Chester W. Olejasz, Complainant,v.Paul H. O'Neill, Secretary, Department of the Treasury, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionOct 8, 2002
01A12877_r (E.E.O.C. Oct. 8, 2002)

01A12877_r

10-08-2002

Chester W. Olejasz, Complainant, v. Paul H. O'Neill, Secretary, Department of the Treasury, Agency.


Chester W. Olejasz v. Department of Treasury

01A12877

October 8, 2002

.

Chester W. Olejasz,

Complainant,

v.

Paul H. O'Neill,

Secretary,

Department of the Treasury,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A12877

Agency No. 96-2248

Hearing No. 150-97-8210X

DECISION

Complainant files an appeal with regard to his claim that the settlement

agreement entered into between the parties has been breached by the

agency.

The record reveals that complainant, a Customs Inspector, GS-12, submitted

an application pursuant to Vacancy Announcement ENF 2/95-005DES for the

position of Criminal Investigator (Special Agent) in 1995. On September

20, 1995, complainant was tentatively selected for the position with

the condition that he meet all pre-employment requirements, including a

medical examination. However, complainant failed an Ishihara Plate Test

and on June 5, 1996, he was determined to be not medically qualified for

the position of Criminal Investigator due to his color vision defect.

The medical requirements of the Criminal Investigator position state

that normal color vision is required. It further states that the

individual must have the ability to distinguish shades of color by

color plate tests. On July 3, 1996, complainant filed a formal EEO

complaint wherein he claimed that he was discriminated against on the

basis of his disability (color blindness) when he was not awarded the

Criminal Investigator position. The agency accepted the complaint for

investigation. Subsequent to the investigation, complainant requested

a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge.

On March 19, 1999, the parties entered into a settlement agreement.

However, complainant claimed in May 1999, that the agency breached

the agreement. On May 21, 1999, the Administrative Judge remanded

the complaint based upon the agency's position that the Office of

Personnel Management (OPM) imposed, controlled, and implemented the

medical standards or test for color vision. The Administrative Judge

directed that the case return to the Commission within 180 days, along

with OPM's response. The response stated that the agency had to obtain

OPM's approval to establish the medical qualifications.

On June 26, 2000, the parties entered into a second settlement agreement.

The settlement agreement provided, in pertinent part, that the agency

agrees as follows:

To develop a practical color vision examination (hereinafter referred

to as the �practical examination�) to test the Complainant's color

vision acuity as relates to the ability to perform the essential job

functions of a special agent series 1811 position. As explained below

in subsection 3, the test will reflect real life situations and will

not use dots and numbers that are used in the Ishihara test.

To develop the practical examination within six months of the date of

execution of this agreement. The six-month time limit may be extended

upon mutual written agreement of the Complainant and the Agency.

. . . .

That if the Complainant passes the above referenced �practical

examination� and meets all other pre-employment requirements, which

apply to all other Special Agent Series 1811 positions, including but not

limited to, drug testing, a background investigation and pre-employment

physical and medical examinations (excluding a color vision examination)

and after appointment, successful completion of all necessary training

at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center:

To place the Complainant in a U.S. Customs Special Agent position

(Criminal Investigator GS-1811), GS-11, Step 5, effective September

20, 1995. To retroactively reflect promotion to a GS-12, Step 2, in

the Special Agent position effective September 20, 1996. Any regularly

scheduled step increases between September 20, 1996, and the signing of

this agreement will be provided as part of this settlement.

To place the Complainant within the geographic location comprising the

Office of the Special Agent in Charge, Miami, Florida, including Resident

Agent in Charge offices.

Complainant agreed to withdraw his complaint and as follows:

To take the practical examination developed by the Agency within thirty

(30) days of the development of the test. The thirty-day limit may be

extended upon mutual agreement of the Complainant and the Agency.

Both parties further agreed that:

All decisions regarding the decision which determines what constitutes

an �essential function� of a United States Customs Special Agent Series

1811 position will be made by the Agency. The Agency's determination of

the essential functions of the Special Agent, Series 1811 position, is

final and cannot be objected to by the Complainant or his expert witness.

(i) A �practical examination� will be developed by the agency. (ii)

After the practical examination is fully developed, the Complainant's

expert witness will review the practical examination. A copy of the

Complainant's expert witness' credentials will be provided to the

[Agency]. (iii) The Complainant's expert witness may provide input to

the Agency's expert witness regarding the medical feasibility of the

proposed test.<1> The Agency's expert shall give due consideration to

any and all input from the Complainant's expert. The Agency's expert

shall reach the final decision regarding medical feasibility. The final

decision cannot be objected to by the Complainant, his representative,

or his expert witness.

By letter dated February 27, 2001, complainant informed the agency that

it had breached the settlement agreement. According to complainant,

his expert has determined that the test developed by the agency is not a

practical test, but rather is more of a clinical test. Complainant stated

that the agency acted in bad faith by producing a clinical test that is

designed to assure his failure given he previously failed a clinical test.

Complainant claimed that the test developed by the agency does not reflect

the real life situations of a special agent. Complainant further claimed

that the process utilized to select the colors was arbitrary and that the

selected colors do not correlate with the real life situations encountered

by a special agent. Finally, complainant stated that the test has been

designed just for him and is not being utilized throughout the agency

for various job classifications involving inspections and law enforcement.

On April 3, 2001, complainant filed an appeal with the Commission.

Complainant notes that thirty days have expired since he filed his

breach claim with the agency and that the matter has not been resolved.

Complainant reiterates the specific points that he presented in his

February 27, 2001 letter to the agency.

In response, the agency asserts that it has fully complied with the

terms of the settlement agreement. The agency maintains that there is no

provision in the agreement that provided that it would make system-wide

changes in the testing process or that the agency would use Special Agents

from across the nation as test subjects. The agency argues that there

is no provision in the agreement that requires that certain colors be

used in the practical examination. According to the agency, the colors

used in the test are the most basic color terms used to identify various

colors. The agency asserts complainant is arguing that the agency should

identify which colors are essential to the performance of the Special

Agent position and then only require that he identify those colors on

the test. The agency maintains that complainant has failed to specify

why he believes the test is not a practical test that reflects real life

situations and also what type of examination would meet his expectations.

The agency argues that its expert witness has explained that the test

reflects the real life situation of surveillance activity where an

observer must identify and report the clothing color of a suspect or the

color of a vehicle. According to the agency, the test utilized 2x2 inch

color samples at a distance of 100 and 400 inches which approximates the

shirt of an average size man (2x2 feet) from distances of 100 and 400

feet. The agency argues that the test reflects the real life situation

of undercover work performed by Special Agents on a routine basis.

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.504(a) provides that any settlement

agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached at

any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both parties.

If the complainant believes that the agency has failed to comply with

the terms of a settlement agreement or final action, the complainant

shall notify the EEO Director, in writing, of the alleged noncompliance

within 30 days of when the complainant knew or should have known of the

alleged noncompliance. The complainant may request that the terms of

the agreement be specifically implemented, or, alternatively, that the

complaint be reinstated for further processing from the point processing

ceased.

The Commission has consistently held that settlement agreements are

contracts between the complainant and the agency, and it is the intent of

the parties as expressed in the contract, not some unexpressed intention,

that controls the contract's construction. Eggleston v. Department

of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795 (August 23, 1990).

In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard to the terms of a

settlement agreement, the Commission has generally relied on the plain

meaning rule. See Hyon v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request

No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states that if the writing

appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face, its meaning must be

determined from the four corners of the instrument without resort to

extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery Elevator Co. v. Building

Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377, 381 (5th Cir. 1984).

With regard to the merits of complainant's allegation of breach, we

find that complainant has not established that the agency breached the

settlement agreement. Complainant challenges the nature of the test

because he believes it is not a practical test as envisioned by the

settlement agreement. However, we observe that the parties agreed in

the settlement that the agency's expert would reach the final decision

regarding the medical feasibility of the examination developed by

the agency. Therefore, complainant is unable to challenge the agency

expert's determination that this test is more likely than not to produce

an accurate diagnosis. Further, even if complainant could contest

the agency expert's determination, we note that complainant did not

show that the test is not a �practical examination.� The agency test

appears to be �practical� given that it reflects the real life situation

of surveillance activity where an observer must identify and report the

clothing color of a suspect or the color of a vehicle.

Complainant contends that a practical test was supposed to be utilized

system-wide, but instead the test has been developed just for him.

The settlement agreement, however, does not provide that the test

developed by the agency has to be utilized system-wide. We further

find that complainant failed to establish that the agency expert did not

give due consideration to the input of complainant's expert or that the

agency otherwise acted in bad faith with regard to the implementation

of the settlement agreement.

Accordingly, the agency's finding that it did not breach the settlement

agreement is proper and is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

October 8, 2002

__________________

Date

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision

was received within five (5) calendar days after it was mailed. I certify

that this decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative

(if applicable), and the agency on:

__________________

Date

______________________________

1�Medical feasibility� shall be defined as �more likely than not to

produce an accurate diagnosis.� (The footnote is part of the settlement

agreement).