Citrix Systems, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 6, 2020

14823733 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Apr. 6, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/823,733 08/11/2015 Georgy Momchilov 007737.00618 2871
11331 7590 04/06/2020
Banner & Witcoff, Ltd.
Attorneys for client number 007737
1100 13th Street N.W.
Suite 1200
Washington, DC 20005-4051
EXAMINER
KETEMA, BENYAM
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2626
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/06/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
PTO-11331@bannerwitcoff.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte GEORGY MOMCHILOV
Appeal 2019-001112
Application 14/823,733
Technology Center 2600
Before MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, JEREMY J. CURCURI, and
SCOTT RAEVSKY, Administrative Patent Judges.
RAEVSKY, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We reverse.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “Applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Citrix
Systems, Inc. Appeal Br. 2.
Appeal 2019-001112
Application 14/823,733

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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims relate to touch, multi-touch, gesture, flick, and stylus input
support for remoted applications. Abstr. Claim 1, reproduced below, is
illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. One or more non-transitory computer-readable media
storing executable instructions that, when executed by at least
one processor, cause a system to:
receive a first touch input event from a remote computing
device different from the system, wherein the first touch input
event is responsive to a first application executing on the
system, the first application being presented on the remote
computing device; and
receive a second touch input event from the remote
computing device, wherein the second touch input event is
responsive to a second application executing on the system, the
second application being presented on the remote computing
device, the second application being different from the first
application, the first touch input event and the second touch
input event being a same type of touch input event,
wherein the second application interprets the second
touch input event differently than the first application interprets
the first touch input event.
REJECTIONS
Claim 1–7 and 11–20 stand rejected under pre–AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Matthews (US 2009/0292989 A1, Nov.
26, 2009) and Duursma et al (US 6,538,667 B1, Mar. 25, 2003). Final Act.
3.
Claim 8–10 stand rejected under pre–AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Matthew, Duursma, and Andrews (US 2009/0125824 A1,
May 14, 2009). Id. at 14.
Appeal 2019-001112
Application 14/823,733

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ANALYSIS
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant and in light of the arguments and evidence produced
thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential).
Arguments not made are waived. See id.; 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Appellant contends the combination of Matthew and Duursma fails to
teach or suggest “the first touch input event and the second touch input event
being a same type of touch input event, wherein the second application
interprets the second touch input event differently than the first application
interprets the first touch input event,” as recited in claim 1. Appeal Br. 7–
14; Reply Br. 2–7.
Appellant contends, “to show the ‘first touch input event,’ the
Examiner refers to ‘a gesture’ (e.g., panning, dragging),” disclosed by
Matthews and “to show the ‘second touch input event,’ the Examiner refers
to ‘receiving input character ‘T’” disclosed by Duursma. Appeal Br. 11.
Appellant also contends the Examiner “doubles down on this position in the
Advisory Action” by finding that “the user touch[ing] the input device is
consider[ed] as [the] same touch event.” Id. at 11–12 (citing Adv. Act. 2).
Appellant contends that the Examiner’s interpretation is contrary to the plain
language of claim 1 because it “improperly ignores words of the claim.” Id.
Specifically, Appellant contends, “the Examiner interprets ‘a same type of
touch input event’ as merely meaning that both touch events [in Matthews
and Duursma] are input events.” Id. at 12. In other words, Appellant
contends that “the Examiner’s interpretation renders superfluous the phrase
‘a same type of touch input event.’” Id. And, according to Appellant,
Appeal 2019-001112
Application 14/823,733

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Matthew’s “panning or dragging” gesture is not the same type of touch event
as Duursma’s “receiving input character ‘T.’” Id.
The Examiner initially finds that Matthews’ “input gesture” to launch
an application is the first touch event and Duursma’s “input gesture” to input
a character is the second touch event. Final Act. 4–5. The Examiner
interprets “the act of performing an input (i.e. touch event) wherein the user
touches the input device is consider[ed] [the] same touch event (i.e. first and
second touch event) performed by the user.” Adv. Act. 2.
In the Answer, the Examiner further finds that the first and second
touch input events are “input action[s] performed by the user on an input
device to select/activate displayed icon/program,” which the Examiner finds
are the same. Ans. 3. The Examiner then finds that Matthew discloses
“user-initiated inputs,” which “implies plurality of inputs could be
performed.” Ans. 3–4. The Examiner further finds that “the act of
performing an input on a touch input device wherein the user se[le]cts [a]
first program and subsequently select[s] another program using first and
second input[s] wherein the two inputs are same types of inputs (i.e. tap-type
input[s]) are disclosed by Matthew et al. in view of Duursma et al.” Id. at 4.
In Reply, Appellant contends that the Examiner’s new finding of “two
inputs that each activate a program” does not meet the claim because they
are “not two touch inputs that are interpreted differently.” Reply Br. 3, 4, 6.
Appellant further responds that
[t]o the extent that the Examiner is arguing that any two
touch events that are inputs would show the claimed “same type
of touch input event” due to both events being inputs, such an
interpretation . . . is unreasonable because it effectively reads
out part of the claim language (i.e., either the “input” of the
“touch input event” or “. . . a same type of touch input event.”).
Appeal 2019-001112
Application 14/823,733

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Id. at 3.
We agree with Appellant. If the Examiner were correct that the first
and second touch input events were selecting a program to open, the result
of those touch inputs would be the same—each program would open. See
Ans. 3. In that case, we agree with Appellant that the second application
would not interpret the second touch input event differently than the first
application interprets the touch input event. In any event, the Examiner does
not cite to any disclosure in Matthews or Duursma related to launching
applications. Moreover, if the Examiner’s alternative theory were correct
that Matthews multiple “inputs” were the same, the Examiner has supplied
no evidence that the result of Matthews multiple inputs would be different
from one another. See id. at 3–4.
We also disagree with the Examiner’s assertion that merely touching
the device twice meets the claim because “the user touches the input device
is consider[ed] as [the] same touch event.” See Adv. Act. 2. The
Examiner’s phrasing here is telling: by referring to the “same touch event,”
the Examiner omits the word “type” from the claim language. The claim
requires the “same type of touch input event,” not merely the “same touch
event.” Merely touching a touchscreen (by dragging one’s finger) in
Matthews is not the same type of touch event as typing a character on a
keyboard in Duursma. See Matthews ¶ 17; Duursma 5:20–21. The
Examiner’s claim interpretation may be the broadest possible interpretation,
but it is not the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the
Specification. See In re Smith Int’l, Inc., 871 F.3d 1375, 1383 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (The “correct inquiry” is to give a claim its broadest reasonable
interpretation, not the “broadest possible interpretation.”); Spec. ¶¶ 97
Appeal 2019-001112
Application 14/823,733

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(“Touch input may include a variety of instrument, hand or finger
movements and actions including touching a point on the screen, stylus pen
inputs, swiping movements, flicking movements, multi-finger or multi-touch
actions (e.g., pinching, expansion) and gestures and the like.”), 124
(“detectable types of input ( e.g., single touch vs. multi-touch)”), 128 (“the
server may store a mapping between types of touch input or gestures and
different types of mouse events/inputs”), 153 (“a type of input (e.g., a
particular type of gesture or set of raw input data)”).
The Examiner has not relied on any of the other cited references to
teach the disputed limitation. Accordingly, we do not sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 and its corresponding dependent claims.
Similarly, each of independent claims 15 and 18 recites similar language to
the above-quoted limitation of claim 1. Accordingly, we also do not sustain
the Examiner’s rejections of claims 15 and 18 and their dependent claims.
CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
References/Basis Reversed
1–7, 11–20 103 Matthew, Duursma 1–7, 11–20
8–10 103 Matthew, Duursma, Andrews 8–10
Overall
Outcome
1–20
REVERSED