than he had prior to June 2010, and that he had previously been reprimanded for not processing his cases in a timely fashion. We find that Complainant has proffered no evidence to show that the Agency’s actions were motivated by discriminatory animus or were a pretext for unlawful disability discrimination.2 CONCLUSION We find that viewing the record evidence in a light most favorable to Complainant, there are no genuine issues of material fact. We further find that the AJ appropriately issued a decision without a hearing finding no discrimination. Therefore, we discern no basis to disturb the AJ’s decision and the Agency’s final order is AFFIRMED. 2 We note that Complainant does not allege that the Agency denied him a reasonable accommodation. 0120122284 4 STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0610) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610) If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you 0120122284 5 and that the Court also permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above (“Right to File a Civil Action”). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations August 15, 2013 Date Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation