CFPH, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

May 11, 2020

2019003569 (P.T.A.B. May. 11, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/025,236 09/12/2013 Lee Amaitis 13-2396 4706
63710 7590 05/11/2020
INNOVATION DIVISION
CANTOR FITZGERALD, L.P.
110 EAST 59TH STREET (6TH FLOOR)
NEW YORK, NY 10022
EXAMINER
CLARKE JR, ROBERT T
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3715
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/11/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
lkorovich@cantor.com
patentdocketing@cantor.com
phowe@cantor.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte LEE AMAITIS and ANDREW GARROOD

Appeal 2019-003569
Application 14/025,236
Technology Center 3700
____________

Before MICHAEL C. ASTORINO, BRADLEY B. BAYAT, and
ROBERT J. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges.

ASTORINO, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), the Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–34. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. The Appellant identifies the real party in interest as
CFPH, LLC. Appeal Br. 3.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Subject Matter on Appeal
The Appellant’s “disclosure generally relates to wagering.” Spec. ¶ 1.
More specifically, the disclosure relates “to improv[ing] profits while
maintaining current bettors’ interest and attracting new bettors” by offering
for purchase “[a]n option to cancel the wager in exchange for a refund
amount.” Id. ¶¶ 2–3.
Claims 1, 16, 26, and 31 are the independent claims on appeal.
Claim 1, reproduced below with added emphasis and bracketed notations, is
illustrative of the claimed subject matter.
1. A method comprising:
[(a)] receiving, by at least one processor of a server in
networked communication with a plurality of user computing
elements, from a remote device of a user a request to place a
wager on an event;
[(b)] determining, by the at least one processor, a fee for
each of a plurality of different exercise times, in which the
determined fee is different for each exercise time, and in which
the act of determining a fee for each of the plurality of exercise
times comprises determining a first fee for a first exercise time
and a second fee for a second exercise time;
[(c)] presenting, by the at least one processor, for
purchase to the user an option to cancel the wager in exchange
for a refund amount,
[(c1)] wherein presenting the option includes
presenting for selection by the user at least the first
exercise time and the second exercise time that is one of
before and after the first exercise time, the first exercise
time having the first fee associated therewith and the
second exercise time having the second fee associated
therewith different from the first fee,
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[(c2)] wherein selection of the first exercise time
allows the user to cancel the wager at least prior to the
first exercise time in exchange for the refund amount,
[(c3)] wherein selection of the second exercise
time allows the user to cancel the wager at least prior to
the second exercise time in exchange for the refund
amount, and
[(c4)] wherein the act of presenting to the user the
option to cancel comprises causing to be displayed on an
interface screen of an electronic display of the remote
device a selectable indicia corresponding to a request to
purchase the option;
[(d)] after causing the selectable indicia to be displayed
on the interface screen, receiving, by the at least one processor,
an indication that the user is purchasing the option, including
receiving a selection by the user of the first exercise time, in
which the act of receiving the indication that the user is
purchasing the option comprises receiving from the remote
device an electronic message indicating that the selectable
indicia was selected;
[(e)] recording, by the at least one processor, information
indicating that the user has paid for the option, wherein a price
of the option is determined based on the first fee associated
with the first exercise time selected by the user;
[(f)] at least prior to the selected exercise time, receiving,
by the at least one processor, data indicating that the user is
exercising the option; and
[(g)] responsive to the user exercising the option,
cancelling, by the at least one processor, the wager in exchange
for the refund amount.

Rejections
Claims 1–34 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed
invention is directed to a judicial exception without significantly more.
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Claims 1, 2, 7, and 15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Brook et al. (US 8,475,267 B1, iss. July 2, 2013)
(“Brook”) and Jean Folger, Options Pricing: Intrinsic Value and Time
Value, https://web.archive.org/web/20121108022412/http://
www.investopedia.com/university/options-pricing/intrinsic-value-time-
value.asp (retrieved June 4, 2015) (“Folger I”).
Claims 3–5 and 11–14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Brook, Folger I, and Jean Folger, Options Pricing:
Factors That Influence Option Price, https://web.archive.org/web/
20121108022531/http://www.investopedia.com/university/options-
pricing/option-price-influence.asp (retrieved June 4, 2015) (“Folger II”).
Claim 6 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Brook,
Folger I, Folger II, and Silvestro (US 2009/0069075 A1, pub. Mar. 12, 2009)
(“Silvestro”).
Claim 8 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Brook,
Folger I, and Greiner et al. (US 2006/0247022 A1, pub. Nov. 2, 2006)
(“Greiner”).
Claim 9 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Brook,
Folger I, and Walker et al. (US 2008/0039189 A1, pub. Feb. 14, 2008)
(“Walker”).
Claim 10 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Brook, Folger I, and Silvestro.
Claims 16, 17, 22, and 24–29 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Brook.
Claims 18–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Brook and Folger II.
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Claim 21 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Brook, Folger II, and Silvestro.
Claims 23, 30–32, and 34 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Brook and Silvestro.2
Claim 33 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Brook, Silvestro, and Kelly et al. (US 2009/0115133 A1, pub. May 7, 2009)
(“Kelly”).

ANALYSIS
Patent-Ineligible Subject Matter
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, an invention is patent eligible if it claims a
“new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”
35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court, however, has long interpreted § 101
to include an implicit exception: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S.
208, 216 (2014).
The Supreme Court, in Alice, reiterated the two-step framework
previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), “for distinguishing patents that claim
laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim
patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217.

2 The statement for this ground of rejection includes claim 33. Final Act. 43.
Claim 33, however, was not included in the body of the rejection. Id. at 43–
47. Claim 33 was rejected under a separate ground of rejection. Id. at 47–
48. Accordingly, we do not understand the Examiner to have rejected
claim 33 under this ground of rejection. We understand the foregoing as a
minor oversight.
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The first step in that analysis is to “determine whether the claims at issue are
directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Id. If the claims are not
directed to a patent-ineligible concept, e.g., an abstract idea, the inquiry
ends. Otherwise, the inquiry proceeds to the second step where the elements
of the claims are considered “individually and ‘as an ordered combination’”
to determine whether there are additional elements that “‘transform the
nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. (quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78, 79). This is “a search for an ‘inventive concept’ —
i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that
the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the
[ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. at 217–18 (alteration in original).
In rejecting the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and under the
first step of the Alice framework, the Examiner determined that the claims
“recite a series of steps for placing a wager on an event and presenting an
option for a user to purchase, wherein the option is used for cancelling the
wager in exchange for a refund amount.” Final Act. 3; see id. at 5, 7, 9.
According to the Examiner, this concept is similar to other concepts that
have been identified by the courts to be an abstract idea, such as organizing
human activity, managing risk (hedging), and conducting a wagering game.
Id. at 4 (citing Alice Corp., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010), In re
Smith, 815 F.3d 816 (Fed. Cir. 2016), and Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom
S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
The Appellant argues claims 1–34 as a group. See Appeal Br. 12–15.
We select independent claim 1 as representative for the group. Pursuant to
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) claims 2–34 stand or fall with claim 1.
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After the Appellant’s brief was filed, the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (the “USPTO”) published revised guidance for use by USPTO
personnel in evaluating subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50
(Jan. 7, 2019) (the “2019 Revised Guidance”). The 2019 Revised Guidance
revised the USPTO’s examination procedure with respect to the first step of
the Alice framework by (1) “[p]roviding groupings of subject matter that
[are] considered an abstract idea”; and (2) clarifying that a claim is not
“directed to” a judicial exception if the judicial exception is integrated into a
practical application of that exception. Id. at 50. The 2019 Revised
Guidance, by its terms, applies to all applications, and to all patents resulting
from applications, filed before, on, or after January 7, 2019. Id.3
The Examiner’s Answer was mailed and the Appellant’s Reply Brief
was filed after publication of the 2019 Revised Guidance. The Appellant
argues that the Examiner misapplied the 2019 Revised Guidance. Reply
Br. 2.

3 The 2019 Revised Guidance supersedes MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) § 2106.04(II) and also supersedes all versions of the
USPTO’s “Eligibility Quick Reference Sheet Identifying Abstract Ideas.”
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51 (“Eligibility-related
guidance issued prior to the Ninth Edition, R-08.2017, of the MPEP
(published Jan. 2018) should not be relied upon.”). Accordingly, the
Appellant’s arguments challenging the sufficiency of the Examiner’s
rejection will not be addressed to the extent those arguments are based on
currently superseded USPTO guidance.
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Step One of the Alice Framework (2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2A)
The first step in the Alice framework, as mentioned above, is to
determine whether the claims at issue are “directed to” a patent-ineligible
concept, e.g., an abstract idea. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217. This first step,
as set forth in the 2019 Revised Guidance (i.e., Step 2A), is a two-prong test;
in Step 2A, Prong One, we look to whether the claim recites a judicial
exception, e.g., one of the following three groupings of abstract ideas:
(1) mathematical concepts; (2) certain methods of organizing human
activity, e.g., fundamental economic principles or practices, commercial or
legal interactions; and (3) mental processes. 2019 Revised Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 54. If so, we next consider whether the claim includes
additional elements, beyond the judicial exception, that “integrate the
[judicial] exception into a practical application,” i.e., that apply, rely on, or
use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the
judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed
to monopolize the judicial exception (“Step 2A, Prong Two”). Id. at 54–55.
Only if the claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate
that exception into a practical application do we conclude that the claim is
“directed to” the judicial exception, e.g., an abstract idea.
The Federal Circuit has explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry
applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the specification,
based on whether ‘their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject
matter.’” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d
1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether the focus of the claims is on a
specific improvement in relevant technology or on a process that itself
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qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a
tool. See id. at 1335–36. Here, it is clear from the Specification (including
the claim language) that the focus of the claim is on an abstract idea.
The Specification is entitled “WAGER SELL BACK OPTION.”
Spec. ¶ 1. The Specification in the Abstract section describes the invention
as:
A user may purchase an option to cancel a wager in exchange
for a refund amount. In purchasing the option, the user may
select an exercise time from a plurality of exercise times, each
exercise time having an associated price, which price may be
the price of the option. The refund amount associated with each
exercise time may be the same amount. Responsive to a user
exercising a purchased option, a determination may be made as
to whether the time of exercise is at least prior to the selected
exercise time. If so, the wager may be canceled in exchange for
the refund amount.
The Appellant’s invention is intended to improve profits for a sports
book, i.e., an entity that accepts bets or places wagers for bettors on the
general outcome of events, whose role is to act as a market maker for sports
wagers, while maintaining current bettors’ interest and attracting new bettors
by offering to a bettor an option to cancel the wager in exchange for a refund
amount. See id. ¶ 2 (“The sports book accepts wagers placed on either team
or competitor, and maintains a point spread which aims to ensure a profit
(i.e., the vigorish) for the sports book regardless of the outcome of the wager
by attempting to attract an equal dollar amount of wagers for each team or
competitor of a particular event.”); see also id. ¶¶ 3, 26.
An examination of claim 1 shows that the claim recites: (a) receiving
from a user a request to place a wager; (b) determining different fees for
different exercise times; (c) presenting for purchase to the user an option to
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cancel (i.e., sell back) the wager based on the selection of the determined
fees and exercise times, including causing to be displayed selectable indicia
corresponding to a purchase request for the option; and then, (d) receiving a
user purchase request in which a first exercise time was selected from the
selectable indicia; (e) recording information of user payment for the
determined fee for the selected first exercise time; (f) at least prior to the
selected exercise time, receiving data indicating that the user is exercising
the option; and (g) cancelling the wager to payout a refund. See Spec. ¶¶ 1–
2, 54, 99–125, Figs. 9–10.
When considered collectively and under the broadest reasonable
interpretation of the claim’s limitations, claim 1 recites a method for
improving a sports book’s profits while maintaining current bettors’ interest
and attracting new bettors by receiving a wager, pricing fees for exercise
times for an option, presenting the option for purchase, receiving a purchase
request for the option, recording payment information for the option,
exercising the option prior to its expiration, and cancelling the wager in
exchange for a refund, which is similar to the concepts of hedging,
mitigating risk, marketing, and/or sales activities, and, thus, recites an
abstract idea. Under the 2019 Revised Guidance, the limitations of claim 1
fall under the certain methods of organizing human activity grouping, which
includes fundamental economic principles or practices and/or commercial or
legal interactions. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
Together, such methods of organizing human activity have been determined
to be abstract ideas. See Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 219–20 (“intermediated
settlement” is a fundamental economic practice, and, thus, an abstract idea);
Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611 (“hedging” is a fundamental economic practice,
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which is an abstract idea); In re Smith, 815 F.3d at 819 (“Applicants’
claimed ‘method of conducting a wagering game’ is drawn to an abstract
idea much like Alice’s method of exchanging financial obligations and
Bilski’s method of hedging risk.”); OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
788 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (concluding that claimed concept of
“offer-based price optimization” is an abstract idea); Versata Dev. Grp., Inc.
v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (determining a price
using organizational and group hierarchies).
Having concluded that claim 1 recites a judicial exception, i.e., an
abstract idea (Step 2A, Prong One), we next consider whether the claim
recites additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (Step 2A, Prong Two). 2019 Revised Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 51. When a claim recites a judicial exception and fails to
integrate the exception into a practical application, the claim is “directed to”
the judicial exception. Id. Claim 1 may integrate the judicial exception
when, for example, it reflects an improvement to technology or a technical
field. Id. at 55.
The additional elements recited in claim 1 supra are italicized. These
additional elements are “at least one processor of a server in networked
communication with a plurality of user computing elements,” such as a
“central processing units (CPUs),” and “a remote device” having “an
electronic display” with an “interface screen,” such as “Web enabled cellular
phones (e.g., iPHONE.RTM.),” which are disclosed in the Specification at a
high degree of generality, i.e., as generic computer components. See, e.g.,
Spec. ¶¶ 25–29, 32, 33, 37–38, 44–47, 53–54, 147–148. The Specification
describes that the devices and processes particularly to the embodiments of
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the Appellant’s invention “can be implemented, individually and/or
collectively, by a wide range of hardware [(e.g., standard integrated circuits,
microcontrollers, microprocessors)], software, firmware, or virtually any
combination thereof,” and “that designing the circuitry and/or writing the
code for the software and or firmware would be well within the skill of one
of ordinary skill in the art in light of this disclosure.” Id. ¶ 147; see also
Ans. 16 (explaining that the processor, computers, electronic
communications network, and remote device with the electronic display
having an interface screen are “general computer elements”).
In this case, claim 1 recites that the “at least one processor of a server
in networked communication with a plurality of user computing elements”
performs steps (a)–(g), i.e., receiving, determining, presenting, recording,
and cancelling. The way the “at least one processor” performs the functions
set forth in steps (a)–(g) is part of the abstract idea. See BSG Tech LLC v.
BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“It has been clear
since Alice that a claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which
it is directed cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the invention
‘significantly more’ than that ineligible concept.”). As for “a remote device”
having “an electronic display” with an “interface screen,” referenced in
claim 1’s steps (a), (c4), and (d), the “remote device” has the ability to
transmit and display data, such as data that concerns a request to place a
wager, a wager sell back option, selectable indicia, and an electronic
message. Similar to the “at least one processor,” the functions performed by
the “remote device” in steps (a), (c4), and (d) are also part of the abstract
idea. See id. In this case, the additional elements in independent claim 1 do
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not, individually, integrate the recited abstract idea into a practical
application.
The 2019 Revised Guidance requires us to also look at independent
claim 1 as a whole in our evaluation of whether the abstract idea has been
integrated into a practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 54. Even when additional elements are not enough on their own to
meaningfully limit an exception, the claimed combination of these additional
elements may still provide the practical application. Id. Indeed, the Federal
Circuit has held that it is possible for “an inventive concept” to reside in “the
non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional
pieces,” such as “a set of generic computer components.” BASCOM Glob.
Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1350
(Fed. Cir. 2016).
Although independent claim 1 calls for an “at least one processor of a
server in networked communication with a plurality of user computing
elements,” and “a remote device” having “an electronic display” with
“interface screen,” the steps performed by the “at least one processor,” and
its interactions with the “remote device,” are generic. See Spec. ¶¶ 25–29,
32, 33, 37–38, 44–47, 53–54, 147–148; DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com,
L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[A]fter Alice, there can remain
no doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations does not make an
otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible.”).
Consequently, under Step 2A, Prong Two, the additional elements in
independent claim 1 do not integrate the abstract idea (a method for using
the services of a sports book) into a practical application.

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Step Two of the Alice Framework (2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2B)
Having determined under step one of the Alice framework that claim 1
is directed to an abstract idea, we next consider under Step 2B of the 2019
Revised Guidance, the second step of the Alice framework, whether claim 1
includes additional elements or a combination of elements that provides an
“inventive concept,” i.e., whether the additional elements amount to
“significantly more” than the judicial exception itself. 2019 Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
The Examiner determined that the additional elements alone and in
combination fail to amount to significantly more than the recited abstract
idea, and recite well-understood routine and conventional computer activity.
Final Act. 4–5.
The additional elements recited are the “at least one processor of a
server in networked communication with a plurality of user computing
elements” and “a remote device” having “an electronic display” with
“interface screen,” which are disclosed in the Specification at a high degree
of generality, i.e., as generic computer components (see, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 25–
29, 32, 33, 37–38, 44–47, 53–54, 147–148). We agree with the Examiner
that the employment of such components in the manner recited is well
understood, routine, or conventional. Considering the steps individually,
claim 1 lacks additional elements to ensure that the claim amounts to
significantly more. Specifically, the recited steps, understood in light of the
Specification, do not appear to require anything other than off-the-shelf,
conventional computers and a network. Likewise, the receiving,
determining, presenting, recording, and cancelling steps involve techniques
well-known in the art. See BSG Tech, 899 F.3d at 1284, 1290–91 (the
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functions and combination of providing a database with a specific structure,
guiding a user to select an item, storing the item on the database, and
displaying usage information and values lacked an inventive concept).
Thus, the additional elements, individually and in combination, do not
provide an inventive concept.

The Appellant’s Arguments
The Appellant argues that “the Office Action has failed [to] set forth a
prima facie case under 35 U.S.C. § 101 that the claim [is] directed to an
abstract idea” and “make a prima facie showing that the claims do not add
significantly more than the allegedly abstract idea.” Appeal Br. 13–15
(emphasis omitted). The Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive of error.
In rejecting the claims under § 101, the Examiner set forth a well-
reasoned analysis of the claims and a comprehensive explanation of the
bases for the rejection. See Final Act. 2–11, 49–50. The Examiner, thus,
notified the Appellant of the reasons for the rejection in a sufficiently
articulate and informative manner as to meet the notice requirement of
35 U.S.C. § 132. And we find that, in doing so, the Examiner set forth a
prima facie case of patent ineligibility. See In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1362
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that the USPTO carries its procedural burden of
establishing a prima facie case when its rejection satisfies the requirements
of 35 U.S.C. § 132); Chester v. Miller, 906 F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(Section 132 “is violated when a rejection is so uninformative that it
prevents the applicant from recognizing and seeking to counter the grounds
for rejection.”).
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The Appellant argues that claim 1 includes additional elements that
integrate the abstract idea into a practical application and “in particular
provides an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an
improvement to other technology or technical field, and implements the
abstract idea in conjunction with a particular machine.” Reply Br. 2–4
(emphasis omitted). The Appellant asserts:
the claimed invention is directed to improvements in computer
performance that are implemented using a particular machine
and may help control activity over the network, particularly by
providing an interactive system that includes operation of
networked communication by which an interface screen of an
electronic display of a remote device presents various
indications including selectable indicia.
Id. at 4–6 (emphasis omitted) (citing Spec. ¶¶ 59, 63–64, 67–68, 71–72).
The Appellant submits that claim 1 is similar to those of DDR Holdings and
Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 880 F.3d 1356 (Fed.
Cir. 2018) among others. Reply Br. 6; see id. at 6–8. The Appellant’s
argument is not persuasive of error.
In DDR Holdings, the Federal Circuit determined that the claims
addressed the problem of retaining website visitors who, if adhering to the
routine, conventional functioning of Internet hyperlink protocol, would be
transported instantly away from a host’s website after clicking on an
advertisement and activating a hyperlink. DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257.
The Federal Circuit, thus, held that the claims were directed to statutory
subject matter because they claim a solution “necessarily rooted in computer
technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm
of computer networks.” Id. The court cautioned that “not all claims
purporting to address Internet-centric challenges are eligible for patent.” Id.
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at 1258. And the court contrasted the claims to those at issue in
Ultramercial Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014), in that, in
DDR Holdings, the computer network was not operating in its “normal,
expected manner” and the claims did not “recite an invention that is . . .
merely the routine or conventional use of the Internet.” Id. at 1258–59.
In this case, any improvement achieved is in the abstract idea itself
and not in the functioning of a computer or in other technology or technical
field. Stated otherwise, the claimed invention improves the fundamental
economic practice of betting by providing a product for purchase that
mitigates risk and applies this solution in a computer environment, which is
not sufficient for patent eligibility. See Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223
(explaining that limiting the use of an abstract idea to a particular
technological environment is not sufficient for patent eligibility).
In Core Wireless, the Federal Circuit held that “claims drawn to
improved interfaces for electronic devices with small screens that allowed
users to more quickly access desired data stored in, and functions of
applications included in, the electronic devices were not drawn to the
abstract idea of an index. Core Wireless, 880 F.3d at 1359, 1362.”
Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Techtronic Indus. Co., 935 F.3d 1341, 1347 (Fed.
Cir. 2019). The court “concluded that the claims recited ‘a specific
improvement over prior systems, resulting in an improved user interface for
electronic devices.’” Id. at 1347–48 (quoting Core Wireless, 880 F.3d at
1363). Here, as discussed above, the claim merely recites a method
performed by a processor to cause to display an interface screen on a remote
device’s electronic display that operates in its conventional manner to
present data, as well as receive, record, and analyze data (i.e., determine,
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cancel), without any technological improvement to the computer
components themselves.
Further, the additional elements of claim 1 are generic and do not
implement the abstract idea with, or in conjunction with, a particular
machine, such as “a Fourdrinier machine (which is understood in the art to
have a specific structure comprising a headbox, a paper-making wire, and a
series of rolls) that is arranged in a particular way that uses gravity to
optimize the speed of the machine while maintaining quality of the formed
paper web.” 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n.27.
The Appellant argues that the Examiner’s Answer does not provide
proper analysis under Step 2B of the 2019 Revised Guidance because it does
not satisfy any of the requirements of the “Changes in Examination
Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter
Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP Inc.[, 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir.
2018)]),” USPTO Memorandum, Robert W. Bahr, Deputy Commissioner for
Patent Examination Policy, April 19, 2018 (the “Berkheimer Memo”)).
Reply Br. 8–9 (emphasis added). Additionally, the Appellant submits “that
the claims include additional subject matter that is not well-understood,
routine, conventional activity and thus an ‘inventive concept’ at Step 2B.”
Id. The Appellant’s argument is not persuasive. As discussed above, we
have determined that the additional elements of claim 1 are conventional and
have included citations to the Specification and court decisions to support
that determination.
Thus, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 1.
Claims 2–34 fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

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Obviousness
Independent Claim 1 and Dependent Claims 2–15
The Appellant argues that the Examiner’s citations to Brook ––
particularly claim 1, Figure 3, and column 2, lines 39–56, which disclose a
wager sell back option exercised at will by a bettor –– do not correspond to
the step of “presenting two different selectable exercise times at the time of
presenting the option for purchase,” which is required by independent
claim 1. See Appeal Br. 10. The Appellant’s argument is not persuasive of
error.
The Appellant’s argument does not account for the entirety of the
Examiner’s rejection and, consequently, is not responsive to the Examiner’s
rejection. The Examiner does rely on Brook’s claim 1, Figure 3, and
column 2, lines 39–56 to teach a wager sell back option at a first selectable
exercise time, but does not rely solely on these citations to account for more
than the first exercise time. See Final Act. 12–14. Indeed, the Examiner
explains in the rejection of claim 1, “[a]lthough Brook expressly discloses
each of the above steps with respect to a first exercise time, Brook does not
expressly state that the above steps are performed for a second first exercise
time.” Id. at 14. The Examiner then cites to Brook’s column 5, lines 31–33
and column 17, lines 1–26 to find that Brook discloses a second exercise
time for the wager sell back option. Id. at 14–15. Moreover, the Examiner
reasons:
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the
art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to
modify Brook to explicitly disclose the foregoing elements not
expressly stated in Brook because: (a) Brook discloses that the
singular use of “a”, “an”, and “the” includes plural referents
[(col. 5, ll. 31–33 of Brook)]; (b) Brook already expressly
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recites determining a fee for a first exercise time, presenting for
selection by the user the first exercise time, and allowing the
user to cancel the wager prior to the first exercising time in
exchange for the refund amount by selecting the first exercise
time; (c) Brook also discloses that an option may be exercised
at a variety of different times[, including between quarter
periods of a sporting event, innings of a baseball game, or
rounds of a boxing match,] (e.g., see at least col. 17, [ll.] 1-26
of Brook); (d) presenting said different exercise times provides
more choice of wagers, and thus the user may hedge their bets
for purposes of risk management associated with their gambling
bankroll; and (e) one of ordinary skill in the art could have
combined the elements as claimed by known methods (e.g.,
computer programming) and one of ordinary skill in the art
would have recognized that the results of the combination were
predictable.
Id. at 15. Additionally, the Examiner further supports this reasoning by
adding:
Further, “[i]t is well settled that the mere duplication of
parts has no patentable significance unless a new and
unexpected result is produced.” In re Harza, 274 F.2d 669, 671
(CCPA 1960). Here, the duplication of the steps discussed
above provides no unexpected results. Thus, the examiner finds
such the duplication steps to be obvious of Brook.
Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added). The Examiner reiterated the
foregoing statements and added further explanation in the response to
arguments sections in the Final Office Action and the Examiner’s Answer.
Id. at 50–51; Ans. 3–5. We determine that the Examiner’s findings and
reasoning are supported by a preponderance of the evidence. And, as
discussed above, the Appellant does not address these citations to Brook or
the additional findings and reasoning provided by the Examiner in the Final
Office Action and the Examiner’s Answer.
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Thus, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 1 and
claims 2, 7, and 15, which depend therefrom, under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Brook and Folger I.
The Appellant does not advance a separate argument for the rejections
of claims 3–6 and 8–14, which depend from claim 1. We likewise sustain
the rejections of claims 3–6 and 8–14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Brook and Folger I in combination with Folger II, Folger II and
Silvestro, Greiner, Walker, or Silvestro.

Independent Claim 16 and Dependent Claims 17–25
The Appellant argues that the Examiner’s rejection fails to explain
how the cited portions of Brook teach or suggest “‘determining, by the at
least one processor, an exercise time and a price for each of a plurality of
options,’ as recited in claim 16” or how Brook’s selected option discloses or
suggests presenting multiple different options to the user for purchase at
multiple different prices,” as called for in claim 16. See Appeal Br. 10–11
(emphasis omitted). The Appellant acknowledges Brook’s disclosure, at
column 5, lines 32–33, which describes that the construction of the terms
“‘a,’ ‘an,’ and ‘the’ include plural references unless the content clearly
dictates otherwise.” Id. at 11. The Appellant then applies this construction
to Brook’s description, “an indication that the bettor has selected an option
to be exercised at will by the bettor during a break in play.” Id.; Brook,
col. 2, ll. 39–40. According to the Appellant, the application results in “one
or more indications that one or more bettors has selected one or more
options to be exercised at will by the one or more bettors during one or more
breaks in play,” and that four possibilities result from this application.
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Appeal Br. 11. Also, the Appellant asserts that the “Office Action has not
explained how the specific interpretation proposed by the Office Action is
actually disclosed.” Id. The Appellant’s argument is not persuasive of error.
As discussed above, Brook’s disclosure recites, “[a]s used in this
specification and the appended claims, the singular forms ‘a,’ ‘an,’ and ‘the’
include plural referents unless the content clearly dictates otherwise.”
Brook, col. 5, ll. 31–33. The use of the term “include” does not require that
in each instance of “a,” “an,” and “the,” each term must be understood as
always singular or always plural, rather a combination of singular and plural
references is a possibility as well. For example, Brook’s description in
column 2, lines 38–40, “receive an indication that the bettor has selected an
option to be exercised at will by the bettor during a break in play,” may be
understood by one of ordinary skill in the art upon considering Brook’s
disclosure at column 5, lines 31–33 as, “receive [a single] indication that [a
single] bettor has selected [a plurality of] option[s] to be exercised at will by
the [single] bettor during a [plurality of] break[s] in play.” Accordingly, we
disagree with the Appellant’s determination that only four possibilities result
from the application of Brook’s construction of “a,” “an,” and “the” to
Brook’s description that “an indication that the bettor has selected an option
to be exercised at will by the bettor during a break in play.”
Further, similar to the unpersuasive argument disputing the
Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 1, the Appellant’s argument for
the Examiner’s rejection of claim 16 does not account for the entirety of the
Examiner’s rejection. See Final Act. 27–31. Notably, the Examiner
reiterated the key aspects of the rejection and added further explanation in
the Final Office Action and the Examiner’s Answer. Final Act. 51–53;
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Ans. 5–8. We determine that the Examiner’s findings and reasoning are
supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Lastly, the Appellant does
not address the additional citations to Brook or the additional findings and
reasoning provided by the Examiner in the Final Office Action and the
Examiner’s Answer.
Thus, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 16
and claims 17, 22, 24, and 25, which depend therefrom, under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as unpatentable over Brook.
The Appellant does not advance a separate argument for the rejections
of claims 18–21 and 23, which depend from claim 16. We likewise sustain
the rejections of claims 18–21 and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Brook in combination with Folger II, Folger II and Silvestro, or
Silvestro.

Independent Claim 26 and Dependent Claims 27–30
The Appellant argues that the Examiner’s citations to Brook ––
particularly column 2, lines 39–56, column 5, lines 54–55, and column 7,
lines 9–10, which disclose a wager sell back option that is exercisable at will
–– do not correspond to the steps of determining and presenting first and
second refund amounts for first and second exercise times, respectively,
which is required by independent claim 26. See Appeal Br. 11–12. The
Appellant acknowledges that Brook’s claim 1 describes “determining the
amount to refund to the bettor,” but that, “even if this were asserted to
disclose the ‘first refund amount,’ the Office Action has not pointed to any
feature that discloses the ‘second refund amount.’” Id. at 12. The
Appellant’s argument is not persuasive of error.
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Similar to the unpersuasive argument disputing the Examiner’s
rejection of independent claim 1, the Appellant’s argument for the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 26 does not account for the entirety of the
Examiner’s rejection. See Final Act. 27–31. Notably, the Examiner
reiterated the key aspects of the rejection and added further explanation in
the Final Office Action and the Examiner’s Answer. Final Act. 53–54;
Ans. 8–9. We determine that the Examiner’s findings and reasoning are
supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Lastly, the Appellant does
not address the additional citations to Brook or the additional findings and
reasoning provided by the Examiner in the Final Office Action and the
Examiner’s Answer.
Thus, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 26
and claims 27–29, which depend therefrom, under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Brook.
The Appellant does not advance a separate argument for the rejection
of claim 30, which depends from claim 26. We likewise sustain the
rejection of claim 30 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Brook in
combination with Silvestro.

Independent Claim 31 and Dependent Claims 32–34
The Appellant argues that the Examiner erroneously relied on
Silvestro’s paragraph 48 to teach “responsive to the user exercising the
option [to cancel the wager], cancelling the wager in exchange for a refund
amount, wherein the user is required to use at least a portion of the refund
amount to place another wager,” as called for by independent claim 31.
Appeal Br. 12 (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted). The Appellant
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supports this argument by asserting that Silvestro’s paragraph 48 is
particular to the restriction of prizes rather than the claimed “refund
amount.” Id. The Appellant’s argument is not persuasive of error.
The Examiner explains that the Appellant’s argument fails to account
for the Examiner’s reliance on Brook in addition to Silvestro to addressing
the disputed recitation of claim 31. See Final Act. 55; Ans. 9–10.
Generally, the Examiner explains the combination of teachings from Brook
and Silvestro were relied upon to result in the subject matter of the limitation
at issue; more specifically, the Examiner explains:
Brook discloses a refund amount in at least claim 1 of Brook.
Silvestro discloses that prizes may include credits that are
restricted for use on wagering on a game. The examiner
submits that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill
in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed
invention to modify the method of Brook to require the user to
use at least a portion of the refund amount to place another
wager because it is known that prizes may include credits that
are restricted for use on wagering on a game (see, e.g., [0048]
of Silvestro) and that such a requirement would encourage users
to place more wagers more frequently.
Final Act. 55; Ans. 9–10; see Final Act. 45–46.
Thus, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 31
and claims 32 and 34, which depend therefrom, under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Brook and Silvestro.
The Appellant does not advance a separate argument for the rejection
of claim 33, which depends from claim 31. We likewise sustain the
rejection of claim 33 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Brook and
Silvestro in combination with Kelly.

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CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § References/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–34 101 Eligibility 1–34

1, 2, 7, 15 103 Brook, Folger I 1, 2, 7, 15
3–5, 11–14 103 Brook, Folger I,
Folger II
3–5, 11–14
6 103 Brook, Folger I,
Folger II, Silvestro
6
8 103 Brook, Folger I,
Greiner
8
9 103 Brook, Folger I,
Walker
9
10 103 Brook, Folger I,
Silvestro
10
16, 17, 22,
24–29
103 Brook 16, 17, 22,
24–29

18–20 103 Brook, Folger II 18–20
21 103 Brook, Folger II,
Silvestro
21
23, 30–32,
34
103 Brook, Silvestro 23, 30–32,
34

33 103 Brook, Silvestro, Kelly 33
Overall
Outcome
1–34

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED