Colonial Parking, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Sep 30, 2015

05-CA-141241 (N.L.R.B. Sep. 30, 2015)

JD–57–15
Washington, DC
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
COLONIAL PARKING
and Case 5–CA–141241
UNITE HERE LOCAL 23
Timothy P. Bearese, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Peter G. Fischer and Bryan O’Keefe, Esqs.
(Baker & Hostetler, LLP), for the Respondent.
Samantha Schnoerr, Esq. (Unite Here), Washington, D.C.,
for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MICHAEL A. ROSAS, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in Washington, D.C.
on July 7–10 and 13, 2015. United Here Local 23 (the Union) timely filed a charge and two
amended charges and the General Counsel issued a complaint on April 21, 2015. The complaint,
as amended, alleges that two managers employed by Colonial Parking at a Ritz-Carlton Hotel in
Washington, D.C. (the Company), at various times between August and December 2014,1
unlawfully interrogated employees, created the impression that employees’ union activity was
under surveillance, threatened employees with termination and other unspecified reprisals related
to their union activities, and engaged in reprisals by disciplining, denying leave requests and
employment references to employees who engaged in union activity. The Company denies the
managers made any coercive statements, asserts the alleged adverse action against two
employees were not motivated by discriminatory animus, but rather, valid business reasons and
practices, and contends the allegations stem from the Union’s attempts to exert pressure on the
Company through the Board’s legal processes during on-going first contract negotiations.
On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and
after considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel and the Company, I make the following

1 All dates are in 2014 unless otherwise indicated.
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2
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION5
The Company, a corporation, is engaged in providing parking valet services at hotel
facilities in Washington, District of Columbia (the District) where it annually purchases and
receives products, goods and materials valued in excess of $5,000 directly from points located
outside the District. The Company admits, and I find, that it is an employer engaged in 10
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act
(the Act)2 and the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
15
A. The Company’s Operations
The Company manages the parking operations of the two Ritz-Carlton hotels in
Washington, D.C. – one at 22nd Street NW and another in the Georgetown section. It employs
approximately 40 full-time and part-time valet attendants, lead attendants, cashiers, and20
maintenance workers at both facilities. Twenty-five of those employees are based at the Ritz-
Carlton’s 22nd Street location (the facility).
The allegations in the complaint focus on the activities of the Company’s two managers at
the facility – Mesfin Taye and Hana Jorji. Taye, a former parking attendant fluent in English and 25
Amharic, has served as the Company’s senior operations manager at both facilities since the
Company took over the facility’s parking contract from Central Parking on August 1, 2013. He
worked in a similar capacity for Central Parking before the transition in August 2013.
Jorji, a former cashier, has been the facility’s project manager since 2012. In that 30
capacity, she supervises daily operations, sets employee schedules, approves leave requests,
supervises employee time, attendance and performance, and issues discipline in consultation
with Taye.
Taye and Jorji have a long history with unions, first as members and then as managers. 35
Jorji, in particular, was an active supporter and shop steward with the Union and its predecessor,
Local 27. As managers, their labor relations with unions prior to August 2013 have been
uneventful. Taye is a member of the Company’s collective-bargaining committee.3

2 29 USC §§ 151-169.
3 The Company attempted to elicit testimony from employee Elfenesh Gedele that Taye never asked
him about the Union. After the General Counsel’s objection was sustained, the Company proffered
additional, but similarly objectionable, testimony by 23 witnesses who, if allowed to testify, would have
testified that it was not part of Taye’s past practice to speak with employees about union matters,
including the petition. As indicated in the record, I refused to receive such testimony, citing the
inapplicability of FRE 406. I also explained the inapplicability of the past bad acts provision of FRE 404
in this instance. (Tr. 381–385.) See United States v. Barry, 814 F.2d 1400, 1403-04 (9th Cir.1987). In
any event, there is no evidence, prior to 2014, that Taye had any grievances or unfair labor practice
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3
Originally from Ethiopia like most of their subordinates, Taye and Jorji succeeded in
having the Company retain most of them after it assumed operations in 2013. The employees
who made the transition included Elene Gebremariam, Fissha Abraham, and Yosef Woldhanna,
all involved in the activities of the Union’s executive committee.45
B. The Company’s Time and Attendance Rules
In August 2013, the Company provided employees with an employee handbook which
includes an attendance and punctuality policy:10
To maintain a safe and productive work environment, Colonial Parking expects
employees to be reliable and to be punctual in reporting for scheduled work. Absenteeism
and tardiness place a burden on other employees and on Colonial. In the more instances
when you cannot avoid being late to work or are unable to work as scheduled, you should 15
notify your supervisor as soon as possible in advance of the anticipated tardiness or
absence, at a minimum of one hour in advance.5
The Company’s progressive disciplinary policy includes the following levels of
discipline: oral warning, written warning, probation, suspension, and termination.6 The policy is 20
not, however, always implemented in a progressive manner as managers have the discretion to
assess the level of discipline deemed appropriate under the circumstances.7
Instances of discipline for time and attendance were rare, however, as the Company
merely asked that employees notify Jorji or, in her absence, Taye, in advance by cellular 25
telephone call or text message if they were going to be late or absent. Jorji was easily accessible
by telephone or text communication, and it was only those instances of lateness or absence in
which employees did not call that created operational difficulties.8
C. The Union30
Employees at both facilities were represented by the Union during Central Parking’s
tenure. As noted above, the Company retained most Central Parking employees when it assumed
the facility’s parking operations in August 2013. On February 17, the Company formally
recognized the Union as their collective-bargaining representative. The recognition agreement35

charges filed against him. Nor was there any evidence that he ever expressed antiunion sentiments prior
to August 2014. (Tr. 391–392.)
4 The contentions of Taye and Jorji that they advocated for the Company’s retention of most
personnel are undisputed. (Tr. 621–624.)
5 The Company-wide distribution of the employee handbook is not disputed. (R. Exh. 9; Tr. 129,
204, 337, 365, 394, 410–411, 620.)
6 GC Ex. 3.
7 The Company skips disciplinary levels when the nature of an infraction warrants more severe
discipline. (Tr. 556–559.)
8 Jorji provided undisputed testimony that she was easily accessible during work and nonworking
hours. (Tr. 581–582, 599, 617–618, 633–635.)
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defines the bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section
9(b) of the Act:
All full-time and part-time employees employed by Colonial at the Ritz Carlton Parking
operations located at 3100 South Street, N.W. and 1150 22nd Street, N.W., in 5
Washington, District of Columbia, including Attendants, Valet Attendants, Cashiers, and
Maintenance employees, but excluding managers, confidential employees, clerical
employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the National Labor Relations Act.9
D. Employee Scheduling Changes10
During Central Parking’s parking operations at the facility prior to August 2013,
employee monthly schedules were posted in the valet office on a board with a note at the top
stating that “no changes can be made without manager approval.” Below the list of employees
with assigned schedules were the names of several on-call employees without assigned shifts.1015
Upon assuming parking operations at the facility on August 1, 2013, the Company issued
a policy regarding work schedules, as reflected in the employee handbook, stating in pertinent
part:
20
Staffing needs and operational demands may necessitate variations in starting and ending
times, as well as variations in the total hours that may be scheduled each day and week.” .
. . Your work schedule may include assignments on Saturdays and Sundays. At its
discretion, the Company may require you to work overtime, including weekends if
necessary, depending on your position, assigned location, and general requirements of the 25
business.11
Upon taking over parking operations in August 2013, without notifying the Union, the
Company implemented the aforementioned scheduling policy by replacing the note at the top of
the posted monthly schedules with another one stating: “this schedule is subject to change based 30
on operation[al] needs . . .” Employees’ schedules did not change, however, as a result of the
changes to the notation at the top of the posted monthly schedules.12
E. Employees Unsatisfied With Collective Bargaining Engage in Protected Activity
35
After the Company recognized the Union as its employees’ labor representative, the
parties commenced bargaining. From April to August, they met for two bargaining sessions, but

9 GC Exh. 10.
10 GC Exh. 9.
11 R. Exh. 9.
12 Several employees testified that the schedule posted during Central Parking’s operations, GC Exh.
9, carried over until approximately September, 2014, when it was replaced by GC Exh. 8. (Tr. 119–120,
125, 329–334, 342–343, 346, 354–355, 361, 364.) However, Jorji identified the names of 10 employees
(5 employees with scheduled shifts and 5 on-call employees) listed on GC Exh. 9 who were not hired by
the Company after it assumed operations in August 2013. The General Counsel did not refute such
evidence and, under the circumstances, I find that the posted monthly schedule listed in GC Exh. 8 was
posted in August 2013, and still in place as of September 2014. (Tr. 693–697.)
JD–57–15
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were unable to conclude an agreement. On August 1, several members of the Union’s
bargaining committee, including Woldhanna and Abraham, met with Union representatives
Sarah Jacobsen and Burt Bayou. They discussed bargaining strategy and a series of actions
demonstrating unity among unit employees and their desire for a quick resolution. Toward that
end, Jacobsen and Bayou recommended generating a petition to be signed by employees at both 5
locations. The employees agreed with that approach and Jacobsen and Bayou produced a
petition for these employees to circulate among coworkers at both hotel locations.13 The
“Petition for a Fair Contract” stated, in pertinent part:
Since the company has now started bargaining with us, we would like to express our 10
desires of what we believe we deserve. As valued workers of Colonial Parking at Ritz
Hotels, we demand to have the same rights and benefits as other union parking workers in
the city…We ask that Colonial Parking not delay our bargaining and to give us a contract
that is only fair to the hard work that we do to make its operations successful.14
15
Woldhanna, Gebremariam, Abraham and Ayele Dema began circulating the undated
petition in August.15 Over the course of August and September, a group of employees took the
petition to coworkers and secretly got 18 of them to sign it.16
Jacobsen and Bayou met again with employees at an area church on September 13. 20
Those in attendance included Woldhanna, Gebremariam, and Abraham. They discussed
strategy, which included having coworkers sign the petition and deciding how and when to
deliver it to Taye.17
F. Taye and Jorji Interrogate and Threaten Employees25
Notwithstanding the secretive nature by which employees solicited petition signatures,
the subsequent conduct of Taye and Jorji reveals that they learned the names of employees who
circulated and/or signed the petition.
30
On August 13, after he began circulating the petition, Woldhanna asked Taye for a letter
of recommendation in connection with an application for taxi driver’s license. Taye refused and

13 There was conflicting and confusing employee witness testimony as to the purpose of the petition
and the dates of meetings and employees who attended. Some of this was attributable to difficulties with
the interpretation of witness testimony or the Company’s cross-examination, which confused bargaining
sessions with other employee meetings. (Tr. 64–65, 74, 91–92, 100, 154, 322, 325–326.) I did, however,
find Sarah Jacobsen generally credible and base most of the chronology regarding the meetings on her
testimony. (Tr. 28–29.)
14 GC Exh. 2.
15 Again, there was conflicting testimony among the General Counsel’s witnesses as to when this
activity began, but it, the credible evidence indicates that the petition circulated among employees after
mid-August. (Tr. 81, 154, 350–351.)
16 The General Counsel’s witnesses provided vague testimony as to when they signed the undated
petition during August and September. (Tr. 72, 154, 160.)
17 Jacobsen credibly recollected this date because it took place 2 days after the Ethiopian New Year.
(Tr. 30.) The employee witnesses confused this date with other meetings. (Tr. 94–95, 103–104, 219–220,
322, 336, 361.)
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remarked: “you expect me to write you this letter while at the same time you are making papers
to sign petition to join the Union . . . I have already reported to headquarters that you are not
going to join the Union . . . I could have written a bad letter to you. Up until now you and we
were like family members, living in peace, in good terms. From now on, we are not going to
continue the sentiment of family-ship.” He also asked Woldhanna why he thought the petition 5
would not hurt the Company and why he signed it.18
During late August, Jorji asked Tewodoros Wadimu, a valet attendant, why he signed the
petition. Wadimu lied, denying that he signed the petition. Jorji responded that signing the
petition was “useless” and “doesn’t help the employee.”1910
During the same period of time, Jorji approached Gebremariam in the cashier’s office and
asked if she signed the petition. Gebremariam acknowledged signing it. Jorji responded that, by
signing the petition, the employees made her a “liar” with the “office” and asked Gebremariam
why she signed the petition if she previously mentioned she would not join the Union. 15
Gebremariam denied ever telling Jorji that she would not join the Union. Jorji concluded with a
cryptic remark that “whoever signed on this paper, you guys will pay for it.”20
Jorji followed up those remarks on September 1 by reminding Gebremariam that she did
employees a favor by getting them rehired, and was being made out to be a “liar” to the 20
Company. She also mentioned how much “power” the Company had, including her ability to
change schedules, knowing that most of them had second jobs. Jorji concluded her remarks by
noting the Company could get the employees fired by “writing letters and letters.”21
G. Employees Attempt to Deliver Petition to Taye25
On September 26, several employees, including Abraham, Woldhanna and Dema, asked
Taye to meet with them by the cashier’s booth where Gebremariam was working at the time.
When Taye arrived, Woldhanna attempted to hand him the petition. Although he did not read
the document, Taye, indicating he knew what it was about, said there was a collective-bargaining 30
process in place, refused to accept it and instructed any off-duty employees to leave. The

18 Woldhanna’s detailed version of the conversation was more credible than Taye’s explanation . (Tr.
73–74, 81-82, 102-103.) Taye insisted he did not feel comfortable explaining the reasons to Woldhanna,
professing uncertainty about Woldhanna’s qualifications for a taxi driver license. However, it also
became clear that recommendation letters were a personal decision and Taye did not always agree to
provide one. (405–409, 527-530, 568-570.)
19 I based this finding on the credible testimony of Wadimu over the terse and conclusory denial of
Jorji in response to leading questions. (Tr. 117–119, 132-134, 687–688.)
20 Gebremariam’s testimony as to the August conversation with Jorji was detailed, spontaneous and
generally consistent. Moreover, her reference to “petition” instead of “paper” when asked to testify again
about this incident was insignificant and, in all likelihood, attributable to inconsistencies in the
interpretation of her testimony. (Tr. 154–157, 166–167, 215–216, 221, 224–225, 228, 230, 237–238.) As
such, I credit her testimony over Jorji’s terse denials in response to leading questions that any of the
alleged conversations in August or September occurred. (Tr. 683–687.)
21 I also credit Gebremariam’s testimony about a second incident in which Jorji confronted her on
September 1. (Tr. 165–167.), but do not credit her vague testimony describing an October encounter that
was virtually identical to the August incident. (Tr. 167–169, 253–255, 301–306.)
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employees left without delivering the petition.22 Later that day, however, a copy of a petition
containing the signatures of seven employees at the Georgetown location was faxed to the hotel
and delivered to Taye. Jorgi also learned about the petition on that day.23
The petition, containing 25 signatures, including 18 from facility employees and 7 from 5
Georgetown location employees, was finally delivered to the general manager of the Ritz-
Carlton Hotel on November 21, 2014. It was on that day that Taye first saw all four pages of the
petition containing 26 signatures.24
H. Elene Gebremariam10
Gebremariam worked as a cashier at the facility for 9 years before her discharge in
December. She previously served as a shop steward and attended meetings of the Union’s
executive committee. Gebremariam’s relationship with Taye and Jorji was uneventful until
August when, as previously explained, Jorji questioned her as to why she signed the petition.15
1. Gebremariam’s Vacation Request
There was only one cashier on duty at any given time. Gebremariam worked the weekday
shifts from 7 a.m. to 3 p.m. and was followed by another employee who worked until closing 20
time at 10:30 p.m. Two part-time employees split the weekend shifts.25
In the past, Gebremariam, would ask Jorji if she could take time off on a particular date
before submitting a leave request form, copies of which were readily available to employees.26 If
Jorji agreed, Gebremariam would fill out a leave request form and submit it for approval. During 25
September 2014, Gebremariam asked Jorji for time off because family would be visiting in about
2 weeks. Jorji responded that there was no one to replace her and Gebremariam did not bother to
submit a written leave request form.27 Had she submitted a form, the Company’s practice was to
routinely approve leave requests. In fact, between August and December, Jorji and Taye
approved written requests for vacation leave submitted by Abraham, Dema, and Woldhanna.2830

22 This occurrence is not disputed and the weight of the credible evidence indicates Taye flatly
refused to read the document or accept it. However, it is also evident that he knew what the document
was about since he referred to the bargaining process and omitted any explanation as to why he did not
even ask his subordinates what it was about. (Tr. 86, 88, 324, 341–342, 352, 421, 496–497, 587.)
23 The faxed document was the third page of the petition that employees attempted to deliver to Taye
that day. It contained only the names of seven Georgetown location employees. (Tr. 420–421, 683; R.
Ex. 11.)
24 Woldhanna incorrectly testified in his Board affidavit that he helped collect 19 signatures. (Tr.
108.) It actually contained 18 signatures on the first two pages from facility employees. Page 4 was
identical to page 3, except that the latter had two additional signatures. (GC Exh. 2; Tr. 43, 106, 495.)
25 GC Exh. 8.
26 The forms were available at both locations. (Tr. 338, 399, 401, 592–593.)
27 I found Gebremariam’s detailed version of this conversation more credible than the terse denial
offered by Jorji. However, there is no proof demonstrating that someone was available to replace
Gebremariam during the period requested. (Tr. 163–164, 249–252, 266, 405, 680–682.)
28 Abraham’s vacation requests were approved in August and October. (Tr. 339–340, 402, 405, 608–
609; R. Exh. 7.) Dema’s request was approved in October. (Tr. 385; R. Exh. 10(d).) Woldhanna’s request
was approved in December. (R. Exh. 10 at 1–2.)
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2. Elene Gebreariam’s discipline for late attendance
For years, Gebremariam was assigned a fixed shift from 7 a.m. to 3 p.m. For the past
several years, however, Gebremariam had a verbal agreement with Taye to arrive after 7 a.m. 5
and stay later than 3 p.m., as needed. This resulted in Gebremariam working less than 40 hours
per week, kept her within the public housing income limit, and enabled Taye to avoid paying her
overtime. As a result, Gebremariam usually arrived late to work and was never disciplined prior
to September.29 This was consistent with Taye and Jorji’s practice of not disciplining any
employees for lateness – and there were many such instances – in 2013 or 2014.3010
Gebremariam’s arrangement with Taye was upended on September 12 when she arrived
3 hours late and received a verbal warning. Earlier that morning, she called Jorji to advise that
she overslept and would arrive late. Upon arriving at work, however, Gebremariam was called
to a meeting with Taye and Jorji. After they issued the verbal warning, Gebremariam objected to 15
the discipline, noting her longstanding arrangement with Taye. Taye replied that “from now on,
there would not be like before, it will never be like before.”31
About a week or two later, Jorji asked Gebremariam to cover a special hotel event on
November 4. Gebremariam, still seething over Taye’s cancellation of her flexible-time 20
arrangement, refused. Taye subsequently approached Gebremariam about 2 weeks before the
event and asked why she refused to come in early to cover it. After Gebremariam attributed her
refusal to the September 12 discipline, Taye reinstated the previous flexible time arrangement if
she agreed to cover the upcoming event.
25
Gebremariam’s attendance practices returned to “normal” as she resumed arriving to
work after 7 a.m. over the next several weeks. On October 30, however, Gebremariam got into
an automobile accident and arrived late to work as usual. She called Jorji and informed her she
would not arrive on time to cover the November 4 event because of her accident.32
30
On November 4, after arriving late to work, Taye and Jorji issued a notice placing
Gebremariam on probation for 30 days. Taye attributed the suspension to the fact that the
flexible time agreement was once again cancelled because Gebremariam failed to cover the
special hotel event earlier that day. Gebremariam explained that she was late because of her

29 Taye and Jorji denied Gebremariam’s assertion regarding a verbal agreement in which she had
flexibility in arriving to work after the start of her shift at 7 a.m. (Tr. 36, 147–152, 204–206, 210, 410,
502–504, 549, 574–578. 583–584, 635–636, 728.) However, her testimony was corroborated by
Gebremariam’s time clock records from August 2013 to November 2014, indicating that she rarely
arrived by 7 a.m. (GC Exh. 4.)
30 The only instance that the Company could point to was the June 3, 2015 discipline of Ermias
Getachew, an overnight valet attendant, who received an oral warning after a no call/no show to work. (R.
Exh. 12, 15.)
31 I credit Gebremariam’s recollection of this conversation because Taye’s version—that she had
never arrived 3 hours later before—was also contradicted by time records. (Tr. 158–159, 415–416, 584,
637, 641, 709; GC Exh. 3; GC Exh. 4 at 12, 53, 59.)
32 Although Gebremariam’s excuse was vague, I credit her testimony that she called Jorji earlier that
day to say she would be late. (Tr. 171, 174, 218.)
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accident. She disagreed with the discipline and initially refused to sign the notice, but relented
after Taye assured her it was only to acknowledge receipt.33
Over the next several days, Gebremariam arrived to work on time.34 During the morning
of November 7, however, she got into an argument with Abiy Habtemariam, a valet attendant,5
who only provided a picture of a claim check presented by a customer. For security reasons,
Gebremariam insisted Habtemariam get a copy of the customer’s driver’s license and an
argument ensued. Subsequently, Gebremariam retaliated against Habtemariam by refusing to
hand him a customer’s car keys when it was his turn to retrieve a vehicle. Habtemariam
repeatedly asked her for the keys, but she refused to hand them to him. Another valet, Ashenafi 10
Balcha, tried to calm her down, but she was angry and continued to refuse Habtemariam’s
requests. Habtemariam missed two more turns in the rotation and was steaming as Gebremariam
continued handing car keys to Balcha. At some point, they argued in front of a customer waiting
for his vehicle. Gebremariam mentioned to Balcha that the customer was waiting, but still
warned him not to give the keys to Habtemariam. An angry Habtemariam grabbed Balcha’s 15
hand and insisted he give him the key because it was his turn. Balcha tried unsuccessfully to
calm Habtemariam down and assured him that he would give him the tip. Gebremariam left the
cashier’s booth, told them to stop arguing and implored Balcha to get the vehicle because the
customer was watching the episode unfold. At some point, Gebremariam called security and
then called Jorji to complain that Habtemariam was interfering with her work.3520
After the argument, Taye and Jorji interviewed Gebremariam, Habtemariam, and Balcha.
Each described his/her version of the incident. Later that day, Taye suspended Gebremariam,
but did not discipline Habtemariam in any respect. Her 2-day suspension notice also alluded to
Gebremariam’s discipline on November 4 for lateness.3625
Upon returning to work on November 14, Gebremariam arrived late at 7:45 a.m. and
explained to Jorgi that she locked herself out of her apartment by accident. Jorji said that she did
not care. After learning later that day that Gebremariam arrived late, Taye told Jorji to inform
Gebremariam that she was suspended pending investigation.3730

33 I credit Gebremariam’s version of this conversation, as corroborated by the timing of the special
hotel event on November 4. (Tr. 173–174, 672; GC Exh. 5.) Jorji acknowledged that Gebremariam had a
medical appointment on that day (Tr. 672.), but still wrote her up because she failed to arrive early, by
6:30 a.m., for the special event. (Tr. 643–644.) Taye simply relied on the fact that Gebremariam arrived
less than an hour late on October 30 and had been warned on September 12. (Tr. 424.)
34 GC Exh. 4 at 89–90.
35 Gebremariam and Habtemariam provided slightly different accounts of the incident (Tr. 175–179,
184–185, 247, 429, 476, 478, 651, 653, 655–656, 764–766–774.) However, the very credible testimony
of Balcha provided the most credible account of the incident, essentially laying blame on both
participants. (Tr. 476–477, 484-486.)
36 The incident was clearly a serious one, especially with the hotel’s events manager calling Taye to
report a related complaint later that day. (Tr. 433, 463–464, 471, 656–657; R. Exh. 17) Neither Taye nor
Jorji provided an explanation, however, as to why Habtemariam was not also disciplined to any extent for
his conduct during the incident. (GC Exh. 6; Tr. 185–188, 426, 434–435, 661–664.)
37 I did not give any weight to Gebremariam’s testimony that Taye attempted to harass, sexually
harass or assault her on November 14. (Tr. 198-199.) Any altercation between Gebremariam and Taye
on November 14, given the former’s assertion that any discipline issued her in November was due to her
“union leadership,” had no bearing on the labor related acrimony leading up to that point.
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On November 15, Jorji called Gebremariam and informed her she was suspended. 38 On
December 12, the Company notified Gebremariam that she was terminated after she declined to
accept the Company’s December 9, 2014 “last chance” agreement relating to the November 15
suspension.39 The notice stated that termination was based on a “failure to comply with company 5
policies.40
LEGAL ANALYSIS
I. STATEMENTS BY TAYE AND JORJI10
The complaint alleges that Company supervisors Taye and Jorji made unlawful
statements to Gebremariam, Wondimu, and Woldhanna in August and September 2014, in
violation of Section 8(a)(1). The Company denied that the allegations.
15
A. Taye’s Statements Regarding the Union
On August 13, after he began circulating the petition, Woldhanna asked Taye for a letter
of recommendation in connection with his application for taxi driver’s license. Taye’s response
indicated his utter disappointment with Woldhanna’s role in generating the petition and 20
suggested that he would have written a bad recommendation letter. Describing their relationship
prior to that point like close family members who enjoyed a good working relationship, Taye
predicted the petition would hurt the Company and asked why Woldhanna signed it. He warned
that the relationship would change. In expressing his disappointment, Taye alluded to the
interest of his superiors at Company “headquarters,” to whom he reported that Woldhanna would 25
not join the Union.
Conversations about union activity between employers and employees are considered
lawful when they involve open union supporters, in a casual setting, and are unaccompanied by
coercive statements. Toma Metals Inc., 342 NLRB 787 (2004) (lawful for a supervisor to ask an 30
employee what is up with the rumor of the union where they had a friendly relationship); Emery
Worldwide 309 NLRB 185, 186–187 (1992) (no violation where a low-level supervisor engaged
in a casual, amicable conversation with an employee that did not involve coercive statements).
Taye’s statements in response to Woldhanna’s requests for a letter of recommendation 35
violated Section 8(a)(1) in several respects. First, they reasonably conveyed the message that
Woldhanna’s secret union activities in generating the petition and soliciting employee support
were under surveillance by the highest level manager at the facility. Register Guard, 344 NLRB
1142, 1144 (2005) (the Board’s test for an unlawful impression of surveillance is “whether the
employee would reasonably assume from the statement that their union activities had been 40
placed under surveillance”); New Vista Nursing and Rehabilitation, 358 NLRB No. 55, slip op.
at 15 (2012) (unlawful impression of surveillance created “when an employer reveals specific

38 The suspension was paid but a stop payment was placed on the paycheck mailed to Gebremariam.
(R. Exh. 1; Tr. 190, 198, 668.)
39 R. Exh. 2.
40 GC Exh. 7.
JD–57–15
11
information about a union activity that is not generally known, and does not reveal its source”);
Flexsteel Industries Inc., 311 NLRB 257, 257 (1993) (employer created the unlawful impression
of surveillance when circumstances indicated that the employer was closely monitoring the
degree of an employee’s union involvement).
5
Second, Taye’s inquiry as to why Woldhanna signed the petition and did not realize that
it would hurt the Company constituted unlawful interrogation. Although the record does not
establish a prior history of antiunion hostility, Taye confronted Woldhanna at work in a hostile
manner in an effort to intimidate him for engaging in protected activity relating to employees’
efforts to attain a first collective-bargaining agreement. The remarks were a clear message that 10
engaging in Section 7 activity was harmful to the Company. Hoffman Fuel Co., 309 NLRB 327,
327 (1992) (employer’s questioning coupled with a veiled threat unlawful where there was no
legitimate purpose for ascertaining the employee’s prospective union activities).
Lastly, the remarks also constituted an unspecified threat of future reprisals since, unlike 15
the close and good relationship that they enjoyed in the past, Taye warned Woldhanna’s terms
and conditions of employment would change for the worse because of his protected activities.
Atlas Logistics Group, 357 NLRB No. 37, slip op. at fn. 2 (2011) (employer’s unspecified threats
of reprisal due to employee’s Section 7 were unlawful); F.W. Woolworth Co., 310 NLRB 1197,
1200 (1993) (employer’s statement that “if you think I’m a bitch now, wait” constituted an 20
unlawful threat of reprisal).
B. Jorji’s Statements regarding the Union
Sometime in August, Wondimu, a valet attendant, secretly signed the petition seeking a 25
first collective-bargaining agreement which, at the time, had not yet been presented to the
Company. During late August, Jorji, the second highest level supervisor at the facility, surprised
Wondimu at work by asking why he signed the petition. The conversation occurred outside the
presence of Wondimu’s coworkers. Obviously intimidated by his supervisor, Wondimu denied
signing the petition. Jorji concluded the coercive exercise by adding that signing the petition was 30
“useless” and “doesn’t help the employee.” Jorji’s interrogation violated Section 8(a)(1).
Sunnyvale Medical Clinic, 277 NLRB 1217, 1217 (1985) (the Board analyzes the totality of the
circumstances to determine whether an interrogation reasonably tends to restrain, coerce, or
interfere with employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights); BJ’s Wholesale Club, 319
NLRB 483, 484 (1995) (interrogation was unlawfully coercive where a supervisor unexpectedly 35
approached an employee who was not an open union supporter, began to directly question the
employee about her stance on the union, and communicated an antiunion message).
During the same period of time, Jorji approached Gebremariam in the cashier’s office and
asked if she signed the petition. After Gebremariam acknowledged signing it, Jorji responded 40
that, by signing the petition, the employees made her a “liar” with the “office.” She then asked
Gebremariam why she signed the petition if she previously told Jorji she would not join the
Union. Gebremariam denied making such a statement. Jorji concluded the conversation with a
cryptic remark that “whoever signed on this paper, you guys will pay for it.” Jorji’s statements
during this encounter constituted an unlawful interrogation and unspecified threat that 45
Gebremariam and anyone else who signed the petition would experience undesirable changes to
their terms and conditions of employment. Atlas Logistics Group, supra at fn. 2 (employer
JD–57–15
12
statements making unspecified threats of reprisal for an employee’s engaging in Section 7
activities violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act); F.W. Woolworth Co., 310 NLRB at 1200; Hoffman
Fuel Co., 309 NLRB at 327.
Jorji followed up those remarks on September 1, 2014 by reminding Gebremariam that 5
she was responsible for getting Gebremariam and her coworkers rehired by the Company, yet
they repaid her by making her look like a ‘liar” with the Company. That remark gave the
reasonable impression that Jorji’s superiors were not pleased that employees engaged in Section
7 activity by taking a more aggressive approach toward a first contract and were inclined to
punish those who persisted. Jorji described two likely avenues of reprisal based on the 10
Company’s “power” over such employees: (1) a more stringent enforcement of Company rules
in order to facilitate the termination of such employees; and (2) changing employees’ schedules
in ways that would interfere with their ability to attend to second jobs. These statements
constituted clear threats of discharge or unspecified reprisals in violation of Section 8(a)(1).
Publix Super Markets, Inc., 347 NLRB 1434, 1435 (2006) (supervisor’s threats to discipline or 15
discharge employees for concerted activity violated Section 8(a)(1)); Braswell Motor Freight
Lines, 156 NLRB 671, 674–675 (1966) (supervisor’s statement that “you can see the trouble
signing cards has caused” was an unlawful threat of discharge in the context of a discussion
about another employee’s termination).
20
II. EMPLOYEE SCHEDULING CHANGES
The complaint alleges that the Company announced a new policy on or about October
2014 that employees schedules are subject to change based on operational needs. It is further
alleged that, by announcing such a change to employees terms and conditions of employment 25
without affording the Union an opportunity to bargain over such a change and the effects of this
change, the Company violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
The General Counsel does not dispute the applicability of the company rule as set forth in
the employee handbook, but relies on its implementation through a posted monthly schedule. 30
Prior to August 2013, the posted monthly schedule stated that schedules could only be changed
with management approval. When the Company took over in August 2013, however, the
aforementioned statement on the posted monthly schedule regarding changes was replaced with
one stating that all employees’ schedules are subject to change based on operational needs. The
Section 8(a)(5) charge, however, is premised on the notion that the change occurred in October 35
2014, which did not occur. Therefore, the Company’s change in its employee scheduling policy
in August 2013 did not violate Section 8(a)(5) and is dismissed.
III. THE REFUSAL TO GIVE WOLDHANNA A LETTER OF RECOMMENDATION
40
The complaint alleges that the Company discriminated against Woldhanna in violation of
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act by refusing to give him a letter of recommendation because he assisted
the Union and engaged in concerted activities. The Company denies the allegations, asserting
that Taye did not feel comfortable providing a recommendation for a taxi driver license
application and was entitled to rely on his personal discretion.45
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13
In order to establish unlawful discrimination under Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, the General
Counsel must show that an employee engaged in protected Section 7 activity, the employer had
knowledge of the employee’s protected activity, animus against the employee’s Section 7
activity, and the employer’s animus was a motivating factor in the decision to take adverse action
against the employee. Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083, 1089 (1980); FES, 331 NLRB 9 (2000) 5
(clarifying the allocation of burdens in the Wright Line framework).
Taye’s unlawful remarks to Woldhanna on August 13 – how Woldhanna could expect
him to write him a letter of recommendation while he was involved in generating a petition for a
first contract—confirm Taye’s knowledge that Woldhanna was engaged in protected concerted 10
activities on behalf of the bargaining unit. They further revealed the animus that Taye harbored
toward such activity and its direct connection to his decision declining to sign a letter of
recommendation for Woldhanna enabling him to apply for a taxi driver’s license. Austal USA,
LLC, 356 NLRB No. 65 (2010) (employer’s statements to employee that indicated animus
towards the employee’s protected activity established unlawful discriminatory motivation); Wells 15
Fargo Armored Services Corp., 322 NLRB 616, 616 (1996) (unlawful motivation found where
employer’s threatened consequences of protected activity were consistent with actions taken
against employees for protected activity).
The only issue here is whether Taye’s discriminatory refusal resulted in adverse action 20
with respect to a term or condition of employment. There is Board precedent holding it unlawful
to refuse an employee a reference letter because he/she engaged in protected conduct. See Café
La Salle, 280 NLRB 379, (1986) (violation of Section 8(a)(4) for employer to refuse to give an
employee a letter of recommendation for another job due to involvement in proceedings before
the Board). Here, however, the General Counsel failed to meet his burden of establishing the 25
regularity with which Taye issued reference letters since there is undisputed evidence that he also
refused certain requests. See Eugene Iovine, Inc. 353 NLRB No. 36 (2008) (practices are terms
and conditions of employment when they occur regularly and frequently such that employees
could reasonably expect the practice to continue); Sunoco, Inc., 349 NLRB 240, 244 (2007)
(“employer’s regular and longstanding practices that are neither random nor intermittent become 30
terms and conditions of employment”). As previously explained, Taye’s otherwise
discriminatorily motivated statements for denying the request were coercive in several respects
and violated Section 8(a)(1), there is insufficient credible evidence demonstrating that letters of
reference were among the terms and conditions of employment that Company employees have
come to expect on a regular basis. Thus, the refusal to grant Woldhanna a letter of 35
recommendation did not constitute adverse action and this charge is dismissed.41
IV. THE COMPANY’S TREATMENT OF GEBREMARIAM
The complaint alleges that the Company discriminated against Gebremariam in violation 40
of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act by refusing her vacation request and then issuing a series of

41 Had I determined that Taye’s denial to issue a recommendation letter constituted adverse action, the
burden would have shifted to the Company to demonstrate that it would have taken the same action even
in the absence of the protected conduct. Wright Line, supra at 1089. There is no doubt that the Company
failed to sustain its burden, as Taye failed to provide a credible, detailed explanation for his refusal as to
Woldhanna’s request. Consolidated Bus Transit, 350 NLRB 1064, 1065 (2007).
JD–57–15
14
disciplinary actions that ultimately resulted in her discharge on December 12. The Company
denies the allegations, asserting that she was discharged based on her disciplinary history and
refusal to sign a “last chance” agreement to return to work.
As in the case of the Company’s response to Woldhanna’s request for a letter of 5
recommendation, the General Counsel must show that an employee engaged in protected Section
7 activity, the employer had knowledge of the employee’s protected activity, animus against the
employee’s Section 7 activity, and the employer’s animus was a motivating factor in the decision
to take adverse action against the employee. Wright Line, supra at 1089.
10
Gebremariam engaged in protected concerted activity by signing the petition in August
advocating for a collective-bargaining agreement. Jorji’s knowledge of and animus toward
Gebremariam’s Section 7 activities became evident toward the end of August and beginning of
September when she angrily interrogated and threatened Gebremariam because she signed the
petition. Austal USA, LLC, supra at 363. Jorji was extremely resentful of Gebremariam’s activity 15
because she had assured her superiors that Gebremariam and others would not engage in such
activity and it made her look like a liar with the Company. Her remarks were significant since
they threatened the eventual termination of employees through stricter enforcement of company
rules and changing employees’ schedules in order to create havoc with the ability of most
employees to perform their second jobs. Taye subsequently reinforced those remarks by 20
revoking his longstanding arrangement with Gebremariam permitting her to arrive late to work
nearly every day.
A. Denial of Gebremariam’s Vacation Request
25
Whether Jorji’s denial of a vacation request was motivated by animus or even qualifies as
adverse action, however, is not as evident. Gebremariam, as she had in the past, asked Jorji if
she could take time off a few weeks later. Jorji responded negatively, indicating that she had no
one to cover the cashier position for Gebremariam. Gebremariam was only one of 4 cashiers on
staff, 2 of whom are full-time during weekdays and 2 of whom work part-time on weekends. 30
The General Counsel did not establish that one of the other 3 cashiers were available to cover
Gebremariam’s scheduled shifts during the requested leave period. As a result, Gebremariam did
not bother to submit the required leave request form even though leave was routinely granted
during the same period of time to other employees engaged in protected concerted activities. As
such, there is insufficient proof demonstrating that Gebremariam suffered an adverse action or 35
that her oral request for leave was denied due to discriminatory reasons. American Gardens
Management, Co., 338 NLRB 644, 645 (2002) (motivational link or nexus must be shown
connecting the employee’s protected activity and the adverse employment action).
B. Gebremariam’s Discipline40
The disciplinary events that unfolded during this period, however, clearly constituted
adverse action – the September 12 oral warning, the November 4 probation, the November 7
suspension, the November 15 suspension, and the December 12 discharge.
45
The first of these events, the September 12 warning, unfolded shortly after Jorji’s
interrogation and threats relating to Gebremariam’s protected concerted activities in signing the
JD–57–15
15
petition in August. Gebremariam arrived late to work that morning, as she did routinely prior to
that date without ever being disciplined. Even though Gebremariam called Jorji earlier that
morning to report that she would arrive late, Jorji still issued her an oral warning to comply with
the Company’s time and attendance rules. Coupled with the absence of any prior history of
enforcement of its time and attendance rules, the Company’s decision to suddenly discipline 5
Gebremariam for coming late to work was attributable to discriminatory motivation.
The retaliatory consequences of Jorji’s threats snowballed after Gebremariam’s
coworkers attempted to deliver the petition to Taye on September 26 at the cashier’s booth where
Gebremariam was working.10
Prior to November 4, Taye reinstated his agreement with Gebremariam permitting her to
routinely arrive late to work. On that day, Gebremariam arrived late to work, disappointing Taye
and Jorji because she failed to arrive early in order to cover a special event at the facility. Thus,
after permitting Gebremariam to resume reporting late for work for at least several weeks, Taye 15
cancelled the agreement again and placed her on a 2-day suspension. The conflicting reasons
offered by Taye and Jorji for the suspension – Gebremariam’s pattern of lateness and her failure
to arrive early for the special event – reveal shifting defenses. See Lucky Cab Company, 360
NLRB No. 43, slip op. at 6 (2014) (finding of animus supported by persuasive evidence that
employer’s reasons for discharge were pretextual and included the use of shifting explanations); 20
NLRB v. Dorothy Shamrock Coal Company, 833 F.2d 1263, 1268 (7th Cir. 1987) (upholding an
unlawful animus finding based upon circumstantial evidence and close timing of adverse actions
to organizing activity). When coupled with Taye’s inexplicable leapfrog over the next
disciplinary level of a written warning to probation, the evidence strongly supports an inference
of discriminatory motivation. Embassy Vacation Resorts, 340 NLRB 846, 848 (2003), rev. 25
denied 2004 WL 210675 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (inference of unlawful motive drawn from
inconsistencies between the proffered reasons for discipline employer’s other actions, disparate
treatment of employees with similar work records or offenses, deviations from past practice, or
proximity of discipline to union activity).
30
The November 4 discipline subsequently mushroomed into a 2-day suspension on
November 7 after Gebremariam got into a workplace dispute with Habtemariam, a valet
attendant. Their altercation in front of a hotel customer was certainly inappropriate. The
incident, accurately reported to Taye by a neutral and credible coworker, revealed that
Gebremariam and Abbe both engaged in misconduct. However, Habtemariam, equally at fault 35
for carrying on in front of a customer whose complaint was reported to the facility, was not even
counseled.
The November 7 suspension was also unlawfully motivated for several reasons. First, it
was premised in part on the previous unlawful discipline. See Dynamics Corp., 296 NLRB 1252, 40
1253-1254 (1989), enfd. 928 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1991) (discipline or discharge of an employee is a
violation of the Act where it is tainted by reliance on prior discipline that was unlawful under the
Act). Second, the suspension was a clear exercise of disparate treatment since Taye was also
informed about Habtemariam’s misconduct during the incident, but did not discipline him in any
manner. See Embassy Vacation Resorts, 340 NLRB at 848 (inference of unlawful motive drawn 45
from “disparate treatment of certain employees compared with employees with similar work
records or offenses”).
JD–57–15
16
After a long history of accommodating Gebremariam’s routine lateness, the Company
was waiting to pounce when she returned to work after the suspension on November 14. That
day, however, she arrived 45 minutes late. The following day, November 15, she was suspended
pending an “investigation” that resulted in her discharge on December 12. Gebremariam’s 5
November 15 suspension and December 12 discharge also emanated from the three previous
unlawful disciplines. Additionally, the discipline runs counter to the Company’s virtually
nonexistent enforcement of its time and attendance rules.
Under the circumstances, the September 12 oral warning, November 4 probation, 10
November 7 suspension, November 15 suspension, and the December 12 discharge were issued
to Gebremariam in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
15
1. By stating on August 13, 2014 that an employee petition advocating for a first
collective bargaining would hurt the Company and asking an employee why he signed it, the
Company gave the impression that employees’ protected concerted activities were under
surveillance, and constituted coercive interrogation and an unspecified threat of future reprisals
in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.20
2. By questioning employees in August and September, 2014, as to why they signed a
petition advocating for a first collective-bargaining agreement, referring to the petition as
“useless,” stating it “doesn’t help the employee,” threatening that employees who signed the
petition that things will change for the worse and employees “will pay for it” by more stringent 25
terms and conditions of employment, including discharge, the Company violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
3. By warning, placing on probation, suspending and ultimately discharging Elene
Gebremariam because she engaged in protected concerted activity by signing the petition, the 30
Company violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
4. By the aforementioned violations, the Company has engaged in unfair labor practices
affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
35
REMEDY
Having found that the Company has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall
order it to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate
the policies of the Act.40
JD–57–15
17
The Company, having discriminatorily discharged an employee, must offer her
reinstatement and make her whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits. Backpay shall be
computed in accordance with F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest at the
rate prescribed in New Horizons, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), compounded daily as prescribed in
Kentucky River Medical Center, 356 NLRB 6 (2010).5
The Company shall file a report with the Social Security Administration allocating
backpay to the appropriate calendar quarters. The Company shall also compensate the
discriminatee for the adverse tax consequences, if any, of receiving one or more lump-sum
backpay awards covering periods longer than 1 year, Latino Express, Inc., 359 NLRB No. 44 10
(2012).
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended42
15
ORDER
The Company, Washington, D.C., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from20
Giving employees the impression that we are watching their activities on behalf of Unite
Here Local 23.
Coercively interrogating employees about their support for or activities on behalf of 25
Unite Here Local 23.
Threatening employees with termination or other unspecified reprisals because of their
membership in or support of Unite Here Local 23.
30
Suspending, terminating or otherwise disciplining employees because of their
membership in or support of Unite Here Local 23.
In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.35
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, offer Elene Gebremariam full
reinstatement to her former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent 40
position, without prejudice to her seniority or any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed.
Make Elene Gebremariam whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a
result of the discrimination against her in the manner set forth in the remedy section of the
decision.45

42 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted
by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
JD–57–15
18
Within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, remove from its files any reference to
the unlawful warning, suspensions and discharge, and within 3 days thereafter notify the
employee in writing that this has been done and that said disciplinary actions will not be used
against her in any way.
5
Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such additional time as the Regional
Director may allow for good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the Board
or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records
and reports, and all other records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored in
electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order.10
Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facility in Washington, D.C.,
copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”43 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by
the Regional Director for Region 5, after being signed by the Company’s authorized
representative, shall be posted by the Company and maintained for 60 consecutive days in 15
conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. In
addition to physical posting of paper notices, the notices shall be distributed electronically, such
as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if the
Company customarily communicates with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by the Company to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any 20
other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Company has
gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Company shall
duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former
employees employed by the Company at any time since August 13, 2014.
25
Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn
certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that
the Company Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. September 30, 201530
Michael A. Rosas
Administrative Law Judge35

43 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice
reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations
Board.”
JD–57–15
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT suspend, discharge, discipline or otherwise discriminate against you because of
your membership in or support for Unite Here Local 23 or any other union.
WE WILL NOT threaten you with suspension, discharge or other unspecified reprisals because
of your membership in or support of Unite Here Local 23.
WE WILL NOT coercively question you about your union support or activities.
WE WILL NOT give you the impression we are watching your activities on behalf of Unite Here
Local 23 or any other union.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer Elene Gebremariam full
reinstatement to her former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent
position, without prejudice to her seniority or any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed.
WE WILL make Elene Gebremariam whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits resulting
from her discharge, less any net interim earnings, plus interest compounded daily.
WE WILL file a report with the Social Security Administration allocating backpay to the
appropriate calendar quarters.
WE WILL compensate Elene Gebremariam for the adverse tax consequences, if any, of
receiving a lump-sum backpay award covering periods longer than 1 year.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove from our files any reference to
the unlawful discharge of Elene Gebremariam, and WE WILL, within 3 days thereafter, notify
JD–57–15
her in writing that this has been done and that the discharge will not be used against her in any
way.
COLONIAL PARKING
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
Bank of America Center, Tower II, 100 S. Charles Street, Ste 600, Baltimore, MD 21201-2700
(410) 962-2822, Hours: 8:15 a.m. to 4:45 p.m.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/05-CA-141241 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE
ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR
COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (410) 962-2880.