Chen, Alexander et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 2, 2021

2019005482 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 2, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/844,038 03/15/2013 Alexander Chen 0260647 5917
63649 7590 03/02/2021
DISNEY ENTERPRISES, INC.
C/O FARJAMI & FARJAMI LLP
26522 LA ALAMEDA AVENUE, SUITE 360
MISSION VIEJO, CA 92691
EXAMINER
TRAN, JIMMY H
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2456
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/02/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@farjami.com
farjamidocketing@yahoo.com
ffarjami@farjami.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ALEXANDER CHEN, JAMES VORIS,
MARK ARANA, LEON SILVERMAN, and
TUOMO KORPINEN

Appeal 2019-005482
Application 13/844,038
Technology Center 2400
Before JAMES R. HUGHES, BARBARA A. PARVIS, and
JOYCE CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judges.
HUGHES, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Claims 1–20, 30–37, and 44–46 are pending, stand rejected, are
appealed by Appellant, and are the subject of our decision under 35 U.S.C.
§ 134(a).1 See Final Act. 1–2; Appeal Br. 2, 20–21.2 We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Disney
Enterprises, Inc. See Appeal Br. 1.
2 We refer to Appellant’s Specification (“Spec.”), filed Mar. 15, 2013
(claiming benefit of US 61/767,204, filed Feb. 20, 2013); and Appeal Brief
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claimed subject matter, according to Appellant, “relates generally
to audio and video content, and . . . systems and methods for delivering
secondary content to movie theater patrons.” Spec. ¶ 2. Specifically,
Appellant’s claims recite computer-readable media and methods for
“provid[ing] . . . users with secondary or supplemental content (such as an
alternate audio track in a user-selected language . . .) to accompany primary
program content.” Spec. ¶ 4; see Spec. ¶¶ 5–8. More specifically, the
exemplary method receives primary content information, as well as an
alternative language audio selection from a user device, where the
alternative language audio is different from the language of the primary
content (primary language) playing in a motion picture theater. The method
then identifies secondary content, related to the primary content, that
includes a video using the alternative language audio. The method sends
information to the user device such that the user device may display a menu
for a user to select the secondary content. When the method receives a user
selection for the secondary content, the method sends the secondary content
to the user device. See Spec. ¶¶ 4–8; Abstract. Claim 1 (directed to a
method), claim 11 (directed to a computer readable medium), and claim 30
(directed to a method) are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below with
emphasis added, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method comprising:
receiving primary content information, and an alternative
language audio selection from a user device, the alternative

(“Appeal Br.”), filed Mar. 8, 2018. We also refer to the Examiner’s Final
Office Action (“Final Act.”), mailed Oct. 13, 2017; and Answer (“Ans.”)
mailed June 13, 2018.
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language audio being different than a primary language of a
primary content playing in a motion picture theater, the primary
content information at least partially identifying the primary
content;
identifying secondary content that is related to the primary
content, wherein the secondary content comprises a video
related to the primary content but not in the primary content, the
video using the alternative language audio;
sending data to the user device for the user device to
display a menu for a user to select the secondary content; and
upon receiving a user selection for the secondary content,
sending the secondary content to the user device.
Appeal Br. 17 (Claims App.).
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Ramaswamy et al.
(“Ramaswamy”)
US 2006/0107195 A1 May 18, 2006
Johnson et al.
(“Johnson”)
US 2006/0218226 A1 Sept. 28, 2006
Mcbride et al.
(“Mcbride”)
US 2010/0015994 A1 Jan. 21, 2010
Capretta US 2012/0095749 A1 Apr. 19, 2012
Rosenblatt et al.
(“Rosenblatt”)
US 2012/0290336 A1 Nov. 15, 2012
Slavin et al. (“Slavin”) US 2013/0111514 A1 May 2, 2013
(filed Sept. 16, 2012)
Padro Rondon et al.
(“Padro”)
US 2013/0272672 A1 Oct. 17, 2013
(filed Oct. 12, 2011)
Walker US 2015/0003798 A1 Jan. 1, 2015
(filed Dec. 27, 2012)
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REJECTIONS3
1. The Examiner rejects claims 1–6 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Padro, Walker, and Slavin. See Final Act. 6–11.
2. The Examiner rejects claims 7–10 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Padro, Walker, Slavin, and Capretta. See Final Act.
11–13.4
3. The Examiner rejects claims 11–16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Padro and Walker. See Final Act. 13–17.
4. The Examiner rejects claims 30–34 and 44 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Padro and Rosenblatt. See Final Act.
17–21.
5. The Examiner rejects claims 17–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Padro, Walker, Mcbride, and Capretta. See Final
Act. 21–23.5
6. The Examiner rejects claims 35–37 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Padro, Rosenblatt, and Capretta. See Final Act. 23.

3 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125
Stat. 284 (2011), amended 35 U.S.C. § 103. Because the present application
has an effective filing date prior to the AIA’s effective date (March 16,
2013), this decision refers to 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
4 The Examiner omits Capretta from the statement of the rejection (see Final
Act. 11, but discusses Capretta in the body of the rejection (see Final Act.
11–13). We include Capretta in the statement of rejection for clarity of the
record.
5 The rejection omits Walker, but claims 17–20 depend (directly or
indirectly) from claim 11, which is rejected over Padro and Walker. We
include Walker in the statement of rejection for clarity of the record.
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7. The Examiner rejects claim 45 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Padro, Rosenblatt, and Johnson. See Final Act. 23–
24.
8. The Examiner rejects claim 46 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Padro, Rosenblatt, and Ramaswamy. See Final Act.
24–25.
ANALYSIS
Appellant argues independent claims 1, 11, and 30 separately, but
does not argue dependent claims 2–10, 12–20, 31–37, and 44–46 separately
with particularity. See Appeal Br. 7–15. We select independent claims 1,
11, and 30 as representative of Appellant’s arguments with respect to claims
1–20, 30–37, and 44–46 and Rejections 1–8 (supra). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Obviousness Rejection of Claims 1–6
The Examiner rejects independent claim 1 as being obvious in view of
Padro, Walker, and Slavin. See Final Act. 6–11; Ans. 22–24. Appellant
contends Padro, Walker, and Slavin do not teach the disputed features of
claim 1. See Appeal Br. 7–10. Specifically, Appellant contends that “claim
1 requires identifying secondary content that is related to the primary
content, [which] comprises a video . . . using the alternative language audio”
(Appeal Br. 7), but Padro “does not disclose ‘identifying secondary content
that is related to the primary content, wherein the secondary content
comprises a video . . . using the alternative language audio’ as recited in
Claim 1” (Appeal Br. 8), and “Walker merely teaches the use of ‘alternative
language text’” (Appeal Br. 8), but the “generic recitation of the term
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‘audio’ in Walker does not teach or suggest that alternative audio is
presented with secondary content apart from the presentation of primary
content” (Appeal Br. 9). See Appeal Br. 7–10.
We adopt as our own (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the
Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken (Final Act. 6–11) and
(2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer (Ans.
22–24) in response to Appellant’s Appeal Brief. We concur with the
findings and conclusions reached by the Examiner, and we provide the
following analysis for emphasis.
Appellant’s claim 1 broadly recites a method for receiving primary
content information (corresponding to primary content playing in a motion
picture theater) and secondary content, related to the primary content, in an
alternate language—“receiving primary content information, and an
alternative language audio selection from a user device, . . . identifying
secondary content that is related to the primary content . . . [that] comprises
a video related to the primary content . . . using the alternative language
audio” and “sending the secondary content to the user device” (Appeal Br.
17 (Claim App.) (claim 1) (emphasis added)). Appellant’s Specification
explains that secondary content may include “alternative language tracks[,]
trivia or quiz contests based on events in the movie . . . in multiple
languages[,] polls requesting that the audience members vote for favorite
characters . . . in multiple languages[, or] optional endings or other scenes”
(Spec. ¶ 25), providing alternative language subtitles on the user device
(Spec. ¶ 26), “product advertisements . . . in the user’s preferred language,”
“movie products . . . in their preferred language, or movie trailers . . . in the
user’s preferred language” (Spec. ¶ 38), and “alternative language tracks,
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alternative language subtitles, audio tracks with user-designated words
removed, movie trivia and facts in a variety of languages, questionnaires and
games in a variety of languages, video overlays, or product advertisements”
(Spec. ¶ 41). See also Spec. ¶¶ 16, 36–38 Accordingly, we broadly but
reasonably construe the disputed limitation to mean identifying information
(secondary content) that includes visual (video) information and audio
(alternate language) information related to the primary content—e.g., movie
trailers in the user’s preferred language (see Spec. ¶ 38; Appeal Br. 8
(secondary content may be a “video trailer for another movie (a prequel or
sequel to the primary content movie) or a music video that is related to the
primary content movie, where the trailer uses an alternative language
audio)”).
As explained by the Examiner, Padro describes receiving primary
content information (such as audio watermarks) that at least partially
identifies the primary content (see Final Act. 6 (citing Padro ¶¶ 68, 73, 77))
and identifying secondary content related to the primary content in a (using
a) selected alternate language (see Final Act. 7–8; Ans. 22–23 (citing Padro
¶¶ 8, 69, 70, 76)). Padro specifically describes identifying and providing
secondary content information in the form of alternate language audio
information. Thus, Padro at least suggests “identifying secondary content
that is related to the primary content, wherein the secondary content
comprises” “alternative language audio” (claim 1). Padro, however, does
not explicitly disclose the secondary content also including visual
information (“a video related to the primary content but not in the primary
content”) (claim 1) that also includes (uses) the alternative language audio.
The Examiner cites Walker for the teaching of secondary content or alternate
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content including alternate language and video information. See Final Act.
7–10; Ans. 22–24.
As explained by the Examiner, Walker describes alternate content that
may include video, audio, and alternate language text. See Final Act. 7–10;
Ans. 22–24 (citing Walker ¶ 106). Although Appellant’s arguments focus
on Walker’s disclosure of alternate language text, consistent with the
Examiner’s findings (Final Act. 2–3, 7–8), Walker teaches other possible
“alternate version content.” For instance, Walker specifically describes
“alternate version content” “such as video, audio, or the like that relates to
particular [(primary)] content but is not presented as part of the primary
playback of the content” and examples of alternate content include: the
“multi-angle feature that can be provided on DVDs” where scenes are
“provided from different angles than what is shown in the primary view,”
“alternate language text, green screen footage showing the scene before
special effects are added, raw audio before sound effects or soundtrack are
added, or the like.” Walker ¶ 106 (emphasis added). Walker further
describes “a second screen device capable of providing alternative version
content synched to primary content displayed on a first screen device” where
“alternate version content on the second screen [is] synched with content
being displayed on the first screen device” (Walker ¶ 9), such that the
second screen may “display curated ‘events’ in sync with primary video
playback” including “trivia, social content, [and] bonus material . . . that are
timed for display at relevant points in the primary video playback” (Walker
¶ 105). Thus, Walker teaches “a video related to the primary content but not
in the primary content” (claim 1), and also teaches the alternate content
including audio information and alternate language text information.
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Although Walker does not explicitly disclose the secondary content
including visual information and alternate language audio information (the
video using alternative language audio), we agree with the Examiner that “it
would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time
the invention was filed to combine the teaching alternative audio of Padro . .
. with the teaching of secondary content of Walker, where the secondary
content would be an obvious substitution of alternative language text with
alternative language audio.” Final Act. 8.
Appellant’s contentions regarding Padro and Walker are unavailing of
Examiner error. Appellant merely provides generalized contentions that
Padro does not teach the disputed features of claim 1 (supra). See Appeal
Br. 8. Appellant focuses instead on the purported shortcomings of Walker
and contends that “Walker does not teach or suggest that alternative audio is
presented with secondary content apart from the presentation of primary
content.” Appeal Br. 9. Appellant, however, misconstrues the Examiner’s
rejection and the cited teachings of Walker. The Examiner does not rely
solely on Walker for secondary (alternate) content including (using)
alternate language audio.
Appellant interprets both Padro and Walker too narrowly, and does
not address the combination of Padro and Walker. Appellant fails to
appreciate that the combination of Padro and Walker at least broadly
suggests secondary content . . . related to the primary content . . .
compris[ing] a video related to the primary content . . . using the alternative
language audio” (Appeal Br. 17 (Claim App.) (claim 1). Thus, Appellant
does not persuasively rebut the Examiner’s findings with respect to the
combination of references and improperly attacks the references individually
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instead of addressing the combination as a whole. The cited references must
be read, not in isolation, but for what each fairly teaches in combination with
the prior art as a whole. See In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed.
Cir. 1986) (one cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references
individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references).
Appellant’s arguments do not take into account what the combination of
Padro and Walker would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art—
The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a
secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the
structure of the primary reference. . . . Rather, the test is what
the combined teachings of the references would have suggested
to those of ordinary skill in the art.
In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981) (citations omitted).
Additionally, Appellant failed to file a Reply Brief addressing the
Examiner’s clarified findings and additional discussion (see Ans. 22–24) of
Padro and Walker, the disputed limitations of claim 1, or otherwise rebutting
the findings and responsive arguments made by the Examiner in the Answer.
Accordingly, we find a preponderance of the evidence supports the
Examiner’s findings and conclusions that the combination of Padro and
Walker (with Slavin) together teaches or at least suggests the disputed
features of claim 1. Thus, Appellant does not persuade us of error in the
Examiner’s obviousness rejection of representative claim 1. Dependent
claims 2–6 depend from and stand with claim 1. Therefore, we affirm the
Examiner’s obviousness rejection of representative claim 1 and claims 2–6
not separately argued with particularity (supra). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
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Obviousness Rejection of Claims 11–16
The Examiner rejects independent claim 11 and dependent claims 12–
16 over Padro and Walker. See Final Act. 13–17; Ans. 24–26. Appellant
contends Padro and Walker do not teach the disputed features of claim 11.
See Appeal Br. 10–13. We select independent claim 11 as representative of
Appellant’s arguments with respect to claims 11–16 (supra).
With respect to claim 11, Appellant contends Padro and Walker do
not teach the disputed features of claim 11. See Appeal Br. 10–13.
Specifically, Appellant contends that “claim 11 requires: (i) that the primary
content is played in a motion picture theater; and (ii) that the secondary
content comprises an alternative scene,” but Padro and Walker “fail to teach
or suggest such limitations” Appeal Br. 10. Appellant further contends that
neither Padro, nor Walker teach an alternate scene. See Appeal Br, 10–12.
Additionally, Appellant contends “Walker does not teach or suggest that the
secondary content comprises an alternative scene, where the storyline is
different, as recited in independent claim 11” because Walker merely
describes “alternative views of the same scene.” Appeal Br. 11; see Appeal
Br, 10–12.
We adopt as our own (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the
Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken (Final Act. 13–15)
and (2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer
(Ans. 24–26) in response to Appellant’s Appeal Brief. We concur with the
findings and conclusions reached by the Examiner, and we provide the
following analysis for emphasis.
Initially, we note that the disputed limitation—“sending the secondary
content [to] a user device[,] wherein the secondary content comprises an
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alternative scene” (Appeal Br. 19 (Claim App.) (claim 11))—merely
describes the information (secondary content) within the transmitted
information signals (i.e., sent to the user device). The particular content of
the transmitted information signals does not affect the underlying process
(e.g., the sending the content) recited in the claim. Therefore, the content of
the transmitted information signals is nonfunctional descriptive material that
does not distinguish the claim from the prior art in terms of patentability.
See In re Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004). See also Ex parte
Mathias, 84 USPQ2d 1276, 1279 (BPAI 2005) (informative), aff’d, 191 F.
App’x 959 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[N]onfunctional descriptive material cannot
lend patentability to an invention that would have otherwise been taught by
the prior art.”); Curry, 84 USPQ2d at 1274 (“Nonfunctional descriptive
material cannot render nonobvious an invention that would have otherwise
been obvious.”). We give no patentable weight to this nonfunctional
descriptive material similar to printed matter. As explained in In re Lowry,
we need not give patentable weight to descriptive material absent a new and
unobvious functional relationship between the descriptive material and the
substrate. See In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579, 1582–83 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(discussing In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 1983)); see also
King Pharm., Inc. v. Eon Labs, Inc., 616 F.3d 1267, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(“[T]he relevant question is whether ‘there exists any new and unobvious
functional relationship between the printed matter and the substrate.’”)
(citations omitted).
Equivalently, material is printed matter if it is “claimed for what it
communicates.” In re Distefano, 808 F.3d 845, 850 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The
disputed limitation of claim 11 (the secondary content sent to the user
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device) merely characterizes the specific content of the transmitted
information signals (the recited alternative scene). Thus, the disputed claim
limitation is directed to printed matter. See id. at 848 (A claim limitation is
directed to printed matter “if it claims the content of information.”).
If a claim in a patent application claims printed matter, “one must then
determine if the matter is functionally or structurally related to the associated
physical substrate, and only if the answer is ‘no’ is the printed matter owed
no patentable weight.” Distefano, 808 F.3d at 851. In the instant claim, the
claimed content (secondary content) of the transmitted information signals
(sent to the user device) is not specifically related to the structure of the
transmitted information signals, or explicitly used in the claim such as by the
user device to perform any function. Rather, the content of the information
signals is not functionally distinct from any other information that is
transmitted or received. Accordingly, we find the disputed claim limitations
constitute nonfunctional descriptive material and printed matter not
functionally related to the associated substrate, which are not entitled to
patentable weight. The content of the information signals in the present
claim is analogous to the data in Curry, where the type of data was found to
be nonfunctional descriptive material in that it “does not functionally change
either the data storage system or communication system used in the method
of [the] claim.” Ex parte Curry, 84 USPQ2d at 1274.
As recognized in Curry, “if the prior art suggests storing a song on a
disk, merely choosing a particular song to store on the disk would be
presumed to be well within the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time
the invention was made.” Ex parte Curry, 84 USPQ2d at 1275. The content
of the information signals (alternative scene) of the instant claim that is sent
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to the user device is no different, in that the content of the communication
does not explicitly alter the structure of the information signals, the
functionality of the recited process (sending the secondary content), or
functionality of the claimed user device. Because the content of the
information signals specified by the disputed limitations constitutes
nonfunctional descriptive material, the particular type of information
transmitted (i.e., the secondary content comprising an alternate scene)
recited in claim 11 is not entitled to patentable weight. Accordingly,
Appellant’s arguments are not commensurate in scope with claim 11. Claim
1 merely requires sending information or data to a user device.
Even if we give the disputed limitation (i.e., the secondary content
including an alternative scene) some patentable weight, Appellant’s
arguments are still not commensurate in scope with claim 11. Claim 11
recites that the secondary content comprises an alternative scene. Neither
Appellant’s claim, nor Appellant’s Specification define the meaning of an
alternative scene. See Spec. ¶ 25. We give claims their “broadest
reasonable interpretation” in light of the Specification, In re Morris, 127
F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citations omitted), without importing
limitations into the claims from the Specification, SuperGuide Corp. v.
DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Appellant’s
claim language does not require that an alternative scene provide a sequence
of events “where the storyline is different” as argued by Appellant. Appeal
Br. 11.
As explained by the Examiner, the combination of Padro and Walker
teaches or at least suggests the disputed limitations of claim 11—
“identifying secondary content that is related to the primary content,”
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sending the secondary content [to] a user device,” and that “the secondary
content comprises an alternative scene” (Appeal Br. 19 (Claim App.) (claim
11)). See Final Act. 13–15; Ans. 24–26. Specifically, the Examiner
explains that Walker describes “alternative view content” where scenes “are
provided from different angles than what is shown in the primary view,” as
well as “green screen footage showing the scene before special effects are
added.” Final Act. 15; see Final Act. 14–15; Ans. 24–26. In the context of
claim 11 (and Appellant’s Specification) (supra), a “scene” is merely a
sequence within a motion picture. Walker at least suggests an alternative
sequence (supra)—either the identical sequence of events viewed from a
different angle (an alternate view scene) or a different version of the
sequence (without visual effects).
Accordingly, we find a preponderance of the evidence supports the
Examiner’s findings and conclusions that the combination of Padro and
Walker teaches or at least suggests the disputed features of claim 11.
Appellant does not persuade us of error in the Examiner’s obviousness
rejection of these claim representative claim 11. Dependent claims 12–16
depend from and stand with claim 1. Therefore, we affirm the Examiner’s
obviousness rejection of representative claim 11 and claims 12–16 not
separately argued with particularity (supra). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Obviousness Rejection of Claims 30–34 and 44
The Examiner rejects independent claim 30 and dependent claims 31–
34 and 44 over Padro and Rosenblatt. See Final Act. 17–21; Ans. 26–27.
Appellant contends Padro and Rosenblatt do not teach the disputed features
of claim 30. See Appeal Br. 13–15. We select independent claim 30 as
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representative of Appellant’s arguments with respect to claims 30–34 and 44
(supra).
Appellant contends Padro and Rosenblatt do not teach the disputed
features of claim 11. See Appeal Br. 13–15. Specifically, Appellant
contends that “Rosenblatt does not teach or suggest secondary content
comprising an offer to purchase other movies,” but instead, “Rosenblatt
discloses . . . purchas[ing] the soundtrack,” which is “not a movie,” or
purchasing “‘the movie upon its release’ (i.e., ‘the’ same movie as opposed
to an ‘other’ movie).” Appeal Br. 13; see Appeal Br. 13–14.
We adopt as our own (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the
Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken (Final Act. 17–21)
and (2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer
(Ans. 26–27) in response to Appellant’s Appeal Brief. We concur with the
findings and conclusions reached by the Examiner, and we provide the
following analysis for emphasis.
As explained by the Examiner, Rosenblatt teaches or at least suggests
the disputed limitations of claim 30—“after the motion picture theater
finishes playing the first movie, sending secondary content to the user device
based on the requested alternate audio track, wherein the secondary content
comprises an offer to purchase other movies” (Appeal Br. 20 (Claim App.)
(claim 30)). See Final Act. 17–21; Ans. 26–27 (citing Rosenblatt ¶¶ 380,
381, 384). Rosenblatt explicitly describes an electronic device alerting the
user that the user may “purchase the soundtrack” “and various exclusive
content, such as a ‘Making Of’ video,” “or upcoming movie trailers,” as well
as “the movie upon its release . . . to the general public.” Rosenblatt ¶¶ 380,
381.
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Neither Appellant’s claim nor Appellant’s Specification preclude the
broadest reasonable interpretation of “other movies” (“i.e., other audio-
visual content”) from reading on Rosenblatt’s disclosure of a “Making Of”
video or trailers for upcoming movies. Rosenblatt ¶ 380; see Appeal Br. 13–
14. We agree with the Examiner that Rosenblatt at least suggests providing
an offer to purchase other movies in light of Rosenblatt’s explicit teachings
of offering for purchase (or reserving) a copy of a movie (for which a ticket
was purchased) and offering for purchase movie trailers or a “Making Of”
video.
Further, as with claims 1 and 11 (supra), Appellant did not address the
Examiner’s clarified findings and additional discussion (see Ans. 26–27) of
Padro and Rosenblatt, the disputed limitations of claim 30, or otherwise
rebut the findings and responsive arguments made by the Examiner in the
Answer because Appellant did not file a Reply Brief.
Accordingly, we find a preponderance of the evidence supports the
Examiner’s findings and conclusions that the combination of Padro and
Rosenblatt teaches or at least suggests the disputed features of claim 30.
Thus, Appellant does not persuade us of error in the Examiner’s obviousness
rejection of representative claim 30. Dependent claims 31–34 and 44
depend from and stand with claim 30. Therefore, we affirm the Examiner’s
obviousness rejection of representative claim 30 and claims 31–34 and 44
not separately argued with particularity (supra). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Obviousness Rejection of Claims 7–10, 17–20, 35–37, 45, and 46
The Examiner rejects claims 7–10 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Padro, Walker, Slavin, and Capretta. See Final Act. 11–
Appeal 2019-005482
Application 13/844,038

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13. The Examiner also rejects claims 17–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Padro, Walker, Mcbride, and Capretta. See Final
Act. 21–23. Further, the Examiner rejects claims 35–37 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Padro, Rosenblatt, and Capretta. See
Final Act. 23. Also, the Examiner rejects claim 45 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Padro, Rosenblatt, and Johnson. See Final Act.
23–24. Additionally, the Examiner rejects claim 46 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Padro, Rosenblatt, and Ramaswamy.
See Final Act. 24–25.
Appellant does not separately argue dependent claims 7–10, 17–20,
35–37, 45, and 46. See Appeal Br. 7–15. For the same reasons as claims 1,
11, and 30 (supra), from which claims 7–10, 17–20, 35–37, 45, and 46
depend, Appellant does not persuade us of error in the Examiner’s
obviousness rejections of dependent claims 7–10, 17–20, 35–37, 45, and 46,
not separately argued with particularity. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Therefore, we affirm the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claims 7–10,
17–20, 35–37, 45, and 46.
CONCLUSION
Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims
1–20, 30−37, and 44−46 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). We, therefore, sustain
the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–20, 30−37, and 44−46.
Appeal 2019-005482
Application 13/844,038

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DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1-6 103(a) Padro, Walker,
Slavin
1-6
7-10 103(a) Padro, Walker,
Slavin, Capretta
7-10
11-16 103(a) Padro, Walker 11-16
17-20 103(a) Padro, Walker,
Mcbride, Capretta
17-20
30-34, 44 103(a) Padro, Rosenblatt 30-34, 44
35-37 103(a) Padro, Rosenblatt,
Capretta
35-37
45 103(a) Padro, Rosenblatt,
Johnson
45
46 103(a) Padro, Rosenblatt,
Ramaswamy
46
Overall
Outcome
1-20, 30-
37, 44-46

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED