Cheryl A. Gardner, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 28, 2005
01a53928 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 28, 2005)

01a53928

09-28-2005

Cheryl A. Gardner, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Cheryl A. Gardner v. United States Postal Service

01A53928

9/28/2005

.

Cheryl A. Gardner,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A53928

Agency No. 66-000-0046-04

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision (FAD)

dated April 13, 2005, concerning her complaint of unlawful employment

discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. and the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. �

621 et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.

For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final

decision.

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was employed

as a Senior Forensic Chemist at the agency's Forensic Laboratory in

Dulles, VA. Complainant sought EEO counseling and subsequently filed a

formal complaint on October 16, 2004, alleging that she was discriminated

against on the bases of race (Black-American), national origin (United

States of America), sex (female), religion (Baptist), color (Brown),

and age (D.O.B. March 11, 1959).

By letter to complainant dated November 5, 2004, the agency accepted

her complaint for investigation and determined that her complaint was

comprised of the following claim:

On July 23, 2004, [complainant] was informed that she would not be

interviewed for the Assistant Laboratory Director position, EAS-26,

position number 09284.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was informed of

her right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge or

alternatively, to receive a final decision by the agency. Complainant

requested that the agency issue a final decision.

In its FAD, the agency concluded that complainant was not subjected to

unlawful discrimination when she was not interviewed for the subject

position. Specifically, the agency found that it articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for its action. In its final decision, the

agency states that the top four candidates were referred by the review

committee to the selecting official (SO). In addition, the agency asserts

that the review committee did not refer complainant to the SO because

the review committee reached a consensus as to the top four candidates,

upon reviewing all the applications.

The record reflects that seven candidates applied for the subject

position. The review committee, comprised of three individuals,

did not interview any of the applicants, but reviewed the candidates'

applications. Thereafter, the review committee scored the applicants

and referred the top four candidates, which did not include complainant,

to the SO.

On appeal, complainant asserts that she was subjected to discrimination

when she was not interviewed for the subject position. The agency

requests that we affirm its FAD.

A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis

first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). For complainant to prevail, she must first establish a prima

facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,

reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that

a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment

action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction

Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to

the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

its actions. See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,

450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency has met its burden, the

complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder

by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of

a prohibited reason. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502

(1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the

first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima

facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel

action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third

step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether

complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the

agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. See U.S. Postal

Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);

Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159

(June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services,

EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of

the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

We find that the agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons

for its actions. The record contains an affidavit from the Chairperson

(C1) of the review committee. Therein, C1 states that the four finalists,

which were referred to the SO, received higher scores from the review

committee than the applicants that were not finalists. Specifically, C1

states that �[the finalists'] qualifications and narratives, as written,

contained information indicating a higher level of qualification for the

vacant position, including better or more thorough narrative[s] containing

the elements of the �star' format (situation/task, action, result) for

the �KSAs' (knowledge, skills, and abilities) required for the position.�

The record also contains an affidavit from another member of the review

committee (M1). Therein, M1 states that the review committee referred

four individuals to the SO. M1 further states that the review committee

decided that these finalists would best meet the requirements of the

subject position based upon their application materials. In addition, M1

asserts that �[d]ue to the scientific, technical, and quality assurance

requirements of the position, I also evaluated applicants in the areas of

advanced degrees, professional certifications, membership in professional

organizations, publications, research and experience in quality assurance

of forensic laboratories accredited by the American Society of Crime

Laboratory Directors.�

The Commission finds that complainant failed to present sufficient

evidence that the agency's reasons for its actions were pretext

for discrimination. In an effort to establish pretext, complainant

raises various arguments including: the subject position was posted

simultaneously internally and externally, and that one of the members of

the review committee, M1, had made the following statement in reference

to internal candidates, �[n]one of the forensic chemists are worthy

or qualified for the position.� Complainant asserts that management

deviated from its routine practice of promoting internal applicants

by posting the subject position both internally and externally.

In response, the SO, in his affidavit, states that in order to obtain

an adequate pool of applicants he requested that the position be posted

internally and externally. SO further states that �this is routine

for the laboratory's scientific and technical personnel.� With respect

to the statement complainant claims was made by M1, in her affidavit,

M1 denies making the statement in question.

Finally, we note that complainant may be able to establish pretext

with a showing that her qualifications were plainly superior to those

of the selectee. See Wasser v. Department of Labor, EEOC Request

No. 05940058 (November 2, 1995). While complainant asserts that she

is qualified for the position and served in a four month detail in the

subject position, upon review of the entire record, we do not find that

complainant's qualifications are plainly superior to the qualifications

of the finalists.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the agency's final decision finding no

discrimination.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

9/28/2005

Date