Clarence A. Gibson, Complainant,v.Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, (National Institutes of Health) Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionApr 9, 2010
0120082199 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 9, 2010)

0120082199

04-09-2010

Clarence A. Gibson, Complainant, v. Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, (National Institutes of Health) Agency.


Clarence A. Gibson,

Complainant,

v.

Kathleen Sebelius,

Secretary,

Department of Health and Human Services,

(National Institutes of Health)

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120082199

Agency No. NIH-NIEHS-06-0005

DECISION

On April 10, 2008, complainant filed an appeal from the agency's March 4,

2008 final decision concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO)

complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. �

2000e et seq. The appeal is deemed timely and is accepted pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the Commission

AFFIRMS the agency's final decision.

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue presented is whether the agency properly determined that

complainant had not been discriminated against on the bases of his race,

sex and in reprisal for prior EEO activity, as alleged.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, complainant worked as

a Property Disposal Specialist, GS-9, in the agency's Property Management

Office, at the National Institutes of Health facility in Research Triangle

Park, North Carolina. On September 27, 2006, complainant filed an EEO

complaint alleging that he was discriminated against on the bases of race

(black), sex (male), and in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity

arising under Title VII when:

1. a) On November 14, 2005, the Property Disposal Supervisor added

cleaning out the Daycare Building to his duties;

b) On April 26, 2006, the Property Disposal Supervisor added sweeping

and mopping the Davis Park Warehouse to his duties; and

c) On June 12, 2006, the Property Disposal Supervisor added driving the

NIEHS shuttle van to his duties.

2. He was subjected to a hostile work environment, as evidenced by the

following (among 24 incidents listed):

a) On August 9, 2006, his supervisor, the Property Disposal Manager,

required him to report on his daily work activities;

b) On September 6, 2006, the Property Disposal Manager reassigned his

decaling duties to a female coworker; and

c) Regularly and on a recurring basis, the Property Disposal Manager

threatens to place negative information in his performance evaluation.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a

copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request a

hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Although complainant

first requested a hearing, the AJ remanded the matter to the agency

for issuance of a final decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b),

following complainant's non-compliance with her Orders. The decision

concluded that complainant failed to prove that he was subjected to

discrimination as alleged.

In its final agency decision (FAD), the agency assumed that complainant

had established prima facie cases of race, sex, and reprisal

discrimination. It then addressed each of the incidents listed by

complainant (six of which were formally accepted in the Letter of

Acceptance, as listed above). Beginning in August 2005, complainant

and other co-workers in the Property Office complained to the Chief

Administrative Officer (CAO) that their supervisor (S1) was treating

them "unfairly." Subsequently, S1 met with the employees and informed

them that if they felt he was treating them unfairly, he would now "dot

every I and cross every T" in order to adhere strictly to the rules and

eliminate unfairness. Complainant alleged that this was an example of

S1's intimidating, unprofessional and abusive behavior.

In claim 1(a) above, the agency stated that complainant was asked

to assist in cleaning out the Daycare building as the landlord was

reclaiming space, and complainant, a co-worker, and contractors were used

to remove agency property and clean the space. S1 asserted that as this

was a duty his office was responsible for, Property Management Office

personnel were properly utilized for this one-day assignment. In other

incidents, S1 would task complainant with functions that were within

the duties of the Property Management Office, although not generally

part of complainant's daily duties, especially if it seemed to S1 that

complainant was not otherwise engaged. In response to S1's request to

assist another co-worker with sweeping and mopping the warehouse area

and to load a truck (claim 1(b)), complainant told S1 to put his request

in writing, to which S1 replied that he as a supervisor did not have to

put requests in writing. This, complainant alleged, was discriminatory

and harassing behavior on the part of S1.

On June 26, 2006, the Property Management Office personnel were

informed that the agency was no longer contracting with an outside

company to provide shuttle service and that this duty was now assigned

to that Office. The CAO selected complainant and another employee as the

primary drivers (claim 1(c)). Other staff were to serve as backups when

complainant and the co-worker were not available. Complainant claimed

that many of the attendant duties to driving the shuttle, such as

reporting to S1 in the mornings, logging requests for shuttle service,

maintaining custody of the shuttle service cell phone when it was his

turn to drive, and informing S1 of his whereabouts at work (claim 2(a)),

were tasks given to him by S1 as a way of harassing him. S1 testified

that these tasks were necessary to carry out complainant's new duties,

and that he, S1, often does not know where complainant is going when he

leaves the office.

S1 testified with respect to claim 2(b), that he reassigned the decaling

duties to another employee in order to address the yearly overages

that appeared at inventory time.1 Finally, in response to claim 2(c),

the agency noted that S1 and the CAO both testified that complainant

has issues with S1's management style, but that complainant has been

treated fairly by S1, receiving cash and performance awards, training

and satisfactory performance appraisals. The agency concluded its FAD

by finding that complainant had not shown any of the agency's reasons

to be pretext for discrimination, or to establish a case of hostile work

environment harassment.

The agency issued its decision finding no discrimination in complainant's

complaint. Complainant filed the instant appeal.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal, complainant argued that the agency's decision should be

reconsidered and that he has been discriminated against and subjected

to retaliation. The agency did not file a response to complainant's

arguments.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b), the agency's decision is subject to de novo

review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). See EEOC Management

Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.A. (November 9, 1999) (explaining that

the de novo standard of review "requires that the Commission examine

the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the

previous decision maker," and that EEOC "review the documents, statements,

and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions

of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission's

own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law").

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, complainant must

satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court

in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Complainant

must initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that he or

she was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances

that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction

Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will

vary depending on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas,

411 U.S. at 804 n. 14. The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department

of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately

prevail, complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

the agency's explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary's Honor

Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993).

Assuming that complainant has established his prima facie cases of race,

sex, and reprisal discrimination, we find, based on our own review of

the record, that the agency has provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reasons for its actions. There is no evidence in the record that any

of S1's actions were taken as a result of complainant's race, sex or

in reprisal for prior EEO activity. In point of fact, the evidence

points to attempts by S1 to adhere to rules and regulations, to carry

out the duties of the Property Management Office to the best of his

abilities using the "other duties as assigned" in order to address

unique situations, and to actually "managing" the work of complainant.

Complainant has not provided any evidence to the contrary.

Finally, to the extent that complainant also alleged that he was subjected

to hostile work environment harassment, we find, under the standards

set forth in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993),

that complainant's claim of hostile work environment must fail. See

Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., EEOC Notice

No. 915.002 (March 8, 1994). A finding of a hostile work environment

is precluded based on our determination that complainant failed to

establish that any of the actions taken by the agency were motivated

by discriminatory animus. See Oakley v. United States Postal Service,

EEOC Appeal No. 01982923 (September 21, 2000).

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal,

including those not specifically addressed herein, we hereby AFFIRM

the agency's final decision, because a preponderance of the record

evidence does not establish that discrimination occurred with respect

to complainant's claims.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1208)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,

Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request

to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail

within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time

limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

______4/09/10_____________

Date

1 The decals were stickers put on new equipment in order to track it.

According to S1, each year, 75-100 stickers were being used but were

not then accounted for by being entered in the system.

??

??

??

??

2

0120082199

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

2

0120082199