Claudia A.,1 Complainant,v.Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security (Headquarters), Agency.Download PDFEqual Employment Opportunity CommissionDec 12, 20180120171713 (E.E.O.C. Dec. 12, 2018) Copy Citation U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Claudia A.,1 Complainant, v. Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security (Headquarters), Agency. Appeal No. 0120171713 Hearing No. 570-2015-00674X Agency No. HSH017732014 DECISION Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s March 10, 2017, final decision concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s final decision finding no discrimination. BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Management and Program Analyst, GS-13, at the Agency’s Enterprise Business Management Office (EBMO) facility in Washington, D.C. Complainant took a voluntary downgrade to this position on February 9, 2014. Previously, she was a GS-15 Program Manager with the Agency. In April 2012, Complainant fell at work and was injured. As a result of this injury, she has been diagnosed with disc displacement, thoracic pain, myofascial pain, muscle spasm, cervical radiculopathy, and cervical disc displacement. Complainant’s ability to work, to care for herself, to sit, to stand, and to walk has been impacted. Her complaint details that her pain and medications cause mental impairment as well. 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website. 0120171713 2 Complainant's doctor opined that with ergonomic furniture and period breaks, Complainant could handle the position on a full-time basis in the office. Her doctor did not indicate that, based on her medical condition, she needed training prior to receiving assignments. On November 29, 2013, Complainant requested an ergonomic workstation, evaluation and ergonomic modifications to her workstation, telework, a flexible location (to work from home), a flexible work schedule, and flexible use of leave. Complainant was granted a telework schedule and elected to telework at all times giving rise to this complaint. On September 10, 2014, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on the basis of disability (mental and physical) and denied her a reasonable accommodation (RA) when: 1. The Agency failed to provide Complainant with four to six months of time for training, necessary training materials, access to resources, and time to learn foundational information before receiving assignments as agreed to by the Deputy Director in December 2013 and February 2014. 2. On April 14, 2014, the Director assigned Complainant work without providing her access to required resources and training, as previously agreed to by the Deputy Director. 3. On June 25, 2014, Complainant's first-line supervisor, the Director, placed her on a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP). 4. On July 11, 2014, the Director had only partially provided Complainant with items on her RA list. 5. On August 4, 2014, Complainant learned that the ergonomic modifications to her assigned office space were not installed. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant requested a hearing but subsequently withdrew her request. Consequently, the Agency issued a final decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b). The decision concluded that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as alleged. On appeal, Complainant did not submit a brief or supporting statement. 0120171713 3 ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b), the Agency's decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614, at Chapter 9, § VI.A. (Aug. 5, 2015) (explaining that the de novo standard of review “requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law”). Claims 1, 2, 4, and 5 Under the Commission's regulations, a federal agency may not discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability and is required to provide reasonable accommodations to the known physical and mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability unless the Agency can show that reasonable accommodation would cause an undue hardship. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o), (p). To establish that she was denied a reasonable accommodation, Complainant must show that: (1) she is an individual with a disability, as defined by 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(g); (2) she is a “qualified” individual with a disability pursuant to 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(m); and (3) the Agency failed to provide her with a reasonable accommodation. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship under the Americans with Disabilities Act, EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (Oct. 17, 2002) (“Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation”). An individual with a disability is “qualified” if he or she satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education, and other job-related requirements of the employment position that the individual holds or desires and, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of such position. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). “Essential functions” are the fundamental job duties of the employment position that the individual holds or desires. Id. § 1630.2(n). We will assume for the purposes of this decision, without deciding, that Complainant is disabled. Based on her medical condition, Complainant’s doctor opined that she was capable of working full time with reasonable accommodations, specifically ergonomic furniture and periodic breaks. The record reflects that the Agency engaged in an interactive process with Complainant to process her reasonable accommodation request. Specifically, after Complainant made her November 29, 2013 request, the Agency participated in an ongoing dialogue between November 2013 and April 2014, to find an appropriate accommodation. 0120171713 4 During this period, the Agency provided Complainant with an ergonomic work-station assessment, full-time telework from her home, a flexible work schedule, flexible use of leave, periodic short breaks, additional time to complete training and assignments, as well as additional training to assist her in completing her assigned assessments. The Agency maintained, however, there is no evidence to support Complainant’s claim that she was promised four to six months of time to complete training and resource materials. The Deputy Director at the time directly refutes this allegation. Additionally, the record does not contain a recommendation from Complainant’s doctor, based on a medical need, for an accommodation for training. Regardless, the Agency did provide online training, including real time training viewing a coworker’s screen as assessments were processed, as well as one-on-one training for Complainant with the Director at Complainant’s home. Regarding claim two, the Deputy Director at the time averred that in the approximate one year she and Complainant worked together at EBMO, she was not aware of any completed work product submitted by Complainant. Complainant discussed the voluntary opportunity to select a downgrade to a GS-13 level with the Deputy Director. Prior to Complainant selecting the new GS-13 position on February 9, 2014, Complainant was provided with scoring guide and reference materials as well as the instruction manuals for preparing IT Dashboard assessments, a required task of the position. The record establishes Complainant received her first assignments on February 24, 2014, from the Director at the instruction of the Deputy Director at the time. Contrary to Complainant’s allegations, Complainant was provided access to Program Health Assessments Guidebook, IMS, and SharePoint on or before February 27, 2014, in order to complete assessments as required by her position. Her first training session occurred on February 26, 2014. The Agency informed Complainant that the nPRS training was not required. Thereafter, Complainant requested three to four weeks prior notice before she received training in her home. During the training sessions, Complainant demonstrated that she was able to navigate through forms and other pages in order to complete an assigned assessment. However, Complainant failed to complete the assigned assessments including an assessment assigned on April 14, 2014. Regarding claims four and five, while a qualified individual with a disability is entitled to a reasonable accommodation, he or she is not necessarily entitled to the accommodation of choice. See Complainant v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01931005 (February 17, 1994). Complainant received an in home ergonomic assessment as well as ergonomic accommodations for her telework capability based on her medical need. Regarding the ergonomic accommodations for her office work space, the record indicates after her ergonomic assessment the purchasing was put on hold due to Complainant’s selection of a telework schedule. Complainant never returned to the office after her medical leave in order for the necessary assessment and modifications for her in office ergonomic accommodation request to be completed. Accordingly, Complainant failed to establish that the Agency denied her reasonable accommodation. 0120171713 5 Ultimately, we find that Complainant received all of her requested reasonable accommodations except for the amount of training she requested and ergonomic furniture in her office. We find that Complainant failed to show a medical need for additional training and we find that Complainant was accommodated with full-time telework. Furthermore, Complainant’s failure to return to the office to complete the ergonomic assessment meant that the office furniture (not necessary since she was teleworking) could not be installed. Claim 3 Complainant alleges she was treated differently than other employees by being placed on a PIP on June 25, 2014. In analyzing a disparate treatment claim under the Rehabilitation Act, where the Agency denies that its decisions were motivated by Complainant's disability and there is no direct evidence of discrimination, the Commission applies the burden-shifting method of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S 792 (1973). See Heyman v. Queens Village Comm. for Mental Health for Jamaica Cmty Adolescent Program, 198 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 1999); Swanks v. WMATA, 179 F.3d 929, 933-34 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Under this analysis, in order to establish a prima facie case, Complainant must demonstrate that: (1) she is an “individual with a disability”; (2) she is “qualified” for the position held or desired; (3) she was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (4) the circumstances surrounding the adverse action give rise to an inference of discrimination. Lawson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 245 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 2001). The burden of production then shifts to the Agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. If the Agency is successful, the burden reverts back to Complainant to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the Agency's reasons were a pretext for discrimination. At all times, Complainant retains the burden of persuasion, and it is her obligation to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); U.S. Postal Serv. Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715-716 (1983). Assuming arguendo that Complainant established a prima facie case of discrimination, the record reflects that the Agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for placing her on a PIP. In the final decision, the Agency explained that it placed Complainant on a PIP because she failed to meet the requirements of her performance work plan and was unable to complete assignments successfully. The record establishes an essential part of Complainant’s job as a Management and Program Analyst is to support the Program Assessments team by completing all assigned IT Programs Health Assessment evaluations in a timely manner. The Agency articulated that Complainant failed to perform these essential functions. Complainant failed to establish that the Agency’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason was a pretext for discrimination. The record shows that Complainant was provided with the necessary training and resources to be able to complete her assessment assignments, and there is no support for Complainant’s claim that the Director placed her on the PIP based on her disability. Additionally, Complainant has not provided any facts to establish similarly situated employees outside of her protected class were treated differently from her. 0120171713 6 CONCLUSION Accordingly, we AFFIRM the Agency’s decision finding no discrimination. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0617) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration in which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Complainant’s request may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The agency’s request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. 0120171713 7 Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations December 12, 2018 Date Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation