0120103497
01-20-2011
Christy T. Cruz, Complainant, v. Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Capital Metro Area), Agency.
Christy T. Cruz,
Complainant,
v.
Patrick R. Donahoe,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service
(Capital Metro Area),
Agency.
Appeal No. 0120103497
Hearing No. 430-2009-00409X
Agency No. 1K-281-0021-09
DECISION
On August 24, 2010, Complainant filed a timely appeal from the Agency's
July 22, 2010, final order concerning her equal employment opportunity
(EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended,
42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The Commission accepts the appeal pursuant
to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the Commission
AFFIRMS the Agency's final order.
ISSUE PRESENTED
The issue presented is whether the decision of the EEOC Administrative
Judge (AJ) that Complainant was not subjected to discrimination based
on her race and in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity when
management moved her from her bid position, and based on race when
management denied her requests for a clothing allowance, is supported
by substantial evidence of record.
BACKGROUND
At the time of the events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant
worked as a Mail Handler at the Agency's Logistics & Distribution Center
in Charlotte, North Carolina. On April 22, 2009, Complainant filed an
EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her:
(1) On the bases of race (Caucasian) and in reprisal for prior
protected EEO activity arising under Title VII when, from January 2009 to
Spring 2009, management moved her from her bid assignment several times.
When she was moved on January 5, 2009, she aggravated a pre-existing
injury that caused her to be out of work from January 6 through January
23, 2009; and
(2) On the basis of race (Caucasian) when, from November 24, 2008
to May 2010, her requests for a clothing allowance were denied.
At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant
with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to
request a hearing before an AJ. Complainant timely requested a hearing.
The AJ held a hearing on June 7, 2010, and issued a bench decision on June
17, 2010, finding no discrimination. The AJ found that Complainant failed
to establish that the Agency's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for
its actions were a pretext for discrimination. The Agency subsequently
issued a final order adopting the AJ's finding that Complainant failed
to prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as alleged.
CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
Neither Complainant nor the Agency filed appeal statements or briefs.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by
an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Universal
Camera Corp. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)
(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory
intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,
456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a
de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held.
An AJ's credibility determination based on the demeanor of a witness or
on the tone of voice of a witness will be accepted unless documents or
other objective evidence so contradicts the testimony or the testimony so
lacks in credibility that a reasonable fact finder would not credit it.
See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part
1614 (EEO-MD-110), Chapter 9, at � VI.B. (Nov. 9, 1999).
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
To prevail in a disparate treatment claim absent direct evidence of
discrimination, Complainant must satisfy the three-part evidentiary
scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). Complainant carries the initial burden of
establishing a prima facie case by demonstrating that she was subjected
to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would support
an inference of discrimination. Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438
U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will vary depending
on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802
n. 13. The burden then shifts to the Agency to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Dep't of Cmty Affairs
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the Agency has met its burden,
Complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to prove, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that the reason proffered by the Agency was a pretext for
discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133,
143 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Ctr v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993).
For purposes of this decision, we assume so without finding that
Complainant established a prima facie case of race and reprisal
discrimination. We find that the Agency articulated legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. The Manager, Distribution
Operations (MDO) testified at the hearing that, in January 2009,
Complainant was asked to move from her regular bid assignment on the
Advanced Flat Sorting Machine with Automatic Induction (AFSM-AI) to work
on the High Speed Tray Sorting (HSTS) machine because of operational
needs. Hearing Transcript (HT) at 113. The MDO testified that the
mail volume dictated that employees who worked on the AFSM-AI needed to
be moved to work on the HSTS.1 Id. The MDO testified that employees
were only eligible for a work clothing allowance if they met certain
established criteria, and she denied Complainant's requests because
Complainant was not eligible for an allowance. Id. at 125.
Complainant now bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the Agency's articulated reasons for changing her
assignment and denying her requests for a work clothing allowance were
pretext for discrimination. Pretext may be shown either directly by
showing that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer
or indirectly "by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is
unworthy of credence." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. Rejection of the
employer's proffered reason permits the trier of fact to "infer the
ultimate fact of intentional discrimination." Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511.
Upon review, we find that the AJ's determination that Complainant
failed to establish pretext is supported by substantial evidence in the
record. We find no evidence that the Agency's actions were motivated
by discriminatory animus towards her protected classes. With respect
to claim 1, Complainant argued that she established discrimination
because she identified a junior employee outside of her protected
classes that the MDO should have moved to the HSTS before her. However,
the AJ found that the MDO credibly testified that the employee held a
higher seniority level than Complainant based on their seniority dates;
therefore, the employee would not have been moved to the HSTS before
Complainant. See HT at 117-19. We note that Complainant testified that
she returned to her original bid position on January 24, 2009, and she
remained in that position through June 2009. Id. at 48. We further
note that Complainant was asked to move to the HSTS on January 5, 2009,
but she failed to establish that she participated in prior protected
EEO activity prior to January 8, 2009.
Regarding claim 2, the record evidence supports the MDO's testimony that
Complainant did not meet the criteria to be awarded a work clothing
allowance. Agency policies dictate that full-time Mail Handlers may
only be given a work clothing allowance in five specific areas, such
as platform (dock) operations, and the MDO testified that Complainant
did not work in any of those areas. See Report of Investigations,
Exhibit 10 (ELM � 932.13); HT at 125. The Human Resources Generalist
testified that mail handlers were not all entitled to a work clothing
allowance, and the majority of them were not given one. HT at 147-49.
Credibility determinations of an AJ are entitled to deference due to the
AJ's first-hand knowledge, through personal observation, of the demeanor
and conduct of the witnesses at the hearing. See Esquer v. U.S. Postal
Serv., EEOC Request No. 05960096 (Sept. 6, 1996). We do not find evidence
in the record that undermines the testimony provided by the officials
at the hearing.
CONCLUSION
The Commission finds that the AJ's factual findings are supported by
substantial evidence in the record. We discern no basis to disturb
the AJ's decision. Accordingly, after a careful review of the record,
including arguments and evidence not specifically addressed in the
decision, the Agency's final order is AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0610)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the
policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (Nov. 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,
Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request
to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail
within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the
defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that
the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also
permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other
security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,
29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within
the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with
the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.
Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time
limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File a Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
January 20, 2011
Date
1 We note that Complainant did not allege that she was subjected to
disability discrimination, and the Agency was not aware that Complainant
suffered from any pre-existing conditions when she was moved to the HSTS
on January 5, 2009. Id. at 50, 66.
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0120103497
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
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0120103497