01A20106_r
06-25-2002
Clara D. Lynch, Complainant, v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Agency.
Clara D. Lynch v. Social Security Administration
01A20106
June 25, 2002
.
Clara D. Lynch,
Complainant,
v.
Jo Anne B. Barnhart,
Commissioner,
Social Security Administration,
Agency.
Appeal No. 01A20106
Agency No. SSA-99-0385
Hearing No. 250-AO-8223X
DECISION
Complainant filed a timely appeal from the agency final order concerning
her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful employment
discrimination brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The Commission
accepts the appeal pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.
The record reveals that complainant, a Service Representative at the
agency's Madison District Office, Madison, Tennessee facility, filed a
formal EEO complaint on July 2, 1999, claiming discrimination on the
bases of race and in reprisal for prior EEO activity concerning her
non-selection for an award in April 1999.
In her complaint, complainant contends that she is the only employee
at the Madison District Office who did not receive either of two types
of awards presented for the award period at issue. One type of award
(herein referred to as a �larger award�), required nomination by the
Manager, a supervisor, a co-worker, or via self-nomination, to an award
panel which made these award selections. The other type of award,
known as an �on-the-spot� award, was smaller and made exclusively by
the Manager. In her complaint, complainant avers that even a white
co-worker who only worked a short time before taking maternity leave
received an �on-the-spot� award, but that she did not. Complainant
identifies the District Manager (herein referred to as the Manager) as
the agency official responsible for her lack of an award, indicating
that she had filed an EEO complaint and law suit against him in 1986.
Complainant contends that she was entitled to receive an award, and that
her non-selection was motivated by racial animus and reprisal associated
with the 1986 complaint.
At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a copy
of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC
Administrative Judge (AJ). The AJ determined that summary judgment was
appropriate because there were no genuine issues of material facts or
credibility in dispute. The AJ issued a decision without a hearing,
finding no discrimination.
The AJ concluded that complainant established a prima facie case of race
discrimination. Specifically, the AJ found that the agency failed to
select complainant for an award, while a white co-worker (herein referred
to as Selectee) who, like complainant, was not nominated by anyone to the
award panel for a larger award, nonetheless received an �on-the-spot�
award from the Manager. The AJ concluded that the agency articulated
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. The AJ found
that the Manager asked each supervisor to consider recommending those
subordinates who had not been selected by the award panel for a larger
award, for an �on-the-spot� award, but that complainant's supervisor
(herein referred to as Supervisor) declined to nominate her because of
the number of complaints received against her from both the public and
co-workers. On the other hand, the Supervisor nominated the Selectee for
an on-the-spot award based on her efforts in completing certain training
prior to her maternity leave. The AJ next determined that complainant
did not establish that more likely than not, the agency's articulated
reasons were a pretext to mask unlawful discrimination. In reaching
this conclusion, the AJ found that complainant did not dispute that
she had numerous complaints against her or that the Manager only made
�on-the-spot� awards to those recommended by their supervisors.
Regarding complainant's reprisal claim, the AJ found that complainant
established a prima facie case. Specifically, the AJ determined that
complainant demonstrated that she engaged in prior protected activity, and
that the Manager, as well as a panel member who could have potentially
nominated complainant for the most prominent of the larger awards,
were both aware of this activity. Nonetheless, the AJ determined that
complainant failed to produce any evidence to demonstrate that reprisal
played a role in her non-selection for an award, noting in particular
the long time period between the prior EEO activity and the current
non-selection. The AJ further determined that complainant's supervisor
did not know about her prior EEO activity, such that this could not have
been a factor in her refusal to nominate complainant for a larger award
or recommend her for an on-the-spot award.
In conclusion, the AJ determined that when viewing the evidence in a
light most favorable to complainant, she still failed to satisfy her
burden of proof in establishing discrimination or reprisal regarding
her non-selection for either type of award presented for the April 1999
award period.
The agency's final order implemented the AJ's decision.
On appeal, complainant contends that the AJ erred when he failed to
conduct a hearing, and argues that he made numerous errors of fact
and law in his decision. In response, the agency argues that summary
judgment was appropriate in this case, and that while it disputes that
complainant established a prima facie case of race discrimination or
reprisal, argues that the AJ made the proper decision in this case.
Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings
by an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the
record. Substantial evidence is defined as �such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.�
Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474,
477 (1951) (citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not a
discriminatory intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard
v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982).
After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that grant
of summary judgment was appropriate, as no genuine dispute of material
fact exists. The record is conclusive that no one nominated complainant
for a larger award, even though such a nomination could have not only
been made by the Manager or the Supervisor, but also by any co-worker
or complainant herself. The record further confirms that exclusive of
the appointment of two panel members, the Manager had no input into the
panel's selection decisions, and that the award panel did not consider
complainant because no one chose to nominate her for an award. Moreover,
the record is equally conclusive that the Manager did not give complainant
an �on-the-spot� award because her supervisor, a black female with no
knowledge of complainant's prior EEO activity, specifically did not
recommend her for this award in light of the complaints against her.
Complainant submits no statement or evidence on appeal to challenge
these findings.
We find that the AJ's decision properly summarized the relevant facts and
referenced the appropriate regulations, policies, and laws. Further,
construing the evidence to be most favorable to complainant, we find
that complainant failed to show that her non-selection for either type of
award was motivated by discriminatory or retaliatory animus toward her.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the agency's
final order.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
June 25, 2002
__________________
Date