Claudia B. Credit, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Pacific Area) Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionOct 23, 2002
01A14192 (E.E.O.C. Oct. 23, 2002)

01A14192

10-23-2002

Claudia B. Credit, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Pacific Area) Agency.


Claudia B. Credit v. United States Postal Service (Pacific Area)

01A14192

October 23, 2002

.

Claudia B. Credit,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service

(Pacific Area)

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A14192

Agency No. 4-F-945-0091-00

Hearing No. 370-A1-2217x

DECISION

This appeal stems from a dispute between Claudia B. Credit (�complainant�)

and her former employer, the United States Postal Service (Pacific

Area) (�the agency�). At all relevant times, complainant worked as

a Supervisor of Customer Services at the agency's Hayward Post Office

(part of the agency's Oakland, California Performance Cluster). On or

around August 17, 2000, she filed an equal employment opportunity (�EEO�)

complaint alleging that the agency had discriminated against her based

on her race (Black), sex (female), age (date of birth of March 2, 1938),

and in retaliation (for prior EEO activity), when her acting manager (1)

began entering her assigned area and disrespecting her by directing her

employees; (2) held a supervisors' meeting from which she was excluded;

and (3) changed her tour of duty and awarded her schedule to an acting

supervisor. Complainant was effectively claiming that the agency

had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (�Title VII�),

as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act of 1967 (�the ADEA�), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq.

The agency processed the above-described allegations, and issued its

report of investigation on or around January 11, 2001. After receiving

a copy of this investigative report, complainant requested a hearing

before an administrative judge (�the AJ�) from the United States Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (�EEOC� or �the Commission�). The AJ

was then appointed to hear the matter. However, after reviewing the

relevant record (and providing notice to the parties), the AJ issued

a decision on complainant's complaint without first holding a hearing.

This AJ ruling, released on May 16, 2001,<1> found that the agency had

not discriminated against complainant on any basis claimed. The agency

adopted this summary judgment decision in full in a final agency order

(�FAO�) issued on May 24, 2001. Complainant then filed a timely notice

challenging this FAO, which this Commission accepted and docketed as

this appeal. We are now issuing this written decision disposing of this

appeal pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a).

EEOC is charged with reviewing the AJ's decision to grant summary judgment

in favor of the agency (and the FAO implementing it) de novo (or �anew�).

See EEO Management Directive for C.F.R. 29 Part 1614 (rev. Nov. 9, 1999)

(�EEO MD-110�), at 9-16. This essentially means that on appeal we

look at the case with fresh eyes. This Commission is free to accept

(if accurate) or reject (if erroneous) the AJ's and agency's legal

and factual conclusions � including on the ultimate fact of whether

intentional discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue of whether

any federal employment discrimination statute was violated here.

That said, the task before us is really to determine whether the AJ's

decision to rule in favor of the agency without first holding a hearing

was proper. EEOC's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without

a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material

fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). These provisions are patterned after the

summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment

is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive

legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists

no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,

a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine

whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of

the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and

all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.

Id. at 255. An issue of fact is �genuine� if the evidence is such that

a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); see also Oliver

v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is

�material� if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case.

If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, summary

judgment is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative

proceeding, an EEOC administrative judge may properly consider summary

judgment only upon a determination that the record has been adequately

developed for summary disposition.

After analyzing all the evidence in this record and considering the merits

of the underlying complaint, we find that the AJ's decision properly

summarized the relevant facts and referenced the appropriate regulations,

policies, and laws. We believe that there were no material facts (i.e.,

facts that would affect the outcome of the case under governing law)

in genuine dispute here with respect to the claims complainant raised.

Therefore, the AJ did not err by issuing a decision without a hearing.

Moreover, even if we view all record evidence in the light most favorable

to complainant (as we must to affirm an AJ's summary judgment in favor

of the agency), we could not conclude that complainant has proffered any

evidence sufficient to establish (as she must) that the agency actions

in question violated Title VII or the ADEA. Thus, the AJ did not err

in finding in favor of the agency here, either.

Accordingly, the AJ's decision, and the FAO adopting it, are affirmed.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

October 23, 2002

__________________

Date

1The AJ had issued an earlier decision on May 14, 2001, erroneously

stating that complainant had failed to file any response to the AJ's

Notice of Intent to Issue a Decision Without a Hearing. However,

complainant had in fact filed a response to this AJ notice, and the AJ

thus issued an amended decision on May 16, 2001, taking this complainant

response into account.