Comcast Cable Communications, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

May 5, 2020

2019002215 (P.T.A.B. May. 5, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/789,517 07/01/2015 Mehul Patel 26141.0227U1 7149
16000 7590 05/05/2020
Comcast
c/o Ballard Spahr LLP
999 Peachtree Street, Suite 1000
Atlanta, GA 30309
EXAMINER
NGUYEN, TIEN M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2423
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/05/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
USpatentmail@ballardspahr.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MEHUL PATEL and EDWARD DAVID MONNERAT
Appeal 2019-002215
Application 14/789,517
Technology Center 2400
Before LARRY J. HUME, LINZY T. McCARTNEY, and BETH Z. SHAW,
Administrative Patent Judges.
SHAW, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL

Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–6 and 8–24. See Final Act. 1. We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Comcast Cable
Communications. Appeal Br. 1.
Appeal 2019-002215
Application 14/789,517

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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to a methods and systems for providing
primary content and secondary content. Claim 1, reproduced below, is
illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method comprising:
providing primary content to a first device, wherein the
primary content comprises at least a first portion and a second
portion and wherein the first device is associated with a user;
determining a user parameter related to secondary content;
transmitting a token to a second device, wherein one or
more functions of the second device are affected in response to a
number of unfulfilled tokens on the second device satisfying a
threshold, wherein the token is fulfilled in response to an
indication that the secondary content has been presented by the
second device;
providing, based on the user parameter, the secondary
content to the second device, wherein the second device is
associated with the user; and
providing the second portion of the primary content to the
first device immediately following the first portion of the
primary content.
Appeal Br. 11 (Claims App.).
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner as evidence is:
Name Reference Date
Watchfogel US 2002/0138831 A1 Sept. 26, 2002
Vrielink US 2008/0301743 A1 Dec. 4, 2008
Shang US 2011/0166917 A1 July 7, 2011
Davis US 2014/0088975 A1 Mar. 27, 2014
Bhogal US 2015/0067714 A1 Mar. 5, 2015
Lewis US 2015/0363837 A1 Dec. 17, 2015

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Application 14/789,517

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REJECTIONS
Claims 1–5, 8, 9, 12–15, 18, 19, 21–24 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as unpatentable over the combination of Bhogal, Shang, and Lewis.
Final Act. 8.
Claims 6 and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over the combination of Bhogal, Shang, Lewis, and Vrielink. Final Act. 25.
Claims 10, 16, and 17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over the combination of Bhogal, Shang, Lewis, and
Watchfogel. Final Act. 26.
Claim 11 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over the
combination of Bhogal, Shang, Lewis, and Davis. Final Act. 29.
OPINION
Appellant argues the Examiner erred in finding Bhogal, Shang, and
Lewis teach or suggest the following limitations of claim 1:
transmitting a token to a second device, wherein one or more
functions of the second device are affected in response to a number of
unfulfilled tokens on the second device satisfying a threshold, wherein
the token is fulfilled in response to an indication that the secondary
content has been presented by the second device.

Appeal Br. 6, 7.
The Token is Fulfilled
First, Appellant concedes that the cited portion of Shang discloses
transmitting a “token-embedded ad” to a “user device.” Appeal Br. 6. The
“token” is then compared to a list of tokens in a “token cache” for
verification. Id. A “user credit account” associated with the “user device”
can then be updated. Id. Appellant argues, however, that the cited portions of
Shang are silent as to any “fulfillment” of the token, let alone “in response to
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Application 14/789,517

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an indication that the secondary content has been presented.” Id. Rather,
Appellant argues, Shang limits its discussion to the “token” as being used to
identify and credit or debit an “advertiser debit account” and a “user credit
account.” Id.
The Examiner finds, and we agree, that Bhogal teaches transmitting
an instruction along with an advertisement to a second device, and Shang
teaches the concept of sending a token with an advertisement by embedding
a token in an advertisement and transmitting the token-embedded
advertisement to a recipient device. Ans. 8. Appellant does not dispute
Bhogal’s individual teachings in this regard. See Appeal Br. 6, 7.
The Examiner explains that the combination of Bhogal in view of
Shang teaches transmitting a token to the second device (by transmitting a
token-embedded advertisement) and that Shang further discloses in
paragraph 46 that “[i]n response to the display of the token-embedded ad on
the display device 112, the user device 104 sends the detected token 120
back to the network head end 102.” Id. Thus, the combination of Bhogal and
Shang further teaches that the token is fulfilled in response to an indication
that the advertisement has been presented or displayed on the second device.
Id.
We agree with the Examiner’s findings and conclusions. Ans. 7, 8.
Appellant’s Specification does not explain fulfillment of a token other than
to state that a “token can be fulfilled (e.g., deleted from memory) by
streaming the secondary content” and that a “second device can receive a
token that is fulfilled once the secondary content has been streamed.” Spec.
¶¶ 41, 45. Thus, Appellant’s Specification discloses deletion from memory
or streaming secondary content as non-limiting examples related to
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fulfillment of a token. Id. Appellant provides insufficient evidence to
persuade us that the Specification or claims limit “fulfilled” in a way that,
under a broad but reasonable interpretation, is not encompassed by Shang’s
teachings of either a user credit/debit, or sending the token back to the
network head end 102 in response to the display of the advertisement on the
user device. Shang ¶ 46. As the Examiner explains, the user account is
credited and the token is sent back to the network head end 102 in response
to an indication that the advertisement has been displayed on the second
device. Ans. 8; Shang ¶¶ 46, 48, 54–56.
A Number of Unfulfilled Tokens on the Second Device Satisfying a
Threshold
The Examiner finds that Bhogal and Shang, as discussed above, teach
sending advertisements and embedding tokens in the advertisements. Ans. 7,
8. The Examiner finds the combination of Bhogal, Shang, and Lewis teaches
that “one or more functions of the second device are affected” in response to
“a number of unfulfilled tokens” on the second device satisfying a threshold.
Ans. 10.2
Appellant argues that even if the token-embedded ads of Shang
disclose a token, the tokens of the unviewed ads of Shang are not “on the

2 In the event of further prosecution, the Examiner may wish to consider
whether this portion of claim 1 satisfies the written description requirement
of 35 U.S.C. § 112: “wherein one or more functions of the second device are
affected in response to a number of unfulfilled tokens on the second device
satisfying a threshold.” Paragraph 41 of Appellant’s Specification states in
one sentence that the “second device can be prevented from performing one
or more functions while the device contains a predetermined number of
unfulfilled tokens,” but does not appear to explain what those functions are
or what it might mean to “affect” a “function.”
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second device.” Appeal Br. 7. We are not persuaded by this unsupported
attorney argument because Figures 7, 8 and paragraph 46 of Shang teach
sending a token-embedded advertisement to the user device even before the
advertisement is viewed. See, e.g., Shang ¶ 46, Fig. 7, elements 252–256;
Fig. 8, element 308; Fig. 2. Thus, Shang at least suggests a number of
“unfulfilled tokens on the second device,” as recited in claim 1.
Appellant also argues that Lewis does not disclose “a number of
unfulfilled tokens of the second device satisfying a threshold.” Appeal Br. 7.
In particular, Appellant argues that the claim recites a number of unfulfilled
tokens on the second device, whereas the Examiner asserts Lewis teaches
one or more functions of the user device affected in response to a number of
advertisements. Id. (emphases added).
Lewis teaches “means for determining that the number of
advertisements in the queue is greater than or equal to a threshold number of
advertisements; and means for causing the presentation of the media content
item to be inhibited in response to determining that the number of
advertisements is greater than or equal to the threshold.” Lewis ¶ 13; see
also Lewis ¶¶ 74–76. Appellant’s arguments regarding Lewis’s individual
shortcomings in teaching a number of unfulfilled “tokens” are unavailing
because the Examiner does not rely solely on Lewis alone for teaching the
recited elements, but rather the cited prior art collectively—including that
Shang teaches sending token-embedded advertisements, and Lewis teaches
determining that a number of advertisements in a queue is greater than or
equal to a threshold. See Ans. 7, 8. Therefore, Appellant’s arguments do
not show nonobviousness where, as here, the rejection is based on the cited
references’ collective teachings.
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Appellant does not argue the Examiner’s rationale in combining the
references, and we discern no error therein. In an obviousness analysis, prior
art references must be “considered together with the knowledge of one of
ordinary skill in the pertinent art,” In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed.
Cir. 1994), and we “take account of the inferences and creative steps that a
person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex
Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). On this record, we find (and Appellant does
not dispute) the Examiner has articulated ample “reasoning with some
rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” KSR,
550 U.S. at 418.
Appellant does not add any new arguments in the Reply Brief. See
Reply Br. 2. In the absence of sufficient evidence or line of technical
reasoning to the contrary, the Examiner’s findings in the Final Rejection and
Answer are supported by the record, and we find no reversible error.
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 1 under § 103. We also
sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejections of the remaining claims on
appeal. Despite nominally arguing some of these claims separately,
Appellant reiterates similar arguments made in connection with claim 1, and
alleges that the additional cited prior art fails to cure those purported
deficiencies. Appeal Br. 7–9. We are not persuaded by these arguments for
the reasons previously discussed.
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CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejections.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis  Affirmed Reversed
1–5, 8, 9,
12–15, 18,
19, 21–24
103 Bhogal, Shang, Lewis 1–5, 8, 9,
12–15, 18,
19, 21–24

6, 20 103 Bhogal, Shang, Lewis,
Vrielink
6, 20
10, 16, 17 103 Bhogal, Shang, Lewis,
Watchfogel
10, 16, 17
11 103 Bhogal, Shang, Lewis,
Davis
11
Overall
Outcome:
  1–6, 8–24
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED