Chris Deck

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 24, 2020

13788261 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jan. 24, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/788,261 03/07/2013 Chris Deck 23189-98 / R&L0003VA 6840
24256 7590 01/24/2020
DINSMORE & SHOHL LLP
255EAST FIFTH STREET
SUITE 1900
CINCINNATI, OH 45202
EXAMINER
HARRINGTON, MICHAEL P
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3628
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/24/2020 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte CHRIS DECK

Appeal 2018-008900
Application 13/788,261
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before BRADLEY W. BAUMEISTER, KARA L. SZPONDOWSKI, and
RUSSELL E. CASS, Administrative Patent Judges.

SZPONDOWSKI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–7 and 9–14, constituting all the
claims pending in the application. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as R+L Carriers,
Inc. Appeal Brief filed Oct. 2, 2017 (“Appeal Br.”) 2.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant’s invention generally relates to facilitating movement of
articles of freight and determining whether the movement of an article is
consistent with one or more shipping rules. Spec. ¶ 2. Claims 1 and 9,
reproduced below, are representative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method for determining whether to move an
article disposed at a first location, the method comprising:
reading an article marker comprising article data
identifying the article disposed at the first location, wherein
when reading the article marker, the first location is located at a
warehouse or a distribution center;
transmitting article data to a computing device, wherein
the computing device is in electrical communication with a
database comprising a plurality of shipping rules related to the
article;
using the computing device to associate the article, based
at least in part on the article data, with one or more of the
plurality of shipping rules in the database;
reading a location marker comprising location data
identifying a second location, wherein when reading the
location marker, the second location is located at the warehouse
or the distribution center;
transmitting the location data to the computing device;
using the computing device to determine whether to
move the article from the first location to the second location,
based at least in part on at least one of the shipping rules with
which the article is associated and the location data;
transmitting a message from the computing device to an
annunciator, wherein the message indicates a determination of
whether to move the article from the first location to the second
location;
eliminating at least one of the one or more of the plurality
of shipping rules with which the article is associated based on
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the first location such that a subset of the plurality of shipping
rules with which the article is associated remain associated with
the article; and
setting a state of the annunciator, based on the message.
9. A method for determining whether to move an article
disposed at a first location, the method comprising:
reading an article marker comprising article data
identifying the article disposed at the first location, wherein
when reading the article marker, the first location is located at a
warehouse or a distribution center;
transmitting article data to a computing device, wherein:
the computing device is in electrical communication with
a database comprising a plurality of shipping rules related to the
article;
the plurality of shipping rules comprise at least a first
shipping rule and a second shipping rule;
the first shipping rule comprises a first priority level and
the second shipping rule comprises a second priority level; and
the first priority level supersedes the second priority level
such that when the first priority rule and the second priority rule
conflict, the first shipping rule is implemented and the second
shipping rule is not implemented;
using the computing device to associate the article, based
at least in part on the article data, with one or more of the
plurality of shipping rules in the database;
reading a location marker comprising location data
identifying a second location, wherein when reading the
location marker, the second location is located at the warehouse
or the distribution center;
transmitting the location data to the computing device;
using the computing device to determine whether to
move the article from the first location to the second location,
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based at least in part on at least one of the shipping rules with
which the article is associated and the location data;
transmitting a message from the computing device to an
annunciator, wherein the message indicates a determination of
whether to move the article from the first location to the second
location; and
setting a state of the annunciator, based on the message.

REJECTIONS
Claims 1–7 and 9–14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed
to patent ineligible subject matter.
Claims 1–4, and 9–12 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over the combination of Kodger, Jr. (US 7,684,994
B2; issued Mar. 23, 2010) (“Kodger”) and Shakes et al. (US 7,331,471 B1;
issued Feb. 19, 2008) (“Shakes”).
Claims 7 and 14 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over the combination of Kodger, Shakes, and Ghazarian
(US 2002/0089434 A1; published July 11, 2002).
Claims 5 and 13 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over the combination of Kodger, Shakes, and Rojas et al.
(US 2006/0210073 A1; published Sept. 21, 2006) (“Rojas”).
Claim 6 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over the combination of Kodger, Shakes, and Moir et al.
(US 2012/0179621 A1; published July 12, 2012) (“Moir”).

ANALYSIS

35 U.S.C. § 101 Rejections
An invention is patent eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
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monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO has published revised guidance on the application of § 101.
2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50
(January 7, 2019) (“2019 Guidance”); October 2019 Update: Subject Matter
Eligibility, 84 Fed. Reg. 55,942 (Oct. 18, 2019) (available at the USPTO’s
website) (“October 2019 PEG Update”). Under the 2019 Guidance, we first
look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
See 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56–57.
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2019 Guidance, Step 2A, Prong 1
The Examiner determines claim 1 “is directed towards a series of
steps of reading an article marker, transmitting article data, associating the
article with shipping rules, reading a location marker, transmitting location
data, determining whether to move an article, transmitting a message
indicating whether to move the article, changing shipping rules, and setting a
state of a device,” which is directed to the abstract idea of “collecting item
and location information, analyzing it with shipping rules, outputting a
response to a device to move the item to a new location, and updating rules
based on the collected information,” similar to concepts the Federal Circuit
identified as abstract ideas in Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom, 830
F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (collecting information, analyzing it, and
displaying results) and Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Financial
Corp., 850 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (collecting, displaying, and
manipulating data). Final Act. 10; see also Ans. 4–5 (also citing Automated
Tracking Solutions, LLC v. Coca-Cola Company, 723 Fed.Appx. 989 (Fed.
Cir. 2018)). Final Action mailed May 2, 2017 (“Final Act.”) 10–11. The
Examiner makes similar determinations with respect to independent claim 9.
Id. at 11–13.
Appellant contends the claims are not directed to an abstract idea, but
“instead are directed to specific computer-implemented methods of
determining whether to move the article from the first location to the second
location based at least in part on shipping rules, transmitting a message to an
annunciator, and eliminating at least one shipping rule with which the article
is associated based on the first location,” which “are distinct from the types
of concepts typically found as abstract.” Appeal Br. 16–17.
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Appellant has not persuasively rebutted the Examiner’s findings and
conclusions. A claim recites a mental process when the claim encompasses
acts people can perform using their minds or pen and paper. See, e.g.,
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372–73 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (determining that a claim whose “steps can be performed in the
human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper” is directed to an
unpatentable mental process). This is true even if the claim recites that a
generic computer component performs the acts. See, e.g., Versata Dev.
Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Courts
have examined claims that required the use of a computer and still found that
the underlying, patent-ineligible invention could be performed via pen and
paper or in a person's mind.”); see also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v.
Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Symantec”)
(“[W]ith the exception of generic computer-implemented steps, there is
nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose them from being performed
by a human, mentally or with pen and paper.”); 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 52 n.14 (“If a claim, under its broadest reasonable interpretation,
covers performance in the mind but for the recitation of generic computer
components, then it is still in the mental processes category unless the claim
cannot practically be performed in the mind.”). The 2019 Guidance
recognizes mental observations, evaluations and judgments as constituting
patent-ineligible abstract ideas. See id. at 52.
Appellant’s Specification describes “a need . . . for a freight carrier to
facilitate movement of articles in freight and determine in real time whether
movement of the article from one location to another location is consistent
with a set of shipping rules related to that article.” Spec. ¶ 5. Appellant
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further discloses that a “visible, audible, or tactile annunciator may notify an
operator whether the movement is consistent or not consistent and may assist
the freight carrier in reducing errors.” Spec. ¶ 5.
Claim 1 recites: (1) “reading an article marker comprising article data
identifying the article disposed at the first location, wherein when reading
the article marker, the first location is located at a warehouse or a
distribution center”; (2) “transmitting article data . . .”; (3) “. . . associat[ing]
the article, based at least in part on the article data, with one or more of the
plurality of shipping rules . . .”; (4) “reading a location marker comprising
location data identifying a second location, wherein when reading the
location marker, the second location is located at the warehouse or the
distribution center”; (5) “transmitting the location data . . .”;
(6) “determin[ing] whether to move the article from the first location to the
second location, based at least in part on at least one of the shipping rules
with which the article is associated and the location data”; (7) “transmitting
a message . . . wherein the message indicates a determination of whether to
move the article from the first location to the second location”;
(8) “eliminating at least one of the one or more of the plurality of shipping
rules with which the article is associated based on the first location such that
a subset of the plurality of shipping rules with which the article is associated
remain associated with the article;” and (9) “setting a state of an annunciator,
based on the message.” Claim 9 recites similar limitations. See Appeal Br.
34–35 (Claims Appendix).
Each of the steps recited above can be practically performed by a
human being and, therefore, recites a mental process under the
2019 Guidance.
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Appellant’s Specification supports our findings. Appellant describes
the “article marker” and “location marker” broadly. See Spec. ¶ 19. For
example, Appellant describes that the “article marker” and “location
marker” as including “serial numbers, hand-written markers, bar codes,
radio frequency identification (RFID) devices, and inductive identifiers.”
Spec. ¶ 19 (emphasis added). Appellant explains that these markers may be
a “string of alpha-numeric characters” that “may be printed (so as to be seen
by a user, e.g., on a label), may be encoded in a bar code, or may be
electronically stored in an RFID device or inductive identifier.” Id.
(emphasis added). Appellant further states that article and location markers
may be “a visual label which can simply be read by a human . . . [and] the
data from the marker may be manually entered into the reader.” Spec. ¶ 23;
see also id. ¶ 25 (“the reading of the markers . . . may also be manually
performed”). As another example, Appellant states that “a person may
visually inspect the marker, contact an operator by phone, and pass the
marker data to the operator who enters it into the computing device.” Id. ¶
23. Thus, limitations (1), (2), (4), and (5) may be practically performed by a
human being. Limitations (3), (6), and (8) involve analyzing the article or
location marker with respect to one or more shipping rules, and limitations
(7) and (9) involve taking some action based upon the result of that analysis,
which, likewise may be practically performed by a human being.
We agree with the Examiner that the claims here are similar to
concepts the Federal Circuit found abstract in Electric Power Group and
Intellectual Ventures I. See also Automated Tracking, 723 Fed.Appx. at 993
(claims directed to systems “for locating, identifying and/or tracking of” an
object using RFID components found abstract, as they achieve the result “by
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collecting data from sensors, analyzing that data, and determining results
based on the analysis of data”).
Accordingly, Appellant has not sufficiently established that the claims
do not recite an abstract idea, and we agree with the Examiner’s findings and
conclusions. See Final Act. 10; Examiner’s Answer mailed July 19, 2018
(“Ans.”) 3–9. Therefore, we conclude the claims recite a mental process
pursuant to Step 2A, Prong One, of the guidance. See 2019 Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 54 (Section III(A)(1) (“Prong One: Evaluate Whether the Claim
Recites a Judicial Exception”)).
2019 Guidance, Step 2A, Prong 2
In determining whether the claims are “directed to” the identified
abstract idea, we next consider whether the claims recite additional elements
that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application.2 We discern
no additional element (or combination of elements) recited in the claims that
integrates the judicial exception into a practical application. See 2019
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55.
The Examiner determines the claims recite generic computer elements
recited at a high level of generality that merely act as a means to receive,
store, transmit, and output data. Final Act. 11.
Appellant contends the claimed methods “are inextricably tied to
computer technology and distinct from the types of concepts typically found

2 We acknowledge that some of the considerations at Step 2A, Prong Two,
properly may be evaluated under Step 2 of Alice (Step 2B of the Office
Guidance). For purposes of maintaining consistent treatment within the
Office, we evaluate them under Step 1 of Alice (Step 2A of the Office
guidance). See 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n.25, & 27–32.

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as abstract.” Appeal Br. 17. Appellant further argues the claims are similar
to those in McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America, Inc., 837 F.3d
1299 (2016) and Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir.
2016). Appeal Br. 17–18, 24–25.
Specifically, Appellant argues the claims “are limited to a specific
process for determining whether to move an article from the first location to
the second location based at least in part on shipping rules and use
‘particular information and techniques and [do] not preempt approaches that
use rules of a different structure or different techniques.’” Appeal Br. 18;
see also id. at. 19. Appellant contends that the claims are designed to
“improve the movement of an article during shipping by proactively
determining whether movement of the article from one location to another is
consistent with one or more shipping rules to proactively prevent the article
from being shipped to the wrong location or with the wrong accompanying
freight.” Id. at 18 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 3–5); see also id. at 24–25 (citing Spec.
¶¶ 3–5, 49). Appellant argues that “the claimed process provides a specific
technological improvement over existing techniques in the field.” Id. at 18
(citing Spec. ¶ 49); see also id. at 23.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments and agree with the
Examiner’s determinations. See Final Act. 2–9, 10–12; Ans. 3–9. As
additional elements, claims 1 and 9 recite “a computing device,” “a database
comprising a plurality of shipping rules related to the article,” that “the
computing device is in electrical communication with [the] database,” and
“an annunciator.”
Appellant’s Specification describes these additional limitations
generically. See, e.g., Spec. ¶ 26 (“communication link 32 may be a
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wireless network, wired network, or a combination thereof”); id. ¶ 27
(“computing device 30 may comprise a personal computer, a server, a
dedicated machine, or other suitable device”); id. (“database 34 may be an
enterprise database management system or ‘cloud’ hosted system”); id. ¶ 35
(“annunciator 28 may comprise visual (e.g., lights), audio (e.g., sirens,
buzzers), or tactile (e.g., vibration) devices or combinations thereof”). We,
therefore, agree with the Examiner that these additional limitations recite
generic computer components performing generic computer functions. See
Final Act. 5–9, 11; Ans. 3–8.
We find insufficient indication in the Specification, nor does
Appellant direct us to any, that the operations recited by the claims invoke
any inventive programming, require any specialized computer hardware or
other inventive computer components (i.e., a particular machine), or that the
claimed invention is implemented using other than generic computer
components to perform generic computer functions (e.g., receive, analyze,
transmit, and output data). See DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773
F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[A]fter Alice, there can remain no doubt:
recitation of generic computer limitations does not make an otherwise
ineligible claim patent-eligible.”). The claims merely add generic computer
components to support the abstract idea, which is insufficient to integrate the
judicial exception into a practical application.
Moreover, we are unpersuaded the claims constitute an improvement
to the functioning of the computer or to any other technology or technical
field; they merely adapt the abstract idea to an execution of steps performed
on a computer. See Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Services, 859 F.3d
1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Our prior cases have made clear that mere
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automation of manual processes using generic computers does not constitute
a patentable improvement in computer technology.”).
The problem described in Appellant’s Specification pertains to
“determining and indicating whether movement of an article is consistent
with one or more shipping rules,” which is a business problem or matter of
mental judgment, not a technical one. Spec. ¶ 2; see also id. ¶¶ 3–5. We
agree with the Examiner that the claims are directed to a business
improvement to solve the described business problem, rather than a technical
improvement, an improvement to computer functionality, or an
improvement to another technology or technical field.. See Ans. 5–8.
We disagree that the claims are similar to those in McRO and Enfish.
In McRO, the patent described computer software for matching audio to a
3D animated mouth movement to provide lip-synched animation. 837 F.3d
at 1306–1307. Moreover, the claims in McRO recited (i) specific limitations
requiring a set of rules that “define[] a morph weight set stream as a function
of phoneme sequence and times associated with said phoneme sequence” to
enable computers to produce “accurate and realistic lip synchronization and
facial expressions in animated characters” (id. at 1313) and, when viewed as
a whole, were directed to (ii) a “technological improvement over the
existing, manual 3-D animation techniques” that use “limited rules in a
process specifically designed to achieve an improved technological result in
conventional industry practice.” Id. at 1316. Similarly, the claimed data
storage and retrieval method in Enfish recited a “self-referential table [for a
computer database, which] is a specific type of data structure designed to
improve the way a computer stores and retrieves data in memory.” Enfish,
822 F.3d at 1336, 1339.
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Here, Appellant has not identified any analogous technological
improvement that is attributable to the claimed invention; rather, Appellant
merely argues that the technological process is improved “by proactively
preventing shipping errors.” See Appeal Br. 18–19. We are not persuaded
that improving a process for movement of an article, using steps that (as
discussed above) can be performed primarily by a human, reflects a
technological improvement analogous to improved 3-D animation
techniques at issue in McRO or an improvement to computer functionality as
in Enfish. Instead, Appellant’s claims focus on improving the process for
moving an article by reducing errors in the process through the use of rules
that can be carried out by a human. Put simply, the claim focuses on
improving the abstract idea itself.
Appellant’s preemption argument is likewise unpersuasive of
Examiner error. See Appeal Br. 19–20. Although preemption “might tend
to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it, ‘thereby
thwarting the primary object of the patent laws,”’ Alice, 573 U.S. at 216
(citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 70–71), “the absence of complete preemption does
not demonstrate patent eligibility” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom,
Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015). See also OIP Techs., Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[T]hat the
claims do not preempt all price optimization or may be limited to price
optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make them any less
abstract.”); Ans. 8–9.
Accordingly, we determine that the claims do not integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application. See 2019 Guidance at 54 (“Section
III(A)(2) (Prong Two: If the Claim Recites a Judicial Exception, Evaluate
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Whether the Judicial Exception Is Integrated Into a Practical Application”).
We, therefore, agree with the Examiner that the claims are directed to a
judicial exception. See Final Act. 2–12; Ans. 10–16.
2019 Guidance, Step 2B
Turning to step 2 of the Alice/Mayo framework, we look to whether
the claims: (a) add a specific limitation or combination of limitations that
are not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field, or
(b) simply append well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to
the judicial exception. 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
The Examiner determines that the generic computer elements (e.g.,
the computing device and annunciator) merely perform the conventional,
routine, and well-known functions of receiving, storing, transmitting, and
outputting data, and, therefore, do not add significantly more to the abstract
idea. Final Act. 11. The Examiner further determines that the claims are
directed to well-understood, routine, and conventional activities, e.g.,
moving an article from a first location to a second location based on
shipping rules, removing rules that are not relevant, and changing a
computer state based on input. Final Act. 9; Ans. 10–11.
Appellant argues that “independent claims 1 and 9 add specific
limitations to what is well-understood, routine and conventional in the field,
and add unconventional steps that confine the claims to a particular useful
application.” Appeal Br. 21. Appellant identifies “determining whether to
move the article from the first location to the second location, based at least
in part on at least one of the shipping rules with which the article is
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associated and the location data and eliminating at least one of the one or
more of the plurality of shipping rules with which the article is associated
based on the first location,” and “setting a state of the annunciator, based on
a message that indicates a determination of whether to move the article from
the first location to the second location” as specific limitations added to
“what is well-understood, routine and conventional in the field and go
beyond the mere concept of simply gathering and storing information using
a computer.” Appeal Br. 21.
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. As explained in Alice, “the
prohibition against patenting abstract ideas cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of [the idea] to a particular technological
environment.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 222 (internal citations and quotations
omitted). When viewed as a whole, nothing in the claim adds significantly
more (i.e., an inventive concept) to the abstract idea.
The additional elements in the claim, identified above, amount to no
more than mere instructions to apply the exception using generic computer
components, which is insufficient to provide an inventive concept. See, e.g.,
Spec. ¶¶ 26, 27, 35. As discussed above, Appellant does not direct our
attention to anything in the Specification that indicates the claimed computer
components perform anything other than well-understood, routine, and
conventional processing functions, such as receiving, storing, analyzing,
transmitting, and outputting data. See Electric Power Group, 830 F.3d at
1355 (“Nothing in the claims, understood in light of the specification,
requires anything other than off-the-shelf, conventional computer, network,
and display technology for gathering, sending, and presenting the desired
information”); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed.
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Cir. 2014) (“That a computer receives and sends the information over a
network—with no further specification—is not even arguably inventive.”);
Alice, 573 U.S. at 224–26 (receiving, storing, sending information over
networks insufficient to add an inventive concept). In short, each step does
no more than require a generic computer to perform generic computer
functions.
Furthermore, we are unable discern anything in the claims, even when
the recitations are considered as an ordered combination, that represents
something more than the performance of routine, conventional functions of a
generic computer. That is, the claims at issue do not require any
nonconventional computer components, or even a “non-conventional and
non-generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces,” but merely call for
performance of the claimed receiving, storing, analyzing, transmitting and
outputting of data “on a set of generic computer components.” See Bascom
Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1350
(Fed. Cir. 2016).
Appellant does not separately argue the dependent claims. See
generally Appeal Br. 14–25. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons we
sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection of claims 1–7 and 9–14.

35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Rejections
The Examiner relies on Kodger to teach or suggest all of the
limitations in independent claim 1 except: (1) “reading an article marker
comprising article data identifying the article disposed at the first location,
wherein when reading the article marker, the first location is located at a
warehouse or a distribution center”; (2) “reading a location marker
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comprising location data identifying a second location, wherein when
reading the location marker, the second location is located at the warehouse
or the distribution center”; (3) “transmitting the location data to the
computing device,” “using the computing device to determine whether to
move the article from the first location to the second location, based at least
in part on at least one of the shipping rules with which the article is
associated and the location data”; (4) “transmitting a message from the
computing device to an annunciator, wherein the message indicates
determination of whether to move the article from the first location to the
second location”; and (5) “setting a state of the annunciator, based on the
message.” Final Act. 16–17 (emphasis added).
The Examiner relies for these missing limitations on Shakes which,
according to the Examiner, discloses reading a location marker located
within a warehouse and using a control system to identify if the item should
be moved to a second location within the warehouse. Id. at 17–18. The
Examiner determines that it would have been obvious to combine Kodger
with Shakes’ “system and method of reading a location marker located
within the warehouse [to] identif[y] if the item should be moved to the
second location based on shipping rules . . ., and indicating on a device to
move the item to the respective location. . .[to] predictably be able to prevent
an incorrect order from being generated.” Id. at 18.
The Examiner makes similar findings with respect to independent
claim 9. Final Act. 20–25.
Appellant argues that one of ordinary skill in the art would not have
modified Kodger with Shakes. Appeal Br. 27. Specifically, Appellant
focuses on the Examiner’s reliance on Shakes to disclose the first and
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second location is at “one of a warehouse or a distribution center.” Id.
Appellant admits that “Shakes discloses scanning shipping items at two
different locations within a single facility,” but argues that “a person of
ordinary skill in the art would not look to modify the scanning and tracking
of shipping items at a variety of locations (e.g., warehouses and/or
distribution facilities) along a shipping route (i.e., the system of Kodger)
with a system of scanning these shipping items multiple times at a single
warehouse or distribution facility (i.e., the system of Shakes).” Id. at 28.
Appellant argues that such a modification would render Kodger
unsatisfactory for its intended purpose or function because “performing
more than one scan at each intermediate location would be an unnecessary
and inefficient modification.” Id. at 29. Appellant also argues that such a
modification to Kodger would fail to track the shipments as they proceed
along a shipping route between multiple locations. Id.
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. Kodger generally relates to
tracking shipped items based upon a predetermined set of expected
occurrences. Kodger 3:25–29. These predetermined expected occurrences
are derived from event-driven data sources, such as, for example, “package
level detail scans; event-driven tracking/visibility systems; time in transit,
including zip code to zip code and building to building; a distribution
system’s package flows between service buildings and between specific
service sorts . . . building and sort pairs . . . and, sort starts and finish times.”
Id.at 3:42–55. Kodger additionally teaches tracking a package as it is
“transported through the carrier’s internal routing.” Kodger 15:50–53.
Shakes is generally directed to modular sorting stations for receiving
and sorting picked items for order, and describes that such modular sorting
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stations “may be positioned at a location away from the packing station(s),
either in the same facility or building or . . . in a different facility or
building.” Shakes 1:8–9, 10:46–50, 11:13–15.
Although Kodger arguably teaches scanning items in a warehouse
area through the above identified teachings, the Examiner relies on Shakes
to explicitly teach “scanning of items in a warehouse area” (Ans. 15), and
we find that the Examiner has sufficiently articulated how the claimed
features are met by the proposed combination of Kodger and Shakes with
some rational underpinning, consistent with the guidelines in KSR Int’l Co.
v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). See Ans. 15–17. We are not
persuaded that such a modification to Kodger renders Kodger unsatisfactory
for its intended purpose, as argued by Appellant, because the Examiner has
shown that Kodger conducts various scan events throughout the shipping
process, including “scanning packages in buildings and internal routing
areas of a distribution chain.” See Ans. 15–17.
For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in
rejection independent claims 1 and 9 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). For the
same reasons, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting
dependent claims 2–7 and 10–14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), which were not
separately argued.

CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis  Affirmed Reversed
1–7, 9–
14
101 Eligibility  1–7, 9–14
1–4, 9–
12
103(a) Kodger, Shakes  1–4, 9–12
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Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis  Affirmed Reversed
7, 9 103(a) Kodger, Shakes,
Ghazarian
7, 9
5, 13 103(a) Kodger, Shakes,
Rojas
5, 13
6 103(a) Kodger, Shakes,
Moir
6
Overall
Outcome
1–7, 9–14

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED