Catherine Lin-Hendel

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 17, 2020

13015528 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Apr. 17, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/015,528 01/27/2011 Catherine Lin-Hendel 3067 2807
23899 7590 04/17/2020
DOUGLAS L WELLER
1832 Rosemary Drive
Gilroy, CA 95020
EXAMINER
WINTER, JOHN M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3685
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/17/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
USPTO@dockettrak.com
patents@dougweller.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte CATHERINE LIN-HENDEL

Appeal 2018-008433
Application 13/015,528
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before RICHARD M. LEBOVITZ, RACHEL H. TOWNSEND, and
JAMIE T. WISZ, Administrative Patent Judges.

LEBOVITZ, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
The Examiner rejected the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
obvious, and under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as reciting patent ineligible subject
matter. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject the claims. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Catherine
Lin-Hendel. Appeal Br. 3.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The claims stand finally rejected by the Examiner as follows:
Claims 18–24, 27, 41–49, 52, 65, and 66 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
obvious in view of Garavini (US 7,080,070 B1, issued July 18, 2006),
Lorenzen et al. (US 7,197,475 B1, issued Mar. 27, 2007) (“Lorenzen”),
Chiasson (US 2002/0002513 A1, publ. Jan. 3, 2002), and
Ryan et al. (US 6,421,675 B1, issued July 16, 2002) (“Ryan”). Final Act. 6.
Claims 18–24, 27, 41–49, 52, 65, and 66 under 35 U.S.C. § 101
because the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception. Final Act.
4.
Claim 18 is illustrative of the rejected claims. Claim 18 is reproduced
below. The claim is annotated with bracketed numbering for reference to the
limitations in the claim.
18. A non-transitory computer-readable medium having stored
thereon instructions that, when executed by a processing device
coupled with the non-transitory computer-readable medium, the
processing device performs a method conducting on-line
commerce, the method comprising the steps of:
[1] generating a user interface prompting a user shopper
to input a list of at least two items;
[2] receiving the list of at least two items from the user;
[3] responsive to receiving the list for each of the at least
two listed items;
[4] searching over a computer network, by the processing
device and based on a user-specified prioritization algorithm, at
least two websites available over the computer network, each of
the at least two websites associated with distinct merchants, to
produce results indicating which items of the at least two items
are available from which websites of the at least two websites;
[5] receiving the results of the searching;
[6] displaying, to the user, the results of the search, the
results comprising information found during the search and
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further comprising availability of said items on respective ones
of the at least two websites searched;
[7] receiving at least one order from the user shopper to
purchase at least one of the at least two items from
corresponding select ones of the websites in the search results
displayed to the user; and
[8] placing orders for the selected items from the selected
websites for the user shopper;
[9] the user-specified prioritization algorithm is based at
least in part on a user selection of the at least two websites, a
default prioritization recommendation, and/or a list of user-
preferred suppliers.
OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION
The Examiner found that Garavini describes a method that comprises
steps [1], [2], and [6] of claim 18. Final Act. 6. The Examiner further found
that Lorenzen describes steps [3], [4], [5], and [8] of the claim, particularly
searching for items over “at least two websites available” using a computer
network. Final Act. 7. The Examiner stated it would have been obvious to
one of ordinary skill in the art to combine Garavini with Lorenzen’s teaching
about searching of items over at least two websites (step [4]) to improve the
searching (“query”) process. Id. The Examiner further cited Chiasson for
teaching receiving orders as in step [7] of the claim to improve the efficiency
of the ordering process and Ryan for teaching the user-specified
prioritization algorithm as in step [9] to provide popular content to a user. Id.
at 8.
Appellant contends that Lorenzen does not describe step [4] of claim
18 of “searching . . . at least two websites available over the computer
network, each of the at least two websites associated with distinct merchants,
to produce results indicating which items of the at least two items are
available from which websites of the at least two websites.” Appeal Br. 16.
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Appellant states that the Examiner’s finding is factually incorrect because
claim 1 of Lorenzen specifically “teaches and claims that one or more
databases on a single website is searched without the necessity to search
outside website.” Appeal Br. 17.
Appellant asserts that claim 1 of Lorenzen teaches searching a single
website. The pertinent portions of claim 1 are reproduced below:
providing a centrally implemented multi-vendor shared
datastore (MV-SD) that acts cooperatively with the MV-CPU
[multi-vendor processing unit] and serves as a shared datastore
for the plurality of vendors;
providing one website hosted on at least one server,
wherein the website sells products to the consumers from the
plurality of vendors, wherein the MV-SD includes at least one
database with detailed product descriptions sufficient to make a
purchase decision for products from the plurality of vendors,
providing a universal shopping cart for a consumer to add
items to purchase from different vendors,
wherein consumers access said one website to buy
products from multiple vendors without leaving the one website
to view detailed product information from different vendors and
without entering another vendor website to add products from
different vendors into the universal shopping cart;
Lorenzen, col. 22, ll. 20–41 (emphasis added).
Appellant has misunderstood claim 1 of Lorenzen and the underlying
written description of it in the Lorenzen patent.
Claim 1 of Lorenzen does not disclose “searching” a single website as
asserted by Appellant. The claim recites the one website “sells products to
the consumers from the plurality of vendors, wherein the MV-SD includes at
least one database with detailed product descriptions sufficient to make a
purchase decision for products from the plurality of vendors.” This step of
claim 1 of Lorenzen does not state that the products which are sold to the
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consumer are searched on the one website. In the subsequent step recited in
the claim, it is stated “consumers access said one website to buy products
from multiple vendors without leaving the one website to view detailed
product information from different vendors.” Therefore, the consumers can
buy and view information about the product on the shared datastore without
having to go to the vendor’s website. Searching is not mentioned in this step.
The claim further recites the consumer can buy products “without entering
another vendor website to add products from different vendors into the
universal shopping cart.” The purchase of the products is therefore done on
one website. Thus, the claim does not disclose the step of “searching” for the
products as asserted by Appellant.
As discussed by the Examiner, Lorenzen describes, with reference to
its Figure 3, how product searching is done.
Lorenzen discloses:
FIG. 3 illustrates, in one exemplary implementation, a Multi-
Vendor Internet Commerce System (MV-ICS) system 300,
which includes a centrally implemented Multi-Vendor Central
System (MVCS) 240, which includes a Multi-Vendor CPU 210
and a Multi-Vendor Shared Datastores (MV-SD) 212.
Lorenzen, col. 9, ll. 27–32. These elements are the same elements recited in
claim 1 of Lorenzen.
Lorenzen describes three different vendors, X, Y, and Z, who use the
multi-vendor internet commerce system of Lorenzen’s claim 1. Lorenzen
explains:
With reference to FIG. 3, Multi-Vendor Central System (MV-
CS) 240 is shown coupled to the Internet 230. Also shown
coupled to Internet 230 are three exemplary vendor websites X,

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Y, and Z, representing the websites that implement the product
offerings of the three independent vendors.
Lorenzen, col. 9, ll. 41–45.
The vendors “offer their products for sale through the MultiVendor
Internet Commerce System (MV-ICS) 300 and . . . allow consumers of their
products to utilize the cross vendor universal shopping cart and checkout
logic of Multi-Vendor Central System (MV-CS).” Lorenzen, col. 9, ll. 57–
61. This description is consistent with claim 1 of Lorenzen which refers to
selling and buying products on one website.
Lorenzen also describes how the searching for products is
accomplished:
Also shown in FIG. 3 is a client browser 318, representing the
consumer interface through which a consumer may interact
with the product offering pages provided by vendor website X,
vendor website Y, and vendor website Z, as well as to perform
actions such as sign-in/registration to the Multi-Vendor Internet
Commerce System (MV-ICS) system, to view the product
offerings offered by the vendors and select items for the
shopping cart and/or checkout, to view the universal shopping
cart that contains products from multiple vendors, and to
perform the checkout on the products selected at one of the
product offering pages viewed on client browser 318. The
exemplary product offering pages associated with vendors X,
Y, and Z are shown as pages 320, 322, and 324
Lorenzen, col. 9, l. 63–col. 10, l. 9.
Thus, this section expressly refers to a “client browser” to interact
with three different websites.

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Fig. 3 of Lorenzen is reproduced below:

Figure 3 shows the browser 318 communicating with the internet 230,
which is linked to the websites of vendors X, Y, and Z. The figure further
shows the client browser 318 accessing product pages A, B, and C, from the
websites of the X, Y, and Z vendors, respectively. Therefore, it is clear from
this figure, and the description of it discussed above, that the consumer
searches multiple websites of different vendors utilizing an appropriate
client browser. This disclosure, as found by the Examiner, meets the
limitation of step [4] of “searching over a computer network, by the
processing device . . . at least two websites available over the computer
network, each of the at least two websites associated with distinct
merchants.” Appellant did not distinguish the “client browser” described in
Lorenzen from the devices used in the rejected claims to accomplish the step
[4] of searching. After the searching is accomplished, consistent with claim
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1 of Lorenzen, the product information (320, 322, 324) is communicated to
the MV-CS enabling purchase of the searched products to be accomplished
on the one website.
In sum, the preponderance of the evidence supports the Examiner’s
finding that Lorenzen describes step [4] of claim 18 of “searching over a
computer network, by the processing device . . . , at least two websites
available over the computer network, each of the at least two websites
associated with distinct merchants.”
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the obviousness rejection of
claim 18 is affirmed. Claim 43 has substantially the same limitations as
claim 18, and Appellant made the same arguments for it as they did for
claim 18. Consequently, the rejection of claim 43 is affirmed for the same
reasons. Dependent claims 19–24, 27, 41, 42, and 4–49, 52, 65, and 66 fall
with claims 18 and 43 because separate arguments for their patentability
were not provided. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

101 REJECTION
Principles of Law
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, an invention is patent-eligible if it claims a
“new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”
However, not every discovery is eligible for patent protection. Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). “Excluded from such patent protection are
laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.” Id. The Supreme
Court articulated a two-step analysis to determine whether a claim falls
within an excluded category of invention. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank
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Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012).
In the first step, it is determined “whether the claims at issue recite
“one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. If it is
determined that the claims recite an ineligible concept, then the second step
of the two-part analysis is applied in which it is asked “[w]hat else is there in
the claims before us?” Id. The Court explained that this step involves:
a search for an “ ‘inventive concept’ ” — i.e., an element or
combination of elements that is “sufficient to ensure that the
patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent
upon the [ineligible concept] itself.”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing from Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75–77)(alteration
in original).
Alice, relying on the analysis in Mayo, stated that in the second part of
the analysis, “the elements of each claim both individually and ‘as an
ordered combination’” must be considered “to determine whether the
additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible
application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (citation omitted).
The PTO published guidance on the application of 35 U.S.C. § 101.
USPTO’s January 7, 2019 Memorandum, 2019 Revised Patent Subject
Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 51–57 (2019) (“Eligibility
Guidance”). This guidance provides additional direction on how to
implement the two-part analysis of Mayo and Alice.
Step 2A, Prong One, of the 2019 Eligibility Guidance, looks at the
specific limitations in the claim to determine whether the claim recites a
judicial exception to patent eligibility. In Step 2A, Prong Two, the claims are
examined to identify whether there are additional elements in the claims that
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integrate the exception in a practical application, namely, is there a
“meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than
a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” 84 Fed.
Reg. 54 (2. Prong Two).
If the claim recites a judicial exception that is not integrated into a
practical application, then, as in the Mayo/Alice framework, Step 2B of the
Eligibility Guidance instructs us to determine whether there is a claimed
inventive concept to ensure that the claims define an invention that is
significantly more than the ineligible concept, itself. 84 Fed. Reg. 56. In
making this determination, we must consider whether there are specific
limitations or elements recited in the claim “that are not well-understood,
routine, conventional activity in the field, which is indicative that an
inventive concept may be present” or whether the claim “simply appends
well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception,
which is indicative that an inventive concept may not be present.” 84 Fed.
Reg. 56 (footnote omitted).
With these guiding principles in mind, we proceed to determine
whether the claimed subject matter in this appeal is eligible for patent
protection under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Discussion
Claim 18 is directed to a “non-transitory computer-readable medium
having stored thereon instructions.” Following the first step of the
Mayo/Alice analysis, we find that the claim is directed to a “manufacture,”
and therefore falls into one of the broad statutory categories of patent-
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eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. We, thus, proceed to Step 2A,
Prong One, of the Eligibility Guidance.
Step 2A, Prong One
In Step 2A, Prong One, of the Eligibility Guidance, the specific
limitations in the claim are examined to determine whether the claim recites
a judicial exception to patent eligibility, namely whether the claim recites an
abstract idea, law of nature, or natural phenomenon.
The Examiner found that claim 18 recites “the abstract idea of
creating a shopping list, searching for the products on the list at multiple
merchant locations and purchasing the items on the list.” Final Act. 4.
Shopping and purchasing items are types of sales activities. Sales activity is
listed as one of the types of “methods of organizing human activity” listed as
an abstract idea in the 2019 Eligibility Guidance. 84 Fed. Reg. 52. See also
Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 712 (Fed Cir. 2014) (claims
“directed to a method for distributing copyrighted media products over the
Internet where the consumer receives a copyrighted media product at no cost
in exchange for viewing an advertisement, and the advertiser pays for the
copyrighted content” were found to be patent-ineligible under § 101).
As indicated by the Examiner, the steps of the claim comprising
searching on websites for items (steps [2], [4]), receiving and displaying the
search results (steps [5], [6]), and ordering the items identified in the search
(steps [7], [8]) constitute sales activity and therefore a method of organizing
human activity. Furthermore, shopping for items (“[4] searching over a
computer network . . . at least two websites available over the computer
network, each of the at least two websites associated with distinct
merchants”) and ordering the items (“[8] placing orders for the selected
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items from the selected websites for the user shopper”) clearly constitute a
fundamental economic practice that is “‘long prevalent in our system of
commerce’” and therefore is outside the scope of § 101. Alice, 573 U.S. at
219 (citation omitted).
Appellant argues that “the Examiner ignores the actual limitations set
out in the claims pending in the case and instead recites a vague general
summary of the claims based on a claim that is not pending in the case.”
Appeal Br. 8.
This argument is not persuasive. As indicated above, it is evident that
the Examiner read the claim and summarized its searching and purchasing
steps for the purpose of explaining why it recites an abstract idea. Final Act.
4 (“Claim 1 recites, in part, a method of generating a user interface,
receiving a list, searching for items on the list, displaying results placing an
order.”). The fact that the Examiner summarized the steps, rather than
repeating the claim verbatim, indicates that the claims were read and
understood.
Appellant asserts that the claim is not abstract because it uses
“technical innovations” to perform the claimed functions. Appeal Br. 11.
Appellant also argues that the steps of the claim could not be performed
without a computer and that mental faculties, use of pen and paper, could not
be used to search a computer network or access merchant websites. Id.
Appellant further asserts that “[s]ophisticated hardware, software, and
protocols, which all must be machine implemented, are required to access
and return data stored in a remote server and encoded within a website.” Id.
at 11, 12, 13.
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This argument does not persuade us that the Examiner erred.
Implementing a method on a generic computer does not confer eligibility on
an otherwise abstract method. Alice, 573 U.S. at 221. While the internet is
used in the claimed method, “the use of the Internet is not sufficient to save
otherwise abstract claims from ineligibility under § 101.” Ultramercial, 772
F.3d at 716.
Appellant argues the hardware is “sophisticated,” but Appellant does
not distinguish the claimed processing device from a generic computer.
In sum, for the foregoing reasons, we find that claim 1 recites an
abstract idea. Accordingly, we proceed to Step 2A, Prong Two, of the
Eligibility Guidance.
Step 2A, Prong Two
Prong Two of Step 2A under the 2019 Eligibility Guidance asks
whether there are additional elements that integrate the exception into a
practical application. As in the Mayo/Alice framework, we must look at the
claim elements individually and “as an ordered combination” to determine
whether the additional elements integrate the recited abstract idea into a
practical application. The Eligibility Guidance explains that “[a] claim that
integrates a judicial exception into a practical application will apply, rely on,
or use the judicial exception in a manner that places a meaningful limit on
the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort
designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Eligibility Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. 54. Integration into a practical application is evaluated by
identifying whether there are additional elements individually, and in
combination, which go beyond the judicial exception. Eligibility Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. 54–55. Specifically, the Guidance describe several
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considerations in determining whether the abstract idea is integrated into a
practical application:
An additional element reflects an improvement in the
functioning of a computer, or an improvement to other
technology or technical field
. . .
an additional element implements a judicial exception with, or
uses a judicial exception in conjunction with, a particular
machine or manufacture that is integral to the claim
. . .
an additional element applies or uses the judicial exception in
some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of
the judicial exception to a particular technological environment,
such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort
designed to monopolize the exception.
84 Fed. Reg. 55.
Appellant argues that each of independent claims 18 and 43 “sets out
subject matter that solves the problem in the prior art that comparisons of
products could only be performed using one website at a time.” Appeal Br.
10. Appellant states that the claims “set out specific technologic
modifications to solve this problem and improve the functionality of known
products that perform such comparisons.” Id. at 10–11. Specifically,
Appellant asserts the claimed processing device of claim 18 searches at least
two websites available over a computer network each of which is associated
with distinct merchants, obtains results, and performs the searches “in a
prioritized order” which “is provided by software running on the server
computer.” Id. at 11. Appellant also argues that claim 43 solves the problem
with “a server computer comprising a memory and at least one hardware
processor is configured to perform searches at distinct websites of each of a
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plurality of different merchants available over a computer network.” Id. at
12.
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive because the steps recited in
the claim do not specifically recite how the desired results are accomplished.
As explained in McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d
1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016), the “abstract idea exception has been applied to
prevent patenting of claims that abstractly cover results where ‘it matters not
by what process or machinery the result is accomplished.’ [O’Reilly v.
Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 113, (1853)]; see also Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1301.” McRO
stated that therefore, a court must “look to whether the claims in these
patents focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant
technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the
abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery.” McRO,
837 F.3d at 1314. In this case, the steps of searching (step [4]) and using a
user-specified prioritization algorithm (step [4], [9]), etc., are not required by
the claim to be executed with specific rules or with specific technology. In
others words, the claim does not recite a “specific technologic modification”
as asserted by Appellant.
The claimed steps, as a whole, recite the desired result, but not the
specific rules that enable the result, which would deter preemption of the
abstract idea of organizing human activity. In McRO, the court held that the
“limitations in claim 1 prevent preemption of all processes for achieving
automated lip-synchronization of 3–D characters.” McRO, 837 F.3d at 1315.
The court explained that “[t]he specific structure of the claimed rules would
prevent broad preemption of all rules-based means of automating lip
synchronization.” Id. Here, the steps in rejected claim 18 are recited in such
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general terms that coupon advertising in a newspaper based on such steps,
but for the required use of a computer network, would preempt the abstract
idea embodied in the claims.
For example, step [4] recites:
searching over a computer network, by the processing device
and based on a user-specified prioritization algorithm, at least
two websites available over the computer network, each of the
at least two websites associated with distinct merchants, to
produce results indicating which items of the at least two items
are available from which websites of the at least two websites.
The claim does not recite by what particular means the searching is
accomplished or the specific way in which prioritization algorithm
prioritizes the searches. Thus, the steps are not recited with sufficient
specificity to avoid preemption of the idea of searching two websites.
Appellant contends that “[s]ophisticated hardware, software, and
protocols, which all must be machine implemented, are required to access
and return data stored in a remote server and encoded within a website.”
Appeal Br. 11, 12, 13. It is true that an improvement in computer networks
and software can confer eligibility on a claim when they provide an
additional element that improves a technology or technical field. See, e.g.,
SRI International, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 930 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir.
2019); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
However, Appellant has not identified the specific improvement to the
hardware or software, but rather has just made assertions about the
“sophisticated” requirements to achieve the claimed results without
explaining what they are or what claim elements narrowly implicate those
requirements.
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Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the recited
abstract idea of recited in the claims is not integrated into a practical
application.
Step 2B
Because we determined that the judicial exception is not integrated
into a practical application, we proceed to Step 2B of the Eligibility
Guidance, which asks, as in the Mayo/Alice framework, whether there is an
inventive concept. In making this Step 2B determination, we must consider
whether there are specific limitations or elements recited in the claim “that
are not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field, which is
indicative that an inventive concept may be present” or whether the claim
“simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously
known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial
exception, which is indicative that an inventive concept may not be present.”
Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 56 (footnote omitted). We must also
consider whether the combination of steps in the claim perform “in an
unconventional way and therefore include an ‘inventive step,’ rendering the
claim eligible at Step 2B.” Id. In this part of the analysis, we consider “the
elements of each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’”
must be considered “to determine whether the additional elements
‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Alice,
573 U.S. at 217 (citation omitted).
Appellant did not provide evidence that the steps individually or in
combination provide an inventive step or accomplish the claimed result in an
unconventional way. The steps of searching for items on multiple websites
was known at the time of the invention as established by Lorenzen. See also
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Spec. 2.2 Appellant has not provided evidence that this step in combination
with the display of results, and using a prioritization algorithm which was
known in the art as described by Ryan, accomplishes the result of searching
for items and placing orders in an inventive way.
Accordingly, the rejection of claim 18 under § 101 is affirmed.
Claim 43 has substantially the same limitations as claim 18, and
Appellant made the same arguments for it as they did for claim 18.
Consequently, the rejection of claim 43 is affirmed for the same reasons.
Dependent claims 19–24, 27, 41, 42, and 44–49, 52, 65, and 66 fall with
claims 18 and 43 because separate arguments for their patentability were not
provided. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
18–24, 27,
41–49, 52,
65, 66
103 Garavini,
Lorenzen,
Chiasson, Ryan
18–24, 27,
41–49, 52,
65, 66

18–24, 27,
41–49, 52,
65, 66
101 Eligibility 18–24, 27,
41–49, 52,
65, 66

Overall
Outcome
18–24, 27,
41–49, 52,
65, 66

TIME PERIOD

2 “Even the most sophisticated and advanced shopping search engines, such
as www.MySimon.Com, which enables a shopper to enter product
specifications, and then searches for the websites of participating merchants
that may carry the items being searched.”
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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED