CLEARSTREAM TECHNOLOGIES LIMITEDDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardFeb 14, 202014383754 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Feb. 14, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/383,754 09/08/2014 Sean Wall P-18266.US02 / 1626A-048 7367 138315 7590 02/14/2020 C. R. Bard, Inc./ClearStream/K&S KING & SCHICKLI, PLLC 800 CORPORATE DRIVE SUITE 200 LEXINGTON, KY 40503 EXAMINER NGUYEN, HIEN NGOC ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3793 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 02/14/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): laura@iplaw1.net uspto@iplaw1.net PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE __________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD __________ Ex parte SEAN WALL __________ Appeal 2019-004449 Application 14/383,754 Technology Center 3700 __________ Before MICHAEL L. HOELTER, ANNETTE R. REIMERS, and LISA M. GUIJT, Administrative Patent Judges. HOELTER, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 2, 4–9, 11, 12, 14–16, 19, 20, 24–27, and 29–32. Final Act. 1 (Office Action Summary).2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). For the reasons explained below, we do not find 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as “Clearstream Technologies Limited.” Appeal Br. 2. 2 The Examiner lists claim 10 as being rejected. Final Act. 1. However, claims 3, 10, 13, 17, 18, 21–23, and 28 are canceled. See Appeal Br. 8–10 (Claims App.). Appeal 2019-004449 Application 14/383,754 2 error in the Examiner’s rejections of these claims. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the Examiner’s rejections. CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The disclosed subject matter “relates generally to balloons for performing medical procedures, such as angioplasty and, more particularly, to a medical balloon having a predetermined portion, such as a working surface, that may be precisely located or identified during use.” Spec. 1:8– 12. Apparatus claims 1, 29, and 30 are independent. Claim 1 is illustrative of the claims on appeal and is reproduced below. 1. A balloon catheter for use in connection with a guidewire, comprising: an elongated, tubular shaft extending in a longitudinal direction, said shaft having a proximal end and a distal end; an inflatable balloon, including first and second ends and a cylindrical portion between the first and second ends that, when inflated, provides a working surface on the cylindrical portion, the second end being a distal end of the balloon along the distal end of the shaft; and at least one wire extending longitudinally from the first end to the second end of the balloon, the wire including a first portion with a different radiopacity from a second portion of the wire for identifying an end of the working surface of the balloon. REFERENCES RELIED ON BY THE EXAMINER Dror et al. US 5,102,402 Apr. 7, 1992 Tu et al. US 6,123,718 Sept. 26, 2000 Aita et al. US 6,884,234 B2 Apr. 26, 2005 Burgmeier et al. US 2005/0215950 A1 Sept. 29, 2005 Spencer et al. US 2008/0249464 A1 Oct. 9, 2008 Solar et al. US 2009/0275920 A1 Nov. 5, 2009 Appeal 2019-004449 Application 14/383,754 3 THE REJECTIONS ON APPEAL Claims 1, 2, 4, 6–8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 24–27, and 293 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Tu and Solar. Final Act. 5. Claim 16 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Tu, Solar, and Dror. Final Act. 8. Claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, and 14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Spencer and Solar. Final Act. 8. Claims 19 and 30–32 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Spencer, Solar, and Burgmeier. Final Act. 10. Claim 20 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Spencer, Solar, Burgmeier, and Aita. Final Act. 10. ANALYSIS The rejection of claims 1, 2, 4, 6–8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 24–27, and 29 as obvious over Tu and Solar The rejection of claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, and 14 as obvious over Spencer and Solar With respect to each rejection, Appellant focuses solely on claim 1. See Appeal Br. 4–5. We, thus, select claim 1 for review, and note those instances where a difference exists between the two.4 Accordingly, the 3 The Examiner lists claim 16 in the header of the rejection but claim 16 is not discussed in the body of the rejection. Final Act. 5–8. Because claim 16 is rejected as being obvious over Tu, Solar, and Dror (see Final Act. 8), we determine that the inclusion of claim 16 in the header of this rejection is a typographical error. 4 Appellant states, “[r]egarding the combination of Solar with Spencer, the same analysis essentially applies.” Appeal Br. 4. Appeal 2019-004449 Application 14/383,754 4 remaining claims (i.e., claims 2, 4–9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 24–27, and 29) stand or fall with their respective claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Claim 1 recites an inflatable balloon having first and second ends, a working surface located there between, and a wire extending from the first end to the second end with “the wire including a first portion with a different radiopacity from a second portion of the wire for identifying an end of the working surface of the balloon.” Appeal Br. 8 (Claims App.). The Examiner primarily relies on the teachings of Tu and Spencer (in their respective rejections), but acknowledges that neither discloses a wire having a first portion with a different radiopacity from a second portion. See Final Act. 5, 9.5 With respect to each rejection, the Examiner relies on Solar for such disclosure. See Final Act. 5, 9 (citing Solar ¶¶ 45–47; Figs. 1–5). In both cases, the Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to modify the balloon catheter of Tu or Spencer to have a first portion with a different radiopacity from a second portion, as disclosed by Solar, and provides a reason for Solar’s combination therewith. See Final Act. 5–6, 9. Additionally (for each rejection), the Examiner discusses Solar’s radiopaque coil 34 (“serving as a marker for locating the wire”) and, alternatively, Solar’s radiopaque markers 36 (which “may be placed at optimal locations”). Final Act. 5; see also Final Act. 9. The Examiner states that, for each combination, Solar’s coil 34 or marker 36 “would allow for identifying an end of the working surface of the balloon.” Final Act. 5, 9. 5 Although the Examiner finds that Tu does not disclose a difference in radiopacity, we note that Tu discloses radiopaque marker band 33 on stiffening wire 31. See Tu Fig. 3. Thus, Tu would appear to disclose a “different radiopacity” along Tu’s wire. Appeal 2019-004449 Application 14/383,754 5 Appellant contends, “nothing establishes that the coil 34 in Solar or the markers 36 identify an end of the balloon working surface” as contrasted with that of the balloon itself. Appeal Br. 4. Appellant acknowledges that in Solar, “the markers ‘may be spaced at optimal locations such as at a proximal end and a distal end of balloon 24, for example.’” Appeal Br. 4 (referencing Solar ¶ 46). However, Appellant contends that Solar “fails to describe identifying the ends of the balloon working surface,” and the Examiner’s finding to the contrary “is pure speculation, which lacks the support of substantial evidence, and thus cannot sustain the rejection.”6 Appeal Br. 4 (referencing In re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1017 (CCPA 1967)). As noted above, Solar teaches that both coil 34 and markers 36 can be employed with the balloon for positioning or locating purposes. See Solar ¶¶ 45, 46. Solar specifically describes locating the markers at proximal and distal ends of the balloon “for example.” Solar ¶ 46. One skilled in the art, guided by Solar’s description of this location as being only an “example,” would reasonably understand that other locations are also possible.7 Thus, we disagree with Appellant’s contention that because Solar “fails to describe 6 We are reminded of instructions from our reviewing court that “apparatus claims cover what a device is, not what a device does.” Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1468, (Fed. Cir. 1990). And further, that claims directed to an apparatus, as here, must be distinguished from the prior art in terms of structure rather than function. See In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477–78, (Fed. Cir. 1997). 7 “A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007). Appeal 2019-004449 Application 14/383,754 6 identifying the ends of the balloon working surface,” this renders such a location non-obvious to one skilled in the art. Appeal Br. 4. For example, Tu clearly discloses a working surface on a cylindrical portion of an inflated balloon. See Tu Figs. 3, 6. Tu also discloses that “[t]he location of the at least one radiopaque marker band 33 allows the position of the inflatable balloon 10 to be accurately determined by fluoroscopy in order to ensure proper positioning of the inflatable balloon prior to inflation.” Tu 8:40–44. Solar discloses “coil 34 is comprised of radiopaque material, and thus acts as a marker for positioning of system 10, 100 or 200” (Solar ¶ 45) and proffers similar language regarding markers 36 (see Solar ¶ 46). One of the reasons the Examiner provided for combining Tu and Spencer with Solar is “in order to allow for locating . . . different regions of the balloon.” Final Act. 6, 9. Because the working region of the balloon differs from the region of the balloon as a whole, Appellant does not explain why one skilled in the art would not desire a precise or optimal balloon (and hence its working surface) location. See Solar ¶¶ 45, 46. This is especially the case when Solar is specifically concerned with proper placement so as to “provide[] an area of focused force for cracking or breaking up hard or difficult lesions.” Solar ¶ 47. In view of the foregoing, we agree with the Examiner that the combined teachings of Tu or Spencer with Solar would result in a balloon catheter that is capable of identifying an end of the working surface as recited. See Final Act. 5, 9. Appellant further contends that “[t]he proposed combination of the Tu or Spencer and Solar teachings ‘in order to allow for locating the wire itself and different regions of the wire as well as different regions of the balloon such as proximal or distal ends’ is not a reason for combining the reference Appeal 2019-004449 Application 14/383,754 7 teachings.” Appeal Br. 5; see also Reply Br. 4, 5. This is because “[a]ccording to the Examiner, the shaft or wire of Tu/Spencer is metal, and thus is already locatable,” and further, “[t]here is no identification of any reason with a rational underpinning of a desire to locate ‘different regions of the wire.’” Appeal Br. 5. These contentions are unpersuasive. First, as noted above, Solar discloses alternative methods for disclosing a balloon location, i.e., use of coil 34 or markers 36. As also noted above, the Examiner states that in either case, Solar’s teachings “would allow for identifying an end of the working surface of the balloon.” Final Act. 5, 9. The Examiner’s reasoning addresses both the use of a coil and the use of markers for the express purpose of providing “areas of focused force” against lesions. Solar ¶ 47. Thus, Appellant’s above focus on the proximal or distal ends of the balloon, when such locations were only exemplary (see Solar ¶ 46), is not persuasive of Examiner error, or that the Examiner lacked articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. In the Reply Brief, Appellant argues that although the Examiner identifies a working surface in Tu’s Figure 3, “Tu never describes a ‘working surface’ as that term is defined by Applicant’s [S]pecification.” Reply Br. 1–2. This argument is likewise unpersuasive. Claim 1 recites “a working surface on the cylindrical portion” of the balloon and Tu’s Figure 3 shows a cylindrical surface similar to that depicted in, for example, Appellant’s Figures 2, 4, 6, 10, and 11. Appellant does not explain how the Specification defines “working surface” such that it encompasses Appellant’s disclosed surfaces but excludes Tu’s. Further, we have been Appeal 2019-004449 Application 14/383,754 8 instructed that our reviewing court “did not mean that things patent drawings show clearly are to be disregarded.” In re Mraz, 455 F.2d 1069, 1072 (CCPA 1972). Appellant also challenges the Examiner’s reliance on Figure 4 of Appellant’s Specification, stating that this Figure “shows the problem solved by the present invention,” i.e., “[m]isalignment of the marker bands.” Reply Br. 2–3. However, the Examiner did not rely on this Figure for the purpose of identifying the problem. Instead, the Examiner relied on this Figure as an illustration of the ends of the working surface of the balloon, which this Figure so readily depicts. See Ans. 10, 11. Appellant also intimates that the Examiner’s treatment of the claim 1 limitation “for identifying an end of the working surface of the balloon” as “intended use” (see Ans. 10) is incorrect because “[e]xpress language of the claim cannot simply be disregarded based on the legally unsupported proposition that it is entitled to ‘limited’ weight.” Reply Br. 3–4. This argument is not persuasive because the Examiner did not disregard this limitation. Instead, the Examiner stated that “Tu and Solar disclose wire and radiopaque markers that could be put in any location as pointed out by Solar.” Ans. 10 (referencing Solar ¶¶ 45, 46); see also id. at 12 (regarding the combination of Spencer and Solar). Further, once the Examiner finds that the prior art structure would be capable of performing all of the functions claimed, the burden shifts to the applicant to show that this is not the case. See In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1474, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Appellant is not persuasive that the cited combination is unable to function as claimed. Appellant also understands that “[t]he same argument is made in relation to the Spencer reference.” Reply Br. 4. Appeal 2019-004449 Application 14/383,754 9 In summation, and based on the record presented, Appellant does not apprise us of Examiner error. Accordingly, the rejection of claims 1, 2, 4, 6– 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 24–27, and 29 as being obvious over Tu and Solar, and the rejection of claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, and 14 as being obvious over Spencer and Solar, are sustained. The rejection of claim 16 as obvious over Tu, Solar, and Dror Appellant does not provide substantive arguments concerning the rejection of claim 16, and appears to rely on arguments provided for parent claim 1. See Appeal Br. 4–7. As we are not aware of any deficiencies in the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 1 as being obvious over Tu and Solar, we likewise sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 16 as being obvious over Tu, Solar, and Dror. The rejection of claims 19 and 30–32 as obvious over Spencer, Solar, and Burgmeier Appellant does not present arguments regarding claim 19 (which ultimately depends from claim 1). See Briefs generally. We summarily sustain its rejection. Appellant argues independent claim 30 and dependent claims 31 and 32 together. See Appeal Br. 5–7. We select claim 30 for review, with claims 31 and 32 standing or falling therewith. Claim 30 requires “means for identifying an end of the working surface of the balloon.” Appeal Br. 11 (Claims App.). Appellant points out that claim 30 has a means plus function limitation and states that, according to examination guidelines, “the application of a prior art reference to a Appeal 2019-004449 Application 14/383,754 10 means or step plus function limitation requires that the prior art element perform the identical function specified in the claim.” Appeal Br. 5 (citation omitted). The Examiner relies on Burgmeier for performing the identical function specified. See Final Act. 20 (referencing Burgmeier “Fig. 2, the radiopaque 40/41 identify the length and two ends of the cylindrical portion”); see also Ans. 13–16. To be clear, Burgmeier teaches that, as regarding Figure 2, “radiopaque portion 40 extends within the expandable balloon portion 28 from adjacent the proximal balloon cone X to adjacent the distal balloon con[e] Y.” Burgmeier ¶ 45. Appellant does not explain how this disclosure in Burgmeier, which identifies the ends of the working surface, differs from the manner recited, i.e., at the ends of the cylindrical portion of the balloon. See also Ans. 13–16. Additionally, compare, e.g., Burgmeier’s Figure 2 with Appellant’s Figures 2, 4, 6, 10, and 11. Hence, this contention by Appellant is not persuasive. Appellant also argues that “the present rejection lacks any explanation as to why a sheath or coating 41 [of Burgmeier] on a catheter shaft is the equivalent of a wire extending longitudinally along the balloon and attached to the shaft at the balloon distal end and including a radiopaque portion for identifying an end of the working surface of the balloon.” Appeal Br. 6. This argument is not persuasive because Appellant is not arguing the rejection, i.e., the Examiner only relied on Burgmeier for its explicit manner of “identifying an end of the working surface of the balloon.” Final Act. 10; see also Ans. 13. The Examiner relied on the combination of Spencer and Solar for the other limitations. See Final Act. 10 (“Spencer and Solar disclose[] essentially every limitation[]”). Thus, this argument by Appellant, Appeal 2019-004449 Application 14/383,754 11 essentially arguing Burgmeier individually, is not persuasive of Examiner error. Appellant further states, “[t]he proposed rejection also lacks a rational underpinning.” Appeal Br. 6; see also Reply Br. 5. However, Appellant appears to disregard the reason the Examiner provided for combining Spencer, Solar and Burgmeier. See Final Act. 10. This contention by Appellant is not persuasive. Appellant also argues that “the sheath or coating 41 of Burgmeier would be provided on the shaft of Solar or Spencer” and “[t]heir wires would still not identify any end of the working surface.” Appeal Br. 7. Again, as noted above, Appellant is not responding to the Examiner’s rejection, which modified “Spencer to identify[] an end of the working surface of the balloon as taught by Burgmeier.” Final Act. 10. According, and based on the record presented, the Examiner’s rejection of claims 19 and 30–32 as being obvious over Spencer, Solar, and Burgmeier is sustained. The rejection of claim 20 as obvious over Spencer, Solar, Burgmeier, and Aita Claim 20 depends, ultimately, from claim 1. Appellant does not provide substantive arguments concerning this rejection of claim 20. See Briefs generally. Instead, Appellant appears to rely on arguments provided with respect to claim 1 above. See Appeal Br. 4–5. As we not aware of any deficiencies in the Examiner’s rejection above, we likewise sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 20 as being obvious over Spencer, Solar, Burgmeier, and Aita. Appeal 2019-004449 Application 14/383,754 12 CONCLUSION In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 2, 4, 6–8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 24–27, 29 103(a) Tu, Solar 1, 2, 4, 6–8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 24–27, 29 16 103(a) Tu, Solar, Dror 16 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 14 103(a) Spencer, Solar 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 14 19, 30–32 103(a) Spencer, Solar, Burgmeier 19, 30–32 20 103(a) Spencer, Solar, Burgmeier, Aita 20 Overall Outcome 1, 2, 4–9, 11, 12, 14–16, 19, 20, 24– 27, 29–32 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation