Carsten Franke et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardOct 9, 201914136454 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Oct. 9, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/136,454 12/20/2013 Carsten Franke 65040-256137 3452 141164 7590 10/09/2019 Barnes & Thornburg LLP (ABB) 11 S. Meridian Street Indianapolis, IN 46204 EXAMINER STEWART, CRYSTOL ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3624 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 10/09/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): INDocket@btlaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte CARSTEN FRANKE, IIRO HARJUNKOSKI, and SLEMAN SALIBA ____________ Appeal 2018-002489 Application 14/136,454 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, NINA L. MEDLOCK, and KENNETH G. SCHOPFER Administrative Patent Judges. MEDLOCK, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1–17. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Our decision references Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed August 1, 2017) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed January 3, 2018), and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed November 3, 2017) and Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed March 2, 2017). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as ABB Schweiz AG. Appeal Br. 2. Appeal 2018-002489 Application 14/136,454 2 CLAIMED INVENTION Appellant’s claimed invention “relates to a system and a method for automatic allocation of mobile resources to tasks which are to be performed at at least one location distant from the mobile resources” (Spec. ¶ 2). Claims 1 and 14 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 14, reproduced below with bracketed notations added, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 14. A method for computer-implemented automatic allocation of mobile resources to tasks which are to be performed at at least one location distant from the mobile resources, the method comprising: [(a)] executing storing data defining the tasks as well as the mobile resources in at least one database; [(b)] waiting for a trigger event by a first data processing device; [(c)] after having been notified of the trigger event, in the first data processing device, accessing the at least one database, executing allocating the mobile resources to the tasks to generate an individual schedule for at least one of the mobile resources, and transmitting each of the individual schedules to a mobile data communication device respectively assigned to the at least one of the mobile resources; [(d)] executing storing in the at least one database: at least one corresponding skill and equipment for each mobile resource; street-level data defining roads between a current location of the mobile resources and the at least one distant location of the tasks; and dynamic data which have a potential impact on the performing of the tasks, the dynamic data including weather related data; Appeal 2018-002489 Application 14/136,454 3 [(e)] executing accessing, in the first data processing device, the at least one database via a standardized data interface which is standardized by introducing a fixed set of input data in a predefined format, wherein the fixed set of input data consists of the data defining the tasks, the street-level data and the at least one corresponding skill and equipment of each mobile resource; [(f)] executing collecting, in the first data processing device, the fixed set of input data from the at least one database; [(g)] executing the allocation of the mobile resources in the first data processing device, by allocating the skills to the tasks and to the equipment, and by generating for the at least one of the mobile resources as part of each individual schedule a street-by-street route along the roads to the allocated tasks; and [(h)] keeping, in a second data processing device distinct from the first data processing device, the fixed set of input data up-to-date by continuously executing a pre-processing of the dynamic data to convert the dynamic data from multiple formats to the fixed set of input data in the predefined format by determining which of the street-level data, the mobile resources and the tasks are affected by the dynamic data and to what extent, by amending affected data including the street-level data, the mobile resources and the tasks which are determined to be affected by the dynamic data, and by storing the amended affected data in the at least one database in the predefined format to be used by the first data processing device, wherein the second data processing unit is configured to execute an adjustment of a priority ranking of at least one of the equipment and skills, based on the dynamic data including the weather related data, and [(i)] executing, in the first data processing device, a re- allocation of the mobile resources using the stored amended affected data so that the priority ranking is reflected in the individual schedule. Appeal 2018-002489 Application 14/136,454 4 REJECTIONS2 Claims 1–17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. Claims 1–4, 7, 9, 10, and 12–14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Schneur et al. (US 2008/0162242 A1, published July 3, 2008) (“Schneur”), Mitchell et al. (US 2010/0312604 A1, published Dec. 9, 2010 (“Mitchell”), Nielsen et al. (US 8,612,276 B1, issued Dec. 17, 2013 (“Nielsen”), and Joe et al. (US 2006/0241855 A1, published Oct. 26, 2006) (“Joe”). Claims 5 and 6 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Schneur, Mitchell, Nielsen, Joe, and Horvitz (US 2008/0004794 A1, published Jan. 3, 2008). Claim 15 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Schneur, Mitchell, Nielsen, Joe, and Pandya (US 2009/0281879 A1, published Nov. 12, 2009). Claim 16 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Schneur, Mitchell, Nielsen, Joe, and Wills (US 2013/0131968 A1, published May 23, 2013). Claim 17 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Schneur, Mitchell, Nielsen, Joe, and Mashinsky (WO 2009/058117 A1, published May 7, 2009). 2 The Examiner has withdrawn the rejection of claims 1–17 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, and the rejection of claims 8 and 11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Schneur, Mitchell, Nielsen, and Joe. See Ans. 4. Appeal 2018-002489 Application 14/136,454 5 ANALYSIS Patent-Ineligible Subject Matter Appellant argues the pending claims as a group (Appeal Br. 4–8). We select independent claim 14 as representative. The remaining claims stand or fall with claim 14. See 37 C.F.R. §41.37(c)(1)(iv). Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, an invention is patent eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court, however, has long interpreted § 101 to include an implicit exception: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). The Supreme Court, in Alice, reiterated the two-step framework previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), “for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217. The first step in that analysis is to “determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Id. If the claims are not directed to a patent-ineligible concept, e.g., an abstract idea, the inquiry ends. Otherwise, the inquiry proceeds to the second step where the elements of the claims are considered “individually and ‘as an ordered combination’” to determine whether there are additional elements that “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79, 78). This is “a search for an ‘inventive concept’ — i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the Appeal 2018-002489 Application 14/136,454 6 patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. at 217–18 (alteration in original). In rejecting the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the Examiner determined that the claims are directed to the “automatic allocation of mobile resources to tasks which are to be performed [at] at least one location distant from the mobile resources,” which the Examiner concluded is an abstract idea similar to other concepts that courts have held abstract (Final Act. 13). The Examiner also determined that the additional elements or combination of elements in the claims, other than the abstract idea per se, (including the database, computing device, processing units, and data processing devices) amounts to “no more than mere instructions to implement the idea on a computer and/or a recitation of generic computer structure that serves to perform generic computer functions that are well- understood, routine, and conventional activities previously known to the pertinent industry” (id. at 13–14). After Appellant’s briefs were filed, and the Examiner’s Answer mailed, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (the “USPTO”) published revised guidance for use by USPTO personnel in evaluating subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 2019 REVISED PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY GUIDANCE, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 57 (Jan. 7, 2019) (the “2019 Revised Guidance”). That guidance revised the USPTO’s examination procedure with respect to the first step of the Mayo/Alice framework by (1) “[p]roviding groupings of subject matter that is considered an abstract idea”; and (2) clarifying that a claim is not “directed to” a judicial exception if the judicial exception is integrated into a practical application of that exception. Id. at 50. The 2019 Revised Guidance, by its terms, applies to all Appeal 2018-002489 Application 14/136,454 7 applications, and to all patents resulting from applications, filed before, on, or after January 7, 2019. Id. Step One of the Mayo/Alice Framework (2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2A) The first step in the Mayo/Alice framework, as mentioned above, is to determine whether the claims at issue are “directed to” a patent-ineligible concept, e.g., an abstract idea. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217. This first step, as set forth in the 2019 Revised Guidance (i.e., Step 2A), is a two-prong test; in Step 2A, Prong One, we look to whether the claim recites a judicial exception, e.g., one of the following three groupings of abstract ideas: (1) mathematical concepts; (2) certain methods of organizing human activity, e.g., fundamental economic principles or practices, commercial or legal interactions; and (3) mental processes. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. If so, we next consider whether the claim includes additional elements, beyond the judicial exception, that “integrate the [judicial] exception into a practical application,” i.e., that apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception (“Step 2A, Prong Two”). Id. at 54–55. Only if the claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application do we conclude that the claim is “directed to” the judicial exception, e.g., an abstract idea. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner erred in determining that claim 14 is directed to an abstract idea (Appeal Br. 6-7). The Federal Circuit has explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the specification, based on whether ‘their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject Appeal 2018-002489 Application 14/136,454 8 matter.’” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether the focus of the claims is on a specific improvement in relevant technology or on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a tool. See id. at 1335–36. Here, it is clear from the Specification, including the claim language, that the claims focus on an abstract idea, and not on any improvement to technology and/or a technical field. The Specification is entitled “SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR AUTOMATIC ALLOCATION OF MOBILE RESOURCES TO TASKS,” and states that the disclosure relates to “a system and a method for automatic allocation of mobile resources to tasks which are to be performed at at least one location distant from the mobile resources” (Spec. ¶ 2). The Specification describes, in the Background section, that various systems are available for automatically allocating resources, e.g., field technicians, to tasks, e.g. maintenance, service, or repair work (id. ¶¶ 3–5). In these known systems, a computing device performs the allocation after being triggered, e.g., periodically by a clock or aperiodically by a user or system input requesting reallocation or rescheduling (id. ¶ 6), and outputs a schedule specifying which mobile resource shall perform which tasks in which sequence at what specified times during a day, taking into account the travel time between the geographical locations (id. ¶ 7). The Specification describes that a long-term schedule, e.g., covering the next working day or next working week, is typically generated first for each field operation; this schedule is then adapted to account for changes in influencing factors, e.g., sick leave of a technician, thereby generating a corresponding short-term Appeal 2018-002489 Application 14/136,454 9 schedule (id. ¶ 8). In known systems, these short-term schedules are not the result of a fully automated reallocation but instead reflect manual adjustments to the long-term schedules; “[a]ccordingly, short-term schedules are usually not optimal” (id.). The claimed invention is ostensibly intended to provide an improved system and method for automatically allocating mobile resources to tasks so that “the practicability and reliability of the generated schedules are increased in order to be able to react more precisely to real-time events” (id. ¶ 18). The Specification, thus, discloses that an exemplary method includes a first data processing device allocating mobile resources to tasks to thereby generate an individual schedule (including a street-by-street route to the allocated tasks) for at least one of the mobile resources; and a second data processing device continuously preprocessing dynamic data (having a potential impact on performance of the tasks) to determine which of the street-level data, mobile resources, and tasks are affected by the dynamic data, and amend the affected data accordingly (id. ¶ 14). Consistent with this disclosure, claim 14 recites a method for automatically allocating mobile resources to tasks comprising: (1) storing data defining the tasks, the mobile resources, and corresponding skill and equipment for each mobile resource, street-level data defining roads between a current location of the mobile resources and the location of the tasks, and dynamic data, including weather-related data, which have a potential impact on performance of the tasks, i.e., executing storing data defining the tasks as well as the mobile resources in at least one database; [and] executing storing in the at least one database: Appeal 2018-002489 Application 14/136,454 10 at least one corresponding skill and equipment for each mobile resource; street-level data defining roads between a current location of the mobile resources and the at least one distant location of the tasks; and dynamic data which have a potential impact on the performing of the tasks, the dynamic data including weather related data (steps (a) and (d)); (2) in response to a trigger event, allocating the mobile resources to the tasks to generate an individual schedule for at least one of the mobile resources, including a street-by-street route to the allocated tasks; and transmitting the individual schedule to a mobile communication device assigned to the mobile resource, i.e., waiting for a trigger event by a first data processing device; after having been notified of the trigger event, in the first data processing device, accessing the at least one database, executing allocating the mobile resources to the tasks to generate an individual schedule for at least one of the mobile resources, and transmitting each of the individual schedules to a mobile data communication device respectively assigned to the at least one of the mobile resources; executing accessing, in the first data processing device, the at least one database via a standardized data interface which is standardized by introducing a fixed set of input data in a predefined format, wherein the fixed set of input data consists of the data defining the tasks, the street-level data and the at least one corresponding skill and equipment of each mobile resource; executing collecting, in the first data processing device, the fixed set of input data from the at least one database; [and] executing the allocation of the mobile resources in the first data processing device, by allocating the skills to the tasks and to the equipment, and by generating for the at least one of the mobile resources as part of each individual schedule a street-by- street route along the roads to the allocated tasks Appeal 2018-002489 Application 14/136,454 11 (steps (b), (c), and (e)–(g)); (3) continuously preprocessing the dynamic data to determine which of the street-level data, mobile resources, and tasks are affected by the dynamic data; and amending the street-level data, mobile resources, and tasks, which are affected, i.e., keeping, in a second data processing device distinct from the first data processing device, the fixed set of input data up-to- date by continuously executing a pre-processing of the dynamic data to convert the dynamic data from multiple formats to the fixed set of input data in the predefined format by determining which of the street-level data, the mobile resources and the tasks are affected by the dynamic data and to what extent, by amending affected data including the street-level data, the mobile resources and the tasks which are determined to be affected by the dynamic data, and by storing the amended affected data in the at least one database in the predefined format to be used by the first data processing device, wherein the second data processing unit is configured to execute an adjustment of a priority ranking of at least one of the equipment and skills, based on the dynamic data including the weather related data (step (h)); and (4) reallocating the mobile resources using the amended affected data, i.e., “executing, in the first data processing device, a re- allocation of the mobile resources using the stored amended affected data so that the priority ranking is reflected in the individual schedule” (step (i)). These limitations, when given their broadest reasonable interpretation, recite allocating mobile resources, e.g., engineers or field technicians, to particular tasks; continually monitoring for changed conditions that impact the performance of the tasks; and adjusting the allocation to reflect the changed conditions, i.e., managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people, which is a method of organizing human activity and, therefore, an abstract idea. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Appeal 2018-002489 Application 14/136,454 12 It is noteworthy that the allocation of the mobile resources to tasks is implemented in claim 14 as a set of data gathering and manipulation steps, and that claims of similar character have been held to involve abstract ideas. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (identifying the abstract idea of collecting, displaying, and manipulating data); Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (characterizing collecting information, analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, and presenting the results of collecting and analyzing information, without more, as matters within the realm of abstract ideas); see also SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“As many cases make clear, even if a process of collecting and analyzing information is ‘limited to particular content’ or a particular ‘source,’ that limitation does not make the collection and analysis other than abstract.” (quoting Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1353, 1355 (citing cases)). Having concluded that claim 14 recites a judicial exception, i.e., an abstract idea (Step 2A, Prong 1), we next consider whether the claim recites additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (Step 2A, Prong 2). The only additional elements recited in claim 14, beyond the abstract idea, are the claimed “first data processing device”; “database”; and “second data processing device” — all of which are disclosed in the Specification at a high degree of generality, i.e., as generic computer components. For example, the Specification discloses that “the first and second data processing units can be implemented by a computing device such as computer having at least one processor,” e.g., a general-purpose computer Appeal 2018-002489 Application 14/136,454 13 (Spec. ¶ 24). The database also is generally described as “any information collecting device, which is file-based and memory resident with the capacity to store the needed information and to provide it to other devices” (id. ¶ 44). We find no indication in the Specification, nor does Appellant direct us to any indication, that the operations recited in claim 14 invoke any assertedly inventive programming, require any specialized computer hardware or other inventive computer components, i.e., a particular machine, or that the claimed invention is implemented using other than generic computer components to perform generic computer functions. See DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[A]fter Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible.”). We also find no indication in the Specification that the claimed invention effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing. Nor do we find anything of record, short of attorney argument, that attributes an improvement in computer technology and/or functionality to the claimed invention or that otherwise indicates that the claimed invention integrates the abstract idea into a “practical application,” as that phrase is used in the 2019 Revised Guidance.3 3 The 2019 Revised Guidance references the MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)–(c) and (e) in describing the considerations that are indicative that an additional element or combination of elements integrates the judicial exception, e.g., the abstract idea, into a practical application. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. If the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application, as determined under one or more of these MPEP sections, the claim is not “directed to” the judicial exception. Appeal 2018-002489 Application 14/136,454 14 Appellant argues that the present claims represent an improvement to the “technological field of automated allocation of mobile resources (e.g., technicians) to the locations of tasks (e.g., maintenance tasks) based on changing, dynamic data from various sources” and that the claims, in particular, are directed to “improving the technological process by enabling a first data processing unit that is configured to efficiently generate schedules (e.g., allocations of the mobile resources to tasks) . . . to adapt the generation of the schedules based on dynamic data [sic] real-time data” (Appeal Br. 6–7; see also Reply Br. 2–3). But, we are not persuaded that adapting the generation of schedules based on real-time information is a technological improvement as opposed to an improvement in a business practice, i.e., assigning work crews to particular tasks. We conclude, for the reasons outlined above, that claim 14 recites a method of organizing human activity, i.e., an abstract idea, and that the additional elements recited in the claim are no more than generic components used as tools to perform the recited abstract idea. As such, they do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. See Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223–24 (“[W]holly generic computer implementation is not generally the sort of ‘additional featur[e]’ that provides any ‘practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea] itself.’” (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77)). Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that claim 14 is directed to an abstract idea. Step Two of the Mayo/Alice Framework (2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2B) Having determined under step one of the Mayo/Alice framework that claim 14 is directed to an abstract idea, we next consider under Step 2B of Appeal 2018-002489 Application 14/136,454 15 the 2019 Revised Guidance, the second step of the Mayo/Alice framework, whether claim 14 includes additional elements or a combination of elements that provides an “inventive concept,” i.e., whether the additional elements amount to “significantly more” than the judicial exception itself. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Appellant points to the Federal Circuit’s holding, in BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016), that an inventive concept can be found in the non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known conventional pieces (Appeal Br. 7). But, Appellant does not adequately explain in what way BASCOM impacts the patent eligibility of the pending claims. Appellant also misapprehends the controlling precedent to the extent Appellant maintains the claims are patent eligible because the claims are allegedly novel and non-obvious in view of the prior art (id.). Neither a finding of novelty nor a non-obviousness determination automatically leads to the conclusion that the claimed subject matter is patent eligible. Although the second step in the Mayo/Alice framework is termed a search for an “inventive concept,” the analysis is not an evaluation of novelty or non- obviousness, but rather, a search for “an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citation omitted). “Groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry.” Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013). A novel and non-obvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent ineligible. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90; see Appeal 2018-002489 Application 14/136,454 16 also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188–89 (1981) (“The ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.”). We are not persuaded, on the present record, that the Examiner erred in rejecting independent claim 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 14, and claims 1–13 and 15–17, which fall with claim 14. Obviousness Independent Claims 1 and 14 and Dependent Claims 2–4, 7, 9, 10, 12, and 13 Appellant argues that the Examiner erred in rejecting independent claims 1 and 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because none of the cited references, individually or in combination, discloses or suggests a second data processing unit implemented in one of the computing device and a further computing device, the second data processing unit being distinct from the first data processing unit, and the second data processing unit being configured for keeping the fixed set of input data up-to-date by executing a continuous pre-processing of the dynamic data to convert the dynamic data from multiple formats to the fixed set of input data in the predefined format by determining which of the street-level data, the mobile resources and the tasks are affected by the dynamic data and to what extent, by amending affected data including the street-level data, the mobile resources and the tasks which are determined to be affected by the dynamic data, and by storing the amended affected data in the at least one database in the predefined format to be used by the first data processing unit[,] as recited in claim 1 (Appeal Br. 8–10), and similarly recited in claim 14 (id. at 11–12). In this regard, Appellant maintains that the Examiner has Appeal 2018-002489 Application 14/136,454 17 misinterpreted the argued limitation as “merely meaning ‘converting dynamic data to the fixed format of geographical data to determined affected segments of roadway,’” and has ignored that the recitation also includes amending affected data pertaining to mobile resources and tasks (id. at 9; see also id. at 5). In rejecting claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), the Examiner acknowledged that the combination of Schneur, Mitchell, and Nielsen does not disclose or suggest the argued limitation (Final Act. 22), and the Examiner cited Joe to cure this deficiency (id. at 22–23).4 However, we agree with Appellant that the cited portions of Joe, at best, disclose using real-time or near-real-time data to optimally compute traffic routes (Appeal Br. 9–10), i.e., amending affected street-level data. We find nothing in the cited portions of Joe that discloses or suggests amending affected data pertaining to mobile resources and tasks and storing the affected data in the predefined format, as called for in the independent claims. Responding to Appellant’s argument, the Examiner, in the Answer, cites paragraphs 42 and 49 of Mitchell as disclosing the amendment of affected data pertaining to mobile resources and tasks (Final Act. 9–10). Yet, as Appellant observes, those portions of Mitchell “merely teach[ ] that a human dispatcher may view work orders occurring during the day and manage alerts and reminders related to the work orders” and the cited portions of Joe “merely teach[ ] that information from multiple sources, such as taxicabs and trucking fleets can be used by a dynamic routing tool to compute traffic routes” (Reply Br. 4). 4 The Examiner applied this same rationale with respect to claim 14 (Final Act. 38–39). Appeal 2018-002489 Application 14/136,454 18 We are persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting independent claims 1 and 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Therefore, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1 and 14. For the same reasons, we also do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claims 2–4, 7, 9, 10, 12, and 13. Cf. In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“dependent claims are nonobvious if the independent claims from which they depend are nonobvious”). Dependent Claims 5, 6, and 15–17 The rejections of claims 5, 6, and 15–17 do not cure the deficiency in the Examiner’s rejection of independent claims 1 and 14. Therefore, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) of claims 5, 6, and 15–17 for the same reasons set forth above with respect to the independent claims. CONCLUSION In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–17 101 Eligibility 1–17 1–4, 7, 9, 10, 12–14 103(a) Schneur, Mitchell, Nielsen, Joe 1–4, 7, 9, 10, 12–14 5, 6 103(a) Schneur, Mitchell, Nielsen, Joe, Horvitz 5, 6 15 103(a) Schneur, Mitchell, Nielsen, Joe, Pandya 15 Appeal 2018-002489 Application 14/136,454 19 Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed 16 103(a) Schneur, Mitchell, Nielsen, Joe, Wills 16 17 103(a) Schneur, Mitchell, Nielsen, Joe, Mashinsky 17 Overall Outcome 1–17 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation