CJC Holdings, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 16, 1994

315 N.L.R.B. 813 (N.L.R.B. 1994)

813
315 NLRB No. 118
CJC HOLDINGS, INC.
1 In adopting the judge’s finding that the Respondent violated Sec.
8(a)(5) and (1) by refusing to furnish the information requested by
the Union, we do not rely on his observations concerning the Fair
Labor Standards Act settlement found in fn. 8 of his decision.
Additionally, we find it unnecessary to rely on the judge’s views
of how bargaining could have progressed.
We agree with the judge’s refusal to allow parol evidence concern-
ing art. X, sec. 3, of the contract, as that contract language is not
ambiguous. In any event, the Respondent’s offer of proof was defi-
cient as it offered no evidence to clarify particular terms of the con-
tract clause.
1 All dates are in 1992 unless otherwise indicated.
CJC Holdings, Inc. and Local 1751, United Brother-
hood of Carpenters & Joiners of America,
AFL–CIO. Cases 16–CA–15537 and 16–CA–
15650
December 16, 1994
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS STEPHENS, DEVANEY, AND COHEN
On September 22, 1993, Administrative Law Judge
James M. Kennedy issued the attached decision. The
Respondent filed exceptions, a supporting brief, and a
reply to the General Counsel’s answering brief, and the
General Counsel filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated
its authority in this proceeding to a three-member
panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has de-
cided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and con-
clusions and to adopt the recommended Order.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, CJC Holdings, Inc., Aus-
tin, Texas, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall take the action set forth in the Order.
Elizabeth Kilpatrick, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Steven L. Rahhal, Esq. (McFall & Associates), of Dallas,
Texas, for the Respondent.
David Van Os, Esq. and Martha P. Owen, Esq. (Van Os &
Owen), of Austin, Texas, for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JAMES M. KENNEDY, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was tried before me in Austin, Texas, on March 23, 1993,
on a consolidated complaint issued by the Regional Director
for Region 16 of the National Labor Relations Board on De-
cember 3, 1992.1 It is based on two separate charges filed
by Local 751, United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners
of America, AFL–CIO (the Union). The charge in Case 16–
CA–15537 was filed on April 13, 1992 (amended on May
13), and the charge in Case 16–CA–15650 was filed on July
8. The complaint alleges that CJC Holdings, Inc. (Respond-
ent) has engaged in certain violations of Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (Act).
Issues
This case presents two separate issues for resolution. The
first is whether Respondent was privileged in March to
refuse to supply the Union with a list of names and addresses
of its then current employees. The second is whether in June
it was privileged to refuse to bargain collectively over a mid-
term wage reopener as called for by a term of the collective-
bargaining contract.
The parties were given full opportunity to participate, to
introduce relevant evidence, to examine and cross-examine
witnesses, to argue orally, and to file briefs. Counsel for all
parties have filed briefs and they have been carefully consid-
ered. Based on the entire record, including my observation
of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent, a Texas corporation, is a manufacturer of
school rings and other jewelry in Austin, Texas. It annually
purchases goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000
directly from suppliers located in States other than Texas.
Respondent admits and I find that it is an employer engaged
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7)
of the Act.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION
Respondent also admits and I find that the Union is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
III. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
As noted, Respondent is a jewelry manufacturer with a
factory located in Austin. It employs about 160 production
and maintenance employees at that location. Through prede-
cessors, it has had a collective-bargaining relationship with
the Union since 1973 when the Union was first certified as
the Section 9(a) exclusive collective-bargaining representa-
tive. Its most recent collective-bargaining contract (G.C. Exh.
2) is a 5-year agreement which began on June 7, 1989, and
which is scheduled to end on June 6, 1994.
The collective-bargaining contract does not contain a
union-security provision, as Texas law forbids such clauses.
As a result, the Union does not always know the identities
and addresses of the employees it represents, for there is
constant turnover within the plant. In order to remain aware
of who the employees it represents are, not only for dues
collection, but for representational purposes, i.e., communica-
tion and the like, it must rely on information provided to it
by Respondent, whose records are necessarily more current.
To this end the Union periodically requests such informa-
tion from Respondent. Indeed, the contract itself (art. V, sec.
3) permits the Union to ask for a seniority list once every
3 months. The seniority list is somewhat helpful as it shows
the names of newly hired employees. It does not usually in-
814 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2 Velasquez’ letter also sought the social security numbers of em-
ployees. Although that request was initially a part of the complaint,
the General Counsel has since withdrawn the allegation which had
asserted that the failure to provide the employees’ social security
numbers violated the Act.
3 Jenkins is a representative of the Southern Council of Industrial
Workers, of which the Charging Party is a member. He is assigned
to the Charging Party as its professional business representative.
4 She confirmed that position by her letter of March 20.
clude the address of any employee, although that information
has been provided in the past on several occasions.
By letter dated March 5, Union President Louis Velasquez
requested Respondent’s personnel director to provide the
Union with a seniority list, also asking for some other perti-
nent information, including addresses and pay rates.2 On
March 10, Personnel Director Suzie Adams, handed Velas-
quez at his workstation a document which was purportedly
a seniority list. It was unaccompanied by the requested ad-
dresses and pay rates. Moreover, it contained numerous er-
rors with respect to the dates of hire. Because the material
was in an envelope, Velasquez did not initially notice the
reply’s shortcomings.
Shortly thereafter Velasquez did become aware of them.
He advised Union Business Representative Ed Jenkins3 of
the inadequacy. Jenkins telephoned Adams to try to straight-
en the matter out. At first she told him that the computer was
not operating correctly. Then she told him that Respondent
was not obligated to provide the addresses, but did not ex-
plain further,4 although the parties became unnecessarily in-
volved over a concern about so-called ‘‘past practice.’’ When
she testified, she asserted that it was not Respondent’s prac-
tice to provide employees’ addresses to the Union and, be-
sides, neither Velasquez nor Jenkins had given her any ex-
planation regarding its need for it. She said that if the Union
had given her a ‘‘justifiable’’ reason for the information, she
might have given the addresses to the Union. In the past, she
says she had given such information to the Union when she
thought it needed it.
It should be observed here that the reason the Union want-
ed the information was to update its mailing list so it could
send its newsletter to as many of its constituents as it could.
Jenkins reports that in February he had sent out a newsletter
using a January 1991 mailing list (which was a little over a
year old). However, he says approximately 65 of the news-
letters were returned by the post office as having incorrect
addresses. Jenkins did not advise Adams of this specific dif-
ficulty, but did tell her he needed the addresses so he could
communicate with the employees. Nonetheless, Adams never
supplied the information requested. Indeed, she made no ef-
fort to correct the seniority errors, the incorrect dates of hire
which she had given the Union. Neither did she provide the
wage rates as Velasquez had originally requested.
I should note here that Respondent, in its answer and at
the hearing, has contended that it was not obligated to pro-
vide the Union with the addresses because it held what it be-
lieves to be the reasonable belief that the addresses would be
provided to the Union’s lawyer for the purpose of initiating
a class-action lawsuit against it. In this regard, the Union had
filed a complaint with the U.S. Department of Labor alleging
that Respondent was improperly calculating the daily quitting
time. It had not been paying employees for time they were
required to spend waiting for inspection by a metal detector
at the end of their workday.
The DOL had found merit in the Union’s complaint and
subsequently negotiated a settlement with Respondent. The
DOL declined, however, to involve the Union in that settle-
ment. Specifically, it refused to advise the Union of the basis
or formula for calculating the backpay due the employees.
This exclusion caused the Union to suspect that the computa-
tions were not to be trusted and resulted in the Union rec-
ommending to its constituency that the employees not cash
the settlement checks which Respondent had tendered. Those
checks contained what the Union believed to be unreason-
ably broad waiver of liability language over each employee’s
signature-endorsement, and it could not in good conscience
allow its people to sign off without knowing more about the
consequences of what they were doing.
In the Union’s view, additional steps needed to be taken
to become knowledgeable. In particular, it needed to consult
with the employees it represented to determine whether the
DOL settlement was adequate or whether more needed to be
done. It appears that the DOL’s authority to remedy viola-
tions of the Fair Labor Standards Act is not exclusive. Em-
ployees and their union are both free to file individual law-
suits under that statute. Whether or not the Union was going
to take that step is unclear. It certainly was an option and
both it and Respondent knew it. Respondent offered evidence
it believed would show that the Union’s attorney, David Van
Os, was going to use the addresses for the purpose of solicit-
ing employees to join in a class action lawsuit against Re-
spondent. I rejected the proffer on the grounds that even if
that were true, that fact would not be material to the issues
presented by this complaint. It would not serve as a defense
to a union request for the addresses of the employees which
it by law represents. Indeed, a lawsuit initiated and main-
tained by employees to vindicate a statutory right pertaining
to an employment benefit may well be protected by the
NLRA. An employer who interferes with that right would be
committing an unfair labor practice. It is clear therefore that
Respondent’s belief that Van Os intended to file a suit over
the FLSA matter cannot be considered a viable defense to
this complaint.
Velasquez agrees that he intended to advise the Union’s
constituency of the perceived necessity to consult with it
about the problems raised by the DOL settlement. He wanted
to notify the affected individuals in the usual fashion,
through the Union’s newsletter. That is not to say that the
newsletter would not contain other material appropriate to
the Union’s duty as the statutory collective-bargaining rep-
resentative. Certainly Velasquez’ desire to communicate with
the employees he represents via newsletter is an appropriate
and proper thing to do.
Moreover, he is under no obligation to explain to the Em-
ployer the Union’s need for the current addresses of the em-
ployees. Similarly, the Employer has no right to affect the
Union’s ability to communicate with bargaining unit mem-
bers. It is enough that the Employer knows that the Union
has a legal obligation to have discourse with the bargaining
unit. Having knowledge of that fact, its only concern must
be to provide the Union, on request, with the names and ad-
dresses it has but the Union does not. Indeed, this Respond-
ent has already provided addresses to the Union in the past.
815CJC HOLDINGS, INC.
5 I fail to understand the Department of Labor’s policy which ex-
cluded the Union from being involved in the determination of the
appropriate settlement formula. This Union was the original com-
plaining party. It also is the statutory representative of the employees
in question. What FLSA policy was contravened by barring it from
even being told how the settlement formula was reached? Assuming
that there is a valid reason behind such an exclusion, that policy in
this instance has had the effect of undermining the collective-bar-
gaining and representational policies established under the NLRA.
6 In point of fact, Respondent’s position was not one of ‘‘inabil-
ity’’ to pay, but of ‘‘unwillingness’’ to pay based on its assessment
of market conditions.
Its perceived reason for declining to provide them on this
occasion is only that the Union was seen as likely to become
so conversant with the terms of the DOL settlement that it
might upset it. And, while an upset settlement might be of
legitimate concern to Respondent, it is not privileged to pre-
vent that from happening by depriving the Union of access
to the employees it represents and access to information
needed to properly represent the constituency. The proper
forum to prevent the settlement from being upset is the bar-
gaining table where all parties know all the facts.5
Thus, Respondent’s reason for wishing to deprive the
Union of the current addresses of the employees it legally
represented is immaterial. The material is critical to the
Union’s representational duties; it is solely within the Em-
ployer’s knowledge. That is sufficient to trigger the obliga-
tion to provide the requested information.
The second issue raised by the complaint is that of wheth-
er Respondent properly interpreted the clause in the collec-
tive-bargaining contract providing for a midterm wage re-
opening. Again, the facts are not in significant dispute.
Article X, section 3 of the collective-bargaining contract
(G.C. Exh. 2, p. 22) reads as follows:
The wage rates to be paid from the first work day of
the first pay period in June 1992 to June 6, 1994 under
Article X and Appendix ‘‘A’’ are subject to negotiation
if either party gives written notice in writing [sic] at
least sixty (60) days prior to the third anniversary (June
7, 1992), of the effective date of the Agreement. If no
agreement is made, or if impasse occurs, all terms of
this Agreement shall remain unchanged.
Union Business Representative Ed Jenkins, by letter dated
April 1, 1992, notified Respondent’s personnel director,
Adams, that the Charging Party desired to open negotiations.
In the letter, he advised that he would be in touch to arrange
a date for the negotiation meeting. Although there is some
testimonial difference between Jenkins and Adams regarding
why a delay occurred in setting a date, she eventually told
him that the only available day Respondent could provide
was June 1, a date when its counsel, John McFall, a Dallas
attorney, could be present. A meeting did take place on that
date as agreed.
During the meeting, attended by several persons represent-
ing both management and the Union, Jenkins and Velasquez
proposed a 50-cent-per-hour across-the-board wage increase
for the rest of the contract term. Respondent, after a caucus,
rejected the proposal, asserting that there was no justification
for such an increase. McFall countered by proposing a 1-year
wage freeze followed by another wage reopener on the next
anniversary. The Union considered that, but recountered with
a 30-cent-across-the-board proposal to cover the first year,
while concurring with a reopener in 1993. McFall rejected
that, saying his 1-year freeze and the 1993 reopener were
what the Company could agree on.
There followed some company contentions that sales were
flat, business projections were not optimistic, and that the
economy had yet to improve. McFall also suggested that Jen-
kins, who was more familiar with the lumber industry (say-
ing Jenkins referred to himself as a ‘‘wood man’’), did not
understand the jewelry manufacturing business sufficiently
well to accept Respondent’s assessment of the business fu-
ture.
Things deteriorated to some extent, and Jenkins advised
that he would have to take Respondent’s position back to his
membership. McFall, apparently believing Jenkins was refer-
ring to a ratification process, told him ratification was unnec-
essary. According to Jenkins, McFall told him that the Union
had to accept the Company’s proposal or there would be no
more negotiations, ‘‘period.’’ McFall does not accept that
characterization, but agrees he told Jenkins Respondent had
made its final offer. Jenkins replied that he would contact
Respondent shortly after he had had a chance to consult with
his membership. At no time did any person suggest that they
had reached a lawful impasse.
Furthermore, neither McFall nor any management official
who was present ever suggested that their bargaining obliga-
tion had been fulfilled as a result of the June 1 meeting. No
one told Jenkins that Respondent was interpreting the con-
tract language as establishing a deadline of June 7 as a date
by which any midterm modification had to be settled. The
entire meeting took about an hour.
On June 11, Jenkins wrote Respondent’s vice president of
manufacturing, Gary Geritson, one of Respondent’s June 1
negotiators, a letter in which he recounted some of Respond-
ent’s assertions. Specifically, he referred to Respondent’s
contentions that economic conditions dictated the Company’s
position with respect to the wage increase. He went on to say
that to better understand what he characterized as Respond-
ent’s ‘‘inability’’ to pay,6 he needed additional information.
He therefore asked Geritson to supply him with certain fi-
nancial records, describing the requisite material in some de-
tail. He asked that the data be supplied no later than June
19. He also asked for a second negotiation meeting on June
22.
McFall replied by letter on June 17. Ignoring Jenkins’ re-
quest for financial information, McFall refused to bargain
further, inter alia, he said:
In view of the fact that no agreement was reached prior
to June 7, 1992, your request for continued negotiations
is declined as untimely. We interpret the relevant clause
to be analogous to an ‘‘evergreen’’ clause, and to re-
quire agreement on or before June 7, 1992 to avoid
continuation of the same pay rates.
With that, further bargaining ceased.
IV. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
The Supreme Court has held on several occasions that an
employer must supply, upon appropriate demand, information
816 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
7 A myriad of cases supports that conclusion. A few are: American
Oil Co., 164 NLRB 29 (1967); Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 220 NLRB
189 (1975); Tom’s Ford, 253 NLRB 888, 894–895 (1980); Valley
Programs, 300 NLRB 423 (1990); and Kingswood Services, 302
NLRB 247, 256 (1991).
8 In this regard, I observe that even if it was the Union’s intention,
or its lawyer’s intention, to pursue a class action on behalf of the
employees for the apparent FLSA violation, preventing the Union
from obtaining the current employee addresses would not have
stopped them. The best way to have prevented that from occurring
would have been to have brought the Union into the FLSA settle-
ment in some fashion. It would then not have been operating in the
dark. True, involving the Union in the settlement may have changed
the dynamics of that settlement; yet it may not have. If all parties
had been knowledgeable about the factors governing the DOL’s set-
tlement terms, the settlement may well have been viewed as satisfac-
tory.
9 Enfd. mem. 889 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1989).
10 Indeed, Respondent asserted that the language is unambiguous;
that the June 7 deadline for agreement is clearly set forth.
to its employees’ statutory bargaining representative, which
is relevant to either the collective-bargaining or the represen-
tational processes. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149
(1956); NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967);
see also Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 61 (3d Cir.
1965), enfg. 145 NLRB 152 (1963). It is also true that there
are some circumstances where the employer is not obligated
to produce the sought for material. See, for example, Detroit
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301 (1979). However, the
burden of proving the material is not producible, where the
information is presumptively relevant, as here,7 rests with
Respondent. Here, the only contention being made, and that
after the fact, is that it would somehow assist the Union’s
lawyer in a yet to be filed lawsuit over the FLSA matter.
That is, and always was, hypothetical.
Yet, unhappy as that may make Respondent, a potential
lawsuit is not a valid reason for depriving the Union of that
information. Most, if not all, union requests for information
have the potential of resulting in litigation, usually in the
context of the contract itself, via the grievance process. How-
ever, the policy of the Act is that if such information is
promptly shared, the collective-bargaining process as estab-
lished by Section 8(d) will take over and the parties will deal
with the matter rationally and in good faith. Obviously, there
is always the possibility that the parties will not be able to
resolve whatever might be found as a result of the informa-
tion turnover. If a grieveable matter is uncovered, the union
is only doing its duty if it is forced to invoke the grievance
procedure. More likely, however, is the probability that most
problems will be resolved short of formal proceedings
though the give and take or consultation which will follow.8
With respect to the question of whether the language of
article X, section 3 of the collective-bargaining contract es-
tablished a deadline of June 7 for an agreement to be
reached, I find Respondent’s reading of that clause to be de-
fective. I did bar, on appropriate objection, evidence regard-
ing the meaning of the language, for I could perceive no am-
biguities, either patent or latent. I therefore allowed the invo-
cation of the parol evidence rule. That rule, of course, pro-
hibits any party to a written, fully integrated, contract from
offering oral evidence tending to alter or vary the terms of
a nonambiguous contract term. Kal Kan Foods, 288 NLRB
590, 592–593 (1988),9 and cases cited. Respondent was
given full opportunity to demonstrate any ambiguity it per-
ceived, but I was not persuaded that any exists.10
The language, of course, has been quoted above. It states
in pertinent part that the wage rates to be paid from June
1992 to June 1994 ‘‘are subject to negotiation if either party
gives written notice in writing [sic] at least sixty (60) days
prior to the third anniversary (June 7, 1992), of the effective
date of the Agreement. If no agreement is made, or if im-
passe occurs, all terms of this Agreement shall remain un-
changed.’’ Only two sentences long, they could not be more
plain on the issue. They allow for the negotiation of new
wage rates for the last 2 years of the contract, if at least 60
days prior to June 7, 1992, either party gives written notice
that it wishes to change the wage rates.
That language only sets a deadline by which the notice
must be given. It simply allows the parties adequate notice
for the purpose of beginning midterm negotiations. The sec-
ond sentence, referring to what will happen in the event no
agreement is reached, does not say that the agreement must
be finalized by June 7. It only says that if an agreement is
not reached, or an impasse results, the wages will remain as
they stood on that anniversary. Nothing prevents the parties
from bargaining after June 7 and nothing prohibits the parties
from reaching agreement on new wage rates, whether they
are solely prospective or whether they have a retroactive fea-
ture.
Moreover, if the parties had meant to set a deadline for
the new wage rates to be settled on, it could have been ac-
complished quite simply. All they needed to do was to say
that the 60-day period begun by the notice was to be the
only period available to negotiate the changes and that if no
agreement was reached by June 7, the rates would remain the
same.
In a sense, I understand Respondent’s argument that the
quoted language establishes a procedure similar to that man-
dated by Section 8(d), to give notice of an intent to negotiate
a new contract 60 days before it expires in order to encour-
age the parties to reach a new agreement before then, thereby
lessening the probability of a labor dispute. Yet even under
Section 8(d), nothing prevents the parties from bargaining
after the expiration of the contract. Therefore, Respondent’s
analogy does not stand up.
Its argument, found in McFall’s letter of June 17, that it
regarded the contract language as similar to an ‘‘evergreen’’
clause is likewise unpersuasive. Evergreen clauses are those
found in contracts providing for their automatic renewal in
the event the appropriate notice of intent to renegotiate is not
given. Here, of course, the Union gave timely notice of its
intent to exercise its contract right of a midterm wage re-
opener. Respondent’s argument necessarily fails because the
Union did give notice, and the duty to bargain midterm was
thereupon imposed. Respondent could not declare its duty to
bargain satisfied until it became apparent that no agreement
could be reached, a lawful impasse. Yet it did make such a
declaration, despite the fact that only one meeting, lasting
about an hour, had been conducted.
The outcome of good-faith bargaining here might well
have been a failure to agree had it been allowed to go its
course, but that cannot be assumed given the state of these
817CJC HOLDINGS, INC.
11 ‘‘Final’’ proposals made during first meetings are either tactical
or usually fail the ‘‘good-faith’’ requirement.
12 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and rec-
ommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
13 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading ‘‘Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board’’ shall read ‘‘Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order
of the National Labor Relations Board.’’
negotiations. Any person familiar with the ways of collective
bargaining will recognize that what occurred during the June
1 meeting is what commonly occurs at first meetings. The
Union asked for more than it expected to get; Respondent
made a counteroffer of no change, also a common opening
and something which employers do not usually expect to get.
Both parties can reasonably be seen to have started where
parties usually start—at the edge, waiting to move toward the
center. During the meeting the Union lessened its demand by
15 cents. Even Respondent’s claim that its proposal was
‘‘final’’ must be taken with a grain of salt.11 Absent Re-
spondent’s declaration that bargaining was over due to a con-
tract clause, additional meetings would have taken place.
With any luck, and a modicum of skill, a new wage rate
would have been reached; absent the luck and the skill, the
parties could nevertheless have reached a good-faith impasse.
Unfortunately, Respondent’s misreading of the contract
clause has caused neither event to have occurred, either of
which would have terminated its obligation to bargain mid-
term.
Accordingly, I conclude that Respondent’s refusal to bar-
gain, based on McFall’s erroneous interpretation of the mid-
term reopener, violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found Respondent to have engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease
and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. The affirmative
action shall require Respondent to bargain in good faith pur-
suant to the midterm wage reopener set forth in the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement.
Based on the foregoing findings of fact and the entire
record in this case, I make the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By refusing, on March 10, 1992, and thereafter, to com-
ply with the Union’s proper request to provide the Union
with the names and addresses of bargaining unit employees,
together with their correct dates of hire, as well as their wage
rates, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices af-
fecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act.
4. By refusing to bargain after June 7, 1992, pursuant to
the terms of the midterm wage reopener clause in its collec-
tive-bargaining contract with the Union, Respondent
breached the obligation to bargain in good faith and thereby
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on
the entire record, I issue the following recommended12
ORDER
The Respondent, CJC Holdings, Inc., Austin, Texas, its of-
ficers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Restraining and coercing its employees by refusing to
bargain in good faith with Local 751, United Brotherhood of
Carpenters & Joiners of America, AFL–CIO by
(1) Refusing and failing to provide that labor organi-
zation with a seniority list containing the names, ad-
dresses, and dates of hire of bargaining unit employees
as well as their wage rates.
(2) Refusing to bargain with that labor organization
after June 7, 1992, pursuant to the terms of the midterm
wage reopener clause in its collective-bargaining con-
tract.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Bargain in good faith with Local 751, United Brother-
hood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, AFL–CIO by
(1) Immediately providing that Union with a senior-
ity list containing the names, addresses, and dates of
hire and wage rates of bargaining unit employees as of
March 5, 1992.
(2) On request bargaining in good faith with that
labor organization pursuant to the terms of the midterm
wage reopener clause in our 1989–1994 collective-bar-
gaining contract and covering the period June 7, 1992,
through the termination date of the contract.
(b) Post at its factory in Austin, Texas, copies of the at-
tached notice marked ‘‘Appendix.’’13 Copies of the notice,
on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 16,
after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representa-
tive, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon re-
ceipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Re-
spondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days
from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has
taken to comply.
818 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us
to post and abide by this notice.
Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected
concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT restrain and coerce our employees by refus-
ing to bargain in good faith with Local 751, United Brother-
hood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, AFL–CIO by
Refusing and failing to provide that labor organiza-
tion with a seniority list containing the names, address-
es, dates of hire, and wage rates of bargaining unit em-
ployees.
Refusing to bargain with that labor organization after
June 7, 1992, pursuant to the terms of the midterm
wage reopener clause in its collective-bargaining con-
tract.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL bargain in good faith with Local 751, United
Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, AFL–CIO
by
Immediately providing that Union with a seniority
list containing the names, addresses, and dates of hire
of bargaining unit employees as of March 5, 1992.
On request bargain in good faith with that labor or-
ganization pursuant to the terms of the midterm wage
reopener clause in our 1989–1994 collective-bargaining
contract and covering the period June 7, 1992, through
the termination date of the contract.
CJC HOLDINGS, INC.