Cohn, Alan Wade. et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 26, 2020

2019002224 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 26, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/691,992 01/22/2010 Alan Wade Cohn 102005.024088 1912
71581 7590 06/26/2020
BakerHostetler / Comcast
Cira Centre, 12th Floor
2929 Arch Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-2891
EXAMINER
YANG, JAMES J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2683
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/26/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
eofficemonitor@bakerlaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ALAN WADE COHN,
GARY ROBERT FAULKNER, JAMES A. JOHNSON,
JAMES EDWARD KITCHEN, DAVID LEON PROFT,
COREY WAYNE QUAIN, and JOHN DEGRAFFENREID DIAL IV
Appeal 2019-002224
Application 12/691,992
Technology Center 2600
Before MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, JAMES B. ARPIN, and
MICHAEL J. ENGLE, Administrative Patent Judges.
ENGLE, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1, 2, 17, 18, 27, 29–32, 34–39, and 41–51, which are all
of the pending claims. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies iControl Networks, Inc. as the real
party in interest. Appeal Br. 1.
Appeal 2019-002224
Application 12/691,992
2
TECHNOLOGY
The application relates to a “user-configurable controller” for “home
security.” Spec. ¶ 2.
ILLUSTRATIVE CLAIM
Claim 1 is illustrative and reproduced below with certain limitations at
issue emphasized:
1. A method comprising:
receiving, by a controller and from a sensor of a plurality
of sensors, sensor information comprising a sensor type of the
sensor, wherein the controller and plurality of sensors are
associated with a security, monitoring, and automation (SMA)
system;
determining, by the controller and based on the sensor
information, a zone associated with the sensor, wherein the zone
is associated with a zone type;
receiving, by the controller, a user input indicating a zone
function profile of a plurality of zone function profiles, wherein
the plurality of zone function profiles are associated with the
zone type of the zone; and
executing, by the controller and in response to receiving a
signal from the sensor, a function based on the sensor type of the
sensor and the zone function profile of the plurality of zone
function profiles.
REFERENCES
The Examiner relies on the following references:
Baum US 2009/0165114 A1 June 25, 2009
Bourke-Dunphy US 6,918,112 B2 July 12, 2005
Sefton US 7,119,674 B2 Oct. 10, 2006
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Application 12/691,992
3
REJECTIONS
Claims 1, 17, 29–31, 34–37, and 41–51 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as obvious over the teachings of Sefton. Final Act. 2.
Claims 2 and 18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over
the combined teachings of Sefton, Bourke-Dunphy, and Baum. Final Act.
17.
Claims 27, 32, and 39 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious
over the combined teachings of Sefton and Baum. Final Act. 20.
Claim 38 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the
combined teachings of Sefton and Bourke-Dunphy. Final Act. 24.
ISSUES
Did the Examiner err in finding Sefton teaches or suggests the
following limitations recited in claim 1:
1) “receiving, . . . from a sensor . . . , sensor information comprising a
sensor type of the sensor”;
2) “receiving . . . a user input indicating a zone function profile of a
plurality of zone function profiles, wherein the plurality of zone
function profiles are associated with the zone type of the zone”;
and
3) “executing, . . . in response to receiving a signal from the sensor, a
function based on the sensor type of the sensor and the zone
function profile of the plurality of zone function profiles”?
ANALYSIS
Sefton discloses using “cameras” to “capture[] images of the license
plates” of vehicles going “to and from a secure facility.” Sefton Abstract.
The license plate number then can be compared to various databases to
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Application 12/691,992
4
identify, for example, an “expected visitor,” an “employee,” an authorized
user of a “high-security parking lot,” or someone on a “blacklist.” Id. Then,
“depending at least in part on the location of the camera that captured the
LPN [i.e., license plate number] and whether the vehicle’s LPN is listed in
one or more of the above-listed databases, the processor controls the
actuation of various barriers or such like devices to allow ingress to and
egress from various locations defined throughout the site.” Id. Sefton also
discloses that other types of sensors can be used both to detect the presence
of a vehicle (e.g., “a magnetic sensor embedded in the pavement”) and to
identify a vehicle (e.g., “optically readable passive tags” such as “RF tags”).
Id. at 4:63–66, Abstract.
Appellant argues Sefton fails to teach or suggest three limitations in
claim 1. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments for the reasons
discussed below.
First, claim 1 recites “receiving, . . . from a sensor . . . , sensor
information comprising a sensor type of the sensor.”
Appellant argues that “the cited portions of Sefton describe only that a
camera captures an image of the license plate and that a time-stamp, camera
identifier, and other pertinent information are associated with the image of
the plate” and that “the camera identifier may be a TCP/IP address of the
camera,” but “Sefton provides no indication that the camera transmits the
camera identifier.” Appeal Br. 4. Appellant further argues that “a TCP/IP
address does not comprise a ‘sensor type.’” Reply Br. 3.
Although we agree with Appellant that a TCP/IP address is not a
“sensor type,” we are not persuaded by Appellant’s conclusory assertion that
Sefton’s system might somehow identify the camera with no identifying
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input from the camera itself. The rejection is for obviousness, not
anticipation, and Appellant fails to address the Examiner’s larger point that
Sefton discloses both multiple cameras and other types of sensors in addition
to cameras and “[i]t would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the
art for the camera identifier to identify the camera in order to differentiate
itself from other vehicle presence sensors that may be used.” Final Act. 3
(citing Sefton 4:63–5:7); see also Ans. 3–4. For example, Sefton discloses:
In a preferred embodiment . . . , the presence of a vehicle is
sensed by any one of the cameras . . . . In other embodiments, the
physical presence of a vehicle is sensed by a vehicle presence
trigger or sensor, such as a magnetic sensor embedded in the
pavement or an infrared sensor. . . . [E]ither or both types of
triggering may be used to initiate a sequence of events as
described below . . . .
Sefton 4:60–5:7. Similarly, Sefton discloses using multiple types of sensors
to identify which vehicle is approaching. For example, “[w]here a vehicle
does not display a license plate, an alternative passive tag will be issued by
the facility and read in the same manner.” Id. at 3:18–20; see also id. at
2:22–24 (“The invention is an event-driven system activated by a camera
reading a license plate and/or a temporary passive tag”).
“A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not
an automaton.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007).
Here, absent further argument or evidence from Appellant, we agree with the
Examiner that it would have been obvious for Sefton’s “camera identifier” to
include a sensor type sent by Sefton’s camera in order to distinguish a
particular camera from Sefton’s other types of sensors.
Appeal 2019-002224
Application 12/691,992
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Second, claim 1 recites “receiving . . . a user input indicating a zone
function profile of a plurality of zone function profiles, wherein the plurality
of zone function profiles are associated with the zone type of the zone.”
Appellant argues that Sefton’s “event types” defined by the user fail
to teach or suggest this limitation. Appeal Br. 5. Further, Appellant argues
that the Examiner “has improperly divorced the subject feature ‘a user input
indicating a zone function profile of a plurality of zone function profiles’
from” the limitation “the plurality of zone function profiles are associated
with the zone type of the zone.” Id. at 8. However, Appellant’s argument
fails to define the term “zone function profile,” point to any description of a
“zone function profile” in the Specification, or explain why Sefton’s user-
defined “event types” do not teach or suggest the claimed “zone function
profile” or such profiles’ association with the zone type.
The Examiner, on the other hand, determines that “a zone function
profile is interpretable as being a set of functions or steps associated with a
zone type.” Ans. 4 (citing Sefton 5:48–60, 6:38–47, 2:19–22). For example,
the Examiner identifies “comparing the license plate information with
numbers stored in one of two databases . . . as one zone function profile” and
“to check for whether or not the captured license plate number is on a
blacklist” as an “alternative zone function profile.” Id. “Because each zone
may be a different type of zone, e.g. a visitor parking lot, a high security
parking lot, etc., each function profile is thus associated with the zone type
of the zone.” Final Act. 4; see also Sefton Fig. 2.
Appellant counters that “the cited portions of Sefton describe that an
event is defined according to a location of an event trigger at the site (e.g.,
detecting a vehicle in a video image or via a magnetic sensor at the
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Application 12/691,992
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location)” and that the two steps the Examiner points to “are not themselves
‘events’ or ‘event types,’ . . . but are both constituent steps of a single event
or event type.” Reply Br. 4.
We agree with the Examiner that Sefton teaches or suggests a user
defining different types of zones (e.g., a visitor parking lot vs. a high
security parking lot) associated with different zone function profiles,
including different functions within the same zone. Although the
Specification of the present application does not appear to use the word
“profile,” it does provide an example dividing sensors up into groups by
zone function (e.g., a “Zone Function” of “Entry/Exit”; “Perimeter”; or “24-
Hour Fire”) with a different action if a particular sensor in a particular zone
is triggered (e.g., “Allow exiting the home domain when the system is
arming” or permit “an entry delay when opened if the system is armed” for
the “Entry/Exit” zone function, compared to “Generate an immediate fire
alarm if triggered” for the “24-Hour Fire” zone function). Spec. ¶¶ 99–100,
Table 1.
Sefton teaches or suggests such an interpretation of the claim
language. In particular, Sefton discloses “site-access control actions based
upon the different event types as defined by the user.” Sefton 2:19–22.
Even within any one location (e.g., one specific high security parking lot),
the user can program different functions such as detection of a vehicle by “a
vehicle presence trigger or sensor, such as a magnetic sensor embedded in
the pavement or an infrared sensor,” which triggers a camera to capture a
license plate number. Id. at 4:60–5:7. Then, “once the presence of a vehicle
has been detected, the subsequent processing steps preferably depend upon
the location of the vehicle in the site,” and, more specifically, “the
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Application 12/691,992
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processing steps are determined by identification number of the camera at
the location where the vehicle is detected.” Id. at 5:8–16. For example, the
user can program the front gate such that the barrier will open when the
camera captures an image of either an employee or an expected visitor,
Sefton 6:3–6, but the barrier at the entrance to the high security parking lot
will only open if the camera captures an image of a license plate that is in
the high security database. Id. at 7:49–65. Thus, Sefton teaches or suggests
a user defining different zone types (e.g., front gate vs. high security parking
lot) and selecting different zone function profiles for each zone type (e.g., at
the front gate, the proximity sensor triggers the camera to capture an image
of a license plate, and the camera triggers the license plate number detection
process).
Third, claim 1 recites “executing, . . . in response to receiving a signal
from the sensor, a function based on the sensor type of the sensor and the
zone function profile of the plurality of zone function profiles.”
Appellant argues that “Sefton does not teach the camera or another
device executing a function ‘based on the sensor type of the sensor’ . . . [n]or
. . . ‘based on . . . the zone function profile of the plurality of zone function
profiles.’” Appeal Br. 10.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument. As the Examiner
points out and as discussed above, the profile for a camera for a high
security parking lot triggers a different function than the profile for a camera
for a visitor parking lot (e.g., permitting entry only for vehicles on the high
security list vs. permitting entry for anyone on the expected visitor list) and
an image is generated only because the sensor is a camera (e.g., as opposed
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Application 12/691,992
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to a magnetic sensor in the pavement detecting the presence of a vehicle).
Ans. 5; Final Act. 5.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, and of
claims 2, 17, 18, 27, 29–32, 34–39, 41–51, which Appellant argues are
patentable for similar reasons. See Appeal Br. 10–11; 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
DECISION
The following table summarizes the outcome of each rejection:
Claims
Rejected Statute Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 17, 29–31,
34–37, 41–51
§ 103 Sefton 1, 17, 29–31, 34–
37, 41–51

2, 18 § 103 Sefton, Bourke-
Dunphy, Baum
2, 18
27, 32, 39 § 103 Sefton, Baum 27, 32, 39
38 § 103 Sefton, Bourke-
Dunphy
38
Overall
Outcome
1, 2, 17, 18, 27,
29–32, 34–39, 41–
51

TIME TO RESPOND
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.36(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED