Claudia Reisz et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 18, 2019

13945158 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 18, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/945,158 07/18/2013 Claudia Reisz MED6-005/01US
318298-2017
7313
58249 7590 07/18/2019
COOLEY LLP
ATTN: IP Docketing Department
1299 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Suite 700
Washington, DC 20004
EXAMINER
LONG, MEREDITH A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3688
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/18/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
zIPPatentDocketingMailboxUS@cooley.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte CLAUDIA REISZ, BRIAN DALESSANDRO, and
RODNEY HOOK
____________

Appeal 2017-010849
Application 13/945,1581
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before BRUCE T. WIEDER, TARA L. HUTCHINGS, and
ROBERT J. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges.

WIEDER, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the
Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1–3, 7–11, 13, and 17–33. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellants’ invention “relate[s] generally to optimization of bidding
on advertisement opportunities on networks.” (Spec. ¶ 2.)

1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is dstillery, Inc. (Appeal
Br. 3.)
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Claims 1, 7, and 11 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1 is
illustrative. It recites:
1. A non-transitory processor-readable medium storing code
representing instructions to be executed by a processor, the code
comprising code to cause the processor to:
receive conversion data for a plurality of impressions
delivered to a plurality of segments across a plurality of
inventories;
calculate a specific inventory conversion rate based on the
conversion data, the specific inventory conversion rate being a
rate at which a segment from the plurality of segments converts
the plurality of impressions for an inventory from the plurality of
inventories;
calculate a non-specific inventory conversion rate based
on the conversion data, the non-specific inventory conversion
rate being a rate at which the segment converts at least a portion
of the remaining inventories;
calculate an impact estimate for the segment, the impact
estimate including a comparison of the specific inventory
conversion rate to the non-specific inventory conversion rate;
receive a request to bid for an impression on the inventory
in response to a browser beginning to load a webpage containing
the inventory, the request to bid for the impression received after
the calculating the impact estimate, such that the impact estimate
is calculated without direct consideration of data for
advertisements previously accessed by the browser;
identify the browser as belonging to the segment after
receiving the request to bid for the impression;
calculate a bid value using the impact estimate for the
segment based on the browser belonging to the segment such that
the bid value is calculated more efficiently than a specific bid
value calculated based on direct consideration of data for
advertisements previously accessed by the browser; and
send a signal having the bid value to a real-time bidding
exchange such that the real-time bidding exchange considers the
bid value when awarding the impression, the impression awarded
before the webpage containing the inventory has completed
loading.
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REJECTION
Claims 1–3, 18–24, 28–30, and 32 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(b) as being indefinite for failing to point out and distinctly claim the
subject matter the inventors regard as the invention.
Claims 1–3, 7–11, 13, and 17–33 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101
as directed to a judicial exception without significantly more.

ANALYSIS
The § 112(b) rejections
The Examiner concludes that claims 1 and 32 are indefinite because
they recite “‘the bid value is calculated more efficiently than calculating a
specific bid value’ (emphasis added).” (Final Action 5.) Specifically, the
Examiner determines that “[t]he term ‘efficiently’ is a subjective term and is
not defined by the claim, the specification does not provide a standard for
measuring the scope of the term, and one of ordinary skill in the art would
not be reasonably apprised of the scope of the invention.” (Id.)
Appellants disagree and argue that claim 1 “does not merely recite
that a bid value is calculated efficiently, which arguably would be indefinite,
but rather specifies that it is calculate [sic] more efficiently than a specific
bid value calculated based on direct consideration of the data for
advertisements previously accessed by the browser.” (Appeal Br. 23.)
Appellants rely on the same argument with regard to claim 32. (Id.)
The Federal Circuit has stated that
when the USPTO has initially issued a well-grounded rejection
that identifies ways in which language in a claim is ambiguous,
vague, incoherent, opaque, or otherwise unclear in describing
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and defining the claimed invention, and thereafter the applicant
fails to provide a satisfactory response, the USPTO can properly
reject the claim as failing to meet the statutory requirements of
§ 112(b).

In re Packard, 751 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
In this case, the Examiner presents a well-grounded rejection
identifying why it is unclear how one would determine that “the bid value is
calculated more efficiently than a specific bid value.” (See Claims 1, 32.)
Appellants do not point to any disclosure in the Specification to define the
term or otherwise persuasively argue why the Examiner is in error.
Therefore, we will affirm this rejection of claims 1 and 32. Claims 2, 3, 18–
24, 29, and 30 depend from claim 1 and are not separately argued. They fall
with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
The Examiner also concludes that claim 28 is indefinite. Specifically,
the Examiner determines that
[c]laim 28 recites the limitation “send the bid request within one
second of receiving the request to bid” (emphasis added) in line
6 of the claim. It is unclear if a bid request and a request to bid
are the same or separate requests. If separate, there is no
antecedent basis for “the bid request.”

(Final Action 5.)
Appellants do not respond to this rejection. Therefore, we summarily
affirm this rejection of claim 28.

The § 101 rejection
Claim 1
“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
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thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. Section 101, however,
“‘contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.’” Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v.
CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quoting Assoc. for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)).
Alice applies a two-step framework, earlier set out in Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66
(2012), “for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible
applications of those concepts.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217.
Under the two-step framework, it must first be determined if “the
claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept.” Id. at 218. If the
claims are determined to be directed to a patent-ineligible concept, e.g., an
abstract idea, then the second step of the framework is applied to determine
if “the elements of the claim . . . contain[] an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient
to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.”
Id. at 221 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73, 79).
With regard to step one of the Alice framework, we apply a “directed
to” two prong test to: 1) evaluate whether the claim recites a judicial
exception, and 2) if the claim recites a judicial exception, evaluate whether
the claim “appl[ies], rel[ies] on, or use[s] the judicial exception in a manner
that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim
is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial
exception.” See USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 54 (Jan. 7, 2019) (hereinafter “2019 Guidance”).
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Here, the Examiner determines that claim 1 is directed to “the concept
of calculating a bid value based on user segmentation and historic segment
data which corresponds to concepts identified as abstract ideas by the
courts.” (Final Action 6.) Specifically, the Examiner determines that
the concept in independent claims 1, 7, and 11 of receiving
conversion data, calculating specific and non-specific conversion
rates, and calculating an impact estimate using the specific and
non-specific conversion rates, then subsequently receiving a
request to bid, identifying the browser, calculating a bid value
using the identified browser and impact estimate, and sending the
bid value is an abstract idea.

(Id. at 7.) In short, the Examiner determines that claim 1 is directed
advertising and marketing. (See Answer 5; see also Final Action 3.)
Appellants disagree and argue that “[t]he independent claims do not,
on their own or per se, recite a ‘mathematical concept, certain methods of
organizing human activity, or mental processes.’” (Supp. Brief 1.2)
Under step one of the Alice framework, we “look at the ‘focus of the
claimed advance over the prior art’ to determine if the claim’s ‘character as a
whole’ is directed to excluded subject matter.” Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC
v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Elec.
Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1353).
The “directed to” inquiry . . . cannot simply ask whether the
claims involve a patent-ineligible concept, because essentially
every routinely patent-eligible claim involving physical products
and actions involves a law of nature and/or natural phenomenon
. . . . Rather, the “directed to” inquiry applies a stage-one filter
to claims, considered in light of the specification, based on
whether “their character as a whole is directed to excluded

2 Appellants filed a “Supplement to the Appeal Brief and the Reply Brief”
on May 13, 2019.
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subject matter.” Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc.,
790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In
other words, the first step of the Alice framework “asks whether the focus of
the claims is on the specific asserted improvement in [the relevant
technology] or, instead, on a process that qualifies as an ‘abstract idea’ for
which computers are invoked merely as a tool.” Id. at 1335–36; see also
2019 Guidance at 54–55.
The Specification provides evidence as to what the claimed invention
is directed. In this case, the Specification discloses that the invention
“relate[s] generally to optimization of bidding on advertisement
opportunities on networks.” (Spec. ¶ 2.) Claim 1 provides further evidence.
Claim 1 recites “code to cause the processor to: receive conversion data,”3
“calculate a specific inventory conversion rate,” “calculate a non-specific
inventory conversion rate,” “calculate an impact estimate,” “receive a
request to bid for an impression on the inventory,” “identify the browser as
belonging to [a] segment,” “calculate a bid value,” “and send a signal having
the bid value.”
In other words, claim 1 is directed to the abstract idea of certain
methods of organizing human activity, i.e., advertising, marketing or sales
activities. Cf. Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. Amazon.com Inc., 838 F.3d
1266, 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]ailoring of content based on information
about the user––such as where the user lives or what time of day the user

3 The Specification discloses that “conversion information can include
information indicating a visit to a marketer’s website, code that has been
downloaded, a service to which a user subscribed, a product purchased by a
user, etc.” (Spec. ¶ 37.)
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views the content––is an abstract idea that is as old as providing different
newspaper inserts for different neighborhoods.”) (citing Intellectual
Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir.
2015)). This is accomplished by receiving information, calculating values,
receiving additional information, identifying a browser/recipient, calculating
an additional value, and sending a signal. See, e.g., Content Extraction and
Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[T]he claims of the asserted patents are drawn to the
abstract idea of 1) collecting data, 2) recognizing certain data within the
collected data set, and 3) storing that recognized data in a memory.”); see
also 2019 Guidance at 52. This may be performed using generic processors
in a generic computer system. (See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 28, 68.)
“[W]e have treated collecting information, including when limited to
particular content (which does not change its character as information), as
within the realm of abstract ideas.” Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1353. “In
a similar vein, we have treated analyzing information by steps people go
through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, as
essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category.” Id. at 1354.
Additionally, the Federal Circuit has “recognized that merely presenting the
results of abstract processes of collecting and analyzing information, without
more (such as identifying a particular tool for presentation), is abstract as an
ancillary part of such collection and analysis.” Id.
Although we and the Examiner describe, at different levels of
abstraction, to what the claims are directed, it is recognized that “[a]n
abstract idea can generally be described at different levels of abstraction.”
Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2016). That
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need not and, in this case does not, “impact the patentability analysis.” See
id. at 1241.
The limitations of claim 1 recite functional results to be achieved.
They do not recite implementation details. In other words, claim 1 does not
recite “a particular way of programming or designing the software . . . , but
instead merely claim[s] the resulting [method].” Apple, Inc., 842 F.3d at
1241. “Indeed, the claim language here provides only a result-oriented
solution, with insufficient detail for how a computer accomplishes it.”
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1342
(Fed. Cir. 2017). Moreover, “the recited physical components merely
provide a generic environment in which to carry out the abstract idea.” In re
TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
We do not see how the recitation of a generic “non-transitory
processor-readable medium,” a generic processor, a generic browser, or a
“real-time bidding exchange,” even in conjunction with the recited
functions, “ensure[s] ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed
to monopolize the [abstract idea].” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (brackets in
original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77.)
Regardless, Appellants argue:
Like Enfish, the independent claims of the present
application integrate any purported judicial exception into a
practical application. As discussed in the new paragraph
following paragraph [0058] specification [sic] (added in the
Reply and Amendment dated October 23, 2014) existing
techniques could not be practically applied to a real-time bidding
situation.

(Supp. Appeal Br. 2.)
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The added paragraph referred to by Appellants discloses that although
it is possible to calculate a specific conversion rate for each user based on
monitor information, this may not be practical in view of real-time bidding
time constraints; and that a segment-based conversion rate “can be pre-
calculated and can provide a suitable estimate.” (Reply and Amendment
Under 37 C.F.R. § 1.114, filed October 23, 2014, at 3.) This added
paragraph does not disclose an improvement to, e.g., the processor, the
browser, or even the real-time bidding exchange. Rather, the asserted
improvement is to a method of organizing human activities, and, in
particular, to advertising and marketing activities.
Moreover, unlike claim 1, the claims in Enfish were “specifically
directed to a self-referential table for a computer database.” Enfish, 822
F.3d at 1337. That is, “the plain focus of the claims [was] on an
improvement to computer functionality itself, not on economic or other tasks
for which a computer is used in its ordinary capacity.” Id. at 1336. Claim 1,
“in substance [is] directed to nothing more than the performance of an
abstract business practice . . . using a conventional computer.” DDR
Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
We do not find Appellants’ argument persuasive.
Appellants also seek to analogize claim 1 to the claims in DDR
Holdings. (Appeal Br. 13–14.) Specifically, Appellants argue that
claim 1, like the claims at issue in DDR Holdings, is patent
eligible under step one of the Alice/Mayo framework because it
address [sic] a business challenge that is particular to the Internet
and does merely recite the performance of some business
practice known from the pre-Internet world along with a
requirement to perform it on the Internet.

(Id. at 13.) We do not find this argument persuasive of error.
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As an initial matter, “[w]e caution . . . that not all claims purporting to
address Internet-centric challenges are eligible for patent.” DDR Holdings,
773 F.3d at 1258. And unlike Appellants’ claim 1, the claims in DDR
Holdings “specify how interactions with the Internet are manipulated to
yield a desired result –– a result that overrides the routine and conventional
sequence of events ordinarily triggered by the click of a hyperlink.” DDR
Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1258 (emphasis added). In other words, the invention
claimed in DDR Holdings does more than “simply instruct the practitioner to
implement the abstract idea with routine, conventional activity.” See
Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see
also DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1259.
Appellants do not persuasively argue why receiving information,
calculating values, receiving additional information, identifying a
browser/recipient, calculating an additional value, and sending a signal, are
not routine, conventional activities. See Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1356
(The claims “do not include any requirement for performing the claimed
functions of gathering, analyzing, and displaying in real time by use of
anything but entirely conventional, generic technology. The claims
therefore do not state an arguably inventive concept . . . .”); see also In re
Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (“Absent a possible narrower construction of the terms
‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’ . . . those functions can be achieved
by any general purpose computer without special programming.”).4

4 We acknowledge that some of these considerations may be more properly
evaluated under step two of the Alice framework. However, for purposes of
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Appellants also argue that claim 1 recites significantly more than the
alleged abstract idea. (Appeal Br. 16–19.) Specifically, Appellants argue
that “[t]he Examiner did not perform the ‘inventive concept inquiry [that]
requires more than recognizing that each claim element, by itself was known
in the art.’” (Id. at 17 (quoting BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T
Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).) Appellants argue
that “the explicit recitations that a request to bid for an impression is
received after an impact estimate for a segment is defined distinguishes the
pending claims from a mere application of a known business practice on the
Internet.” (Reply Br. 5.)
We do not find this argument persuasive. Rather, we agree with the
Examiner that “[t]he concept of pre-calculating data so that it is available
when a need for it arises (i.e. when a request to bid is received) accelerates
the process of responding to a request to bid, but it is not a specific
improvement in the way computers operate––rather, it is an abstract idea
implemented on a computer.” (Answer 6.)
Appellants also seek to analogize claim 1 “to claim 2 of example 21 in
Appendix 1 of the USPTO July 2015 Update on Subject Matter Eligibility.”5
(Appeal Br. 18.) We do not find the analogy persuasive. The Update simply
presents hypothetical examples. (See Update Appendix 1.) Moreover,

maintaining consistent treatment within the USPTO, we evaluate it under
step one. See 2019 Guidance.
5 See July 2015 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (July 2015) (available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ieg-july-2015-
update.pdf); see also July 2015 Update Appendix 1: Examples (July 2015)
(available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ieg-july-
2015-app1.pdf) (“Update Appendix”).
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claim 2 in Example 21 recites “[a] method of distributing stock quotes over a
network to a remote subscriber computer” including the steps of
transmit[ting] the formatted stock quote alert over a
wireless communication channel to a wireless device associated
with a subscriber based upon the destination address and
transmission schedule,
wherein the alert activates the stock viewer application to
cause the stock quote alert to display on the remote subscriber
computer and to enable connection via the URL to the data
source over the Internet when the wireless device is locally
connected to the remote subscriber computer and the remote
subscriber computer comes online.

(Id. at 3.) The Update Appendix explains that
[t]he claimed invention addresses the Internet‐centric challenge
of alerting a subscriber with time sensitive information when the
subscriber’s computer is offline. This is addressed by
transmitting the alert over a wireless communication channel to
activate the stock viewer application, which causes the alert to
display and enables the connection of the remote subscriber
computer to the data source over the Internet when the remote
subscriber computer comes online.

(Id. at 4.)
Claim 1 in Example 21 is similar to claim 2 except that Claim 1 lacks
the stock viewer application; and, thus, does not address “the Internet-centric
challenge of alerting a subscriber . . . when the subscriber’s computer is
offline” or “enable[] the connection of the remote subscriber computer to the
data source over the Internet when the remote subscriber computer comes
online.” Claim 1 in Example 21 is described as patent ineligible. (Id. at 3–
4.) Appellants do not persuasively argue why code to cause a processor to
receive information, calculate values, receive additional information,
identify a browser/recipient, calculate an additional value, and send a signal,
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is analogous to addressing “the Internet-centric challenge of alerting a
subscriber . . . when the subscriber’s computer is offline” and, in particular,
“enables the connection of the remote subscriber computer to the data source
over the Internet when the remote subscriber computer comes online.” (See
id. at 4.)
Nor do Appellants persuasively argue why Appellants’ claim 1 is
analogous to claim 2 in Example 21, but not analogous to claim 1 in
Example 21.
In view of the above, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 is
directed to an abstract idea.
Step two of the Alice framework has been described “as a search for
an ‘“inventive concept”’ —i.e., an element or combination of elements that
is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly
more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Alice, 573 U.S. at
217–18 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73).
Appellants argue that claim 1 “recites a method that includes
calculating an impact estimate by determining based on a specific inventory
conversion rate and a non-specific inventory conversion rate. When
properly viewed as an ordered combination, these are not routine or
conventional tasks, as evidenced by the Exert [sic, Expert] Declaration.”
(Appeal Br. 20.) Appellants also argue that “the absence of a rejection under
§§ 102 or 103” and the inclusion of “recitations that describe the specific
inventory conversion rate, the non-specific inventory conversion rate, and
the impact estimate that are calculated before the request to bid is received
. . . amount to ‘significantly more’.” (Id. at 21.) We do not find these
arguments persuasive.
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“No matter how much of an advance in the [advertising/marketing]
field the claims recite, the advance lies entirely in the realm of abstract ideas,
with no plausibly alleged innovation in the non-abstract application realm.”
SAP America, Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
In other words, “[t]he ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or even
of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject
matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable
subject matter.” Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188–89 (1981).
Appellants’ argument relies on the ineligible concept itself to establish that
the claims recite an inventive concept. But “[i]t has been clear since Alice
that a claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it is directed
cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the invention ‘significantly
more’ than that ineligible concept.” BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899
F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
We are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1
under § 101. Claims 2, 3, 18–24, 29, and 30 depend from claim 1 and are
not separately argued. They fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

Claims 7 and 11
Appellants separately argue that independent claim 7 is patent eligible
under § 101. (Appeal Br. 22–23.) In particular, Appellants argue that
the recitations in claim 7 that the bid value is calculated using an
impact estimate for a segment such that the bid value is
calculated without direct consideration of browser history also
amount to significantly more than any judicial exception
identified by the Examiner. This is an unconventional recitation
not previously disclosed or suggested in the references of record.
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(Id. at 22.)
Appellants also separately argue that independent claim 11 is patent
eligible under § 101. (Appeal Br. 21–22.) Appellants argue that “when the
recitations of claim 11 are viewed as an ordered combination, they amount
to significantly more than any judicial exception included within the claim.”
(Id. at 22.) In particular, Appellants argue that “the use of pre-defined
impact estimates for segments and calculating a bid value not directly based
on advertisements accessed by the browser flow from new problems
presented by the real-time bidding environment.” (Id.)
We do not find these arguments persuasive for the reasons discussed
above. In short, “the advance lies entirely in the realm of abstract ideas,
with no plausibly alleged innovation in the non-abstract application realm.”
SAP America, Inc., 898 F.3d at 1163; see also id. at 1168.
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claims 7 and 11 under § 101. Claims 8–10 and 25–28 depend from claim 7
and are not separately argued. Claims 13, 17, 31, and 33 depend from claim
11 and are not separately argued. These claims fall with claims 7 and 11.
See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

Claim 32
Claim 32 depends from claim 11 and recites: “the bid value is not
directly based on advertisements accessed by the browser such that the bid
value is calculated more efficiently than calculating a specific bid value
calculated based on direct consideration of data for advertisements accessed
by the browser.”
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Appellants argue that “[c]laim 32 more explicitly distinguishes the
specific improvement in computer capabilities and solution to an Internet-
centric challenge from the overly broad judicial exceptions identified by the
Examiner.” (Appeal Br. 23.)
Claim 32 imposes a negative limitation, i.e., “the bid value is not
directly based on advertisements accessed by the browser.” Once again,
“the advance lies entirely in the realm of abstract ideas, with no plausibly
alleged innovation in the non-abstract application realm.” SAP America,
Inc., 898 F.3d at 1163; see also id. at 1168. Therefore, for the reasons
discussed above, we do not find Appellants’ argument persuasive.

DECISION
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–3, 18–24, 28–30, and 32 under
35 U.S.C. § 112(b) are affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–3, 7–11, 13, and 17–33 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED