CLEARCAPITAL.COM, INC.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 21, 2020

2020000097 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 21, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/653,388 10/16/2012 Kevin Leon Marshall CCAP-001DVB 4355
138718 7590 07/21/2020
Polsinelli LLP
3 Embarcadero Center
Suite 2400
San Francisco, CA 94111
EXAMINER
WHITAKER, ANDREW B
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3629
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/21/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
sfpatent@polsinelli.com
uspt@polsinelli.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte KEVIN LEON MARSHALL, SEAN M. MCSWEENEY, and
ALEXANDER VILLACORTA
____________

Appeal 2020-000097
Application 13/653,388
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, ADAM J. PYONIN, and
PHILLIP A. BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges.

THOMAS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 10–24. Claims 1–9 are canceled. See
Claim Appendix. A telephonic oral hearing took place on July 7, 2020, and
a copy of the transcript will be placed in the file in due course. We have
jurisdiction over the appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as
ClearCapital.com, Inc. Appeal Br. 3.
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The present invention relates generally to building Home Data Index
(“HDI”) models. See Spec., Abstract.
Independent claim 10, reproduced below, is representative of the
appealed claims:
10. A method of building a multidimensional index
model, the method comprising:
receiving a subject property and user preferences
from a user;
geocoding the subject property based on one or
more attributes associated with the subject property, wherein
geocoding the subject property includes:
identifying boundaries for a plurality of possible
different markets, and
assigning membership for the subject property
within at least one of the plurality of possible different markets
based on the subject property being located within the identified
boundaries of at least one possible market;
spatially matching the geocoded subject property
to other properties associated with the at least one possible
market, the other properties having shared attributes with the
subject property, wherein the spatial matching uses property
data of the geocoded subject property and is performed based
on the user preferences that include a range of volatility or risk
associated with a representative sample size for the at least one
possible market;
identifying housing market segments for the
subject property based on the shared attributes within the at
least one possible market;
establishing a hierarchy for the housing market
segments having a variable number of tiers that organizes
trends of property within the identified housing market
segments, wherein a number of tiers used is based on a selected
value range and sales type, and wherein the hierarchy is based
on user preferences that define the variable number of tiers;
generating a plurality of home pricing models that
provide information associated with a respective housing
market segments, wherein the information includes pricing for
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property within the housing market segment inclusive of the
subject property;
selecting a first model from the plurality of
generated models that meets an acceptable level of accuracy,
wherein the acceptable level of accuracy is based on the user
preference that includes using one or more of model type,
associated volatility or risk, the established hierarchy used; and
outputting information associated with the housing
market based on the selected first model via a user interface,
wherein the outputted information corresponds to pricing for
property within the housing market inclusive of the subject
property with the shared attributes.

Appellant appeals the following rejections:
R1. Claims 10–24 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the
claimed invention is directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act.
4–6.
R2. Claims 10–24 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Florance (US 2009/0132316 A1, May 21, 2009),
Rothstein (US 6,058,369, May 2, 2000), and Kagarlis (US 2008/0168004
A1, July 10, 2008). Final Act. 6–30.
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant, and in light of the arguments and evidence produced
thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential).
ANALYSIS
Rejection under § 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
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ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with the framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”). For example, concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and
thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity,
such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski,
561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584,
594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63,
69 (1972)).
The USPTO published revised guidance on the application of 35
U.S.C. § 101. USPTO’s 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Revised Guidance”), updated by
USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
peg_oct_2019_update.pdf) (jointly referred to as “Revised Guidance”); see
also October 2019 Patent Eligibility Guidance Update, 84 Fed. Reg. 55942
(Oct. 18, 2019) (notifying the public of the availability of the October
update).
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Under the Revised Guidance “Step 2A,” the office first looks to
whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human
activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)). 84 Fed. Reg. at
51–52, 55.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, does the Office then
(pursuant to the Revised Guidance “Step 2B”) look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to
the judicial exception. 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Step 2A, Prong 1 (Does the Claim Recite a Judicial Exception?)
With respect to independent method claims 10, 17–19, and 23, the
Examiner determines that the claims are directed to “selecting a generated
home pricing model from a plurality of generated models that meets an
acceptable level of accuracy” (Final Act. 4; see also Ans. 3), which the
Examiner concludes, and we agree, are certain methods of organizing human
activity, i.e., a fundamental economic practice (id.), which is a type of
abstract idea.
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Consistent with the Examiner’s determination, Appellant’s
Specification discloses:
The present invention builds Home Data Index (HDI)
models. One driving force behind this HDI initiative is that no
one model or measure can truly capture the widely dynamic
movement of home prices. Even within a small geographical
area, such as a ZIP code, there is significant variation in
property sale types, sale frequencies and sale values. To better
describe these variations, the present invention presents a suite
of paired sales and price per square foot index models built
around an array of property transaction characteristics. These
HDI models expand on the usage and understanding of
traditional home price indices (HPIs) by implementing a
multidimensional index comprised of four main dimensions:
geography; time frames; value range; and property sales type.
Several layers exist within each dimension, allowing for more
than 300 different index model perspectives for a given
property address. For each permutation among the layers of the
four main dimensions, a model is constructed with an
associated confidence score that reflects the statistical relevance
of each estimate.
Spec. ¶ 10.
Claim 10 recites at least the following limitations which encompass
fundamental economic practices: (1) “receiving a subject property and user
preferences,” (2) “geocoding the subject property . . . [by] identifying
boundaries . . . and assigning membership,” (3) “spatially matching the
geocoded subject property to other properties,” (4) “identifying housing
markets segments,” (5) “establishing a hierarchy for the housing market
segments . . . based on a selected value range and sales type,”
(6) “generating a plurality of home pricing models,” (7) “selecting a first
model . . . that meets an acceptable level of accuracy,” and (8) “outputting
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information associated with the housing market based on the selected first
model . . . correspond[ing] to pricing.” See claim 10.
At least the following decisions from our reviewing court have found
many types of fundamental commercial practices patent ineligible: OIP
Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 701 (mem) (2015) (offer-based price optimization);
buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (transaction
guaranty); Personalized Media Commc’ns, L.L.C. v. Amazon.com Inc., 671
F. App’x 777 (mem) (Fed. Cir. 2016) (receiving instructions for ordering);
Macropoint, LLC v. Fourkites, Inc., 671 F. App’x 780 (mem) (Fed. Cir.
2016) (tracking freight); Wireless Media Innovations, LLC v. Maher
Terminals, LLC, 636 F. App’x 1014 (mem) (Fed. Cir. 2016) (monitoring
shipping containers); America’s Collectibles Network, Inc. v. Jewelry
Channel, Inc. USA, 672 F. App’x 997 (mem) (Fed. Cir. 2017) (conducting
reverse auction by adjusting price and inventory); and EasyWeb Innovations,
LLC v. Twitter, Inc., 689 F. App’x 969 (mem) (Fed. Cir. 2017) (receiving,
authenticating, and publishing data); In re Villena, 745 F. App’x 374 (mem)
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (property valuation). Appellant’s claims similarly involves
fundamental economic practices involving the dynamic movement of home
prices.
Appellant challenges the Examiner’s determinations on the ground
that one of the claimed limitations, i.e., “establishing hierarchies and tiers to
organize property trends . . . is not one of the ‘fundamental economic
principles or practices.’” Appeal Br. 15. We disagree with Appellant.
Claim 10 specifically recites that “a number of tiers used is based on a
selected value range and sales type” of the housing market segments. See
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claim 10. As such, we find unavailing Appellant’s contention that the
aforementioned limitation is not related to fundamental economic practices
given that the claimed “hierarchies” are explicitly based on value ranges and
sales activities. In any case, Appellant fails to dispute that any of the other
claimed limitations are abstract concepts. The identified abstract idea need
not encompass every claim limitation. Otherwise, there would be no need
for step two of the Alice inquiry. Alice, 573 U.S. at 216.
Therefore, for at least the aforementioned reasons, we agree with the
Examiner that claim 10 recites an abstract idea, which we conclude are
certain methods of organizing human activity, e.g., fundamental economic
practices.
Step 2A—Prong 2 (integration into a Practical Application) 2
Under the Revised Guidance, we now must determine if additional
elements in the claims integrate the judicial exception into a practical
application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
Here, we consider the claim as a whole, i.e., “the limitations
containing the judicial exception as well as the additional elements in the
claim besides the judicial exception . . . evaluated together to determine
whether the claim integrates the judicial exception into a practical
application.” October 2019 Patent Eligibility Guidance Update, at 12,
available at http://www.uspto.gov/PatentEligibility.

2 We acknowledge that some of the considerations at Step 2A, Prong 2,
properly may be evaluated under Step 2 of Alice (Step 2B of the Office
revised guidance). For purposes of maintaining consistent treatment within
the Office, we evaluate them under Step 1 of Alice (Step 2A of the Office
revised guidance). See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n.25, 27–32.

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We discern no additional element (or combination of elements)
recited in Appellant’s representative claim 10 that integrates the judicial
exception into a practical application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 54–55 (“Prong 2”). For example, Appellant’s claimed additional elements
(e.g., “a user interface” in claims 10 and 17–19; “‘a processor,’ ‘database,’
‘display,’ and ‘user interface’” in claim 23) do not: (1) improve the
functioning of a computer or other technology; (2) are not applied with any
particular machine (except for a generic computer); (3) do not effect a
transformation of a particular article to a different state; and (4) are not
applied in any meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the
judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the
claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
exception. See MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
Appellant contends that “[t]he hierarchy, tiers, and models are
relevant to a computer-based analysis” (Appeal Br. 16), “allowing the
computing device to perform an analysis that humans could only have done
in the past.” Id. at 17. Appellant further contends that “[t]he claims also
provide a user, via the computing device, the ability to receive up-to-date
insight on housing market without the substantial time delays often
encountered in the past.” Id.
As an initial matter, we note that representative claim 10 (and
independent claims 17–19) fails to recite a “computing device” or a
“computer-based analysis.” See Claims 10, 17–19. Claim 23 is the only
claim reciting a computing device. Representative claim 10 merely recites
performing various steps and outputting information via a user interface.
With the exception of the user interface, we find that such steps could
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practically be performed by a human. As such, we agree with the Examiner
that, with the exception of claim 23, “these aspects of the claim are not
recited as being performed by a computer whatsoever.” Ans. 6.
Appellant’s Specification states:
One goal of the Home Data Index (HDI) in the present
invention is to provide an accurate view of real estate markets
by incorporating various levels of geographic precision, time
frames, value intervals, and sale types. Generally, a Home
Price Index (HPI) is a measure of how home prices in an area
appreciate or depreciate over time based on the sales activity
over the same period. One main purpose of HPIs is to offer
insight into how market forces affect property values in a
particular area. Several statistical approaches are currently used
to determine appreciation rates, each with a different way of
dealing with times frames, geographic resolutions and sale
types. Some published HPIs tend to generate indices at large
geographical perspectives, such as state, regional, or
metropolitan areas. Additionally, many of the current
methodologies also require a substantial time delay between the
date of release and the dates for which the estimates are made.
In some cases as much as three months pass between the time
an estimate is made and the time it is made available.
Furthermore, some HPIs only consider a specific class of
property sales types, or fail to distinguish among distinct sales
types, thereby omitting important sectors of markets that may
have significant impact on overall changes. Motivated by these
limitations, the approach to real estate market appreciation rates
in the present invention includes varying spatial resolutions,
data time lag resolutions, sale value stratification, and property
sales types. These four main dimensions allow the present
invention to provide the clearest picture of market dynamics at
the smallest geographical area, using the most recent data
available. By allowing users to view market indices this way, a
more tailored index may be obtained with greater relevance
toward a user’s needs. In short, the present invention’s HDI
allows one to view real estate markets through an array of
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prisms to better suit the various characteristics of markets
across the country.
Spec. ¶ 20.
As stated in the Specification, the claim process simply allows a user
to view real estate properties through many perspectives for a given property
address. However, the claimed process fails to improve the functioning of
any computing device, as recited in claim 23. Rather, the processor,
database, display, user interface, and computing device, in claim 23, merely
link the underlying abstract idea (i.e., certain methods of organizing human
activity) to a particular technological environment, i.e., using generic
computing elements for building Home Data Index (HDI) models. Thus, the
claimed process, in claim 23, uses generic computers and computer
networks to automate providing a Home Data Index Model. Such claims are
not patent eligible. See OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d
1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“relying on a computer to perform routine tasks
more quickly or more accurately is insufficient to render a claim patent
eligible”).
In McRO, the Federal Circuit concluded that the claim, when
considered as a whole, was directed to a “technological improvement over
the existing, manual 3-D animation techniques” through the “use[of] limited
rules . . . specifically designed to achieve an improved technological result in
conventional industry practice.” McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am.
Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Specifically, the Federal Circuit
found that the claimed rules allow computers to produce accurate and
realistic lip synchronization and facial expressions in animated characters
that previously could only be produced by human animators, and the rules
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are limiting because they define morph weight sets as a function of phoneme
sub-sequences. Id. at 1313 (citations omitted).
In contrast, here, Appellant has not identified any analogous
improvement attributable to the claimed invention. Although providing
Home Data Index (HDI) models may improve a business process, it does not
achieve an improved technological result. We see no parallel between the
limiting rules described in McRO and the results-based rules recited in
Appellant’s claims.
For these reasons, we determine the additional recitations of claim 23
do not integrate the recited patent-ineligible subject matter into a practical
application.
For at least the reason noted supra, we determine that claim 10 (and
claims 17–19, 23) (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate
that exception into a practical application. Thus, representative claim 10
(and claims 17–19, 23) is directed to the aforementioned abstract idea.
Alice/Mayo—Step 2 (Inventive Concept)
Step 2B identified in the Revised Guidance
Turning to the second step of the Alice inquiry, we now look to
whether claim 10 contains any “inventive concept” or adds anything
“significantly more” to transform the abstract concept into a patent-eligible
application. Alice, 573 U.S. at 216. As recognized by the Revised
Guidance, an “inventive concept” under Alice step 2 can be evaluated based
on whether an additional element or combination of elements:
(1) adds a specific limitation or combination of limitations that
are not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the
field, which is indicative that an inventive concept may be
present; or
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(2) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a
high level of generality, to the judicial exception, which is
indicative that an inventive concept may not be present.
See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56; see MPEP § 2106.05(d).
Appellant contends that “[t]he Examiner has not provided any clear
and convincing evidence regarding why the described process being
implemented by the computer should be considered generic.” Appeal Br.
18.
Here, the Examiner determines that the additional limitations “are
recited at a high level of generality and are recited as performing generic
computer functions . . . that are well-understood, routine[,] and conventional
activities.” Final Act. 5; see also Ans. 5. We agree with the Examiner.
Consistent with the Examiner’s determination, Appellant’s Specification
states “Fig. 6 is a block diagram illustrating a General Purpose Computer,
such as utilized for calculating Home Data Indices, in accordance with the
present invention.” Spec. ¶ 19; see also ¶ 61. As such, the Examiner’s
noting the generic nature of the component parts recited in the claims is
clearly consistent with Appellant’s Specification and provides sufficient
evidence of a generic computer system used to implement the abstraction.
See Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1057 (Fed.
Cir. 2017) (“Significantly, the claims do not provide details as to any non-
conventional software for enhancing the financing process.). See
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1342
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (explaining that “[o]ur law demands more” than claim
language that “provides only a result-oriented solution, with insufficient
detail for how a computer accomplishes it”). Such an analysis is a factual
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determination. See Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (“Whether something is well-understood, routine, and conventional to
a skilled artisan at the time of the patent is a factual determination.”).
We find no element or combination of elements recited in Appellant’s
claim 23 that contains any “inventive concept” or adds anything
“significantly more” to transform the abstract concept into a patent-eligible
application. Appellant has not adequately explained how claim 23 is
performed such that it is not a routine and conventional function of a generic
computer.
Because Appellant’s independent claims 10, 17–19, and 23 are
directed to a patent-ineligible abstract concept, do not include additional
elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application, and
does not add a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, and conventional,” we sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of the claims 10–24 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to
non-statutory subject matter in light of Alice, its’ progeny, and the Revised
Guidance.

Rejection under § 103(a)
Appellant contends that “Rothstein is silent regarding user preferences
pertaining to the range of volatility or risk that would be used in connection
with spatial matching. Rothstein merely describes the ‘risk index’ in
connection with investing.” Appeal Br. 20.
The Examiner finds that “under the broadest reasonable interpretation,
the Rothstein reference is determining the risk index for the market segment
(based upon a user input[,] i.e.[,] preference) . . . The claim only recites . . .
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is performed based on the user preferences that include a range of volatility
or risk associated with . . . at least one possible market.” Ans. 7. The
Examiner further finds that “all parties involved in any type of real estate
transaction would be concerned with risk, regardless of the property being
purchased for residential personal use or as an investment.” Id.
Here, Appellant emphasizes that Rothstein is silent about “spatial
matching.” Appeal Br. 20. However, we point out that the Examiner relies
specifically on Florance to teach “spatially matching the geocoded subject
property” (see Final Act. 7–8), and imports the teaching of Rothstein to
teach “user preferences” and “at least one possible market.” Id. at 9. As
such, even if Rothstein is silent about spatial matching, as argued by
Appellant, Appellant fails to dispute whether Florance teaches this feature
and/or what the combined teachings of Florance and Rothstein would have
suggested to one skilled in the art.
Furthermore, Appellant’s aforementioned arguments do not take into
account what the collective teachings of the prior art would have suggested
to one of ordinary skill in the art and is therefore ineffective to rebut the
Examiner’s prima facie case of obviousness. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413,
425 (CCPA 1981) (“The test for obviousness is not whether . . . the claimed
invention must be expressly suggested in any one or all of the references.
Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have
suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.”) (citations omitted). This
reasoning is applicable here.
Appellant also contends that “the organization and display of data in
Kagarlis is not based on any sort of hierarchy or tiers within the hierarchy”
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(Appeal Br. 22), and “Kagarlis is also silent regarding defining a variable
number of tiers.” Id. at 23.
The Examiner finds that Kagarlis teaches “indices which are broken
into subindices . . . whereby user defined criteria defines subsets.” Final
Act. 10. The Examiner “broadly interpreted . . . the choice of the subsets of
transactional data as the hierarchies which are then able to derive a subindex
therefrom as the tiers.” Ans. 8. In other words, the Examiner equates
Kagarlis’ indices, subindices, and subsets with the claimed hierarchy and
variable number of tiers.
In response, Appellant contends that Kagarlis’ “‘choice of subset of
transactions’ does not teach any particular ‘number of tiers,’ let alone the
specifically claimed ‘variable number of tiers’ that is defined by user
preference.” Reply Br. 12.
The Examiner finds that Kagarlis teaches that a user can make a
choice of subset from which to derive a subindex. See Ans. 8. We interpret
such findings as illustrating that Kagarlis teaches the claimed hierarchy,
based on user preferences, that define the variable number of tiers. We find
that Appellant has not sufficiently distinguished Kagarlis’ indices and
subindices from the claimed hierarchy and variable number of tiers. We also
find unavailing Appellant’s argument that Kagarlis “does not teach any
particular ‘number of tiers’” (Reply Br. 12), given that claim 10 does not
require any particular number of tiers.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 10.
Appellant’s arguments regarding the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claims 17–19 and 23 rely on the same arguments as for claim 10, and
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Appellant does not argue separate patentability for the dependent claims.
We, therefore, also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 11–24.

CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 10–24 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is
affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 10–24 as being unpatentable
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over Florance, Rothstein, and Kagarlis is affirmed.
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
10–24 101 Eligibility 10–24
10–24 103 Florance,
Rothstein, Kagarlis
10–24
Overall
Outcome
10–24

No period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this
appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).

AFFIRMED