Charles N. Wickliffe, Complainant,v.R. James Nicholson, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionDec 1, 2005
01a51027 (E.E.O.C. Dec. 1, 2005)

01a51027

12-01-2005

Charles N. Wickliffe, Complainant, v. R. James Nicholson, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.


Charles N. Wickliffe v. Department of Veterans Affairs

01A51027

December 1, 2005

.

Charles N. Wickliffe,

Complainant,

v.

R. James Nicholson,

Secretary,

Department of Veterans Affairs,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A51027

Agency No. 200P2881; 200P0691-2002-100355

Hearing No. 340-2002-03702X

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final order

concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The appeal

is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the following reasons,

the Commission affirms the agency's final order.

ISSUE PRESENTED

Whether the Administrative Judge's decision to grant the agency summary

judgment was correct.

Background

The record reveals that complainant, a Recreation Therapist at the

agency's Greater Los Angeles Healthcare Service facility, filed formal

EEO complaints on May 16, 2001, and on November 21, 2001. He alleged

that the agency retaliated against him for his EEO activity when he was

subjected to harassment and a hostile work environment. Specifically,

he alleged that eight incidents occurred between 1997 and September 2001

which consisted of the following:

1) there was a change in the policy governing �use or lose� leave; 2)

complainant was temporarily reassigned to the Sepulveda Ambulatory Care

Center; 3) complainant was given a letter of counseling in April 2001

after an altercation with his supervisor (S); 4) complainant's second

level supervisor did not read a letter of appreciation for complainant's

work at an employees' meeting; 5) S required complainant to revise

a holiday funding request; 6) complainant was not given an option to

respond to a co-worker's accusation of fraud; 7) complainant was required

to check leave already approved; 8) complainant's co-workers were allowed

to leave a meeting during his presentation.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a copy

of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC

Administrative Judge (AJ). The AJ issued a decision without a hearing,

finding no discrimination.<1>

The AJ concluded that complainant failed to establish a prima facie case

of discrimination because the incidents alleged were not sufficiently

severe or pervasive such that they altered complainant's terms and

conditions of employment. She also concluded that even when viewing

the facts in the light most favorable to complainant, he failed to

demonstrate the agency's actions were taken in retaliation for his

protected activity. Specifically, complainant acknowledged that he did

not have a good working relationship with S and his second and third

level supervisors even before he filed an EEO complaint. Moreover, some

of the incidents in question occurred before he engaged in any protected

activity. An example of this was the policy related to the use of �use

or lose� leave during the holiday period which was in effect in 1997.

A decision was made to change the policy in 1997 before complainant's

first EEO activity occurred in March 2000.

Finally, the AJ found there was no genuine issue of material fact

that the agency had legitimate reasons for the actions that it took.

For instance, complainant did not dispute that he had an altercation

with S concerning the use of a popcorn machine before the decision was

made to temporarily detail him to another office. This altercation also

prompted the issuance of a letter of reprimand. Complainant also did

not dispute that he expressed he did not want to work with S anymore as

a result of the incident and that he did not want to have anymore �one

on one� interactions with S which led to his temporary reassignment.

Based on these conclusions, the AJ found that the record did not

establish by a preponderance of the evidence that discrimination occurred.

The agency's final order implemented the AJ's decision.

Complainant makes no new contentions on appeal, and the agency requests

that we affirm its final order.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

We first set forth the law regarding harassment under Title VII and

the standard of review on appeal of an AJ's grant of summary judgment.

The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a

hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material

fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the

summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment

is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive legal

and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine

issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

255 (1986). An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that

a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital

Equip. Corp., 846 F.2D 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"

if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case.

When considering granting summary judgment, the trier of fact must believe

the evidence of the non-moving party and all justifiable inferences must

be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Id. at 255. In the context

of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider summary

judgment only upon a determination that the record has been adequately

developed for summary disposition. Petty v. Department of Defense,

EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003).

Turning to the law as it relates to claims of harassment, harassment of

an employee that would not occur but for the employee's race, color, sex,

national origin, age, disability, religion or retaliation is unlawful,

if it is sufficiently patterned or pervasive. McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d

1129, 1138-1139 (D.C. Cir. 1985). A single incident or group of isolated

incidents will not be regarded as discriminatory harassment unless the

conduct is severe. Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1358 (11th

Cir. 1982). Whether the harassment is sufficiently severe to trigger

a violation of Title VII must be determined by looking at all of the

circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct,

its severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating,

or a mere offensive utterance, and whether it unreasonably interferes

with an employee's work performance. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,

510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).

Harassment is actionable only if the incidents to which complainant

has been subjected were "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the

conditions of [complainant's] employment and create an abusive working

environment." Id; see also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,

23 U.S. 75 (1998); Cobb v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC Request

No. 05970077 (March 13, 1997).

To establish a prima facie case of harassment, complainant must show that:

(1) he is a member of a statutorily protected class and/or was engaged in

prior EEO activity; (2) he was subjected to unwelcome verbal or physical

conduct related to his membership in that class and/or his prior EEO

activity; (3) the harassment complained of was based on his membership

in that class and/or his prior EEO activity; (4) the harassment had the

purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with his work performance

and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment;

and (5) there is a basis for imputing liability to the employer.

See Roberts v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Appeal No. 01970727

(Sept. 15, 2000) (citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th

Cir. 1982)).

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that grant

of summary judgment was appropriate, as there are no genuine disputes

of material fact. We find that the AJ's decision was correct that

the incidents alleged, even when viewed in the light most favorable to

complainant, were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile

work environment. Further, we conclude that even though the record was

adequately developed, the evidence did not sufficiently reflect that

the actions at issue were based on complainant's protected activity.

Therefore, there was no genuine dispute that the agency's actions were

based on legitimate reasons. Based on these conclusions, the Commission

finds that summary judgment was appropriate in this case.

For these reasons, we affirm the agency's final decision which fully

implemented the AJ's grant of summary judgment in favor of the agency.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

December 1, 2005

__________________

Date

1 Complainant's appeal does not specifically

challenge the AJ's issuance of a sanction for complainant's failure to

timely file his pre-hearing statement, therefore, this decision will

not address the propriety of the AJ's order in this respect.