Complainant,v.Martin J. Gruenberg, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Agency.Download PDFEqual Employment Opportunity CommissionJun 14, 20130120120722 (E.E.O.C. Jun. 14, 2013) Copy Citation U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Complainant, v. Martin J. Gruenberg, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Agency. Appeal No. 0120120722 Hearing No. 471-2010-00039X Agency No. FDICEO-090020 DECISION Complainant filed an appeal from an Agency’s final order dated October 21, 2011, finding no discrimination with regard to her complaint. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM the Agency’s final order. BACKGROUND The record indicates that Complainant, a Financial Institution Specialist (FIS) under the Corporate Employee Program (CEP), filed her complaint on August 10, 2009, which was later amended, alleging discrimination as following: A. Whether she was subjected to a hostile work environment based on race (African- American) and age (over 40) when: (1) From October 2008, and continuing, she was not provided adequate training to allow her to complete the Risk Management (RM) rotation of the CEP, and her performance was scrutinized more than the other FIS employees; (2) On June 11, 2009, at the direction of the Chief, Performance Management, CEP, Corporate University (CU), she was denied the opportunity to move forward with the CEP and graduate with her FIS class on June 29, 2009, based on negative 0120120722 2 Developmental Feedback Forms (DFFs) she received between January, and June, 2009; (3) On June 19, 2009, she received a 45-day Letter of Warning (LOW) signed by the Chief; and (4) On July 17, 2009, she received a negative DFF that did not contain a logical evaluation of her performance and contained "needs development" ratings and that did not properly apply FDIC's performance management standards. (She also alleged that she was retaliated against regarding this incident.) B. Whether she was subjected to discrimination in reprisal for prior EEO activity when: (1) On July 2, 2009, the Detroit Field Supervisor threatened not to pay her for the time she was out on sick leave and she subsequently was not paid for two of the days she was out on sick leave; (2) On July 9, 2009, the Supervisory Examiner rejected her doctor's note as insufficient and instructed her to submit medical documentation that included diagnosis, prognosis and duration, when she took more than three days of sick leave; and (3) On July 9, 2009, when she returned from sick leave, she was told by the Detroit Field Supervisor that she should have reported to the Grand Rapids Field Office and that her pay would be reduced for the time she had been at the Detroit Field Office that day. She was subsequently not paid for one hour. C. Whether she was subject to retaliation and harassment based on race (African- American) and age (over 40) when on August 12, 2009, she received a DFF that contained "needs development" ratings and that did not properly apply FDICs performance management standards. D. Whether she was subject to retaliation and harassment based on race (African- American) and age (over 40) when: (1) On September 11, 2009, she received an unsigned DFF that contained "needs development" ratings and that did not properly apply FDIC's performance management standards for a FIS in the risk management rotation; (2) On September 21, 2009, she received a letter from the Deputy Learning Officer, CU, terminating her employment during her trial period for unsatisfactory performance, effective close of business September 23, 2009; and (3) On October 8, 2009 (pay period 19), she was paid for only 45 hours and not 63 hours of work during her last pay period of employment. The record indicates that at the conclusion of the investigation, Complainant requested a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). The AJ, after a hearing, issued a decision on October 14, 2011, finding no discrimination, which was implemented by the Agency in its final order. 0120120722 3 ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Substantial evidence is defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held. An AJ’s credibility determination based on the demeanor of a witness or on the tone of voice of a witness will be accepted unless documents or other objective evidence so contradicts the testimony or the testimony so lacks in credibility that a reasonable fact finder would not credit it. See EEOC Management Directive 110, Chapter 9, § VI.B. (November 9, 1999). In this case, assuming arguendo that Complainant established a prima facie case of discrimination, the AJ determined that the Agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the alleged incidents. The AJ noted that on March 3, 2008, Complainant began her employment with the Agency, subject to a two-year probationary period, as a FIS in the Agency’s CEP. Under the CEP, Complainant was required to complete a series of rotational assignments during her first year of employment and ultimately become a commissioned bank examiner within four years. The record indicates that Complainant successfully completed rotations in the Division of Supervision and Consumer Protection and the Division of Resolutions and Receiverships. With regard to claims A(1), A(2), and A(3), the AJ stated that in October 2008, Complainant began her final RM rotation which consisted of her being out in the field for bank examinations with a team of Agency bank examiners and being given various component assignments to complete. During the RM rotation, indicated the AJ, all FIS employees, including Complainant, were provided with training and instructions by the Examiner in Charge (EIC) who gave feedback through use of a DFF. The AJ stated that DFFs were frequently provided to FIS employees late, sometimes by up to a few months and after the FIS had completed other bank assignments. The AJ stated that Complainant, after her fifth bank examination, received a “needs development” rating on her DFF indicating that she was being difficult and not following instructions given to her by a senior FIS and meeting with bankers without another examiner present, which was contrary to guidance she had previously received. The AJ indicated that Complainant’s subsequent bank examinations also revealed that she was repeatedly questioning instructions given to her and not completing her assigned work at all or in a timely manner. Also, stated the AJ, Complainant had problems with her team and interpersonal skills, including being argumentative, not being receptive to receiving feedback, and refusing to attend a feedback meeting. Thus, Complainant received several “needs development” ratings on her DFFs. Due to her performance deficiencies, stated the AJ, Complainant was issued the 0120120722 4 LOW on June 19, 2009, and was informed that she would not be graduating with her class. In the LOW, Complainant was informed that she would be working on development bank assignments, including acting as an Operations Manger (OM), in order to help her to improve her performance. Regarding this incident, the AJ determined that Complainant failed to show that she was treated less favorably than a similarly situated employee under similar circumstances. With regard to claims B(1) and B(2), Complainant claimed that she was sick from June 23, through June 30, 2009. The Agency stated that during the relevant time period at issue, although Complainant was asked to provide medical documentations to support her more than three days of sick leave, she only provided a doctor’s note stating that “[Complainant] was seen in this office on 06-24-2009. Her next appointment is scheduled for 07-09-2009.” The AJ stated that the foregoing note, without any medical diagnosis, prognosis, and duration, did not justify her seven days of sick leave. The Agency stated that Complainant was properly paid for three days of sick leave, for which she did not need documentation, and two days of annual leave, but she was not paid for the two days of sick leave for which she did not provide the required documentation. With regard to claim B(3), the AJ noted that prior to the relevant time period at issue, Complainant took preapproved annual leave through July 8, 2009, following her sick leave, described above, and as a result, she was not able to participate in her first development assignment under the LOW. The AJ stated that on July 9, 2009, Complainant erroneously reported to the Livonia office for her work instead of the Grand Rapids office as she was previously instructed to do. The AJ indicated that as a result, Complainant was required to report to the Grand Rapids office and was denied pay for the time she had not reported to the correct office. With regard to claims A(4), C, D(1), and D(2), the AJ stated that during her LOW development assignments, Complainant continued to have performance issues and resisted feedback and received a number of “needs development” ratings on her DFFs. Based on the foregoing, the Chief recommended Complainant’s removal from her employment during her probationary period. The Deputy Learning Officer, based on the Chief’s recommendation, issued Complainant the letter of termination. In the letter, Complainant was also given an option to resign instead of termination. Complainant resigned effective September 23, 2009. With regard to D(3), the AJ stated that Complainant was not paid for those hours at issue due to a miscommunication and the payment was ultimately made to her but was delayed due to a clerical error and not due to any discrimination. Based on the foregoing, the AJ determined and we agree that the record was devoid of any evidence that Complainant was treated differently than a similarly situated employee under similar circumstances. The AJ also determined that Complainant did not have the initiative, self-study, or ambition similar to other FIS employees, identified by her, who successfully completed the program. Rather, Complainant, stated the AJ, was characterized as difficult and argumentative and was resistant and refused to attend a feedback meeting. The AJ determined 0120120722 5 that Complainant failed to establish a case of hostile work environment on any discriminatory basis. The AJ also determined and we agree that Complainant failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Agency’s proffered reasons were pretextual. On appeal, Complainant disputes the AJ’s findings by raising new matters, including the terms of her employment subjecting her to a two-year probationary period, which are not the issue in the instant case nor were they raised by her during the hearing. We note that the record clearly indicates that Complainant agreed to the terms of her employment at the beginning of her employment. Complainant also claims that her EIC’s feedback concerning her work performance via DFFs was improper and inadequate. However, we find that these matters were already presented to the AJ during the hearing and the AJ properly considered the matters in her decision. After a review of the record, we find that Complainant failed to show that her work performance, which was the ultimate basis for her termination, during the relevant time period at issue, was in fact adequate to meet her probationary requirements. Upon review, we find that the AJ’s factual findings of no discriminatory intent are supported by substantial evidence in the record. CONCLUSION After a review of the record in its entirety, including consideration of all statements submitted on appeal, the Agency’s final order is AFFIRMED because the AJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0610) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days 0120120722 6 of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610) If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above (“Right to File a Civil Action”). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations June 14, 2013 Date Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation