Charles W. Wilson, Complainant,v.Elaine Chao, Secretary, Department of Labor, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionDec 9, 2002
01A14707 (E.E.O.C. Dec. 9, 2002)

01A14707

12-09-2002

Charles W. Wilson, Complainant, v. Elaine Chao, Secretary, Department of Labor, Agency.


Charles W. Wilson v. Department of Labor

01A14707

December 9, 2002

.

Charles W. Wilson,

Complainant,

v.

Elaine Chao,

Secretary,

Department of Labor,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A14707

Agency No. 9-05-003

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision

(FAD) concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in

violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation

Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. The appeal is accepted

pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the following reasons, the

Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final decision.

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was employed

as an Industrial Hygienist, GS-12 at the agency's Chicago North Office,

OSHA, Region 5, Des Plaines, Illinois facility. Complainant sought EEO

counseling and subsequently filed a formal complaint on October 3, 1998,

alleging that he was discriminated against on the basis of disability

(renal failure) when: (1) the agency forced him to take a disability

retirement, effective June 6, 1998, by harassment and threats of AWOL

status; and (2) he was denied a reasonable accommodation to continue work.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was informed of

his right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge

or alternatively, to receive a final decision by the agency. When

complainant failed to respond within the time period specified in 29

C.F.R. � 1614.108(f), the agency issued a final decision.

Background

The preponderance of the record supports the following facts: During

the spring of 1997, complainant met with his supervisor (S1) and his

second-line supervisor (S2) and informed them that he was undergoing

peritoneal dialysis. Complainant told his supervisors that he needed

to perform his dialysis during his 30-minute lunch break but that the

process would take longer than 30-minutes. His supervisors approved 75

minutes without requiring complainant to take any leave and asked that

he let S1 know if he needed more time. Complainant did not request any

additional time.

On September 5, 1997, complainant had been approved for Leave without Pay

(LWOP) which was requested to allow him to recover from a severe infection

that he developed from renal failure. On October 27, 1997, complainant

requested 12 weeks of unpaid leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act

(FMLA). Although the medical documentation that complainant submitted

was missing information regarding complainant's medical condition, such

as the onset of his illness and estimated period of his incapacitation,

complainant's supervisors, nevertheless, approved complainant's request.

The 12-week period of FMLA leave ran between October 6, 1997 and December

26, 1997. Complainant was informed that he was expected to return

to work on December 29, 1997. On the morning of December 29, 1997,

complainant called S2 and informed her that he would not be in that day

and would be off from work for another 3-4 weeks due to the fact that

he had switched from peritoneal dialysis to hemodialysis. S2 placed

complainant on Absent without Leave (AWOL) status pending receipt of

proper medical documentation. Later that day, complainant's physician

provided medical documentation to S2 indicating that complainant may be

able to return to work on January 26, 1998, however he recommended that

upon complainant's return, he should only work three days per week.

Complainant's physician did not specify a medical reason why this

part-time work schedule was recommended, nor did he state how long he

was recommending complainant to stay on this schedule. S2 approved

additional leave up to January 23, 1998. However, on January 16,

1998, S2 sent a memorandum to complainant advising him that if he or

his physician believed that his particular medical condition would

qualify him as a qualified individual with a disability entitled to a

reasonable accommodation, that complainant needed to formally make a

request for a reasonable accommodation. Along with this memorandum,

S2 sent complainant the medical requirements of his position and a

position description. S2 asked complainant to get his physician to

respond to questions listed in the �standard for medical documentation�

she provided. S2 also informed complainant that upon receipt of the

requested information, she would then render a decision as to whether

or not an accommodation was possible. Thereafter, S2 never received a

written or oral request for a reasonable accommodation.

On January 26, 1998, complainant called S1 to inform her that he was still

in the hospital and could not return to work. Since complainant had yet

to send in the requested medical documentation, S2 called complainant at

the hospital to obtain additional information. The hospital informed

S2 that complainant was discharged. S2 then called complainant at

home and left a message for him to call her back. Approximately, one

hour later, S2 received a fax from complainant's physician indicating

that complainant had been discharged from the hospital on January 21,

1998 and that he would probably return to work on February 9, 1998.

S2 again called complainant at home and left a message asking him to

call her back. Complainant never returned S2's phone call.

Complainant was advised that he was placed on AWOL on January 26, 1998

and would remain on AWOL until he returned to work. On February 12,

1998, complainant called the office and informed S1 and S2 that he had

fluid build-up around the heart, problems with dialysis, and would have

to be on antibiotics for the next six months, which left him exhausted

and unable to work. Complainant also explained that he had met with his

physician and after discussing his condition with his doctor, complainant

decided not to return to work and to file for disability retirement.

Final Agency Decision

In its FAD, the agency concluded that it accommodated complainant's

numerous requests for leave from October, 1997 through January, 1998,

despite complainant's failure to provide adequate medical documentation.

In January, 1998, complainant was advised by management that if he

believed that he was an individual with a disability and needed additional

leave or other accommodations, he would be required to provide medical

documentation requesting the specific type of accommodation needed and

the medical basis for such request. The agency concluded that since

complainant failed to request a reasonable accommodation, he was not

denied a reasonable accommodation. In addition, the agency concluded

that complainant failed to prove that he was subjected to a hostile work

environment or was forced into retiring on disability.

Complainant presents no arguments on appeal.

Analysis and Findings

Issue 1 - Harassment and Constructive Discharge Claim

With respect to complainant's harassment and constructive discharge

claims, we note that harassment is actionable only if the harassment

to which the complainant has been subjected was sufficiently severe

or pervasive to alter the conditions of the complainant's employment.

Cobb v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC Request No. 05970077 (Mar. 13,

1997).

In order to prove disability-based harassment, complainant must prove:

(1) that he is a member of a statutorily protected class; (2) that he was

subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) that the harassment complained of

was based on his disability; (4) the harassment had the purpose or effect

of unreasonably interfering with his work performance and/or creating

an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) there

is a basis for imputing liability to the employer. Flowers v. Southern

Reg'l Med. Servs., Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 235-36 (2001).

In order to prove constructive discharge complainant must prove that:

1) a reasonable person in complainant's position would have found the

working conditions intolerable; 2) the conduct causing the intolerable

working conditions is an EEO violation; and 3) complainant's resignation

was caused by the intolerable working conditions. Taylor v. Army &

Air Force Exchange Service, EEOC Request No. 05900630 (July 20, 1990);

Perricone v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05900135

(June 11, 1990).

Assuming that complainant is an qualified individual with a disability,

we find that complainant has failed to prove, by a preponderance of

the evidence, that he was subjected to a hostile work environment

that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of

his employment. In fact, the evidence establishes that management was

extremely accommodating. Likewise, we do not see any evidence in the

record to suggest that a reasonable person would have found the working

conditions intolerable or that complainant's decision to retire was

caused by any intolerable working conditions. Accordingly, we find

that complaint failed to meet his burden in proving a violation of the

Rehabilitation Act with respect to issue 1.

Issue 2 - Reasonable Accommodation Claim

Under the Rehabilitation Act, an agency is required to reasonably

accommodate the known physical and mental limitations of a qualified

individual with a disability unless the agency can show that accommodation

would cause an undue hardship. See 29 C.F.R. � 1630 et.seq. To establish

a case of discrimination based on a failure to accommodate a disability,

complainant must show: (1) that he is an "individual with a disability"

and (2) that he is a "qualified individual with a disability," in that he

is qualified for and can perform the essential elements of the position

held or desired with or without reasonable accommodation. Cansino

v. Department of the Army, EEOC Request No. 05960674 (Aug. 27, 1998)

(citing Prewitt v. United States Postal Service, 662 F.2d 292 (5th

Cir. 1981)). An "individual with a disability" is one who: 1) has a

physical or mental impairment that substantially limits or restricts

one or more of his or her major life activities; 2) has a record of

such impairment; or (3) is regarded as having the impairment. See 29

C.F.R. � 1630.2(g). Major life activities include functions such as

self care, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,

breathing, learning, and working. See 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(i).

Assuming, arguendo, that complainant is an individual with a disability,

pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act, we find that he failed to request a

reasonable accommodation or present sufficient evidence that his medical

limitations required a specific accommodation from the agency. The record

in this case establishes that complainant was reasonably accommodated

from the spring of 1997 through January 26, 1998. Complainant was

placed on AWOL from January 26, 1998 through February 12, 1998,<1>

despite requesting leave from his supervisors. The record indicates

that while complainant requested leave, he failed to provide medical

documentation linking his request for leave to a particular medical

condition.<2> Since the request for leave was not obviously linked to

any particular medical condition, it was permissible for the agency to

seek clarifying medical documentation. Moreover, because complainant

failed to respond to the agency's request for such medical documentation,

complainant was not entitled to a reasonable accommodation. See EEOC's

Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship under

the Americans with Disabilities Act, pp. 12-15 (revised October 17, 2002).

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's

contentions on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence

not specifically addressed in this decision, we affirm the FAD.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

December 9, 2002

__________________

Date

1 On February 12, 1998, complainant informed

management that he was unable to work and decided not work but to file

for disability retirement.

2 We find that the record is unclear as to whether complainant is

asserting that the agency failed to approve leave as a reasonable

accommodation or that the agency failed to allow complainant to

continue to work. To the extent that complainant is asserting that he

was not allowed to work, we conclude that the record does not support

the finding that complainant adequately expressed his desire to work.

Accordingly, we find that complainant was not denied such a request.

Moreover, to the extent that complainant argues that he was coerced or

harassed into retiring, as stated above, we find that the preponderance

of the evidence does not support such conclusion.