Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Dec 18, 2008

No. 78962079 (T.T.A.B. Dec. 18, 2008)

Mailed: December 18, 2008

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
________

In re Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc.
________

Serial No. 78962079
_______

Pamela B. Huff, Kristi F. Dent and Matthew M. Jennings of
Cox Smith Matthews Incorporated for Clear Channel Outdoor,
Inc.

Shaila E. Settles, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office
114 (K. Margaret Le, Managing Attorney).
_______

Before Bucher, Taylor and Bergsman, Administrative
Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Taylor, Administrative Trademark Judge:

Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. has filed an application
to register on the Principal Register the mark TAXI
ENTERTAINMENT NETWORK (in standard character format) for
services ultimately identified as “Out-of-home advertising
services, namely, rental of advertising space in broadcast
media, and preparing and placing advertisements in
broadcast media for others” in International Class 35.1 At

1 Serial No. 78962079, filed August 28, 2006, and alleging a
bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce.

THIS OPINION IS NOT
A PRECEDENT OF
THE TTAB
Ser No. 78962079
2
the request of the examining attorney, applicant disclaimed
the words “ENTERTAINMENT NETWORK.”
The trademark examining attorney has refused
registration under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1052(d), due to a likelihood of confusion with the
marks in Registration No. 1888792 for TAXI (in standard
character format) for “advertising agency services” in
Class 35 [and] “graphic art design services” in Class 42
and Registration No. 2818654 for TAXI and design, shown
below,

for “Advertising agencies” in Class 35 [and] “Graphic art
design, designing and implementing web sites for others” in
Class 42. The registrations are owned by the same entity.
Registration was also refused pursuant to Trademark
Act Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (e)(1), on the ground
that the proposed mark TAXI ENTERTAINMENT NETWORK is merely
descriptive of a feature or characteristic of applicant’s
out-of-home advertising services.
Ser No. 78962079
3
When the refusals were made final, applicant appealed.
Both applicant and the examining attorney filed briefs.2 As
discussed below, we affirm the refusals to register under
Section 2(d) and reverse the refusal to register under
Section 2(e)(1).
LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
We initially note that inasmuch as both applicant and
the examining attorney focused their discussion of the
relatedness of the services on applicant’s recited services
vis-à-vis the advertising agency services (advertising
agencies) identified in the cited registrations, we will do
the same.
Our determination of the issue of likelihood of
confusion is based on an analysis of all of the probative
facts in evidence that are relevant to the factors set
forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d
1357, 177 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973). See also, In re Majestic
Distilling Co., Inc., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201 (Fed.

2 Applicant, in its brief, indicated that its identified
services were classified in International Class 42. We note,
however, that the services are classified in International Class
35. In any event, it is well recognized that the system of
dividing goods (and services) into classes is a USPTO
administrative convenience and that a determination on the
relatedness of the respective goods (and services) is not
restricted by this artificial boundary. See Jean Patou Inc. v.
Theon Inc., 9 F.3d 971, 29 USPQ2d 1771 (Fed. Cir. 1003); Graco
Inc. v. The Warner-Graham Company, 164 USPQ 400, 402 (TTAB 1969).

Ser No. 78962079
4
Cir. 2003). In any likelihood of confusion analysis, two
key considerations are the similarities between the marks
and the similarities between the goods and/or services.
See Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544
F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24 (CCPA 1976).
The Marks
Considering first the marks, we must determine whether
applicant’s mark, TAXI ENTERTAINMENT NETWORK, and
registrant’s marks, TAXI and TAXI and design are similar or
dissimilar in terms of sound, appearance, connotation and
commercial impression. Applicant argues that when its mark
and the cited marks are viewed in their entireties, “it is
clear that there is no reasonable probability of
confusion.” (Br. p. 4). Applicant particularly contends
that its mark differs significantly from the cited marks in
terms of commercial impression and that the visual and
aural distinctions between all of the marks have
significance. The examining attorney, by contrast,
maintains that the marks are “similar in commercial
impression because applicant has adopted in its entirety
the sole source-identifying element in registrant’s mark[s]
(i.e., ‘Taxi’) without adding additional elements that
distinguish the marks and/or their source.” (Br. p. 6).
Ser No. 78962079
5
As applicant correctly points out, the marks must be
considered in their entireties. However, it is well
settled that one feature of a mark may be more significant
than another, and it is not improper to give more weight to
this dominant feature in determining the commercial
impression created by the mark. See In re National Data
Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ 749 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“There
is nothing improper in stating that, for rational reasons,
more or less weight has been given to a particular feature
of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on
consideration of the marks in their entireties. Indeed,
this type of analysis appears to be unavoidable.”) In
addition, with a composite mark comprising a design and
words, the word portion of the mark is the one most likely
to indicate the origin of the goods to which it is affixed.
CBS, Inc. v. Morrow, 708 F.2d 1579, 218 USPQ 198, 200 (Fed.
Cir. 1983); In re Dakin’s Miniatures, Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593
(TTAB 2001) (“words are normally accorded greater weight
because they would be used by purchasers to request the
goods”); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d at 1056.
Furthermore, the test is not whether the marks can be
distinguished when subjected to a side-by-side comparison,
but rather whether the marks are sufficiently similar in
terms of their overall commercial impression that confusion
Ser No. 78962079
6
as to the source of the services offered under the
respective marks is likely to result.
Applying these principles to the marks at issue, we
conclude that applicant’s mark is similar to both cited
marks. While there are differences between the marks,
namely the addition of the term “ENTERTAINMENT NETWORK” to
applicant’s mark and the black quadrangle design to
registrant’s design mark, we nonetheless find the marks are
similar in appearance, sound, connotation and commercial
impression. In particular, the dominant portion of
applicant’s applied-for mark is TAXI inasmuch as the
descriptive and disclaimed wording “ENTERTAINMENT NETWORK”
is subordinate in nature.
Further supporting the position that the word “taxi”
is the dominant portion of applicant’s mark is its position
as the first word in the mark. Presto Products Inc. v.
Nice-Pak Products, Inc., 9 USPQ2d 1895, 1897 (TTAB 1988)
(“it is often the first part of a mark which is most likely
to be impressed upon the mind of a purchaser and
remembered”). See also Palm Bay Imports Inc. v. Veuve
Clicquot Ponsardin, 386 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Veuve” is the most prominent part of the
mark VEUVE CLICQUOT because “veuve” is the first word in
the mark and the first word to appear on the label);
Ser No. 78962079
7
Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of America,
970 F.2d 874, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (upon
encountering the marks, consumers must first notice the
identical lead word). Accordingly, the dominant portion of
applicant’s mark is identical to the entire word portion of
registrant’s TAXI marks.
Applicant is correct that disclaimed matter cannot be
ignored. However, inasmuch as the term ENTERTAINMENT
NETWORK merely describes a feature of applicant’s services,
namely, that applicant’s advertisements are featured
specifically in broadcast media, it will not be looked upon
as source indicating.
As regards the cited TAXI and design mark, the term
TAXI is the dominant portion because the word portion of a
mark is more likely to be impressed upon a purchaser’s
memory and used in calling for the goods. In re Dakin’s
Miniatures, Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1596 (TTAB 2001).
Moreover, the design consists simply of a black quadrangle
carrier having no source-indicating significance.
Put simply, when we consider applicant’s mark and the
two cited registered marks in their entireties, we find
that due to the shared term “TAXI,” applicant’s mark is
similar to both cited, registered marks. The du Pont
Ser No. 78962079
8
factor of similarity of the marks thus favors a finding of
likelihood of confusion.
Third-Party Usage of TAXI
Applicant also argues that the cited “TAXI” marks are
weak and therefore should be afforded only a relatively
narrow range of protection. (Br. p. 9). In support of its
position that the mark is weak, applicant made of record
copies from the TESS database of the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) of forty-five (45) third-party
applications and seventy-two (72) use-based third-party
registrations for marks containing the term “TAXI” for a
variety of goods and services.3 We find these examples of
limited probative value. First, as regards the
applications, they show only that the applications have
been filed. See Interpayment Services Ltd. v. Docters &
Thiede, 66 USPQ2d 1463 (TTAB 2003). As regards the third-
party registrations, while they may be used to demonstrate
that a portion of a mark is suggestive or descriptive, they
are not evidence that the marks shown therein are in use or
that the public is aware of them. See AMF Incorporated v.
American Leisure Products, Inc., 177 USPQ 268, 269 (CCPA

3 Applicant included copies of three additional registrations.
However, one was owned by applicant and the other two are of no
probative value because they are not use based.

Ser No. 78962079
9
1973)[“little weight is to be given such registrations in
evaluating whether there is likelihood of confusion.”].
Moreover, our review of such registrations reveals that of
the seventy-two registrations, the term “TAXI” has been
disclaimed in fifteen and two of the marks are registered
on the Supplemental Register. The remaining marks include
additional distinguishing terms (e.g., TAKEOUT TAXI with
knife and fork design, SPACE TAXI PINBALL, PEANUT ISLAND
WATER TAXI and TAXI-BOT) or cover very different goods and
services (e.g., perfumes, colognes, toilet water and
shampoo; toys; restaurant services; and paper goods and
printed matter). Essentially, the third-party
registrations fail to show that the word “taxi” has any
descriptive significance in connection with advertising
services.
We add that even if “TAXI” were considered to be weak
due to an asserted degree of common usage, even weak marks
are entitled to protection where confusion is likely. See
Matsushita Electric Company v. National Steel Co., 442 F.2d
1383, 170 USPQ 98, 99 (CCPA 1971) (“Even though a mark may
be ‘weak’ in the sense of being a common word in common use
as a trademark, it is entitled to be protected sufficiently
to prevent confusion from source arising”). Here,
notwithstanding any alleged weakness in the registered
Ser No. 78962079
10
marks, they are still similar in sound, appearance,
connotation and commercial impression to applicant’s mark.
We accordingly find this du Pont factor is neutral.
Relatedness of the Services/Channels of Trade
Considering next the relatedness of the services, it
is well settled that the question of likelihood of
confusion must be determined based on an analysis of the
services recited in applicant’s application vis-à-vis the
services recited in the registrations, rather than on the
basis of what the record reveals the services to be.
Canadian Imperial Bank v. Wells Fargo Bank, 811 F.2d 1490,
1 USPQ2d 1783 (Fed. Cir. 1992); and The Chicago Corp. v.
North American Chicago Corp., 20 USPQ2d 1715 (TTAB 1991).
Furthermore, where the services in an application or cited
registration are broadly described, such that there are no
restrictions as to trade channels and purchasers, it is
presumed that the identification of services encompasses
not only all services of the nature and type described
therein, but that the identified services are provided in
all channels of trade which would be normal therefor, and
that they would be purchased by all potential customers
thereof. See, e.g., In re Elbaum, 211 USPQ 639 (TTAB
1981).
Ser No. 78962079
11
In this case, we compare applicant’s “out-of-home
advertising services, namely, rental of advertising space
in broadcast media, and preparing and placing
advertisements in broadcast media for others” with
registrant’s “advertising agency services (advertising
agencies).” In analyzing the relatedness of these
services, it is not necessary that the services of
applicant and the registrant be similar or even competitive
to support a finding of likelihood of confusion. It is
sufficient that the respective services are related in some
manner and/or that the circumstances surrounding their
marketing are such that they would be likely to be seen by
the same persons under conditions which could, because of
the marks used therewith, give rise to a mistaken belief
that they originate from or are in some way associated with
the same source. In re Melville Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1386
(TTAB 1991).
Applicant, in urging reversal of the refusal,
maintains that the services offered under the cited marks
and its mark are so substantially different that confusion
in unlikely.
The examining attorney argues that the services are
related because registrant’s advertising agency services
Ser No. 78962079
12
are highly similar to and likely encompass applicant’s
“out-of-home advertising services, namely rental of
advertising space in broadcast media, and preparing and
placing advertisements in broadcast media for others.”
Noting that likelihood of confusion is determined on the
basis of the services as identified in the application and
cited registrations, and not on the basis of what the
record may show the services to actually be, the examining
attorney points out that, as identified, it is presumed
that applicant will rent advertising space and prepare and
place advertisements in all forms of broadcast media and
without limitation to LCD screens in taxi cabs only. In
addition, there is no limitation to the type of
registrant’s advertising agency services. The examining
attorney accordingly maintains that the preparation and
placement of advertisements in broadcast media are services
that are performed by advertising agencies and are
therefore encompassed in the description “advertising
agency services” and/or “advertising agencies.”
In support of this position, the examining attorney
made of record with her Final office Action, evidence from
Wikipedia indicating that the creative department of an
advertising agency creates [or prepares] the actual ads,
and the account services department places the
Ser No. 78962079
13
advertisements. She also made of record excerpts of
advertising agency websites, including those of Rita
Sanders Public Relations and Advertising Agency, Odney
Adverting, Blitz, Impact Adverting and Green Dot
Advertising, obtained from a search of the Google search
engine for the terms “advertising agency placement,”
showing that advertising agency services include engaging
in media buying, i.e., buying space and time for
advertisements in media outlets, and planning and placing
advertising in broadcast media, including television.
We find this evidence sufficient to establish that
registrant’s advertising agency services and/or advertising
agencies encompass applicant’s out-of-home advertising
services, namely rental of advertising space in broadcast
media, and preparing and placing advertisements in
broadcast media for others.
In an attempt to distinguish its services from those
of the registrant, applicant argues that its services are
not those typically associated with advertising agencies
such as strategic planning, advertising and design – the
creation of advertising campaigns. Rather, applicant
contends that its services involve the broadcasting of
informational and entertainment content as well as
Ser No. 78962079
14
advertisement on LCD screens in taxi cabs. Specifically,
applicant argues that its mark is used in connection with
“programming from NBC, real time tickers with a variety of
topics, passenger information including GPS tracking of
[the] taxi trip, Time, Fare and the ability to pay by
Credit and Debit Card.” (Br. p. 2). These arguments are
unavailing as an applicant may not restrict the scope of
the goods covered in the cited registration by argument or
extrinsic evidence. In re Bercut-Vandervoort & Co., 229
USPQ 763, 764 (TTAB 1986).
Applicant similarly argues that its consumers are
seeking to place ads in an actual broadcast and not looking
to create advertisements to be placed with third parties
and thus consumers of applicant’s services will not likely
encounter the cited marks in the same marketing context.
However, in the absence of any limitations in the
identification of services as to channels of trade and
classes of purchasers in the application and the cited
registrations, we must presume that the services will be
offered in all usual channels of trade for such services,
and will be purchased by the usual classes of purchasers
for those services, and thus, at a minimum, the channels of
trade and classes of purchasers overlap. In re Elbaum,
supra.
Ser No. 78962079
15
In view of the above, the du Pont factors of the
relatedness of the services, channels of trade and classes
of purchasers favor a finding of likelihood of confusion.
Conditions of Sale
Applicant also argues that confusion is not likely
because its broadcast medium is “extremely advanced
technology” and the consumers most likely to rent its
advertising space will be technologically savvy
professional or commercial purchasers who will be less
prone to confusion when making purchasing decisions. (Br.
p. 6). Applicant further argues that both applicant and
registrant market and sell their services to large
corporations whose purchasing employees are unlikely to
confuse applicant’s services with the cited services or to
encounter the informational and entertainment dissemination
services of applicant when making large expenditures
related to developing an advertising campaign. Id. In
addition, applicant argues that both its services and
registrant’s services can be very expensive and, therefore,
companies will exercise more care in committing such
substantial sums and are therefore unlikely to become
confusion as to the source of either applicant’s or the
cited services. (Br. p. 7).
Ser No. 78962079
16
Unfortunately, applicant does not provide any evidence
regarding the decision-making process used by these
purportedly technologically savvy professional or
commercial purchasers, the role trademarks play in their
decision making-process, or how observant and
discriminating they are in practice. Accordingly, the
problem with applicant’s argument is that there is no
corroborating evidence. See Refreshment Machinery Inc. v.
Reed Industries, Inc., 196 USPQ 840, 843 (TTAB 1977)
(selling to a sophisticated purchaser does not
automatically eliminate the likelihood of confusion because
“[i]t must also be shown how the purchasers react to
trademarks, how observant and discriminating they are in
practice, or that the decision to purchase involves such
careful consideration over a long period of time that even
subtle differences are likely to result in recognition that
different marks are involved”).
Moreover, as noted previously in this decision, there
is no limitation in either recitation that the services are
rendered solely to professional or commercial purchasers.
Nor is there any evidence regarding the cost of either
applicant’s or registrant’s services. However, even
assuming arguendo that the respective services are
expensive and will be offered only to, and purchased only
Ser No. 78962079
17
by, “professional or commercial purchasers,” even
knowledgeable and careful purchasers can be confused as to
source, where, as here, very similar marks are used in
connection with partially overlapping services. See In re
Research Trading Corp., 793 F.2d 1276, 230 USPQ 49, 50
(Fed. Cir. 1986) citing Carlisle Chemical Works, Inc. v.
Hardman & Holden Ltd., 434 F.2d 1403, 168 USPQ 110, 112
(CCPA 1970) ("Human memories even of discriminating
purchasers … are not infallible.").
Additional Argument
Last, applicant argues that the Patent and Trademark
Office has allowed marks for somewhat similar services to
register where the only meaningful difference between the
marks was the addition of the phrase ENTERTAINMENT NETWORK.
However, as often noted by the Board and the Courts, each
case must be decided on its own merits. The determination
of registrability of a mark in another case cannot control
the merits in the case now before us. See In re Nett
Designs Inc., 236 F.3d 1339, 57 USPQ2d 1564, 1566 (Fed.
Cir. 2001). See also, In re Kent-Gamebore Corp., 59 USPQ2d
1373 (TTAB 2001); and In re Wilson, 57 USPQ2d 1863 (TTAB
2001).
After considering and balancing all of the evidence as
it relates to the relevant du Pont factors, we conclude
Ser No. 78962079
18
that purchasers familiar with registrant’s advertising
agency services (advertising agencies) rendered under the
marks TAXI and TAXI and design would be likely to believe,
upon encountering applicant’s mark TAXI ENTERTAINMENT
NETWORK for out-of-home advertising services, namely,
rental of advertising space in broadcast media, and
preparing and placing advertisements in broadcast media for
others, that the services originate from or are associated
with or sponsored by the same source.
DESCRIPTIVENESS
We now consider whether the phrase TAXI ENTERTAINMENT
NETWORK merely describes applicant’s “out-of-home
advertising services, namely, rental of advertising space
in broadcast media, and preparing and placing
advertisements in broadcast media for others.”
The examining attorney bears the burden of showing
that a mark is merely descriptive of the identified goods
or services. See In re Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, and
Smith Inc., 828 F.2d 1567, 4 USPQ2d 1141, 1143 (Fed. Cir.
1987). A term is considered to be merely descriptive of
goods and/or services, within the meaning of Section
2(e)(1) of the Act, if it immediately conveys information
concerning a quality, characteristic, function, ingredient,
attribute or feature of the product or services in
Ser No. 78962079
19
connection with which it is used, or intended to be used.
See, e.g., in re Gyulay, 820 F.2d 1216, 3 USPQ2d 1009 (Fed.
Cir. 1987), and In re Abcor Development Corp., 588 F.2d
811, 200 USPQ 215 (CCPA 1978).
To determine whether a term is merely descriptive we
must consider the term not in the abstract, but in relation
to the goods or services for which registration is sought,
the context in which it is being used or intended to be
used, and the possible significance that the term would
have to the average purchaser of the goods or services
because of the manner of its use. In re Recovery, Inc.,
196 USPQ 830 (TTAB 1977). The question whether a proposed
mark is merely descriptive is not determined by asking
whether one can guess, from the mark itself, what the goods
or services are, but rather by asking, when the mark is
seen on or in connection with the goods or services,
whether it immediately conveys information about their
nature. See In re Patent & Trademark Services Inc., 49
USPQ2d 1537, 1539 (TTAB 1998).
Further, when two or more merely descriptive terms are
combined, we must determine whether the combination of
terms evokes a new and unique commercial impression. If
each component retains its merely descriptive significance
in relation to the goods, then the resulting combination is
Ser No. 78962079
20
also merely descriptive. See, e.g., In re Tower Tech,
Inc., 64 USPQ2d 1314 (TTAB 2002) (SMARTTOWER held merely
descriptive of commercial and industrial cooling towers).
However, a mark comprising a combination of merely
descriptive components is registrable if the combination of
terms creates a unitary mark with a unique nondescriptive
meaning, or if the composite has a bizarre or incongruous
meaning as applied to the goods. See In re Colonial Stores
Inc., 394 F.2d 549, 157 USPQ 382 (CCPA 1968); In re Shutts,
217 USPQ 363 (TTAB 1983); and TMEP section 1209.03(d).
The examining attorney maintains that the applied-for
mark, TAXI ENTERTAINMENT NETWORK, is a combination of
merely descriptive terms that fail to create a new
nondescriptive phrase. She specifically argues that TAXI
ENTERTAINMENT NETWORK “immediately conveys an idea of two
significant features and/or characteristics of applicant’s
services, namely, that applicant’s advertisements are
broadcast in a media outlet and that the broadcast media
outlet and advertisement appear in taxi cabs.” (Br. p.
11). As regards the term “Taxi,” the examining attorney
specifically cites to applicant’s March 29, 2007 response
to the first Office Action wherein applicant states that:
[a]pplicant’s mark TAXI ENTERTAINMENT NETWORK
is used in connection with airing ‘programming
from NBC, real time tickers with a variety of
Ser No. 78962079
21
topics, passenger information including GPS
tracking of [the] taxi trip, Time, Fare and the
ability to pay by Credit or Debit Card’ on
state-of-the-art LCD screens installed in the
back seats of cabs.

(Br. p. 12 citing applicant’s March 29, 2007, Response to
Office Action at 1)(emphasis supplied). Based on
applicant’s above-referenced explanation, she contends that
the word “Taxi” describes the fact that the broadcast media
and advertisements will be seen in taxicabs. As regards
the disclaimed wording “ENTERTAINMENT NETWORK,” the
examining attorney argues that it describes the fact that
the advertisements will be prepared and placed in broadcast
media and the advertising space rented in broadcast media.
In short, the examining attorney maintains that the
combination of these terms create no incongruity, and no
imagination is required to understand the nature of the
services.
Applicant, by contrast, maintains that its applied-for
mark TAXI ENTERTAINMENT NETWORK “is not merely descriptive,
but is rather suggestive of, Applicant’s services because
it requires substantial thought and perception on the part
of the consumer to reach a conclusion as to the nature of
the services described.” (Reply br. p. 3).
We agree with applicant. Although the record
demonstrates that “TAXI” and “ENTERTAINMENT NETWORK,” as
Ser No. 78962079
22
individual components of applicant’s mark, describe
features or characteristics of applicant’s services, the
examining attorney did not establish that consumers, upon
seeing applicant’s mark TAXI ENTERTAINMENT NETWORK, would
perceive it as merely describing a feature or
characteristic of applicant’s advertising services. It
would take at least two mental steps to connect the mark
with a significant feature of applicant’s rental of
advertising space in broadcast media and/or preparing and
placing advertisements in broadcast media for others
services: 1) the viewer must understand that applicant
does not provide entertainment services of any kind but,
rather, that the entertainment services are underwritten by
advertising applicant prepares and/or that the
advertisements are placed in the broadcast medium that
applicant provides; and 2) that the advertising services
are rendered in a taxi.
In sum, “[i]t has been recognized that there is but a
thin line of distinction between a suggestive and a merely
descriptive term, and it is often difficult to determine
when a term moves from the realm of suggestiveness into the
sphere of impermissible descriptiveness.” In re Recovery,
Inc., supra. Moreover, it is well established that any
doubt must be resolved in favor of the applicant. See In
Ser No. 78962079
23
re Merill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, and Smith, Inc., supra.
(internal citations omitted). In view of the foregoing, we
find that the mark TAXI ENTERTAINMENT NETWORK is not
descriptive of the identified services.

Decision: The refusals to register under Section 2(d)
of the Trademark Act are affirmed, and the refusal to
register under Section 2(e)(1) of the Trademark Act is
reversed.