Compass Bankv.Intellectual Ventures II LLCDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardMar 9, 201509178606 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 9, 2015) Copy Citation Trials@uspto.gov Paper 22 571-272-7822 Entered: March 9, 2015 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ COMPASS BANK, COMMERCE BANCSHARES, INC., and FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF OMAHA, Petitioners, v. INTELLECTUAL VENTURES II LLC, Patent Owner. ____________ Case IPR2014-00719 1 Patent 6,314,409 B2 Before KRISTEN L. DROESCH, JENNIFER S. BISK, and JUSTIN BUSCH, Administrative Patent Judges. DROESCH, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON REQUEST FOR REHEARING 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) 1 Case IPR2014-00722 has been consolidated with the instant proceeding. IPR2014-00719 Patent 6,314,409 2 I. INTRODUCTION Compass Bank, Commerce Bancshares, Inc., and First National Bank of Omaha (collectively “Petitioners”) filed two Petitions to institute an inter partes review of claims 1–11, 13–21, 23–27, 29, 30, 32, 33, and 36–39 of U.S. Patent No 6,314,409 B2 (“the ’409 Patent”). Paper 1. We instituted review of only claim 23 of the ’409 Patent and consolidated the proceedings for both trials. Paper 11. Intellectual Ventures (“Patent Owner”) filed a Request for Adverse Judgment and disclaimer of claim 23. Paper 17. Pursuant to Patent Owner’s Request, we entered Judgment against claim 23 of the ’409 Patent on December 12, 2014. Paper 19. Petitioners filed a Request for Rehearing of the Judgment and Final Written Decision. Paper 20 (“Req. Reh’g”). For the reasons that follow, Petitioners’ Request for Rehearing is denied. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW In its request for rehearing, the dissatisfied party must identify, specifically, all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). III. DISCUSSION Petitioners “request rehearing of the Board’s judgment and final written decision . . . because the final written decision did not address all of the claims challenged by Petitioners as required by 35 U.S.C. § 318(a).” Req. Reh’g 1. Petitioners contend that, in issuing a final written decision addressing only claim 23, the Board violated § 318(a), and it must rehear the decision and issue a final written decision that addresses all of the claims IPR2014-00719 Patent 6,314,409 3 challenged in the Petition (i.e., claims 1–11, 13–21, 23–27, 29, 30, 32, 33, and 36–39). Id. at 2. Petitioners argue that the statutory text of 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) “is plain and unambiguous ––‘the Patent Trial and Appeal Board shall issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner’–– and when statutory text is plain and unambiguous, it must be applied according to its terms.” Req. Reh’g 3 (citing Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1895–96 (2013); Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 387 (2009); Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450, 461–62 (2002)); see id. at 1–2. Petitioners argue “Congress included the words ‘any patent claim challenged’ in order to express its intention that the Board’s final written decision must address all of the claims challenged in a petition.” Id. at 3–4 (citing United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 362–63 (1945); Barseback Kraft AB v. United States, 121 F.3d 1475, 1480–81 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Joseph Morton Co. v. United States, 757 F.2d 1273, 1278–80 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). Petitioners assert that “other sections of the statute illustrate what Congress meant by a ‘patent claim challenged by the petitioner,’” referring to 35 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(3) and 314. Req. Reh’g 4. Petitioners further contend that because the Patent and Trademark Office has not issued any rule or regulation interpreting § 318(a) to mean that the Board’s final written decision need not address all of the claims challenged in the petition, the Patent and Trademark Office “has impliedly recognized the clarity of § 318(a).” Req. Reh’g 5 (citing United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct 1836, 1843–44 (2012)). Petitioners argue that the lack of any regulation interpreting § 318(a) is in IPR2014-00719 Patent 6,314,409 4 contrast to the rules and regulations regarding the institution of inter partes review. Id. at 5–6 (citing 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.104 (b), 42.108 (a)–(c)). Petitioners contend that the Office’s regulations refer to the “claim challenged” or “challenged claims” when referring to the petition content and threshold requirements for institution of inter partes review, but refers to “all or some” or “some or all” of the challenged claims when addressing the scope of an inter partes review. Id. (citing 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.104(b), 42.108 (a)–(c)). Petitioners contend that interpreting “claim challenged,” as used in § 318(a) to mean only a claim for which inter partes review is instituted is inconsistent with the meaning attributed to the nearly identical terms in §§ 42.104 (b) and 42.108 (a)–(c). Id. at 6. Petitioners also argue that the overall statutory scheme requires that any final written decision address all of the claims challenged in a petition because the final written decision will only have limited estoppel effect under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e). Req. Reh’g 7. Petitioners assert that Congress intended for an instituted inter partes review to dispose of all of the grounds that could be raised under §§ 102 and 103 with respect to the claims challenged in the petition if the proceeding resulted in a final written decision, and also intended that an instituted inter partes review that resulted in a final written decision would be subject to appellate review. Id. at 7–8 (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 141(c), 311(b), 315(e), 319; 157 Cong. Rec. S1376 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011)). Petitioners contend that by omitting analysis of some of the claims from the final written decision, “the Board impermissibly shields this portion of its analysis and decision-making from the appellate oversight intended by Congress.” Id. at 8 (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 141(c), 314(d), 319). IPR2014-00719 Patent 6,314,409 5 We are not persuaded that we misapprehended or overlooked § 318(a). Notably absent from Petitioner’s arguments is any discussion of 35 U.S.C. § 316(a). Section § 316 requires the Director of the Patent and Trademark Office to “prescribe regulations . . . setting forth the standards for the showing of sufficient grounds to institute a review under section 314(a),” and “establishing and governing inter partes review under this chapter,” 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(2), (4). One of the prescribed regulations, 37 C.F.R. § 42.108, provides the following instructions: “[w]hen instituting inter partes review, the Board may authorize the review to proceed on all or some of the challenged claims and on all or some of the grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim,” and “may deny some or all grounds for unpatentability for some or all of the challenged claims. Denial of a ground is a Board decision not to institute inter partes review on that ground.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a), (b). Another prescribed regulation, 37 C.F.R. § 42.73, provides the following instructions: “[a]ctions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include . . . cancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial,” and “[a] petitioner . . . is estopped in the Office from requesting or maintaining a proceeding with respect to a claim for which it has obtained a final written decision on patentability in an inter partes review . . . on any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during the trial . . . .” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b), (d) (emphasis added). A trial is “a contested case instituted by the Board based upon a petition,” and “specifically includes . . . an inter partes review under Chapter 31.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.2. In light of the regulations prescribed properly by the Director pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 316, we are not persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments that IPR2014-00719 Patent 6,314,409 6 § 318(a) requires issuance of a final written decision with respect to the patentability of all of the patent claims challenged by the petition. Therefore, we are not persuaded that we misapprehended or overlooked 35 U.S.C. § 318(a). IV. DECISION ON REHEARING Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing is denied. IPR2014-00719 Patent 6,314,409 7 PETITIONERS: Joseph Melnik jmelnik@jonesday.com Geoffrey K. Gavin ggavin@jonesday.com Marc Vander Tuig mvandertuig@senniger.com Jason Jackson Jason.jackson@kutakrock.com PATENT OWNER: Lori Gordon lgordon-PTAB@skgf.com Jonathan Strang Jstrang-ptab@skg.com Donald Coulman dcoulman@intven.com Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation