Chrysler, LLC

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

May 1, 2009

07-CA-051553 (N.L.R.B. May. 1, 2009)

JD–16–09
Auburn Hills, MI
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
CHRYSLER, LLC
and Case 7-CA-51553
LOCAL 412, INTERNATIONAL UNION,
UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND
AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF
AMERICA (UAW), AFL–CIO
Donna M. Nixon, Esq., for the General Counsel.
K.C. Hortop, Esq. (Eastman & Smith Ltd.),
of Novi, Michigan, for the Respondent.
DECISION
Statement of the Case
IRA SANDRON, Administrative Law Judge. The complaint, issued on December 9,
2008,1 stems from unfair labor practice charges that Local 412, International Union, United
Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), AFL–CIO (the
Union) filed against Chrysler, LLC (Respondent or Chrysler). The General Counsel alleges that
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) by
failing and refusing to provide the Union with information it requested that was necessary for,
and relevant to, the Union’s performance of its duties in representing employees.
Pursuant to notice, I conducted a trial in Detroit, Michigan, on March 3, 2009, at which
the parties had full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to
introduce evidence. Respondent and the General Counsel filed helpful posthearing brief that I
have duly considered.
Issue
Did Respondent unlawfully fail and refuse to provide the Union with information it
requested on July 17, 18, and 28, regarding Respondent’s use of outsourced companies, and
information it requested on July 28 concerning Envi, Chrysler’s new hybrid-vehicle program?
Witnesses
Michael Hayes, the Union’s chief steward for unit 1, testified for the General Counsel.
Respondent called Morris Simms, Chrysler’s senior manager of labor relations.

1 All dates are in 2008, unless otherwise indicated.
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I will address credibility in the Facts section. Apropos of this case, I note here the well-
established precept that witnesses may be found partially credible: “‘[N]othing is more common
in all kinds of judicial decisions than to believe some and not all’ of a witness’ testimony.” Jerry
Ryce Builders, 352 NLRB 1262 fn. 2 (2008), citing NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 179 F.2d
749, 754 (2d Cir. 1950), revd. on other grounds, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). Rather, in evaluating its
plausibility, a witness’ testimony is appropriately weighed with the evidence as a whole. Golden
Hours Convalescent Hospitals, 182 NLRB 796, 798–799 (1970).
Facts
Based on the entire record, including testimony, my observations of witness’ demeanor,
documents, and stipulations, I find the following.
Respondent, a corporation headquartered in Auburn Hills, Michigan, has offices, plants,
and places of business throughout the United States, and is engaged in the manufacture,
nonretail sale, and distribution of automobiles and automotive products. Jurisdiction has been
admitted, and I so find.
Respondent’s Auburn Hills facility (the facility) is the sole location germane to this
proceeding. Thousands of employees work there, including about 400 employees in the
Union’s unit 1. The Union represents about 3500 persons in approximately 59 units, 19 of
which consist of Chrysler employees. Units are comprised of districts.
The International UAW (the International) and Chrysler have been parties to a
nationwide agreement for many years, the most recent effective by its terms from October 29,
2007–September 14, 2011.2
Since 1978, the International has assigned its representative responsibilities to the
Union. At all times relevant, Respondent and the Union have been parties to a local
supplemental agreement covering unit 1.3 Page 18 thereof sets out some of unit 1’s
occupational groups, in the categories of designers, layout, and detailers. The Union’s requests
for information (RFI’s) all related principally to the 275–300 employees in these classifications.
The RFI’s
Chrysler regularly utilizes outside contractors to perform outsourced work at the facility.
On July 17, 18, and 28, Hayes, in his capacity as steward for Local 412, unit 1, district 4, made
separate RFI’s concerning seven such contractors, to Todd Frohner, then Respondent’s union
relations representative. They were for Magna Corporation, EDAG Corporation, FEV Engine
Technology, MSX International, AMR Automotive Research India Private Limited, INCAT, and
A.R.D.C.4
Aside from the company named, the RFI’s were identical in key respects. Each opened
with the statement that it was an RFI pursuant to a grievance investigation pertaining to three
memoranda of understanding (MOU’s) in the collective-bargaining agreement, and possibly to

2 GC Exh. 18.
3 GC Exh. 19.
4 GC Exhs. 2–8. All were e-mailed, with the possible exception of GC Exh. 8 (A.R.D.C.),
which Hayes may have hand-delivered.
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other provisions therein. The cited MOU’s were: (M-3) joint activities; (M-6) new technology;
and (M-10) sourcing.5 Hayes went on to state:
In order for the Union to properly prepare and process for possible grievances, fulfill the
unions [sic] contract administration and bargaining responsibilities, and to monitor and
administer the collective bargaining agreement we request the following information from
the Company.
Please inform the Union the following information pertaining to the engineering resource,
[name of company], which is being utilized by Chrysler LLC.
This to include but not limited to:
A list of all programs and/or vehicles that engineering, design, packaging and
prototype tasks are being performed for Chrysler LLC and its subsidiaries.
A complete Chrysler Development System (CDS) breakdown of the program.
If the engineering resource is not supplying total vehicle assistance and is just a
component(s) resource please provide a list of the components that they are involved
with.
For the six requests dated July 17 or 18, Hayes asked that the information be provided
by July 28; for the seventh, dated July 28 (A.R.D.C.), he requested the information by August 3.
Hayes made these RFI’s primarily to determine whether the Company’s use of
outsourcing violated any provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement, particularly with
respect to performance of bargaining-unit work.
Simms testified that Magna and MSX perform a great deal of work for Chrysler outside
of the scope of unit 1 or district 4. He believed the same holds true for INCAT but was not
knowledgeable about EDAC or FEV.
Also on July 28, Hayes made an RFI to Frohner, either by e-mail or hand-delivery,
for information pertaining to Chrysler’s new Envi hybrid-vehicle program.6 Referring to the three
MOU’s cited above, and repeating the same purposes as in the other requests, he asked for the
following:
The scope of the program objectives.
Verification that International UAW has attended meetings to discuss the start of this
program and all its intentions. Including names, dates and documentation supporting
this notification.
A complete Chrysler Development System (CDS) breakdown of the program.
A complete list of all Departments (Union and Non-union) and organizations currently
working on this program. This is to include Chrysler and any other outside parties.

5 See GC Exh. 18 at 125–35, 143–147, & 201–214.
6 GC Exh. 9.
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Organizational charts for each of the departments requested in the previous bulletin
item.
As with the RFI concerning A.R.D.C., Hayes asked Chrysler to provide the information by
August 3.
Events Prior to February 2009
Frohner responded by memorandum dated July 28, acknowledging receipt of the July 17
and 18 RFI’s.7 He stated that he was in the process of gathering information to respond and
that the Company’s final response would be provided “within a reasonable period.” By
memorandum dated July 31, he made an identical response to the A.R.D.C. and Envi RFI’s.8
By an e-mail of August 5 to Frohner, Hayes reiterated his RFI’s with the exception of
INCAT, the omission of which he did not notice in Frohner’s memorandum.9 Hayes asked if all
or part of the requested information was available for the Union to pick up.
Hayes testified without controversion, and I find, the following. In July, he had
conversations with Frohner in meetings on unrelated matters, at which he asked the status of
the requests. He recalled two specifically. The first was in early August, when Frohner replied
that he had sent the requests to Chrysler’s union relations department, which was working on
obtaining the information. The second was at an August 20 grievance meeting, at which
Frohner responded that said department was still working on it. Frohner also said that he could
not identify AMR and asked if Hayes could recommend a point of contact to discuss the RFI.
Hayes suggested a particular director.
In a September 5 e-mail concerning a variety of topics, including Frohner’s upcoming
transfer to another location, Hayes asked Frohner the status of the RFI’s.10 Hayes, by a
September 16 e-mail to Jeff Lofay, who had taken over for Frohner as union relations
representative, asked for any or all of the requested information.11 He stated that in his last
conversation with Frohner, on September 9, the latter had said that a named individual was still
working on the project. By a September 18 e-mail, Union Chair Richard Harter asked Lofay
about any progress in obtaining the information.12
On September 30, Hayes e-mailed Thomas Groechel, Chrysler’s human resources
director. He reiterated the RFI’s and requested the information by October 3.13 In the last
sentence, he stated, “Please do not offer alternatives such as a meeting with management or a
discussion with Labor Relations. Labor relations and Chrysler Union Relations departments
have had more than adequate time to obtain the requested data.” Hayes testified that no one
from Chrysler had previously made any offers for alternatives; rather, he put in this last
sentence because he did not want what he deemed further stalling by the Company. I do
believe that he considered Respondent to be stalling. Nonetheless, I find it implausible that he
would have made this statement sua sponte and without some predicate in the way of

7 GC Exh. 10. He apparently inadvertently omitted reference to the INCAT RFI.
8 GC Exh. 11.
9 GC Exh. 12.
10 GC Exh. 13.
11 GC Exh. 14.
12 GC Exh. 15.
13 GC Exh. 16. Attachments included the INCAT RFI.
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management initiation of the subject. Regardless, no such management offers were put in
writing or otherwise formally presented to the Union as proposals.
Lofay sent Hayes an e-mail on October 14, referencing six of the RFI’s.14 He stated that
the Company was “currently working to gather the previous information the Union requested”
and that he would contact the Union “[a]s soon as the information is complied [sic].” This is the
last written communication between the Union and Chrysler in evidence.
On October 7, the Union filed the charge underlying this proceeding. Respondent does
not dispute the fact that it never provided the Union with any information in response to the
RFI’s.
Communications in February 2009
The trial was initially scheduled for February 4, 2009. Respondent made an unopposed
motion to postpone, which the Regional Director granted in a February 6, 2009 order.15 At all
times during settlement discussions, the General Counsel insisted on a formal Board settlement
agreement and represented this as the Union’s position.
Both Hayes and Simms testified about conversations they had before and after the
Regional Director’s postponement of the trial to March 3, 2009. The first conversation was on
the late afternoon on about February 5, when Hayes called Simms into his office.16 The second
conversation was by telephone, about 2 weeks later. Their respective versions of the contents
of their conversations were substantially similar, with one major exception.
In the first conversation, Simms suggested that they identify people who might be able to
sit down and provide the requested information. He stated that some of the requests were quite
broad, because Chrysler used companies such as Magna and MSX in many facets of the
different processes, and should be narrowed. At one point, he gestured toward the stack of
purchase orders that the procurement and supply department had run off for him. He and
Hayes agreed that they would not be sufficient to satisfy the RFI’s.
Simms described the difficulties that he had encountered in obtaining the information,
including reductions in the union relations staff and in the work force overall, and organizational
restructuring. In this regard, he asked Hayes if the Union would agree to a postponement of
the trial so that the Company could have more time. Hayes replied that he was opposed to this.
Simms also discussed a potential informal settlement agreement if the Company could get
enough information to satisfy Hayes.
Either at this meeting (Simms’ testimony), or in a phone conversation about 2 weeks
later (Hayes’ account), Simms offered to set up meetings between Hayes and managers to
facilitate obtaining the information. Their testimony conflicted on whether the offer was
conditional, and Hayes’ response.

14 GC Exh. 17. INCAT and A.R.D.C. were not included.
15 GC Exh. 1(f).
16 Based on Simms’ testimony on its foundation, which was more detailed and unequivocal
than Hayes’, who first indicated the conversation was in person but then stated that it was by
telephone.
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According to Simms, he imposed no conditions, and Hayes responded that he would be
interested in sitting down with the managers. Simms testified that after he received word of the
postponement, he sent Hayes an e-mail and asked if Hayes could work on the list of managers
with whom to meet because they only had until March 3 (the new trial date) to start meeting,
and they needed to get going quickly. When I asked Simms if that e-mail was in the record, he
answered, “I didn’t bring it. I wish I had now.”17 Simms further testified that he sent subsequent
e-mails asking Hayes for the information but, again, none were produced at trial. Thus, without
a satisfactory explanation, Respondent failed to provide documents in its possession that would
reasonably be assumed to be favorable to its position (i.e., support Simms’ version that his offer
was unconditional and that Hayes agreed to it). Therefore, I draw an adverse inference against
the credibility of Simms’ testimony on this matter. See PCC Fabricators, Inc., 352 NLRB 701 fn.
5 (2008); Martin Luther King Sr. Nursing Center, 231 NLRB 15 fn. 1 (1977).
Contrary to Simms, Hayes recounted that Simms conditioned his offer upon the Union’s
agreement to an informal Board settlement agreement and/or a further postponement of the
trial, and Hayes told him no.
Under all the circumstances, I find more plausible Hayes’ version of Simms’ offer and his
response. First, I note Respondent’s failure to produce purported documents that would have
corroborated Simms’ account. Second, Simms initiated their meeting on about February 5,
when Respondent’s motion for a postponement of the trial was pending, and Simms admittedly
asked the Union to agree to such. Accordingly, I find that Simms’ offer was conditional on the
Union’s agreement to an informal Board settlement agreement and/or further postponement of
the trial.
Analysis
An employer is obliged to supply information requested by a collective-bargaining
representative that is necessary and relevant to the latter’s performance of its responsibilities to
the employees it represents. NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967); NLRB v. Truitt
Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956). The information must be furnished in a timely fashion. Beverly
California Corp., 326 NLRB 153, 157 (1991); Interstate Food Processing, 283 NLRB 303, 306
(1987).
Respondent has raised several defenses. It first contends that the matter should be
deferred to the parties’ grievance-arbitration procedure under the Collyer doctrine.18 However,
the Board in recent decisions has strongly reaffirmed its longstanding policy of finding deferral
inappropriate when the 8(a)(5) allegations pertain to failure to provide information. See Medco
Health Solutions of Spokane, 352 NLRB 640 (2008); Team Clean, Inc., 348 NLRB 1231 fn. 1
(2006).
Respondent’s brief cites (at 6) a single case in support of its position: United Aircraft
Corp., 204 NLRB 879 (1973), affirmed sub nom, Int’l Association of Machinists v. NLRB, 525
F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975). Seven years ago, Respondent cited the same case to the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals, when it sought Board deferral of another information-request case, in
DaimlerChrysler Corp., f/k/a Chrysler Corp., 288 F.3d 434 (2002). The Court was not
persuaded, stating (at 445):

17 Tr. 107.
18 See Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837 (1971).
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United Aircraft is an almost 30-year-old case that does not represent the Board’s current
policy of the application of Collyer to information-request cases. And United Aircraft is
the only case cited by CD in support of its position. At oral argument before this court,
DC’s counsel acknowledged that the Board’s policy since United Aircraft has been
entirely consistent in holding that information cases will not be deferred under
Collyer . . . .
For those reasons, United Aircraft is not viable authority, and Respondent’s deferral argument
fails.
Alternatively, Respondent raises three contentions. I note that at no time prior to
February 2009, when the matter was already scheduled for trial, did Respondent voice any
objections to complying with the RFI’s.
The first is that a provision of MOU M-10 provides that the Union has the right to written
notification of any contemplated outsourcing decision,19 and it therefore already received the
requested information. Since determining Respondent’s compliance with MOU M-10 was one
of the reasons for the RFI’s, this contention warrants no serious consideration, especially when
Respondent has produced no evidence of any such notification.

The second is that the Union failed to demonstrate relevance. In analyzing relevance,
the Board’s distinguishes between requested information relating directly to the terms and
conditions of represented employees, and requested information concerning matters outside of
the bargaining unit.
The former is presumptively relevant. Beverly Health & Rehabilitation Services, 328
NLRB 885, 888 (1999); Samaritan Medical Center, 319 NLRB 392, 397 (1995). This includes
information pertinent to a union’s decision to file or process grievances. Beth Abraham Health
Services, 332 NLRB 1234 (2000); Bell Telephone Laboratories, 317 NLRB 802, 803 (1995),
enfd. mem. 107 F.3d 862 (3d Cir. 1997). The Envi RFI largely fell into this category.
As to the latter, a union bears the burden of establishing its relevance and need.
Racetrack Food Services, 353 NLRB No. 76 (2008); Tri-State Generation, 332 NLRB 910
(2000). This includes Information about the subcontracting of work, even if it impacts on
bargaining-unit employees’ terms and conditions of employment. Disneyland Park, 350 NLRB
1257 (2007); Richmond Health Care, 332 NLRB 1304, 1307 fn. 1 (2000); Associated Ready
Mixed Concrete, Inc., 318 NLRB 318 (1995), enfd. 108 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1997); Ohio Power
Co., 216 NLRB 987, 991 (1975), enfd. 531 F.2d 1381 (6th Cir. 1976). Thus, the RFI’s
concerning outsourced companies, and to the Envi RFI, in part, were in this category.
In determining whether such a burden has been met at the trial level, the Board applies
a liberal, discovery-type standard. Hamilton Sundstrand, 352 NLRB 482 (2008), Disneyland
Park, above. The General Counsel can establish relevance by presenting evidence that either
(1) the union demonstrated the relevance of the information, or (2) the relevance of the
information should have been apparent to the employer under the circumstances. Ibid. The
burden is not “an exceptionally heavy one, requiring only a showing be made of a ‘probability
that the requested information is relevant, and that it would be of use to the union in carrying out

19 GC Exh. 18 at 212.
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its statutory duties and responsibilities.’” Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 323 NLRB 1182,
1186 (1997), enfd. 157 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 1998), quoting Acme Industrial Co., supra at 437.
Here, the RFI’s referenced specific MOU’s in the collective-bargaining agreement,
requested certain types of information, and stated that the Union sought the information for,
inter alia, possible grievances.
Respondent never raised lack of relevance as a basis for not furnishing the information
sought. Indeed, both in written communications and orally, management repeatedly stated that
Chrysler was making efforts to obtain the information and would provide it.
I conclude, therefore, that the requested information was relevant and necessary to the
Union’s representation of unit employees, based both on the contents of the RFI’s, and
Chrysler’s responses. For the same reasons, I conclude that the presumptively relevant
portions of the Envi RFI, if severed for analysis, were relevant and necessary.
Finally, I turn to Respondent’s claim that its delay in furnishing the information was
justified due to the expansive nature of the requests. At the February 2009 meeting, Simms
alluded to the broad scope of the RFI’s, in particular with regard to two of the companies, and to
the difficulties that his office had had in compiling information. He did not state that obtaining
the information would be “burdensome” as such. Assuming he had, a mere assertion that the
information request is overly broad to the point of being burdensome does not suffice to relieve
an employer from the obligation to provide relevant information. Rather, the employer must
establish that the expense, labor, and or resources required to fulfill the request rise to the level
of burdensome. Pulaski Construction Co., 345 NLRB 932, 938 (2005); Goodyear Atomic Corp.,
266 NLRB 890, 891 (1983), enfd. 738 F.2d 155 (6th Cir. 1984); Colgate Palmolive, 261 NLRB
90 (1982). Neither Simms in his conversations with Hayes, nor Respondent at trial, offered any
evidence showing this.
I note that the situation here is distinguishable from those in which an employer has at
some point furnished all or some of the information sought; Respondent has never provided
anything, timely or otherwise.
Accordingly, Respondent’s defenses fail. Absent demonstration of a valid defense, an
employer is obliged to furnish information found relevant. Beth Abraham Health Service, supra
at 1235; Woodland Clinic, 331 NLRB 735, 737 (2000).
Based on all of the above, I conclude that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
by failing and refusing to furnish to the Union the requested information.
Conclusions of Law
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By the following conduct, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices
affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act and violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
(a) Failed and refused to provide to the Union information that the Union requested
about Respondent’s use of outsourced companies at its headquarters facility.
(b) Failed and refused to provide to the Union information that the Union requested
about Respondent’s Envi hybrid-vehicle program at its headquarters facility.
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Remedy
Because Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices, it must be ordered to cease
and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
The General Counsel seeks a broad cease-and-desist order, contending that
Respondent has demonstrated a proclivity to violate the Act by engaging in a pattern of failing to
provide the Union with information. The General Counsel cites the following cases, in which
Respondent was found to have so violated Section 8(a)(5) (listed in order of issuance date,
latest first, with the particular units of the Union involved, and the dates of the RFI’s):20
1. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 344 NLRB 1324 (2005) - unit 53, 1999.
2. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 344 NLRB 772 (2005) - units 4 and 21, April–
September 2003.
3. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. NLRB, supra - unit 53, 1997 and 1998.
4. DaimlerChrysler Corp., JD-133-99 (1999) - unit 1, 1998.

These cases concerned Respondent’s actions over a period extending from 1997–2003,
and going back as far as 12 years. In view of their remoteness in time, I have conceptual
difficulty finding that they have a relevant nexus to the matter before me. Moreover, the record
is silent on how many information requests the Union has made of Respondent since 1997, and
the number of occasions when Respondent provided information to the Union’s satisfaction. As
a result, the above violations cannot be evaluated in any kind of meaningful context.
For these reasons, I conclude that the General Counsel has not established that
Respondent has engaged in recent years in a pattern or practice of failing to provide the Union
with requested information or of otherwise violating the Act. Accordingly, a broad
cease-and-desist order is unwarranted, and I deny the General Counsel’s request for such.
ORDER
Chrysler, LLC, Auburn Hills, Michigan, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing and refusing to provide the Union with information the Union requests that is
relevant and necessary to its role as the collective-bargaining representative of employees.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in
the exercise of the rights Section 7 of the Act guarantees to them.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Timely furnish the Union with the information it requested about Respondent’s use of
outsourced companies at its Auburn Hills, Michigan headquarters operations.
(b) Timely furnish the Union with the information it requested about Chrysler’s Envi
hybrid-vehicle program at that location.

20 Because the fifth case cited by the General Counsel, Chrysler, LLC, JD-48-08 (2008) (unit
1), is an ALJD pending before the Board on Respondent’s exceptions, it is not a final
adjudication that can be considered for evidentiary purposes.
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(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facility in Auburn Hills,
Michigan, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”21 Copies of the notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 7, after being signed by Respondent’s authorized
representative, shall be posted by Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in
conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these
proceedings, Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all
current employees and former employees employed by Respondent at any time since July 17,
2008.
(d) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn
certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that
Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. May 1, 2009.
____________________
Ira Sandron
Administrative Law Judge

21 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words
in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read
“Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order
of the National Labor Relations Board.”
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities
We recognize Local 412, International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), AFL–CIO (the Union) as the bargaining
representative of employees described in our 2007–2011 collective-bargaining agreement with
the International UAW, and in local supplemental agreements.
WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to provide the Union with information it requests relating to
our use of outsourced companies at our Auburn Hills, Michigan headquarters facility; our Envi
hybrid-vehicle program at that facility; or otherwise is relevant and necessary for the Union’s
performance of its duties as your collective-bargaining representative.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the
exercise of your rights under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as set forth at the
top of this notice.
WE WILL timely furnish the Union with the information it requested about our use of
outsourced companies at our Auburn Hills, Michigan, headquarters facility, and about our Envi
hybrid-vehicle program at that facility.
CHRYSLER, LLC
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
477 Michigan Avenue, Federal Building, Room 300
Detroit, Michigan 48226-2569
Hours: 8:15 a.m. to 4:45 p.m.
313-226-3200.

THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST
NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS
NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, 313-226-3244.